Three Scottish critics, an essay in the history of ideas. by Carpenter, Richard C
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1951
Three Scottish critics, an essay in
the history of ideas.
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/10391
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
GRADUATE SCHOOL 
Dissertation 
THREE SCOTTISH CRITICS 
.AN ESSAY IN THE HISTORY OF IDEA.S 
by 
Richard C. Carpenter 
(A. B., Tufts College, 1938; A. l•! . Boston University, 1939) 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
1951 
7 h"TI 
l 0 51 
c. 
Cff(~\ 
APPROVED :BY 
~ /r-· / NY (/~ 
First Reader. ~ ••• ---.~ •••••••••••• 
Professor of English 
Second Reader •••• c!!~ ~'. .. W.~ ..... . 
Associate Prof~~r of English 
TO 
Ethel and Peter 
PREFACE 
This essay is the result of both necessity and long-standing 
interest. When I was searching for a topic for a dissertation, the 
first false steps that we all take were in the direction of the Gothic 
Novel. In the course of reading about this genre I was led to the 
criticism of the late eighteenth century, and thence to the Scots who 
form the subject of this essay. At first I thought, \oJi thout realizing 
the molding influence of established habits of thinking, that they 
\'rould be interesting to investigate simply for themselves--a sort of 
criticism of criticism. But as time drew on and I found that much 
work had already been done in that direction, I was slowly prodded 
into studying the ways in which they thought. In my study of lit-
erature this is the way it always turns out: whatever the initial 
intent, the outcome is a quasi-philosophical investigation. Such efforts 
are not easy, and many times I have felt that this work would lie in 
the uncompleted bourne from which so many doctoral dissertatioiEnever 
return. Yet it is done at last, thanks to my friends and particularly 
to the encouragement of my \'rife. I have found many people helpful: 
in the Boston University Chenery Library, at the Widener Library at 
HarVard, and the Boston Public Library. I am especially indebted to 
Professors i'linslow H. Loveland and Donald J. ''linslo\·T, the readers of 
this dissertation, for their unfailing kindness and stimulating advice. 
To Elmer W. Salenius and Howard K. Moore, who have shared this experience 
with me, I O\'re the debts of comradeship. To Miss Christine Roche, who 
typed the manusaipt, I am grateful for unfailing effort. And above all 
I O\'le more than can be expressed to Ethel, without whom this would never 
have been written. 
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Cm..Pl'ER I 
i. The Problem 
In the latter half of the eighteenth century the Enli ghtenm.ent be-
latedly made its way into a land long trammeled by bigotry~ political 
upheaval~ superstition and provincia]ism. But despite her late start~ 
Scotland learned the lessons of reason and order to rapidly that she be-· 
came the peer of any country in Europe in intellectual accomplishment .. 
In fact~ she shone most brightly at the very time when other nations 
were losing some of the lustre of their Augustan age. Edinburgh~ the 
Athens of the North~ with her population of only soma 79900 could boast 
as many distinguished leaders of thought as could London vdth her 700 1 000. 
Such men asAdam Smith~ David Hume, Thomas Reid, James Macpherson~ James 
Beattie~ and William Robertson, not to mention the eccentric scion of the 
laird of Auohinleck, gave Scotland a renown which it had never had before 
and which it probably has not equaled since. The universities threw off 
the wrappings of a medieval curriculum and method to become true centers 
of learning~ far outstripping Oxford and Cambridge, then in some of their 
. 
worst doldrums.l Literary and scientific societies provided forums where-
in men could engage in mutual stimulation as well as adm~ration. Beyond 
such formal organizations there was much in the social life of sitting-
room and tavern to help sharpen further already keen 1rvi ts. "The century 
became the record of the most profound thinking, an.d the most comprehen-
sive speculation~ both in literature and in science, and it may be said 
1. The Cambridge Histor_y gf_ Eng;lish Literature,IX, 457 ff. 
2. 
with reason, that judged by the standards of its writers the Soots intellect 
:aever stood higher."l 
Amo ,E.g these brighter names we have listed above there are some of less 
prominence, but which were much respected in their awn day, and which may ~ 
thought even more typical of the age in which they lived. It is our purpose 
in the following pages to pr esent the ideas of three of these men,, who are 
known principally for their work as literary critics and as ,;rhetoricians: 
Hugh Blair, George Campbell , and Lord Kames. It is hoped that this essay., 
by studying closely these three typical thinkers and writers, may serve to 
illuminate some of the characteristic thought-patterns of the Scottish En-
lightemnent, and perhaps of the later ei*hteenth century in general. For., 
while Blair, Campbell, and ~ames hold a fairly i mportant place in the his-
tory of criticism, they are of more interest to the follavdng inquiry because 
(as I shall try to indicate ) they are representative. 
Because the plan has been primari l y to study works rather than men,_. 
and typicalL ideas rather than literary values, this has been subtitled, "An 
Essay in the History of Ideas." But I would like to say at the outset~ that 
although much of the information in the following pages leans toward socio-
logy and philosophy, the ultimate object is to exandne the ways in which ~ 
critical theory has been developed in a particular time and place. For 
that reason, it is my belief that this essay should contribute some smal~ 
bit of knowledge to the study of literature. This contribution ·is not so 
much in the way of unearthing new evidence, or reassessing old, but rather 
_ < 1. John Watson, ~Scot of ~Eighteenth Century, New York: . · 
~trong, n.d., p.l. It i s indeed a matter for comment that this per1od 
is so little known among many students of English titerature. 
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in systemi.tizing and ana lyzing genera lly accepted ideas, seeing how our 
concepts of the nature of eighteenth century thought can be defined and 
clarified by focussing on a s pecific subject and using a particular 
method of analysis. In addition, this study may serve to reemphasize 
some considerati ons about the thought of the eighteenth century and to 
mininuze others. However, here at the beginning, because the subject is 
limited in certain ways and because a somewhat unusual method f or inves-
ti gations of this sort i s followed, it is necess e.ry to make a few ex-
planations: 
First, the three vrriters whom I have chos en t o study have been se::J. ec -
ted with various considerations in mind. Paradox:i:a.lly enough their se-
condary rank as thinkers and writers is among the most important. Despite 
their res pectable place in the history of criticism, it would be hard to 
maintain that they reared towering structures of the intellect singularly 
neglected by thinkers of later a ges. But, although the point mi ght 
be argued, there is good rea1;on to believe that the men who can tell 
us the most about an era and its ideas are its representative rather than 
its seminal minds . The criticism of Bl air, Kame s , and Campbell is cut from 
much the same cloth a s t hat of a dozen other writers of their time. Like 
Pope, in this way at any rate , they are of that "plastic material which has 
taken the i mpress of the main peculiarities of their time v.'i th singular 
sharpnes s and fidelity . 11 1 They illustrate the same preconceptions, they 
use the same technical vocabulary, they show the same reliance on me·l:;hod , 
t hey come to much the same conclusions as do innu..merable of their contem-
poraries . Althout:h we vvould hesitate to graph the lines of influence, it 
1. Sir Leslie Stephen, English 'Ehought in the Eighteenth Century, 
2 vols ., New York, 1902, II, 350 • 
is clear that these Scots have ideas simila.r ~ to, sometimes identical 
with~ a score of critics from Addison to LeBossu. Of course, they are 
not mere eclectics, but neither are t hey really original thinkers. Be-
cause of this they are most useful in this type of broad survey of ideas. 
Whi le it is possible to examine the sequential relations of a single idea 
no matter what minds it may have appeared in, it is almost impossible 
to come to any illuwinat ing conclusions about the general t hinking of a 
great mind. Perhaps John Livingston Lowes shows us most clearly in the· 
Road to Xanadu the diffi culties of this procedure. But in1order to get 
a picture of an a ge, minds of the second rank present advantages. Pro-
fessor Palmer has this t o say of the matter: 
The tendencies of an age appear more disti nctly in.' its 
writers of inferior rank than in those of coiD~nding 
genius. These latter tell us of past and futnr.e as well 
as of the a ge in which they live . They are for all time. 
But on the s ensitive responsive souls, of less creative 
power, current ideals record themselves with clearness .1 
A second reas on for selecting these three Scots is to be found in 
the nature of the critical work they did. Each of them produced a work 
which takes the g~neral field of literary criticism as its province, with 
some differences in emphases, of course. The bulk of the critical work 
of the period is less inclusive, usually taking up a topic such as taste. 
the sublime, the pleasures of the imagination~ or wit; but the three prin-
cipal works of Blair, Kames, and Campbell include all these topics and 
many more besides. They thus afford us the ess enc e of the general 
1. George Herbert Palmer, The Bnglish Works of George Herbert, 1905, 
P• xii~ quoted in Arthur o. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 19L12, P• 20. 
critical thought of the period. Further , the very fact that each of .t .hese 
men wrote only one si g,nificant critical work enables us better to concen-
trate our inquiry.l 
Another important consideration is in the fact that these men were 
Scots. In that small country and those cities of few thousanas, men 
knew each other. vfel l ; the~· shared the same backg;round and education; 
they 1vere one and all pi ous; they shared in national pride and prejudices . 
Social historians2 point out frequently the friendliness and familiar inter-
course which characterized Edinburgh (and presumabl y most other cities)of 
that day. Our critics were members of a close-knit society in which ideas 
had free circulation. As a consequence it is at once easier to s ee the 
cow.monali ty of their notions and to distinguish their individual differences 
than it would be vvi th t hree thinkers from widely different social milieus--
a desideratum in keeping the inquiry in hand. 
The fact that these three Scots wrote only one important critical work 
apiece does not mean that they wrote nothing e lse, and the following 
inquiry consequently is limited to a certain extent. Kames wrote on 
jurisprudence, morality and religion, agriculture, education, the art 
of thinking, and history; Blair and Campbell are perhaps more noted as 
preacher and theologian then as critics. While all their work on these 
various subjects may in some places be referred to, it has been thought 
1. The only critical works besides the three principal ones listed 
below are Blair's Critical Dessertation on Ossian and an anonvmous 
.;.__=--- _ __;....:.....,-:---~--- - . . .. -
piece , presumably by Kames, on the same subject. 
2. See for example Henry Gray Graham, The Social Life of Scotland 
in the Eighteenth Century 2 vol., London: :s"la:ck, 1900:-or "JOEii vvatson 
The Scot of the Eighteenth Century. 
unnecessary to examine such works extensively. Though an exhaustive 
study of the thinking of these men would have to delve into everything 
they ever vvrote, or said, the criticism should afford quite sufficient 
material for the 2~pos$here involved, In Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric 
and Belles Lettres, Kames' Elements of Criticism, and Campbell's Philloso-
~ of Rhetoric 1 there can be found most if not all the important as-
suEptions, prejudices, theOries, and methods that guided their work. 
Here at the outset of the inquiry it might be well to comment on the 
period with which we are dealing. The years between 1750 and 1800 mark 
the limits: Kames published his Essays ~the Principles of Morality 
and Natural Religion in 1751 (he had dome work earlier, but only in 
jurisprudence), and in 1801 Blair died, the last u~ the three. We might 
reasonably place the focal point of this study, then, at about 1775, 
and in i'act Campbell brought out The Philosophy -of Rhetoric in 1776. Foi" 
about ten years before and after this date our critics were doing their 
most productive thinking. This is important, for it means that we: 
1. For purposes of convenience I have used t he following editions, 
and the references throughout are to them: Blair: Lectures on Rhetoric 
and Belles Lettres, with a memotr by the author's >tife, to which are 
added., copious questions; and an analysis of each lecture, by Abraham 
Mi lls, Reacher of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, Stereotype University, 
Colle ge and School Edition, Philadelphia, Hayes and Sell, 1858. (This 
is one of the several American textbook editions; its late date bespeaks 
a continued popularity; the first edition was Edinburgh, 1783• Kames: 
Elements of Critic ism, with analyses and trans lations of ancient and . 
foreign illustrations, edited by Abraham Mills, Hew edition, New York:. 
Hunti~gton and Savage, 1842. (First edition, Edinburgh, 1762.) 
Campbell: The Philosophy 2tRhetoric, a new edition, with the author ~ s 
last additions and corrections, New York: Harper and Brothers, n.d • . 
(First edition, 1776, 2 vols.) 
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are dealing with thought-patterns during a vital transition period in the 
history of western thought, most particularly in the thinking that con-
cerned the fine arts.. These were years· when men were moving from one set 
of concepts. which -we usually call 11neo-cl!assical" to another set termed 
"romantic.••· We id:ight reaeonablly expect to find modes: of thought charac• 
ter!i1tio of both views of life coexisting in the same man• and we woulld 
not be disappointed. Ideas which would be considered paradoxical! in 
other times manage to live in reasonably compatible marriage in such an 
age; for example. we ought not to be surprised to see Kames enunciating 
classical doctrines of harmop:y and decorum at the same time he advocate-s 
t hat literature arouse the passions. 
Because of the prevalence of these mixed modes of thought in this 
period., we shall hesitate to categorize our critics as either "·neo-
classical" or "romantic": in their general outlook, and in fact,, it ap-
pears wisest to avoid even the idea that they are "pre-romantic .. 11' 
Whi]e the study of a trans i tion period may be very usefully organized 
around conceptions of its being an approach to something or a retreat 
from something, such a method is not absolutely necessary. It also 
raises some difficulties , for in emphasizing the "approach-idea": it is 
apt to minimize ideas that look to the past in contrast to those which 
are premonitory of the golden future. It is likely t o lead the inves-
tigator into making false emphases and concentrating only on ideas 
which fit into a preconceived pattern. To be sure, Blair wa-t:r one of the 
s·brongest supporters Bf the romantic Ossian,. but to plump on that point 
is to slight the facts that he was also a strong supporter of decorwrr 
and perspicuity, and spent rather more time analyzing style than he did 
a. 
in effusions over Ossian. In order to avoid this tendency to over-
emphasi~e one or another aspect of the thought of these men~ therefore~ 
we shal~ try to get along without neo-classicism and romanticism as 
much as possible., although these ideas are too embracing to repudiate; 
entirely .. 
The subject of this essay,, then, is an inquiry into the ideas o£ 
three Scottish critics who lived in a transition period. as those ideas 
are presented in three sizeable critical works. It might appear that 
such a subject is very limited. and so it would be if ideas existed in 
laboratory isolation.. Unfortunately. however, (or perhaps fortunately) 
they exist in combinations. and they are shaped both by those combinations 
and by no~-rational influences. This brings us to the method by which 
we shall try to deal with them. It would be theoretically most sound to 
take individual ideas,. found in the critical works, and trace them back 
to the more general ideas which shaped them, and then to try to assess 
the probable impact of social and environmental influences on the gen-· 
eral- ideas.. But while this procedure would be more precise and scien• 
tific ... it would be the labor of ages in a broad survey such as this. 
Another possibility would be to ignore the puzzling matter of the social 
influence and proceed as if the ideas of our critics were the product 
only of systematic thinking. In view of the type of society in which 
they lived (as will appear later) this hardly would satisfy the require-
ments of the project. As A. o. Lovejoy points out: "• •• two types of 
factors are at work in the history of thought; and it is the business 
of the historian--if he can--to discriminate and correlate them, and 
9· 
perhaps~ in the long run~ to arrive at some rough quantitative estimate 
of the relative part played by each.nl In order t o satisfy these re-
quirements it is feasible to f()llow a deductive method: to establish 
from other sources of knowledge the general social situation~ then the 
philosophical background. After this it would be possible to relate these 
observa~ns to more specific critical ideas and to see hmv those ideas 
are interrelated. 
This is the somewhat unusual method whmch is followed in this essay. 
The first major division is the establishment of the social prewise. After 
sketching briefly the lives of our critics~ we shall garner a nodding ac-
quaintance with some of their contemporaries~ in order to i~dicate the 
tJ~es of men with whom they lived and worked. Following this~ we shall 
look more closely at thffi critics' friendships, and then sketch in the club 
life which played such a prominent part in the inteilectual life of the 
time. Next will come a consideration of the universities and the kind of 
influence which they brought to bear. A fifth section will take up the: 
literary background of the critics as evidenced in the works under discus-
sion~ and will draw some tentative conclusions about their predilections 
and interests. The following section will be on the general social status--
the relative standing of the critics in the class divisions of their ti~ 
The las t section in the chapter vdll hazard some conjectures about the 
national character and the possible bearing which that may have had on 
criticism. This pro~edure should serve to give a broad picture of the 
peculiar social conditions under which the critics lived~ and should 
imply some of the attitudes t o be seen in their work. 
The next chapter vdll first analyze t ite 11blimate of opinion" of 
1. Arthur o. Lovejoy~ "·Reflections on the History of Ideas~ 11 Jomr-· 
~of the History of Ideas, 1940~ I~ 18. 
-
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cri-tics:· their fundamental philosophical assumptions including such be.- -
lief's as that in a harmonious~ law-governed universe;; unif'ormi tarianism;· 
and the wisdom of God in the creation. Then~, to complete the establish-· 
mant of the "~ational premisea there will. be an examination of the psy-
chological beliefs of' the critics and the methodology of their work. 
The fourth chapter takes up the general cri·tical ideas of the 
critics as they can be deduced from the works under discussion. W~ 
shall see what Blair~ Kamas~ and 6ampbell thought about the sublime.., 
beauty, hu:mor ~- imagination,. rhetoric, and taste, for e:x:a.mplia.. We shall 
see. hcw1 our critics conceived of these matters, in what ways they dif--
fered on them, and try to relate them to the general patterns of dideas· .. -
we have encountered previously. A3 well_., we shall puraue briefly some 
of the critics' opinions on various genres and individual works of litera-
ture. The basic purpose in this chapter is illustrative: to show some 
of the typical stands which the Scots take on various subjects. It is 
hoped that the analyses will also indicate that our critics show the 
characteristics of thinkers in an age of transition, the "mixed modes"· 
of thought which occur in such a period. Another purpose of the chapter-
will. be to relate the critical ideas ~ld by the Scots to the background_,. 
both social and "rational."· We shall try to estimate the degree to which 
eao}1. t;!,~[pe pf bacR:gr9imd. cptrbritbuted to cr:Lt:DcilslJl~ 
A concluding chapter will summarize the results of' the investiga-
tion.. In the Appendix willJ be found analyses of the three principa]. 
critical. works with which we are concerned~ these analyses serving both 
for reference and to outline the frequently difficult and amorphous · · · · ·· -
11. 
structure of the books. 
ii. Prior Studies 
Before proce:eding with the body of this essay6, however 6 it is neoes-· 
sary that we survey quickly the work which has been done in this field. 
or which, while belonging primarily to another field of inquiry6 impinges 
on this one. While not especially extensive 6 the work is sufficient to I 
divide conveniently into four categories: general literary and socia1 
histories, studies of literary thought of the period,. and "'related works,. 11 
The works of the first category,, in giving consideration to the history 
of Scottish letters and society in the eig~teenth century,. naturally 
touch on all three men of the group we are studying, sometimes briefly. 
occasionally at length. They are most useful to this study in placing 
Blair6, Kam.es 6 and Campbe,l l . among their contemporaries and in their socia~ 
milieu. I have found the works of Grahaln» Mi.llla.r, Watson, and Mathiesonl 
valuable in this way,. as adjuncts to primary sources and compendia of in-
formation which I have used in the second chapter. Harold Thompson's work 
on Henry MacKenzie is another interesting work which has been helpful in 
this way. 
More detailed and specifically literary are two studies in the se-
cond category,. Bosker 1 s L.iterary Criticism in ihe !Jr2_ ~ Johnson and 
Williams' treatment of the rhetorical portion of the Scots' work. Boslter 
gives a fairly extensive consideration to the ideas of our critics in· 
1. To avoid multiplyin~ footnotes unnecessarily in this section, I 
refer the reader to the bibliography for the works mentioned throughout. 
his survey of the body of late eighteenth century criticism. Although 
he tries to avoid strait-jacketing them--his principal purpose being 
somewhat similar to ours, to . show the "vacillation and compromise"' be-
tween neo-classicism and r omanticism in this age and the ways in which 
these two prevalent themes 11'often overla .p and interpenetrate each 
other"1--his treatment is naturally much less detailed, in some ways even 
superficial. In particul ar, classifying Blair a member of the Schoo] of 
Taste and Kames as a member of Reason is typical of the hapi t of miillmi-
zing important factors in the thinking of this period in order to metho-
dize the subject. Also t he establishment of a battle between neo-classi-· 
cism and romanticism distorts the problem; Bosker is continually search-
ing for evidences of thes e qualities so that he can classify different. 
groups of critics. Doubtless this was necessary in a broad survey such 
as his,, Q_~~: here we are more concerned with "'overlapping and interpene-
tration11 than with classifying. 
Williams concentrates , as do we, on Blair, Kames,. and Campbell. 
H e considers in detail their theories about langua ge in or-der to point 
out the contributions they made to the study of rhetoric. If this es-
say were not designed to s t udy ideas and criticism in general rather 
than rhetoric~ there would be little point in duplicating Williams' 
task. But while it is true that each of the critics spends a good dea~ 
of attention on rhetoric (as the means of effective communication, 
not merely~~liega.nt language 11 by rules) they do so as part of a coherent 
plan, not as an end in its elf. This may be seen in Campbell.'s 
statement as to his basi.c purpose., a statement that can be duplicated 
in the other critics: 
••• this study, properly conducted., leads directly to 
an acquaintance with ourselves; it not only traces the 
bperations of the intellect and imagination~ but dis-
closes the lurking springs of action in the heart. In 
this view, it is perhaps the surest and the shortest., 
as well as the pleasantest way of arriving at the 
science: of the human mind. It is aw an humble. attempt. 
to liead the mind of the studious inquirer into this 
track that the following sheeti are now submitted to 
the examination of the public. 
In. studying the patterns of the critics 1 thought, then,. a treatment of the 
rhetoric too narrowly confines them. Nevertheless~ Williams 1 work has its: 
place in the history of rhetoric. and has proved helpful in the portions 
of this essay that deal :with. that subject. 
Turning from these two studies to the third category--monographs on 
the thought of the century--we encounter a considerable body of material. 
Although scholars have mined this soil somewhat less avidly than they 
have the equivalent English period. they have not been unwilling to stake 
out clai~. One such is the comprehensive survey of rhetorical theory 
in the later eighteenth century by Harold Harding.. While: similar to 
Williams' study, Harding's dissertation is built on the development of 
theory rather than on any group, so that I consider it a monograph. al-
though I would not wish to press the point. In the· course of his work., 
Mr-• . ffiarding naturally summarizes the ideas of our critics on rhetoric • 
but the same qualification I have made; for Williams applies to Harding:. 
he is interested in only one .side of the Scots' thought. 
1. S.ee; Bllair.., Lectures, P• 13;: Kames,. Ellements,. PP• 14-1;5. 
14· 
otheT monographs are even more conf'ililed, treating either some aspeo't; 
of the individual critics in the fashion of Bryan on Campbell!,. MacKenzie 
and Randall on Kames,l or Mays on Blair; or some concept such as taste,, 
the sublime,, or imagination as do Monk., Bond., Ahlle9-, and Babcock. In the 
first group, Mackenzie and Randall have some interesting things to say. 
MaKenzie show& with some. cogency that iamas. was a mechanist (or associa-
tionist) philosopher;: but I feel~ as I have tried to show in Chapter III. 
that this is too bald a view and does not take into account the place of 
ninternal senses 11 and •ori ginal propensities .'1! Be that as it may, :McKenzie's 
work has proved stimulating~ and I am indebted to it as a corroboration 
of my own opinions. Miss Randall has also been able to add something to 
my research by her analysis of the Newtonian elements in Kames' methou., 
and through her excellent biography at the beginning of her study. Of 
course •. her purpose is much more limited than that of this essay., so that 
there are points of contact rather than duplications of her work in most 
of. our observations on Kames. 
The other class of monographs also has points at which it impinges 
on this investigation;; for treatments of the sublime, taste,, imagination. 
etc. naturally include our critics'' views on these matters. The difference 
is that each of these studies only touches one portion of our critics• 
thought without integrating that portion particularly with the rest of 
o£ their thought. As a consequence,. even such a def'initd.ve treatment 
as Monk's does not reach quite the same conclusions as tb the place of the 
- .... 
s ublime in the critics' systems as the ones we reach here. We shall have 
occasi on naturally to refe r to these studies in the following pages; but 
I vnsh to point out that we do not intend simply to incorporate their 
findings, except where they accord with our own, into tthe fabric of our 
investigations. 
In the ·category which I have somewhat lamely denominated "related 
works 11 there are two books on whltbh I wish to connnent here: Robert Schmitz's 
biography of Blair and Gladys Bryson's Man and Society, the Scottish 
Inquiry of ~Eighteenth Century. The biography is the only recent one 
on any of the group, and a perusal of it together with ~~ss Bryson's work 
would certainly he~p anyone to assess more understandingly the importance 
of the Scottish Enlightenment. Both books are soundly documented, interest-· 
ing, and well or~nized. The biography has helped to clarify some matters 
about Blair's place in the literary society of his day and has been help~ 
ful in giving background of assistance in assessing Blair's thought. AL-
though it might be accused of too much partiality, it is far from a pane-
gyTic on the one hand, and help~ on the other to restore the balance in 
judging the Scots which has been badly tipped by literary historians.l 
Miss Bryson's book adds a chapter to the nhistory of efforts to for-
mula.te the problems and methods of social science11 and 11is concerned 
••• with the efforts of the ei ghteenth century to establish and empirica~ 
basis for the study of man and society~2 In a way she is handling the 
1. See Schmitz, ~Blair, P• v. Note the conunent that: 11 ... he is 
latterly appearing again ••• in scores of articles and books attempting in 
one way or another to reconstruct the moral, intellectual, or aesthetic 
temper of Blairs day, which is how recognized as a highly important era 
in the history of British thinking. 11 
2. N.a.n and Society, Princeton, 1945, p.l. 
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same. sort of materials we are using here, but there are at least three 
impor~ant differences. The primary subject in her book is not literary 
criticism, but moral philosophy; the men with whom she deals are such 
philosophers as Adam Ferguson~ Francis Hutcheson~ and David Hums, although 
Blair and Kames are mentioned;: the practical outcome of the philosophy 
is studied in the opinions which were held about marriage and political 
economy rather than taste and the sublime • . The fundamental objective is 
the same however: Man~ Societ;y: and the study in these pages both seek 
to add some knowledge to what we have about the thought of the eighteenth 
century .. 
These~ then are the principal works which have been ~Titten to date 
in this field of inquiry. MUch more work is being done, and there is a 
place for still more. At present none of it tries to cover the 11ame 
ground which is projected for surveying here, so that I believe that with-
in liroi ts we are engaged in contributing to the area of knowledge in an 
active and worthwhile intellectual area .. 
CHAPrER II 
'lUle S:Oc.ia li. Premise 
i. Brief Lives 
The first in reputation of our little group of philosopher-critics is 
also the oldest. Henry Home was born in 1696 at the small family estate 
of Kames in Berwickshire . His family was good, t hough not distinguished 
for wealth of social posi tion--on his mother's side there was the rather 
quest ionable distinction of a Jacobitism which influenced Henry in his 
young manhood. 1 His earl y education was in the hands of a tutor (whom he. 
disliked); and "someti me between 1712 and 1717 Henry Home became official-
l y attached to the chru&bers of John Dickson, Wr i ter to the Si gnet in Edin-
burgh,'t. to become trained, according to the custom of those days, in the; 
law.2 He also busily engaged himself with the study of Latin, Greek, and. 
Mathematics, an indication of his lifelong interest in most things in-
tellectual,_ particularly the classics.3 Characteristically, not all of 
his time was spent with the tomes of law or of letter's; throughout his 
long life he was noted for his enifoyment of conviality,_, and his student 
days may have been prolonged by his socia l life in Edinburgh,_ where ac-
cordi ng to Boswell a countess observed that .Henry and his fr i ends served 
very good wine.4 Despite a certain degree of riotousness in his conduct-
1. John Ramsay of Of Ochertyre,. Scotland and Scotsmen iE, the Eighteenth 
Century, 2 vols.,_ ed. Al exander ~llardyce. Edinburgh and London, 1888, I, 19L• 
2 .• Alexander Tytler,, Lord Woodhouslee. :Memoirs of the Life and Writings 
of the Honorable Henry Home of Kames, 2. vols.,. 2d Ed., Edinburgh, 1814, I, 10 • 
- 3• Ramsay of Ochertyre, 2£• cit., I, 180. 
Lf, .. ~~sweil Papers,. XV, 301, quoted in Helen w. Randall,: "The Critical 
Theory of Lord Kames," Smith College Studies in Mod11rn Langua ges, XXII., 
1940-hl :p9. Throughout this biographical sketch I have followed Miss· 
Randai14s biography of Kames in tlie first part of her study,. as being more· 
orderly than the standard biography by Tytler whi ch is more an account of 
Kames 1 times e.nd works than of his life,. and more compl ete than the 
"Materials" which Boswell. prepared in anticipati on of writing the life:. of 
his good friend. These "'Materials" are to be f ound in Vol. I PP• 65 ff. 
of The ~ivate ~apers of James Boswell from Ma l ahide vast l~, ed. Geoffrey 
Sc"'Cre'e and :tr;A. :!'ottle-;-18 vola.,. wt. Ve-rmm: New YUrk ---
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however,. Home :-managed to pass the examinations :flor advocate in 172.3 and 
was from then until his elevation to the bench a practicing attorney. 
His rise to proll'ti.nence i n his profession was somewhat slow,. due perhaps 
partly to those social habits which he curtailed a bit after the comple-
tion of his studies. but which he certainly did not eli~~nate from his 
scheme of things. Probably competition with other keen lawyers, young 
and old. was an even heavier drag on his progress, for the law in 
eighteenth century Scotland brought with it the highest rewards and 
called to the ~bitions of clever men. During these early years of lack 
of preferment, however. he began the work which added steadily to his re-
putation with the bar--the collection of selected (what he called 11re-
ma.rkable11) decisions of t he court. This practice he kept up for nearly 
all. the rest of his life, and a most valuable undertaking it was because 
in those days little or nothing had been done in the necessary work of 
collecting and organizing cases to establish precedents in the law. 
But while Home was always primarily a lawyerk his typically vora-
cious interests led hi>m into many other activities, most of which he 
pursued through the course of his long life, periodically gathering new 
ones, but never entirely surrendering any he had once had. We shall 
have occasion later to comment on his membership in the Rankenian Club 
and the Select Society. his contacts with the illustrious men of his time, 
and his publications. For now, we shall only mention some of the high-
lights of his busy life. In 1751 he published anonymously his first work 
not concerned with jurisprudence--the Essays ~the Principles of Moralit;r_ 
and Natural Religion, a work which occasioned more controversy than any 
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of his other publications. In one portion of it Home argued for neces-
sity and a delusive feel i ng of freedom of the will--a position which a-
roused the ire of the clergy and which he thought it wise to retract~ 
though under considerable pressure, in the second edition. Miss Randal] 
explains that" ••• the whole episode was only a tempest in a teapot, but 
throughout he showed the characteristics of tenacity and a ~ighting 
spirit with which he is credited in w.any contemporary accounts."l 
In the meantime Home had married well both as far as social posi-
tion and personal happiness were concerned, was raising a family, be-
coming a more and more prominent advocate, and had inherited the fami-
ly estate at Kames where he began to give rein to his interests in im-
proving the land--a sort of eighteenth century Louis Bromfield. In 
1752~ he was appointed to the bench as a Lord of Session, taking the 
title of Kames by which he was henceforth to be known. For the next 
few years he appears to have occupied himself quite seriously with the 
duties of his position, although not so assiduously as to neglect his 
intellectual pursuits or to prevent his becoming a fast friend of Ben-
jamin Franklints. Kames and the distinguished johannes factotum of 
the Enlightenment in America were quite evidently kindred spirits; we 
shall have occasion further to remark on this, but at present we may 
note one result of their contact, and of similar ways of thinking in 
Kames 1 Introduct i on to ~ ~ 2!_ Thinking published im 176ll. This 
little book was primarily intended for the instruction of his children 
and was a manual, in two parts, of maxims and illustrative stories ana 
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tales. It shows Kames' interest in education and and moral instruction--
matters which always concerned him; his own sysi:;ematic thinking and feel -
ing that t hinkinE could be systematically inculnated; and his favorite 
authors~ because many of the maxims are from writers whom he was to quote: 
e:x:bensi vely in the Elements of Critic ism. 
The intellectual similarity of Kames and Franklin formed a firm basis 
for a lasting friendship significant to a complete understanding of both 
men:: "'• •• in Kames Franklin found a self-made man who Il:ike, himself was: 
interested in speculation on moral and theological subjects, in the edu-
cation of youth, in the dissemination of ideas through clubs,. in defying 
the established opinions of the schools and the church."l And it is sig-
nificant that Kames increased the scope and tempt) of these activities 
after becoming friendly with Franklin. 
In 1763 Kames- went to the supreme driminal court of Scotland,. there 
to serve with distinction until the end of his life. I believe it is 
important to realize that ~ with the other critics of the group and with 
the majority of the literary and philosophical gentlemen of his time, 
Kames primarily gave his l ife to an exacting profession, to find in his 
many other activities relaxation and satisfaction without thinking of , 
their effect on his career--gifted amateurs we might call these men,. but 
amate.urs in j;pe original sense: they felt that-• lite without letter• 11 
but death. At any r ate, Kam.1 wa1 tir1t of all a judge~ although it ie 
to be noted that he was a judge who showed many of the ohar aeteristics 
we shall find in his writing: a "penchant for analysia ••• the same desire 
1. Ibid, P• 13. 
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to arrive at caus es rather than merely to order the facts,l a disregard 
for convention, a liveliness of language~ and a disinclination to squan-
der his time or money in impressing other people.2 His other activities 
still increased throughout these tv1enty years. In 1769 he became presi-
dent of the Philosophical Society which he had helped to revive some 
sixteen years before, whi le he also spoke frequently at the Select So-
ciety~ of which more later. He also joined a literary group at Stirling, 
chiefly sponsored by the John R~ay of Ochtertyre whom I have quoted 
above. As well, he was a patron of a musical society, was frequently 
in the role of adviser to young men and women i n and about Edinburgh--
among whom were Blair and }3oswelll.,. was an active correspondent with 
many of the prominent men and women of his day, and became one of Scot-
land's outstanding agriculturists--especially i n the work of reclamation 
which he carried on at his estate. With all this he managed during this 
period to publish three new books on law, later editions of his earlier 
works mentioned above, and four other works in different subjects: 
Elements of Criticism (1762},. Sketches of_the __ History of Man (1774)~ 
The Gentleman Farme; (1776), and Loose Hints ~Education~ E!. ~Cull .. 
~ of the Heart (1781). Not all these works were new; some parts had 
been collected more than thirty years.t: but the energy with which Kames 
carried these inumerable projects to completion plainly shows his charac-
ter. 
Kames ended this remarkably full. career on the twenty-seventh of 
1. Ibid.~ P• 15• 
2. ~ay of Ochtertyre, .££• cit., I, 190-191 •. 
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December in 1782~ only six days after attending the Court of Session for 
the last time. The greater part of his life's work was effectively obli-
terated by the moving finger; only the Elements of Criticism has retgined 
any substantial interest for the student of the latter eighteenth can-
tury who has other than mere antiquarian predilecti ons ... One mystery 
remains:: 
Curiously enough, these facts of Kames's life 
account sufficiently for his every undertaking ex-
cept the Elements of Critic ism. 'When he found 
time for hhe tremendous amount of reading and re-
search revealed in those volumes~ why he became 
interested in literature for its own sake beyond 
the need for culture which he hoped to fill for 
Scotland, haw he managed to transcend the limita-
tions of his education and background to become 
surprisingly catholic and cosmopolitan in his 
tastes~ remain puzzling questions. But it can beJ 
said that in this book, as. in the other affairs 
of his life, he showed unmitigated energy, scho~­
arly habits~, and a tendency to think as he pleased.l 
His young friend and quasi-protege., Hugh Blair, 2 was a person pro-
bably much less intri guing to a dweller in the 1;wentieth century, pos-
Eessing as he did neither the crotchets nor the crustiness of Kames;: yet 
his position in the warn1 esteem of his own age was undoubtedly higher. 
Blessed with a keen but unoriginal intelligence, possessed of a strong 
desire to please everyone combined with enough pomposity to impress the, 
impressionable~ and conti nually striving to give indefati gable attention 
to all the legitimate means for advancement he could hardly fail to win 
1. Randall, ££• cit., P• 22. 
~. Throu~1out this sketch I have found invaluable the recent biography 
of Blair by Robert Schmitz, although various other sources which are. men-
tioned below have sometimes supplmmented his excellent work. 
the place he graced for so many years. For half a century he was an ac-
cepted leader in Edinburgh society. As the good Dr. Elair, purveyor of 
the most elegant and undisturbing sermons, and es the Professor who had 
shown the great worldthat there was nothing lacking in Scots' delicacy 
of taste and sentiment in belles lettres, Elair exerted his benign and 
bland influehce to bring sweetness and light into all the lives he could 
reach. And his reach certainly exceeded his grasp. His '·rorks were most 
widely circulated, the Sermons vying with the Lectures ~Rhetoric to 
regulate the morals and the taste of the century·. The Lectures became 
probably the "best-adopted 11 textbook on rhetoric in the next one-hundred 
years, going through twenty-five Eritish and thirty-five American ed-
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itions in the seventy-five years follo\·Ting its publication. It was trans-
lated in French, Italian~, German, Spanish, and Russian. and was abridged 
in fifty-two editions, some forty-seven of these ·. published in America. 
The Sermons in turn had much the same history-- 11were almost as widely 
circulated as the Rhetoric, and like the lthetoric found a wide foreign 
language public through translations in French, German, Dutch, and Gaelic. ul 
This influence was extended by innumerable 11popularizations 11--extracts 
and digests bearing such delightful titles as The Sentimental Beauties 
and ~4oral Delineations from the '\'tri tings of the celebrated Dr. Elair ••• 
--- --- -
selected with a view to refine the taste, rectify the judgment, and 
------ -- - --
mould the heart to virtue. Familiarl y ealled 11 Blair1 s Beauties II this ,.,ork 
reposed in dignity on many a parlor table in the nineteenth century, long 
1. Schmitz,~· cit., p. 3. 
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after Blair's burr was long silent in the church and the university. 
Such fame as authority in the worlds of tast e and of morals was 
sometimes overshadowed in his own time~ hoVIever~ by the doughtiness with 
which Blair jousted >vith all who misdoubted the authenticity of his beloved 
Ossian. In fact one of Dr. Johnson's more embarrassed moments occurred 
when he . averred to Blair that "many men~ many wonen, and many children"! 
might have written the poems~ not knowing that he wa.s speaking to the man 
who had recently defended their authenticity. Blair was one of the very 
few~ even including good Soots~ who defended Macpherson's spurious pro-
ductions until the last of his life~ fortunate l y never having the chance 
to read the report of the Highland Society which"in 1805 ended all rea-
sonable doubt ~ enrolli~~ Macpherson's name upon the index of the world's 
proven literary forgers."2 Blair's national pride was assisted by his 
tendencies toward primitivism1 3 his interest in the nature of the sublime~4 
and his views toward history5 to convince him that the work was genuine~ 
and more that~ one of the world 1 s great epic poems • To this and one of 
his most celebrated compositions is directed. In A Critical Dissertation 
EE_ ~Poems of Ossian~ ~Son of Fingel (1763) Blair proved to his own 
satisfaction that t his conglomeration ranked with the Illiad and the Aeneid 
in nearly every r!'spect even outstripping tho two classic poems in some 
ways. Mistaken as he was, a f'aot recognized by some clearsighted Scots 
1. See Boswell's Life of Johnson for Year 1763. 
2. Schmitz~ ..2.E.!. cit.~ P. 127. 
3· See Bosker~ ~· cit.~ and especially R~ H. Pearce~ "The Eighteenth 
Century Scottish Primitivists," ELH. XII, 1945~ 203-220. 
4• See Blair~ Ch. III. 
5· See in particular Donald M. Foerester ~ 11 Homer in English Criticism, 
the Historical Approach in the Eighteenth Cen'cury, 11 Yale Studies in English~ 
CV~ New Haven, Ya le University Press, 1947• 
such as David H'ume,.l Blair yet staunchly defended his new-found prodigy 
so that it was not long before his Dissertation "thrown into the midst of 
ofO a seething romanticism"2 made him "an intern.ational figure and the 
treatise a classic document reflecting the struggles between progress and 
primitivism~ between the universal and the individual in literature, be-
tween the ri ghts of reason and imagination~ of the intellect and pas•ions 
to legislate for and to govern creative expression. Blair provided .. 
mu~t.um diverso palato in a time of changing literary appetites.n3 
This kind of writing was probably less pleasant in its effects~ if 
more enjoyable in its composition, than his comfortable and decorous 
sermons or the elegant and perspicuous observations on literature which 
graced his lectures; for it entailed a great deal of controversial bick-
ering painful to a man of moderate temper. Essentially~ Blair was inclined 
to the low: road,. all his life showing a des i re to shine within the pur-
lieus of an innocuous conformity. This does not mean that his was a 
stereotyped character. or that he was completley bound by convention. 
Rather his was a middle flight that carried him above the crowd btft never 
soared into dangerous regions of feeling or of speculation • 
. llis. .l amily background, his schooling, his habits, his progreslJ to-
ward success all show this characteristic--this quality which we might 
oall mediocrity if it were not for the unfavorable connotations of that 
term, which we would probably be better advised to call nmiddJBness", 
1. John Hill. Burton, Life ~Correspondence 5:!. David H1nne, 2 vols., 
Edinburgh,. 1846, I, 480. 
2. Legouis and Cazamian. !.._History 2!._ English Literature, New York., 
1930, P• 944• 
3• Schmitz, ~· .£!1•• P• 51 .• 
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even at the e:x:penee of coining a word. His .~ family coul:d boast of a num-
ber of eminent professors, clergymen, and lawyers, all of whom have been 
quite completely forgotten, with the notable exception of Robert Blair~ 
his cousin of an earlier generation, who possesses a sort of fame for 
his writing of that landmark of ltipre-romantio" melancholy, ~Grave. 
Hugh Blair's great g:randfather mi. ght perhaps be exee.pbed from this genera~ 
consignment to limbo for his place as an eminent dissenter and Covenanter 
during the stormy seventeenth oentury.l But it i~ still true that the, 
Blair family was not oriinary in Scotland, despite the slings and arrows 
of history. 
Hugh was early destined to join this company as a minister of the 
kirk. To this end he went through the regular course of education--the 
High School at Edinburgh, with its heavily classical and rhetorical pattern 
of studies, 2 and than the University which he entered at what appears to 
us to be the precocious age of thirteen,3 though such preoocity W:aa by no 
means so unusual in his day. A.t the University.., recently changed from the 
older system of "regenting"4 to a more normal type of curriculum, Blair 
studied Logic, Greek, and Natural Philosophy to add to the predominantl.y 
Latin background which he already had.. He also came under the influence 
of Professor Stevenson, who helped form the love of letters in many · 
h. D. N. B • 
2. See Chapter II below. 
~ ~· John Hill,~ Account E£. 2 Life~ Writin~ E!_ ~Blair, D. D., 
Phi1adelphia;; J .. Humphrey, 1808, P• ~ 
4• Regenting was the system whereby groups of students were assi~nad 
to a single instructor who carried them through the entire curriculum) in-
cluding such subjects as Greek, ethics, pneumatics, logic, mathematics, 
and physics. It was abolished in Edinburgh in 1708, in Glasgow in 1727, 
St. Andrews 1747, Marischal College in Aberdeen 1757 • See Ch-aham, The 
S.ocial Life .£!:.Scotland in ~ Eigb.teenth Century,. pp 187 ft. 
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students, and who quite probably is responsible for initiating that affec~­
tion for literature which became Blair 1 s dominant interest in later years,. 
Due to the desultory program resulting from the changover in methods of 
instruction, Blair did not get around to standing for his M. A. degree 
until 1739--nine years after his entrance on the course. 
In 1741 he was accapted into the ministry and the following year 
received a pastorate at Collessie. After a brief apprenticeship there, 
he, w.aa appointed to the Canangate Church in EdinbWt"gh,, a position which 
he filled competently for the next eleven years, and ~n which his fortunes 
steadily advanced. Toward the end of this time . in 1753, to be exact, he 
showed the first solid result of the literary interests which had begun 
in coll.ege, with an eight-volume edition of The Works of Shakespeare. 
This undistinguished and derivative job of editing was yet competently 
handled and eminently saleable--its primary PurPose, for it had been pro-
jected as a commercial venture by the Soots. publishel'ts in competition with 
London.. What is more important, however,, is that Blair was launched on his 
career as arbi tar of letters·. 
During the rest of his busy life he was to divide his time between 
ministeria·l duties--which largely consisted of preaching, pastoral care 
being in the hands of his assistants and colleagues like Robert Heron 
and William Greenfield--and the demands of his position as one of the 
leading men of letters in Edinburgh society~ In 1754. he was called to 
the pulpit of Lady Yeater's Church~ and four years later to the most en-
viable cure in Edinburgh,. the High Church of St. Giles, whither the very 
cream of the populace repaired on Sunday to hear the comfortable doctrine 
in elegant style for which he was so noted. During these years he had 
contributed to the short-lived Edinburgh Review, a literary venture which 
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died from too much of a. diet of politicsr he had become an active member 
of the Select Society--the group of literati and intelligentsia formed 
in 175ln he had taken part with the defense in the controversy over Kames's 
Es·says ~the . Principles 2!_ Morality ~Natural Religion;; he had be:en ac-
tive in supporting the attempt to revive the drama in the stronghold of 
Presbyterianism-even going so far as to take one of the parts~ that of 
Anna: the Maid, in private amateur performance of John Home's tragedy 
Doug]as • Besidas this was a constant stream of minor activities: connected 
with the busy, con@Bnia1 life of the Athens of the North. 
In 1759 his local activities took on international importance with 
his enthusiastic support of Macpherson :as he became involved in prose-
lytizing for and defending the Fragments. We shall have occasion later 
to comment on Blair's views as expressed in this work~ and to hazard 
some conjectures for the sources of those views. For now~, in this bio-
graphical. sketch,. it will suffice to point out that his part in this 
literary cause celebre increased his reputation many times over~ that it 
occupied his attention off and on for the next twenty years:~, and that it 
is the writing for which he is undeservedly best known. For ex.am.p]e_, 
Webster's Biographical Dictionary says of Blair;. "Scottish Presbyterian 
Clergy711an. Professor of Rhetoric Edinburgh u .. (1762;..83) r defended authen-
ticity of Macpherson's Ossianic poems;; author of Lectures .2E:_ Rhetoric . 
(1783).nl 
This mention of his position as Professor~ h~rever~ brings· us to 
1. P. 156. 
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that portion of his life . From 1759 to 1783 he held this lectureship 
which gave him the opportunity to organize and express his views of letters 
and to influence a number of young men of some importance to the world of 
his time. W11en the Lectures were finally published in 1783, the year 
Blair retired, they were already noted far and wide. In the succeeding 
years, as we have pointed out, they were reprinted many times to become 
most influential as a textbook, During the period of their delivery, 
Blair was naturally occupied vtith many other activities. He was frequent-
ly consulted concerning new publications; he supervised an, anthology of 
The British Poets issued in 1753; he carried on an extensive and notable 
correspondence with Hume, who was in France part of this time; he received 
such distinguished literary visitors to Edinburgh as Dr. Johnson and ~~s . 
Elizabeth Montagu; he published the various editions of his Sermons and in-
creased thereby not only his reputation but his pocketbook, t he Sermons 
being financially a great success . 
These multifarious activities continued for the resto of his days. 
Blair newer lost his hold on the top of his ls.dder J> in his sixty-ninth 
year finding among his friends and proteges the young poet from Ayrshire, 
one Robert Burns, whom Blair quite naturally failed to understand fully, 
but whom he recognized as a genius and advised as an elder friend. 
Strangely enough Burns quite often took this advice quite seriously, whe-
ther through expediencv_, knowing that having the literati of Edinburgh on 
one's side was necessary to success, or because he really respected Blair 's 
j udgment in some matters_, we shall not know·. Perhaps Burn's analysis of 
Blair ' s chars.cter may cast a li ght on this matter as wall as on Blair: 
It is not easy forming an exact jud~ent of any 
one, but in my opinion, Dr. Blair is meriely an aston-
ishing proof of what industry and application can do. 
Natural parts like his are frequently to be met with; 
his vanity is proverbially known among his acquaintances; 
but he is justly at the head of what may be called fine 
writing; and a critic of the first 1 the very first rank 
in Prose; even in Poesy a good Bard of Nature's making 
can only take the pass of him. He has a heart not of 
the finest water 1 but far from being an ordinary one. 
In short~ he is trulyj~worthy and most respectable ohar-
acter.l 
T;hi,.s worthy man labored unabated at his chosen tasks 1 his energy some-
wllat • curtailed in these last years by the importunaoy of physical decline. 
Plagued by the gout, and feeling "prodigiously old, 11 he still managed 
many enterpr .. ses. The supervision of the publicati on of the literary re-
mains of one John Logan, a gentleman of some -repute,, the promotion of the 
publication of Thomas Somerville's History .2£_ ~ !testoration;. and an 
extrensive correspondence with Sir John Sinclair, t ;he eminent agricuJJ-
turist and financier--these were some "btl the things which occupied him 
in his last years. In 1797 at the request of Henr~- Maokensie he wrote: ~ 
lnng and detailed 1etter2 about the Ossian controversy. which vras then 
under the scrutiny of the Highland Society. Still full of projects and 
still leading an active social life» Blair passed away in 1800. While 
not a great man, certainly.., and while ridden with many frailties due to 
his pedestrian ways, he was still a recipient of so much s ::J:;isfaction 
in this life that we might well envy his felicity. 
Among inumerable activit ies in which he engaged was a rather minor 
incident which links him to George Campbell. Despite the fact that the 
D.N.B.terms them nfriends,." and despite their intellectual sympathies.,. 
ll.. 
1896, 
2. 
Chambers-Wallace, The Life and Works 
II, 75, in Schmitz. op. oit.:p.- 121. 
Ibid •. , P• ~21-
of Robert Burns, New York~ 
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this is the only com1ection I have been able to find be~veen these two 
eminent gentlemen. Be· that as it may, there stli.ll was enough of a con-
tact for Blair to act as intermediary between Hume and Campbell, adver-
saries (though good-natured ones) on the subject of miracles.l It is 
perhaps unfortunate that no other good friend in C,mpbell 's time or 
shortly after felt the commemorative urge strongly enough to make this 
intri guing little incident part of a piography as dull as Tytler's life 
of Kames or as slight as Hill's bmography of Blair. At least, if someone 
had done so, we would have some information to help us understand a man 
who emerges from the pages of a textbook on rhetori c as possessed of 
keen intelligence, delight in argument, good sensel, discrimination, and 
even a dour sort of Scotch humor. As it is, we have only the bare bones 
of such accounts as are to be found in Chambers' Biographical Dictionary 
of Eminent Scotsmen, the D.N.B., o~ one of the older editions of the En .. 
cyclopedia Britannica. Perchance some day a scholarly drudge with access 
to materials will assist at limning a portrait of this onetime eminent 
clergyman and man of letters. In the meanwhile we can only recount the 
facts and try to assess their relative importance in the light of other 
information. 
Campbell was born on Christmas day, 1719, about a year and a 
half after Blair, seven years after Hume and probably four yeArs after the 
other two most eminent Scots of his day 1 Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith •. 
He is thus of a younger generation than Kames and lived his meridian 
years during the liveliest period of the Scottish Awakening. His home, 
however, from birth to death was not the center of intellectual and other 
activity, but the lesser epicenter of Aberdeen. It is not to be thought 
i. Ibid, P• 34• 
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that this constituted a kind of isolation or that Campbell enjoyed much 
less stimulating contacts than those of Kames and Blair. For example~ 
among his friends were some of the most distinguished of eighteenth cen-
tury Soots: the philosopher of "common sense" Thomas Reid., and James. 
Beattie.., author of The WJinstrel and an Essay on Truth aimed at Huma., a:s: 
well. as such keen, if long-forgotten, man as Alexander Gerard,, author of' 
the Essay .2!!. Taste • 
Before. taking his prominent pJJ.ace in such society,. however, Campbell! 
had gone through the usual. early career of a minister of the Church of 
Scotland. In accord with custom .. he came from a ministerial family., his: 
father, the Rev. Colin Campbell being a minister in Aberdeen and having 
a family of six: chi.ldren. Un:f'ortunatelly, this good man died when ·&o:t!ge; 
was nine., leaving his widow and children in straitened circumstances:. 
Partly as a consequence perhaps, George was destined for the most lucra-
tive of professions, the law;- perhaps his talent for controversy was a·p-
parent even at this age. To this end he was sent to Edinburgh where he 
was apprenticed to a Writer to the Signet. He did not take to the law 
very well~ and soon his theological interests were impelling him to at-
tend lectures in theology at the University. On the completion of his 
legal apprenticeship he enrolled at the Aberdeen divinity schoo]• where 
he immediately distinguished himself as a student. Be graduated from 
there in 1746, and after two years, his first attempt at obtaining a 
living having been unsuccessful,l he was ordained minister at Ba:chory 
ll. There is no smirch in a young Scottish divine's not getting a living 
quickly, there being necessary a meeting of minds on the part of the con-
gregation and the clergy as to the suitability of the candidate. Fre-
quently the congregation refused the first candidate merely in order to 
assert their independence as far as possible. Although they could not 
choose their minister, at least they could make a gesture. See Watson.,~· cit. 
Ternan1 a little town some twenty miles from Aberdeen. 
In this little country parish he labored for the next nine years 
both at his pastoral work and at studies v.rhich were later to give him 
his measure of fame. Be left Banchory-Ternan in 1757 to becom~ one of 
the ministers of Aberdeen~ and shortly one of its intellectual leaders. 
His membership in the Philosophical Society in particular placed him in 
contact with such men as I have mentioned above. In 1759 he was ap-
pointed Principal of the Marischal Colle@e although he had held no aoa-
demic position previously. But he was held high in the esteem of i~ 
portant friends~ including that of the Duke of Argyle 1 a distant rela-
tive. He soon indicated his qualifications for the post and established 
his place among the thinkers of his age with his publication. 0f the 
Dissertation ~Miracles (1763), the work for which he is probably best 
known. This work placed Campbell in a high-powered intellectual circle. 
Although to later eyes his arguments do not have the force of those of 
his opponent, David Hume~ Campbell was looked on as one of the most ef-
fective defenders of the citadel of orthodoxy in the teeth of the at-
tacks launched by that arch-skeptic. One edition of the Encyclopedia 
Britanica · puts it well when they say: "The Dissertation is not a com-
plete treatise upon miracles, and does not approach the subject from 
points of view it would be regraded from naw,but ~~th all deductions 
it was and still is a valuable contribution to theological literatve. ~"i 
1. Ninth Edition, New York~ Scribners~ 1878, IV, 754• It is perhaps 
appropriate that this old work, much more in the original Scottish tradi-
tion than later editions, should have an excellent biography of Campbell. 
Irt 1771 CampbeJ.:lL was elected professor of theology at Marischal Col'-
1ege~, whereupon he resigned his city parish, preaching instead, at Gre:yt'riars 
Church, a duty that accompanied the academic position. His next pub-
lished material~ however·J: was not in the realm of theology as we might 
expect,. but was rather the considered result of ideas which had been ger-
minating since his days as a country parson. The only one of his major 
works not connected with his profession,. ~Philosophy Ef_ Rhetoric. 
calll:) out in 1776. In 1778 he was properly back in the fold with A... New 
Translation~~ Gospels with critical and explanatory notes~ by some 
considered his greatest work;: some of his sermons were published at that 
time and in the prededing years; while his Lectures of Ecclesiastice.] 
History appeared posthumously in 1834• 
Campbell's ever-present interest in his profession is amply evi-
danced by his learnittg Ge-rman when he was nearly seventy so that he 
could read Luther's translation of . the Bib1a: •. But in 1791 a severe 
illness impaired his never very robust health so that he was obliged~ 
to resign his offices in 1795• The death of his wife in 1792 after a 
long married life during which she had been a true helpmeet~ hastened 
his decline • In 1796 he died. "·It is as a theologian and as a 
sch~~r~ the acutest and most cultivated that the Church of Scotland 
has produced~ that he will be best remembered •. 11'1 
So much for the facts of his life.. We have various other scraps of 
ini'ormation about him;· we know that he was a pleasant and kindly man 
1
'wi th a mild and delicate e xpression, "2 that ha was s t imulating and 
1. Encyclopedia Britannica, ~· ~· 
2. James McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy, New York: Carter and 
Brothers, 1880~ P• 245• 
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highly re garded both as a preacher and a teacher, and especially that he 
was a most keen and active worker in the intellectual and religious 
worlds. McCosh places inim "next to Reid in the Aberdeen School11 l as 
far as phil.osophical abmliity is concerned. Beyond these facts and o-
pinions the man is to be found in his work whither we shall shortly 
repair. 
l. Ibid.,. P• 244• 
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ii Some. Conten~oraries 
Blair, Kames, and Campbell were quite evidently far from schollar-Jiyr 
recluses who spent their days in comunion with their ow.a spirits and 
spun their ideas out of themselves a lone like the spider in Swift's fable. 
P~ther did they move, during their entire lives in very active societies 
and found among their friends and acquaintances a variety of intriguing 
and stimulating personalities. And not only di.d they know this variety 
of people casually, but out of the whole society they could count a sur• 
prising number as their true intimates. We are hardly familiar with 
this phenomenon nowdays when our literary and intellectual societies 
meet desultorily for a brief olashco£ ideas anO. then retire each to 
his own concerns. With the close-knit communities of Scotland the situa-
tion was completely different: 
The remarkable feature ••• was the familia.r fraternity 
in which these men lived. They all knew one another--
most of them since boyhood, for they were all about the 
same age. They met one another almost every day of ·:- _ 
their lives; they belonged to the same set of society , 
sat at the same tables in the dingy old flats,, copious-
ly partaking of claret and punch without a_ headacha and 
indigestible national dishes without a nightmare, with 
all the zest of epicures over the most delicious n0vel-
ties . They could not go aut of their wynds without 
being sure to-:,see friends they had met last night at 
Mrs •. Cockburn's merry parties.,.. over a light tea and 
oakes; or at the Lord President's, over a heavy supper 
and drink:. David Hum.e,, when he left his house in 
James' Court, might meet the dapper and prim Dr., Hugh 
Blair, or rub shoulders -.vi. th Lord Eli bank,. to whom he 
would give a stiff bow, as he was not on good ts~ 
with his Lordship. Principal. Robertson, proceeding 
in his stately gait, would meet Dr. Carlyle, arrived 
from. Inveresk ••• Lord Kames would pass by in his wig 
and gown from his house in Canongate on his way to 
cour·b., and as his tall, gaunt figure disappeared 
around the corner, who should cone by but Lord Monboddo, 
who always kept a distance from a man who had the bad taste to 
ridicule his profound speculations.l 
Of course. if we were to know completely what nade our critics what they 
,;rere • we would certainly have to analyze in turn t his human frame of re-
ference as closely as the intellectual content of their work. But sue~ 
an enterprise is not feasible here. Hcwfever~ it would quite probably add 
some light to our understanding of the critics if we were to acquaint 
ourselves with some representative members of t heir society. 
Perhaps the most interesting of the lot is the eccentric Lord 
Monboddo just mentioned--he who thought that Douglas outshone any 
Shakespearian tragedy. He has always a considerable place in any ac-
count of eighteenth century Scttland for greater idiosyncracies than this~ 
however. His strange notions and the pertinaci ty with which he advanced 
them have appealed to many people as they amused many of his contempora-
ries. The principal characteristic of this Lord of Session~ entrusted 
with the most important legal decisions seems to have been his belief 
that the 01:-eeks and Romans had discovered everything that was worth 
knowing and were in every way superior to this soft and de~nerate race 
of moderns. Even in his old age he would nev·er take a carriage, because 
the ancients used no such device. He felt that being dragged at a 
horse's back (perchance he put this more strongly, being a Scot of his 
ti:ae) was "a truly ludicrous degeneration of the genuine dig,oity of 
human nature."2 He deli ghted especially in imitating the customs of 
the ancients 1 and invited his friends frequently to banquets with the 
1. Henry Gray 01:-aham, Scottish Men of Letters, PP• 104-5• 
2. "James Burnet," Edinburgh Enoye"l'opedia,quoted in McCosh, O.£!. 2.!:t•, 
P• 247• 
menu and the costumes modeled after the Greek fashion, with garlands on 
the tabae and plenty of profound discussi on to help wash dawn the food .. 
He even practiced anointing himself with oil, or at least with a lotion 
oonoooted for the purpose according to his ·GWD. f'ormula.l Many other eo-
centricities are ascribed to him, not the least of which is his belief 
based on his reading,in a kind of evolution and that men once had taila.. 
Yet as a thinker he is not to be despised. Dr •. Johnson had a pl:easant 
conversation with him when he toured the North country2 and such a stu-
dent as Glaiys Bryson considers his ideas at some length.3 His e.:mgera-
tiona and fancies concealed his wit and penetration from many of his as-
sociates. To me he is most interesting as an evident proof' of the extent 
to which we can see divergence from the norm even in such a narrow so-
ciety as this. He is also interesting to us because he wrote a consider-
able work, The Origin~ Rrogress of Language.., which has some affinity 
to the speculations on language of the critics • 
Of course, most acquaintances of Blair, Kames, and Campbell were m 
much more nnormal, 11 at least less eccentric. Their crotchets: were more 
in accord with the custons of the day and were hardly to be noticed by 
their friends, much less to be remembered before their accomplishments. 
To be sure~ some of their normal courses of conduct appear a trifle 
peculiar to us, particularly in view of their professions. The univers•l 
1. 
2. 
Pottle 
3· 
Loc. cit. 
James Boswell, Journal of~ Tour ~o_!!:~ Hebrides, ed. by F. A. 
and c. H. Bennet, New York: The Viking Press, PJ• 53-58. 
Bryson, .2£_• ~., P!;!Sim. 
custom of drinking in the morning as well as the afternoon or evening 
hardly seems to consort with the cloth;; while i·b is baldly stated im. 
iuc h a work as Barke's nove 1 ,, whether reliable or not,. that hardly one 
of the gentleman of Edinburgh was above visiting the "bawds"' who in-
festea the oity. Perhaps Burns~ while fitting no pattern because he 
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was a poet, was not atypical as a man. On the whole, nevertheless ., . the 
gentleman of Edinburgh and Aberdeen were.~: according to their lights·, . 
steady citizens who worked assiduuusly at their vocations and avocations. 
Few, if any, of them were like MOnboddo;: while individual enough, they 
fit pretty well the general pattern. 
The one who strayed farthest afield is probably also the most 
eminent among them~ all, though his straying was entirely of the intellect. 
David Hume's iconoclastic skepticism eatned him the title of infidel 
and atheist many times; and though heartily accepted by the clergy of 
the Moderate1 party including such men as Blair and Jardine,, he was 
suspect by the general populace to the end of his days. But his plac~ 
with the enlightened was secure;perhaps those who wera less radical. than 
he still enjoyed the feeling of liberality en@9ndered by association with 
his speculative mind. And too, it makes 11 l :i!'b.sral!s" feel more so to ac-
cept the "·radical" who is spurned by the "reactionaries." Hume was al-
ways prominent among these men~ although it is doubtful if they had full 
conception as to the revolutionary character of his thought in philo-
sophy, or appreciated the wellnigh. unanswerable power of his arguments:. 
_____________________________________ 6___ ______ , ________________________ _ 
1. See below PP• for more on this party. It is to be noted here 
that all the clergymen-men of letters .-were of this group which emp.ha-
siz·ed ehhics and benevol~Aoe rather than the stern piety dominant in the 
Church of Scotland since John Knox •. 
2... The Wonder £_£ All ~ Gay World,.~ London; Collins, 1949. (Burns 
in Edinburgh, 1786-7--interesting as history, if not as fiction). 
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In fact., it was not s c· ·much Hume the philosopher who was so highly honored 
in their assemblages, as Hume the historian. The reasons are not far to 
seek, for Hums's philosophical labors were largely those of his youth; 
and, realizing that his speculations were more daring than people were 
ready to accept, he had turned to history and the writing of' essays on 
various subjects--political, moral, and aesthetic. With all his keen in-
tellect which could so easily see through the pretensions of' our minds, 
he was still a most human man who admitted that his ruling passion was 
11 love of' literary fame, "1 and who delighted in pleasant company and good 
food as did most his oont emporari·es. Moreover, his friends were proud 
of' him. He was the most famous of' historians, to be sure, but he also 
was a member of' the great world of' culture. Schmitz conjectures that 
perhaps the principal r eason for Blair's corresponding so much with Hume 
while the philosopher was in France was the joy he felt at thus condng 
into contact with the e l egant and cultured society which Hume was favored 
to know so intimately& "Hume 's career in politics was, in fact, one of' 
the great events in Blai r's life, for it brought Edinburgh into contact 
with the world of' letter s, fashion, and public policy as it had never 
been linked before. 'Forget us not ••• we beseech you in the barren 
country,' wrote Blair. 'The smallest scrap f'ram you is a feast to us 
here. •n2 
But while Monboddo was imitating the Greeks and Hume was 
1. From "My Own Life," quoted in William K. Wright, ~ His'bory_of' 
Modern Philosophy, New York, Macmillan, 1941, p • • 196• 
2. Schmitz, .2£!_ cit., P• 74• 
enj0yi·ng his ruling passion as he moved among the great, most Scots went·. 
soberly about their daily tasks. ~tither their professions nor their 
inclinations were particularl y conducive to ab~rrations from what they 
felt was the normal course of man's life. A good example of this more 
frequent sort of Scot is a t hinker as illustrious as Hume, although in 
the realm of political economy rather than philosophy. Adam Smith is 
as responsible as any single man in history for the development of the 
capitalist system and I suppose is the most influential Scot ih the 
modern world.l Of course, he had, like Hums, conversed with the intel-
lectuals of France when he visited the continent as tutor to the young 
Duke of Buccleuch;: but before this phase of his career he had already 
been noted as the professor of moral philosophy at G-l!a.sgow and author 
of the celebrated treatise Theory of Moral Sentiments. He lived among 
the great of two continents , but early in his career he had moved in the 
equally congenial atmosphere of the Select Society. In fact,. Adam Smith 
the economist, had successfully filled the professorship which was to be 
held Ja ter by Blair, although the position did not achieve the distinc-
tion of a title until the l atter's incumbency. Furthermore,, like the 
other Scots, including Hume in this, "Smith had given much attention 
to ancient and modern languages, and, to un-Scotch his own sty]e,, had 
labored over translations, particularly f'rom the French."2 As we shall 
have occasion to note, one of the primary concerns of the Select Society 
was this des i re to get away from Scotticisms and to be quite as cultured 
as any Englishman. In thi s ., as in many other ways, Smith, whom we 
1. Webs.ter& Biographical Dictionary. 
2. Schmitz.,. Q& ..Q.i:t., P• 62. 
consider a truly semina] mind , was quite avera.ge to his associates. li&J · 
was a hard-working professor and diligent student on the one hand .. and 
a busy member of Scottish society on the other. 
Smith's position as prof essor, however, was unusual in one way~ 
for he had early repudiated t he clerical education in which he had 
been started by his parents •. For the rest of his car6er he was one of 
the relatively few lay members of his profession in eighteenth century 
Scotland.. Most other pedagogues were like William Robertson in that they 
either combined the two offi ces, or had left parishes for appointmentu. 
in the universities. Robert son himself is one of the most distinguished 
of professors and a great f r iend of all the Edinburgh group!f, par"t:Ucu~ 
lar1y B]air. His marne is v i rtually lost except to earnest student. of 
historio·graphy or delvers i nto this period, yet he was ranked with 
Hume, Gibbon,. and Voltaire a s one of the great writers of history in 
the century • .l His History of Scotland was "received with general ap-
plause,..n while his History ~Charles V brought him 4500:' pounds·, the 
largest sum ever paid for a historical work. " It brought him an iuro-
pean reputation; it was translated into French in 1771;: Voltaire. de-
c1ared that it made him for get his woes. and Catherine II of Russia, 
wha sent hill1 fRobertsg~ a gold snuff-box, that it was her constant 
traveling companion~2 
Several other~ profess ors with clerical backgrounds are to be 
1. Bryson, ££• cit. P• eo. 
~. Cambridge History of English Literature,. X, .326. 
found associated with our cri tics. In Aberdeen, Campbell knew well 
Thomas Reid,. the celebrated philosopher of "common-sense" whose works 
gave rise to an e~tire school of philosophy--the only philosophy which 
can be termed Scottish as such.l Reid spent the greater part of his 
career in the role of academician, first at Aberdeen as professor of 
philosophy, and later at Glasgow as successor to .Adam Smith in the cha~r 
of moral philosophy.2 His system of thought suffers in our un~formed 
eyes perhaps because of its name, which would seem to connote something 
not quite solid and acute enough to meet the iron skepticism of Hume~ at 
whom it was primarily aimed. There is something to this~ as such critics 
as :McCosh point out, but his ideas are still metaphysically form:iidablie 
enough to give pause to any but a seasoned adadernic philosopher. He 
also succeeded for the most part in satisfying his contemporaries who· 
found Hume 's views exceedingly uncomfortable.. In this endeavor he was: 
the complement of Campbell who defended the citadels of faith against 
flume's theol.ogical speculations, whereas Reid worked on the metaphysi-
calL bastions. As we might expect, Campbelll is an adherent of Reid's , 
metaphysical position, and may be said to borrow some of his critical 
premises from the school of common sense. 
Also in Aberdeen was the celebrated author on taste and another 
clerioS:li phiJLo:sopher~ A].exa.nder Gerard_. whom we have mentioned before. 
Although it is likely that the tight grip of the kirk on the universities 
1. See McCosh_. ~· 2tt•• Art •. XXXVI, PP• 192-227;; Bryson,. ~· ~· 
PP•· 130-136~ James Seth, English Philosophers ~Schools ~Philosophy~ 
London:Dent, 1912, PP• 227-236 for the ideas of this philosophy.- Any ._ 
good history of philosophy vnll have a section devotea to thls uniquely 
Scottish school. 
and vic:e versa. was detrimenta1 to the greater part of his career so that 
he combined his vocations. He is best known6 however 6 as a writer on 
the interesting subject of t aste, on which his colle.ague:s expended much 
attention also. He is thus much like his clergyman friends in his com-
bination of ipterests. It is evident that it was a quite ~nusual pro-
cedure for the Moderate ministers to be a man of letters as well. 
Another excepti on6 like Adam Smith, to this mono:r::olr of the clergy 
over the intellectual life of the country is the philosopher Adam Fer-
fuson. His vocation was that of a professor; his interests, typically 
those of the Scottish Renaissance; 
He was a central figure of the Scottish group of nenlightened~ a 
leader in the club life of Edinburgh, successot to his friend~ . 
David Hume as head of the Advocates' Library L equivalent to being 
Librarian of Congress ~ ceteris paribu~ and from 1764 until 1785 _ 
professor of pneumatics and moral philosophyl in the University of 
Edinburgh. On one of his two brief leaves of absence, in 1778, 
he was a member of the unsuccessful Conciliation Commission which 
came to America in the hope of negotiating an early peace with 
the colonies. Not only did he occupy a pla«e of presti@B in 
Scottish university l i fe and public affairs, but he was widely 
read and followed abroad ••• 2 
He is also one of the preeminent figures in the Scots endeavor to frame, 
a sociology, his Essay ..2!:.. t he History of Civil Society being considered 
by those who should know as one of the basic works to this science.3 
We might mention at length many more men of distinction with whom 
Blair, Kames, and Campbel l associated--in any @Bneral ·account of the life 
and thought of this period certain names are bound to appear--Alexander 
Carlyle, 11 Jupitern Carlyle , whose biography brings us closest to the ac -
tual life of the times; Henry N'!acken:zie, 11the man of fee lingn. in the 
1. For an ana lysis of these terms see Ch. II below. 
2. Bryson, .£12..• cit. , PP• 30-31. 
3• Ibid., Ch. II 
popular mind and the arbiter of taste in all minds; Lord Hailes, anti-
quarian and judge as well as friend to Dr. Johnson; Lord Elibank,"the 
Maecenas of_ a~ of the young clergy who afterwards figured very high 
as authors and orators, ttl and who framed the triumphant reply to Dr. 
Johnson's. definition of oatmeal;2 John Home, the author of the most 
highly regarded play of the day--e.t least in Scotland. But perhaps 
enough has already been said to indicate that this was indeed a bri],... 
lia.nt society in which our critics moved and played their not incon-
siderable parts. Certainly it was a society •vi th important ideas and 
accomplishments, and it was a society which provided many of the con--
ditions necessary to produce works of acute analysis and clear thinking. 
In order to understand the work of our critics we must novv turn to those 
general characteristiat; of this society which apparen-l:;ly helped to mold, 
or at least, strongly to affect their labors. 
iii. Friendships ~Club Life 
It seems unlikely tha:t; anyone would lean heaYily on the unbiassed 
testimony of Matthew Bramble, or Tobias Smollett for that matter, con-
earning the character of ~cotland and Scotsmen in the eighteenth cen-
tury. The change from criticism to eulogy as the Bramble party moves 
out o£ England and into the land of oatmeal and l~ggis is only too ap-
parent to any reader. Yet it is equally almost inevitable to quote 
1. Ramsay of Ochtertyre, .QJ2.• U,t., P• 378• 
2. In answer to Johnson's definition that oatmeal Y'B.S fed to horses 
in England and men in Sc otland, the good lord is reported to have re-
torted, "But where will you find such men and su.ch horses?" (Henry 
Qrey Graham, The Social Life of Scot!land in ~Eighteenth Century, I 179.) 
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"Matt.'s" asseveration that Edinburgh ·.vas "a hotbed of genius." There 
seems little doubt that the ity and the country in general led obser-
vers t o connnent on the concentration of intellect at that time.. How-
ever~ further on in the same pas sage, Bramble says: 11 I have had the 
good fortune to be made acquainted with many authors of the first dis-
tinction: such as ·bhe t v.ro Humes ~-hare he probably me~nt that one of 
them was Home,, the spelling was indifferently change.a? Robertson,. Smith , 
Wallace,. Blair, Ferguson, Wi lkie, & c., and I have found ·bhem all as 
agreeable in conversation as they are instructive and entertaining in 
their writings ••• 11 1 I feel that these two ideas--the notion of the 
high-powered intellects and that of the friendli ness should be taken as 
complementary.. Anyone who first studies this period is impressed by the 
unanimity with which commentators and historians agree on this atmos-
phere of cordiality. Even Dr. , Jom1son appears to have been mollified 
by it, f'or both in his meeting with Monboddo and his conversation with 
the scholars of Aberdeen he was as little ursine as we are apt to find 
him.2 Of course, this @Sniality did not extend as far as wishy-washy 
agreement on intellectual matters. There were f'irm lines taken, fre-· 
quently in complete opposition to each other, but for the most part a 
man's opinions were not allowed to sour the friendly intercourse of this 
society. Particularly interesting is the friendship of Hums, the a 
arch-heretic,. with ministers of the Kirk, like Bl1a.ir and Dr. Jardine .. 
1 .. Tobias Smollett, T.Jl.51 Expedition ~Humphrey Clj nker, New York: 
The i-.fudern Library, 1929, P• 281. 
• 
2.. James Boswell, The Journal of ll_ Tour t£.. ~ Hebridws, 1785, PP• 64-65. 
This being true, it appears necessary to give some attention to 
these personal relationships before we try to analyze more closely the 
general social complex of the times. Unfortunately, this enterprise is 
made highly oonjectural,for t he most useful materials for examining the 
interrelations of persons are practically non-existent in eighteenth can-
tury Scotland. About the only work which could be used as a diary is 
Boswell's Malahide Papers, but unfortunately Boswell is very cursory in 
his treatment even of his good friends Kames and Blair-~vith the exce~bion 
of the "materialsu for Kames' llifa. He lets us know that he met them at 
various parties, and gives us such bits of information as that Blair's 
preaching "would stop hounds by his eloquence,ul but we learn little about 
how well acquainted these gent l emen were with each other; we get a. 
wealth of bits of information but li ttla which tells us how they felt to-
ward their friends and acquaintances. Correspondence, the gold mine of 
eager prospector-scholars, is very scanty. Not that the Soots wrote no 
letters, but that very little correspondence has come down to usa "the 
writers ••• did not keep copies for publication, or their friends did not 
keep the originals for lbve. Probably they wrote few letters: being of 
a frugal mind they may have grudged the postage.112 In the Blair-Hume. 
correspondence already mentioned and the Kames-Montagu letters considered 
below we can find some interesti ng tid-bits, but no real opportunity to 
reconstruct a portion of the age such as the Walpole correspondence can 
give us. Yet although we shall have to conjecture or leave merely 
1. Ma:lahide Papers,XIII, 109, quoted in Schmitz, .2.£!. cit, P• 1. 
2. Graham, Scottish Men !:!£_Letters, pref. v. 
im.plied much of what must be the important facts in .the personal relations 
of these men, we must also note that these relation.s existed. The pre-
cise way in which one man may have influenced another must be an x fao-
tor which we simply cannot assess* and perhaps it is just as well, for 
the probability is very strong that many such 11influenoes 11 are specious. 
The lack of literary evidence still does not eliminate the fact that the 
Scottish group was " ••• closely connected by ties of friendship and by the 
relation of teacher and pupi l ~s~ that we may fairly speak of them as 
comprising a school."l 
We do have certain facts which may be construed though indirectly, 
as sig;nifice.nta we have recor ded some close friendships and admitted 
influences, we have considerable information about the clubs which 
formed such important part of the personal li vas of ·these men. We 
know, f or example, thata 
In Hume's spacious parl or was to be met everybody of note 
in the city--judges, ministers., advocates, doctors, professors; 
Lord Kames with his sar casm, his coarse jokes, his crackling 
laughJ John Home--.1'dear Johnnie" with his many friends--with 
his radiant presence, which was genial if not brilliant as the 
sun; Carlyle of lnveresk, stately., handsome, full of' life and 
good talk; Dr. Blair, prim, precise, and pompous; Dr. Robertson 
and Adam Ferguson ••• It was a kindly, genial friendly life which 
was to be found in Edinburgh in those days--with a familiarity 
of social intercourse f ound nowhere else.2 
The stately and handsome Dr. Carlyle affords us same firsthand evidence 
as to this characteristic of hi s society when he says that 11The whole 
corcle of learned and ingenious men who had sprung up together at this 
1. Bryson, ~cit., P• 2. 
2 • . Ibf d, P• 52-53• 
was remarkable for ·bhe unbroken union whic h prevailed in it, n l and 
goes on to tell us the various factors which contributed to this "frater-
nal concord11 : the small area of' the cit y, and the hospitality of' the age. 
He says that only in that city and at that time: 
• • .there could arrive from t he country in t ho afternoon and be 
almost certain of' assembling such men as David Hume, and Adam 
Smith, and Robertson, and John Home, and Adam Ferguson, and 
others in a tavern at nine which was the hour of' supper in 
those days and the chief time of' convivial entertainment until 
about the year 176o• These circumstances conduced not a little 
to that harmony which then reigned among an order of men sai d 
proverbially to be irr itable minds.2 
To be sure, this conge~ality sometimes had untoward results, one of the 
most bemusing of' which is the demise of the Edinburgh Review, the organ 
of the august Select Society, precipitated, so one critic thinks, by the 
tendency to "log-rolling" in its work of reviewing: pointing out that 
11all the contributora.were in intimate terms with one another, and most 
of them were authors. n3 Perhaps this might help us to unaerstand the 
untimely deaths of many modern "little" magazines. 
Beyond this gener al intimacy, we know of some cl~se friendships 
of importance,' particularly i n the life of Blair. His first bio~apher 
points out that Blair was fortunate in knowing people "of the most 
liberal sentiments" from the t i me he entered actively into soci ety,4 
and also remarks on the absence of "petty jealousies ••• among men· of 
1. Ibid., P• 111. Graham quotes fro.m an unpublished MS of Carlyle's 
which the heirs kindly allowed him to use. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3• John -n:-Millar, !_Literary History ~Scotland., New Yorka Scribners, 
1903· 
4. Hohn Hill, An Account Ef.. ~ ~~Writings o.f_ Hugh Blair, D. D. • 
Philadelphiaa J. Humphrey, 1808, P• 178• 
letters, all of whom, when trying to bring themselves forward, far from 
1 depref!sing, were ready to assist their nei ghbor. 11 According to Hill, 
David Hume was the first such friend who was ready to assist Blair in. 
his career, although as time went on the debt was paid. We have al-
ready had occasion to remark on the correspondence between these two, 
but there was much more to their friendshop than a series of letters. 
Blair was one of Hume'a defenders before the General Assembly when 
Hume and Kames were accused of inl:li.d~lity;; he collaborated with Hume 
in literary projects, such as the consideration of Reid's Inquirx ~ 
the Hwn.an Mind, tried to bring Hume into controversy with Campbell over 
miracles, and argued with Hume over Ossian; he even rented Hume's house.2 
Throughout their lives, though Hume was older than Blair, and incom-
parably the greater man, they were in close contact. What impact the· 
philosopher's cool and analytical mind might have had on Blair we do 
not know, for there appears to be nothing in the latt er's work to in-
dicate any absorption of skeptical principles. Of course, such an ag-
gravation of 11moderatenessltlwould really never have done, for however-
much Hume was accepted as a man and as a historian, his philosophical 
principles were pure anathema to religion. Blair influenced Hume on 
at least one occasion, however, when he advised against the philoso-
pher 's publicati on of his Dialogues ~ Natural Religion. ''l"o~ -God's 
sake, tt said Blair. 11 let that be a posthumous work. if' ever it should see 
the light."3 
1. Loc. cit. 
2. Scbmi tz, ~· cit.. PP• 67, 29ff •• 34, 35· 
3· Letter 29---s-eptember, 1763, ~. Royal Society of Edinburgh,. III. 
51, quoted in Schmitz, ~· cit •• P• 34• 
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A friendship which produced more apparent results in Blair's life, 
was that >tith William Robert son. They had more in common than did Blair 
and Hume, for they were of t he same profession and the same university, 
Robertson as Principal and Blair as Professor. Blair also admired 
Robertson, who had a definite talent for affairs; and they were very 
similar in their ability to smooth over differences among their friends 
by the smooth power of moderation. More important, "these intimate 
friends,, however, were not satisfied with admiring ·the talents which 
each possessed, whether in oonunon, or 'Otherwise, but availe.d themselves 
of that critical skill for which both were distinguished.. Neither of 
them ever presented a work to the public which the other had not revised."l 
This sort of situation was not peculiar between Blair and Robertson 
alone, however, for Adam Smit h also was a support on which Blair leaned 
on more than one occasion.. Hill, saying that Blair was a 11timid in-
quirer,n goes on: "Dr •. Blair felt the benefit of such a friend, and 
gladly availed himself of every advantage which his company and con-
versation could afford."2 I:b is perhaps not straining a point to see 
evidences of this friendship in Blair's theory of the sympathetic i-· 
:rnagination which is based on very simiibar principles to those expres;-
sad in Smith's Theory of the Moral Sentiments,3 although these ideas 
were quite universal among the Scots. A more concrete influence in the 
same direction can be descried from the fact that Blair used some of 
1. Hill, .££.• £!i•, P• 179• 
2. Ibid., P• 182. 
3· Walter Jackson Bate., rtThe Sympathetic Imagitlation in Eighteenth 
Century English Criticism, 11 ELH, XII, June, 1945, :1.44-164. 
,... 
Adam Smi'th 's ma.nu.soripta in his Leotures ~Rhetoric ~ ::aelles Lettres. 
Smith had been the first one to deliver the leotures on this sabJect 
at the behest of Lori X&lll8s1 in 1748, and although these leotarea have 
not oome down to u.s, we have perhaps the sabstanoe of some of them in 
the work of Blair. Incident ally, Blair shoald n.ot be thought of .as a 
plagiarist beoau.se he quite freely admitted his borrowing from his es-
teemed friend and predeceasor.2 
Ot course, tor our purposes the most important friendship of 
Blair's life is that with Lord Kam.es. It was. Kames who secared his '· 
- . 
appointment as Professor and who urged the publication of the Lectu.rea.3 
Blair on the Clther hand was as much interested in defending the repu.-
tation of his future patron in the furore over the Essa,ys ~ the ~­
ciplea ~)[orality aa he wu in the defense of Hume.4 Moreover, the ,_ 
debt which Blair's LectUJIBs <aU4. jUJ Kames• Eleme~ is cited in several 
places by Blair himself5 and is thought to be apparent by some obser-
vers in mu.ch of the whole stracture of the work. 6 It is anlikely that 
we should a.onstrae the contact between the cru.s1;y Jurist and the 
you.ng clergyman as one of special importance to the former, for Kames 
1. Kandall, ~· oit., P• 17. 
2. Hill, op. oit. , P• 182. 
3. Alexander Tytler, Lord Woodhou.selee, Memoirs of the Life and 
Wri tioga of tb.e Honourable Henry ~ ot KamH, Edinburgh, 1814-;-f;" 
276-7. 
4. Although Blair pla.yed aromost prominent part in this legal-
theological squabble, it should be remembered that he was only one of 
the Moderate party, including su.ch men as Bober·tson, Alexander 
Wedderburn, and Lord Rai1es. 
s. See, for example, Lectures, PP• l7n., 49JCle, l46ne, 
6. Ba.nd,.:Ll, ~· cit. , P• 83. 
liked to consider himself as a patron of letters and a sort of' mentor 
to the younger generat i on. He had early taken under his wing William 
Hamilton of Bangour, author of the Braes of Yarrow and a kind of' prede-
cessor to Burns; he advised Hume for a considerable time; as we have men-
tioned, he established the custom of' lectures on literature and filled 
the post with young men of his choosing. "It was but a just tribute to 
his me r its, when many years afterwards, Adam Smith, then in the height 
of his literary reputation, said, in reference to the great number of 
eminent writers which Scotland had of' late years produced, 'We must every-
one of' us acknowledge Kamas t'or our master. '"1 In fact, I believe that 
Kames was, because of his predilection for giving advice and his desire 
to be independent of' authority, more the source of whatever elusive in-
f'luence his manifold friendships might produce than the recipient. Too, 
Kames' biographers do not indicate that he played even a lukewarm Damon 
to any Pythias: his friendshi ps were very wide, but not particule.rly deep. 
One contact, however, in Kames' life is especially interesting be-
cause of' an effect apparently quite out of' proportion to its length• 
I refer to his acquaintance with Benjamin Franklin. The Introduction 
~the Art 2£. Thinldn_g_ mentioned above2 is the most apparent similarity 
between these two men: 
Before they met, they had shown similarities in temperament and 
experience. But once Kames had been stimulated by the wider 
interests and greater verve of' Franklin, he showed more zea~ 
than before in the interests which were common to them both. It 
seems quite possible that Franklin provided the direct impetus 
for the Introduction 12_ ~ ~ £! !hinking, for the practice of' 
1. Tytler, ,2£.• oi t. • P• 218. 
2. P. 13. 
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acting as the self-appointed mentor to you:c.g women, for tfe broad 
intellectual range of the Sketches E!._ ~ Eistory of Man. 
And Tytler adds that Frankl in particularly liked t his work of Kames' 
because of its moral maxims , which sowed " ••• thick in the young mind 
the seeds of goodness concerning moral conduct."2 Moreover, after an 
acquaintance with Franklin of only a few weeks in 1759, Kames evinced 
interests in natural science , in particular, evaporation; started popu-
larizing his experiments i n agriculture after corresponding ~th Franklin 
about oxen; and began the direction of the educati on of Catherine C~rdon.3 
Randall terms this 11hardly f ortuitous," and indeed it seems that his 
brief contact with Franklin combined with the lengthy and rich corres-
pondence in the succeeding 't en years, had a considerable influence in 
fructifying many tsf Kames' i deas. 
Another friendship which is sometimes illuminating, if hardly in-
fluential, was that between Kames and Mrs. Elizabeth M.ontagu. Miss 
Randall has reprinted in an Appendix eleven of the sixteen lengthy let-
ters which Kames v~ote in the course of this correspondence, and a very 
long letter from Mrs. Montagu in reply to Kames' request for her opinions 
on the subject of Ornament. 1hrough these letters we get a somewhat al-
tered perspective on Kames, t hough not radically dif ferent. He still is 
primarily concerned with his intellectual activities, especially the 
Elements to which references are made ever and anon; but he also shows 
1. Randall, o~ cit., P• 13. 
2. Tytler, .££• £!!•,13IP•363 • 
3• Randall, loc. ill..• 
• 
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a saavity and address becoming to a Chesterfield. There is little in · 
these letters of the Kames of the ftcoarse Jokesw and "cackligg laugh" 
mentioned above. If &01thing his approach is unctuous in the portions 
of the letters devoted to an:thing remotely resembling personal matters. 
Kevertheless, the final impr ession one receives from thest communicatioQS 
is that both sender and reci pient delighted in the sound of their own 
words and the profundity of t heir sentiments. They show the asual 
eighteenth century preference for letters that really s~ something--
that approach it with vigor and leave it exh~sted--but we conseqaently 
le&i'n more about the au1ihor 's theories and opinions than we do about 
his life. 
With George Campbell, however, we have not even thesl small erambs 
of satisfaction, for he evidently was one of the more frugal Soots who 
gradged the postage. At least there are no published letters or memoirs 
by him or abou.t him, and so far as I know, no extant material of this 
sort at all. In faet, in the frequently qaoted oontretemps when Bl.air 
tried to get Hume farther involved in the controversy over miracles, we 
know what Blair said, a.n,d Hwne, bu.t Oampbells speaks to u.s not. We oaa, 
of course, indu.lge in the preeariou.s game of' internal evidence, and find. 
in his works that he knew one man better than a.n,other beoau.se he makes 
reference more often to the former. Bu.t, even repu.diating sach fine-spun 
speou.lation, we ean see that he was acqaainted with Reid, for ex~ple, 
enou.gh to be an adh~rent of' the Scottish philosopbi• iie also kD.ow · 
that he was one of' the members of a society founded for the parpose If 
intelleotaal stimulation, in whioh Reid, :Beattie, and John Gregory were 
alsoaotive. It is qaite probable, of course, that he fol~wed the u-
su.al pattern of eondu.et in tho se times, and moved a de:a:t in society, 
knew many people and fo~ t hat their ideas .i mpinged on his own. The 
strength of his counter attack on the attackers of the Common Sense 
Philol~phy, 1 might well indicate that he was mor e than academically 
interested in this question, and that he took advantage of opportunity 
to defend his friends when it presented itself'. Nevertheless, having · 
gone thus far, it m~ be well to draw baok before we reach the gate of' 
cloud-cuckoo land, and to sa;s simply that there appears to be no evi-
dance indicating that Campbell was very different in his personal at-
titude from his fellow critics. 
Campbell's membership in the Philosophical Society af Aberdeen 
does afford some solid foot i ng and leads u.s into this whole interesting 
. 
sub·Ject of clubs and societ i es in eighteenth cent ury Scotland. These 
organizations seem to be qui te unique--in their f ormal, but shirting, 
membership, their generally serious interests, their drive for improve-
menta and proJects of various kinds, all combined with a good deal of' 
conviviality. Of course, there were olubs and olubs, with widely differ-
ing purposes and types of' meadllersa 
Clubs there were of' all kiDds, for wits and oits, for 
solid traders and spendthrift youths, for judges and clerks, 
for men o.f' law, men of letters, and men of' l • t sure-clubs 
bearing strange names, whose meaning i .s lost and fine hu-
mor evaporated; but t hough the comp&n3 Taried, the pur-
pose was eyer the same. It must be said that the expen-
diture of' time was the chief' expense, for t he f'&Tourite 
dishes were cheap--minoed collops, rizared ha4dooks or 
tripe, a fluke or roasted skate, and onions, for which the 
sum of sispenoe was oharged. The "Spendthrift Club" en-
Joyed itself immensely at fourpenoe half'penQ1 a head.2 
1. See 'lhe Philosophy of Rhetoric, PP• 60-6ln. 
2. Graham, Social Life, I, P• 106. 
---~-------------------------
51. 
In effect, I suppose, these clubs were the Scottish equivalent of tne 
coffee-houses, ~t in general the clubs to which our critic• belonged 
. were more conscious of their being a group wit h a specified purpose 
and mission than were the amorphous organisations of the coffee-houses. 
Their meetings were regularly scheduled at some favorite tavern where 
they usually had supper, ~ch claret, and still ~ore conversation. 
••Whateyer the members had to offer in the way of pb.i losophy, science, 
or belles-lettres was augmented, criticized, and further inspired by 
these gatherings of friendly competitors.ttl At some meetings, particu-
larly of the Philosophical Society and the Select Society, with which 
we are mostly concerned, pape~s were read which later appeared as 
. 
p\lblications or por'Sions of the works of the members. Graham goes 
so far as to s~ that " ••• in taverns Soots' modern literature was 
born, and the first public it addressed was in a public house".2 A 
contemporary account bears out this assertion and serves to show' the 
importance which might be at•ached to these organisationss 
Soon after the extinction of the rebellion of 1715, a 
number of promising young men began to distinguish them-
selves in a science or polite literature. In order to 
improve themselves and counteract conceit, which is ne-
ver more apt to spring u.p than in rich minds u.naccus-
tomed to contradiction, societies were instituted where-
in at stated timee, l iterary subJects were canvassed 
with freedom and impartiality, i.ngentoua paradoxes were 
started and assailed with equal ingenuity. There the 
members used to submit their first ess~s in composi-
tion to the friendly censure of their associates, which 
1. Bryson, .DA• ~. P• 7. 
2. Graham, ~ of Letters, P• 61. 
helped to lop awSI luxuriances and •cheok presumption. 
Meanwhile the tribute of applause was not withheld 
from rising merit. It required only time and a coincidence 
of fortunate circumstances to convert t hese flowere into 
fruit.l 
The society of which Campbell was such a distinguished member 
shows the above characteri stics most clearly. A.nother contemporary 
58:· .. 
feels that it owed its inspiration to the influence of Franois 
Hutcheson, of whom we will hear considerably a bit later.2 The gDuup, 
variollsly called the Philosophica.l and the Literary Club (nicknamed 
by the captiolls, the "Wise" club )3 was founded in 1758 with Reid as 
its first secretary and had as its purpose the disoussion of meta-
.'Pl\ysical and literary problems which were presented by the members 
usllally as papers. Tytler thinks that this emphasis on the philo-
sophical was due $.l,most ent irely to the initiating force of Hutcheson, 
but with the advantage of hindsight, we mey qualify this slightly 
and point out that speculation was in the air. Still, as he says, in 
great part we " ••• owe the writings of Reid, Gregory, Campbell, Gerard, 
and Beattie ••• n4 to this society. One point of some importance, per-
haps, is that the different members, while in substantial agreement 
on m~ things, still represented "different aspects of intellectual 
pursuita"5 which gave some of their discussion an ··.lndoubted liveli-
ness. Moreover, we ought to recognize that this waw a brilliant 
1. Rams~ of Ochertyre, Sootland and Scotsmen, P• 8. 
2. Tytler, op. cit.,I, 296. ---
3. J. M. Bulloch, ! History £!:. the University E.f. Aberdeen, 
1495-1895,Londona Hodder and Stoughton, 1895, P• 173. 
4. Tytler, loo ~· 
5. Bulloch, ££• cit., p. 174. 
group; although their discussions have been lost in the dust of time. 
they were acute and articulate reasoners who must have struck many sparks 
from one another. "With such members the Literary Club must have seemed 
a marvel of brilliancy at t he time, and it certainly gave a hope for a 
measure of culture such as Aberdeen had never before witnessed."! 
Meanwhile, in the capital a literary gentleman had a choice of 
clubs to which he mi ght lend his efforts. Kames. for example, was 
at one time or another a member of the Poker Club, the Rankenian Club• 
the Philosophical Society. and the . Select Society. The first of these, 
instituted in 1762. interestingly shows the way in which these organi-
zations combined several obj ectives successfully. Its ostensible pur-
pose was " ••• to 1poke up' the national spirit a gainst English oppress·ion 
and insolence ••• " but it als o found among its foremost concerns the 
n ••• oonsutn.ption of' that beverage which was a favorite :!n Scotland--a 
wine which came into vogue f rom the old intercourse with France. and 
was popular for its cheapness until the English government enforced the 
duty and raised the price .n2 Beyond these objectives of national 
pride and oonvi val enjoyment was another more pertinent totthis in-
quiry. The club was composed not only of the literati, but also num-
bered among its members ro~ny noblemen, gentlemen of fortuae, and mem-
bers of' the liberal professions3 who quite naturally benefited one a-
nother by the exchange of' their ideas and sentiments. The club " ••• had 
happy effects on private char acter by forndng and polishing the manners 
1. Loc. cit. 
2. Graham, Men 2f. Letters . P• 52. 
3· ~·· p:-112. 
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saitable to civilised society, for fr!Jbanished pedantry from the con-
··.'fers'ation of scholars, and exalted the ideas and enlarged the views 
ot the gentry, and created in the several orders a new interest in each 
other which had not taken place before ih the coantry."l ~ Tytler s~s: 
"LIJVcomprehended the greater part of the men of letters in Scotland 
at that period•••L~~sabsisted in Yigour and celebrity for many years, 
and contin~ed its weekly meetings with great regalarity, long after 
the object of its instttation had ceased to engage attention, and it 
is not to be doabtld that its influence was considerable in fostering 
genius and promoting the caltivation of good taste and elegant litera-
ture."2 
The more venerable Rankenian3 was. formed in 1716 principally for 
Jacobite and non•Jurant activities, the early years of the century in 
Scotland being times when strong religioas and political feelings pre-
dominated even in clab life. It may be remembered that Kames himself 
was inclined toward Jacobi tism in his youth, as were m&nl good Scots; 
and probably that is one reason he joined this organisation around 
1722. On the other hand, here "• •• Home had his first real chance to 
indulge his taste for metaphysics and morab philosoph3, the two f~ 
vorite sabjects for discussion with the young men of the dq.":·. In 
short, the interest in speca1ation so characteristic of this society 
in general tended to usurp the activities of organizations founded 
for qaite different object i ves. The yoang men of the clu.b even n 
"maintained an animated &.o r.respondence with Bishop Berkeley, who, though 
1. Alexander Carlyle, from some anpablished ~S which Graham was 
allowed to ase by his heirs, ~oted in Men of Letters, p. 112. 
2. Tytler, op. cit., I , 254. -----
3. So calledbeoause i t met at Ranken' s Tavern. s-ett Mathieson, 
op. cit. P• 200 
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they pushed his system t o an amazing length, is said to have declared 
that nobody understood i t better 'than this set of young gentlemen in 
North Britain'•"l The Rankenian became the logical predecessor of the 
more famous Select Society, which took the torch that fetl and fanned 
it into a quite respectable flame; yet desptie the Rankenian's lesser 
importancea "The influence of this society in diffusing that spirit 
of philosophical research which has since become so fashionable in 
Scotl~~4. has often been mentioned to me by those who had the best op-
portunities of observing t he rise and progress of Scottish literatare."2 
The Select Society was formed in 1754 "whe.o. this venerable society 
-{the R&nkeniq,/ had pe~haps survived its vtgoar."3 Chiefly responsible 
for the fou.nding were Allan. RamBal, son of the poet, and Alexander 
Wedderburn, the jurist and friend of Blair, who was the first chairman. 
At first U "• •• consisted of only fifteen members, bat it became so £' 
fashionable that in a few years it numbered 300, including all the 
literati, m&n1 nobility, gentry, lawyers, clergy, and physicians, who 
met every Frid~ night."4 Interestingly enough, instead of a tavern, 
its meeting place was the Advocates' Library, which perhaps indicates 
the serious nature of the organization. 
Trade, politics, social econo~, historic questions were 
debated; such as "Should Bounties on Corn Be Allowed?tt 
"Was Paper Credit .a Benefit to the CoantryT" "Was Brutus 
Right in Killing Caesar?" Robertson, Kames, Lord Alemore, 
Sir Gilbert Eliot, and Wedderburn were frequent speakers. 
Lord Elibank, William Wilkie, and Lord Monboddo added livli-
ness by their whims, t heir cleverness, and their humor. 
1. Mathieson, .QR.• cii., P• 200. 
2. Dugald Stewart, Account of the Life and Writings of Willi~ 
Robertson, D.D., 2d ed., Londons-cadierr-ind Davi es, 1802; 
3. Mathieson, OR.!_ cit., P• 201. 
4. Graham, !!E, 2!_ Let ter s, P• 111. 
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David Hu.me and Adam Smi th gave only their silent presence ••• nl 
The only subjects precl uded from the discussions of the Select 
Society were ''Jaoobitism and revealed religion1i.2--this qualification 
affording an interesting contrast to the Rao.kenian. Club; but in the 
opinion of Da.~a,ld Stewart, this may have aided in producing "debates 
which have not often been heard in modern assemblies--de~at es where 
the dignity of the speakers was not lowered by the intrigues of policy 
or the intemperance of fact ion; and when the most splendid talents 
that have ever adorned the country were roused to their best exertions 
by the liberal and ennobling discussions of Literature and Philosopey. "--' 
This is, of course, eulogistic, but even making allowances for the 
enthusiasm of the writer we may admit that 'tit must have been a re-
markable and 'select' societ y in the best sense of the term."& In 
the three-hundred members were included the most celebrated men of the 
day, and even some who are still celebra.ted, ~. for . James Boswell tells 
us that he was a. member. 5 
It numbered in its ranks fifteen members, who then were, or 
became peers; an.d eighteen WhO were, or became, judges in the 
Court of Session. They include& such men as Sir Gilbert Eliot, 
Alexander Wedderburn (afterwards Lord Loughborough), Andrew 
Pringle (afterwards Lord Alemore), Professor Hugh Blair, Pro-
fessor William Wilkie, author of the Epigoniad, Lord Kames, Lord .. 
Hailes, Lord Elibank, Charles Townshend, Sir John Dalrympille, Dr. 
Robertson, the historian and afterwards Principal of the University 
of Edinburgh, David Hume, and Ferguson the Poet.G 
At first, the Select Society was almost as catholic in its interests 
1. Leo. cit. 
2. Mifhieson, ~· ~·, P• 201. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
1791, 
6. 
Stewart, ~· ~.,p. 15. 
Knight, .9..£• cit., p. 11. 
In Boswell's Memoirs , reprinted from the European Magazine of 
in F.A. Pottle, Boswell's Literary Career, Oxford, 1929. 
Loc. cit. 
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as Lord Kames, who kept np an extensive correspondence on a variety 
of subjects as part of his membershipa writing to Dr. Black "on the 
attraction of cl~ and water; ••• arotessor Walker on the generation ot 
pilants ••• Dr. Be1i d on the l aws of motion or the conversion of clay 
into vegetable monld ••• "l etc., etc. But as time went on, the literar,y 
interest of the organization began to predominate. This was andou.bted.-
ly good in some w~s, for it helped to stimulate literary efforts a-
mong the members. Tytler, with his usual fervor, assnres as that it 
"had an influence yet. more extensh'e and permanent {than the Rankeni~) 
in diffnsing the taste for l etters in Scotland, and in kindling the 
tire of genius, which then began to display it sel f in various works, 
which have done credit to :t h e national character. "2 
Another result of this literary interest, however, was both detri-
mental to the society and significant to the cnlt ural history of Scotland 
--the effort to ttu.n-scotch" the language and let t ers of the country. 
We shall speak more later of this interesting movement, but now it is 
important as one of the principal concerns of the Select Society in 
the last years of its e~st ence, and consequently a partial concern 
ot our critics in their function as members. Kames'own method in this 
design of bringing Scotland. up to standard in langnage was to employ 
such lectu.rers as Smith and Blair to instruct by example, bu.t as one 
1. Graham, Men of Letters 
2. Tytler, ~ cit., II, 245 • 
. .. 
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ot the active members of the society he was also a particip~t in the 
effort to improve through i nstraction. '~nglish in Scotland waa a 
written, not spoken langa~e. nl and it will be remembered that Hwne 
had stadied it as a foreign tongae, while Smith had "labored over 
translations, particalarly from the French"2 in orde; to clear his 
style of provincialism. T'o make iahese studies more widespread, the 
society employed elocution masters, the first being Thomas Sheridan, 
the father of the dramatist, to give the lessons in. correct pronun-
elation. They changed the name of the organization to the "Society 
tor Promoting the Reading and Speaking of the English Lang11age," 
• 
and the year after Sheridan • s visit one Mr. Leigh was engaged to 
continue the lessons. But the whole proced11re was 11nw1sely pro-
Jeoteds 
Young advocates like Wedderburn, and mature j11dges like Kames; 
noble lords--Galloway, Eglinton, Errol; literary men like 
Hume, Blair, and Robertson, all began to try syllabl~ their 
words aright, to the sarcastic amusement of the old-i G4shioned 
at their efforts to r id themselves of the old tong11e witho11t 
being able to learn the new. In two years members seceded ft' om 
the transformed society, Sllbscriptions fell into arrears, and 
the committee with s11lk:y dignity reported that the condition 
of affairs "serves to confirm an observation that has some-
times been made that in Scotland every disinterested plan of 
public utility is slighted as soon as it loses the eh~rm of 
novelty. n 3 
•.. Thus the Select Society committed sllicide through c11l t11ral in-
digestion, but it still is plain that it, and the other clubs and . 
societies of Scotland were important forams for the exchange of ideas 
1. Mathieson, op. cit., P• 200. 
2. Sclunitz, op:-cit., P• 62. 
3. Graham, Social Lite, I, 120. 
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as well as effective stimul ators and sounding-boards. We cannot know, 
of course, to what extent they molded opinion or struck sparks which 
would later burn up brightly in individual minds. But we do know that 
they pl~ed a vital part in the personal lives of our critics, that in 
these organizations they could present their ideas for appl~se and 
friendly criticism, that here they found broadening cultural contacts 
which helped to make them so truly children of the Enlightenment, that 
here they were prevented from both eccentricity and dead conformity. 
These societies tell us much by inference about the lduld of intellec-
tua1 soil in which the ideas of the Soots took root, and perhaps the 
tart comments of John Mi~lar tell us something which is ultimately 
even more signitioant: 
That grown-up men should form an association for the purpose 
of discussing aQY question in a more or less formal manner is--
certainly a startling notion to the present generationL~. 1900/ 
Debating Societies, we are apt to think, should be left to -
the youthful, to those who have plent~of time to canvass 
topics on which all sensible men L!ic~ have made up their 
minds, and would rather not divulge their sentiments. The men 
of the eighteenth century apparently possessed ~ taliSiii'an-
of perpetual youth. Zitalics mini/1 
1. Millar, cit. ~·· P• 338. 
iv. The Universities 
Besides the participation in the clQb life of their times and the 
association with various fri ends and acquaintances, there impinged on 
our critics other influences which help us to understand their ideas. 
They were all interested in education and two of them were schooled in 
the u.niversities; 1 their learning was typical of that of their times; 
they were members of highly regarded protessions and took their social 
status therefrom; they were Soots. Of course, with each of the trio 
one or another of these aspects of their social background maJ pre-
dominate, and naturally these categories are not completely inclusive. 
It could very well be said that if we are to concern oursebves with 
the possible effect of their class-standing on these men, we ought 
to consider their family lives, or their financial situation. While 
this is true enough, it seems also tr11e to me, that the categories ot 
education, litera~ background, class-standing, professional positwn, 
and national attitude should tell 11s a good deal that is pertinent to 
6 6. 
the inqlliry on which we are engaged. These are most powerful influences 
on the thinking of aD3 man of letters; with our critics they are es-
pecially so, due to the ci r cwnstances of the times and the land in 
which they lived. 
While the clubs and societies were helpful in advancing the cul-
tural life of Scotland, the renaissance of the Scottish universities 
1. While Kames was not a aniversity man, having received his law 
training as an apprentice, he took a keen interest in pedagogy. His 
Introduction to the Art of Thinking, (1761) and Loose Hints on Educa-
tion (1781), as i'ell--aB his acting as mentor to young ladies;-illc#rate 
this interest. 
was indubitably more widespr ead and enduring in. i ts effects. "As in. 
the sixteenth century under Buchanan. and Melville, so now again. in. the 
eighteenth century the universities took on new life. This was product 
and, in. part, the source of the new intellectuality. nl This develop-
men.t was sadly needed, however, and did not come to life in one burst 
of energy. Up until about 1730, just about the time that Blair and 
Campbell were entering on. t heir careers as student s, the curriculum and 
instruction were both wary weak. In Edinburgh the ancient custom. of 
regenting2 had heen abolished for some years, but the instruction had 
not not ably improved, while in. the Marischal College in Aberdeen, the 
system would not be changed until two years before Campbebl would be-
come principal. The teaching was unbelievably dull, consisting almost 
exclusively of lectures, del i vered in Latin, and i ndustriously copied 
word for word by the long-suffering st~dents.3 The story is told by 
barious historians of the students' complaining when the professor de-
parted ever so slightly from the text of the notes he had been using 
for the previous twenty years so that they could not foJJ. ow their fathers' 
notes.4 The curriculum consisted of philosophy on. the medieval plan, 
with plenty of Aristotle and scholastic subtleties, some smattering of 
the classics, and the merest taste of s~ience except for those who 
were to go on into a scientif ic career. It would seem that with such 
1. Bryson, op. cit., P• 7. 
2. See note;-p.~above. 
3. Graham, Social Life, I I, 188. 
4. Bryson, op. cit., P• 9. 
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conditions there woald be no place for learning to blirn up brightly, 
"yet here and there within t he organization of studies there were op-
portunities to acqaire somet hing more than formal and antiq,liatedknow-
ledge. nl In particular, the University of Glasgow was fo r tunate in this 
• 
first half of the century i n having Francis HQtcheson as a member of 
its faclilty. :Sut not only Glasgow was favored-the whole land bene-
fited by his presence. As a contemporary Italian historian pats itJ 
A learned Iri~, by hi' seal and talents, and a noble and 
generou.s duke, L Argyll? were raised u.p in heaven as the 
distinguished instruments of calising to spring and flolirish 
in these cold and nor thern regions what it was once foolish-
ly thought colild only shoot with SliCh vigor in the warm clim-
ates o! Lesser Asia, of Greece or Italy., Francis Hatchinson I sic I having oome i nto Scotland t o profess philosophy and the 
'he s~u.dy of humanit i es in the Uni~rsity of Glasgow, diffased 
througholit the whole countrY~ by his lectur's and discourses, 
as well as by his excellent printed works, a lively taste for 
the study of philosophy and learning.2 
Although it is probably unwise to lean too heavily on the biographical 
interpretation of history, yet it does seem that Hu.tcheson was about 
as responsible as aQY one man coald be for the awakening of the uni-
varsities, with all aocomp&QYing the results in the general intellec-
tual life of Scotland. 
His inflliencie proliferated, bringing abolit changes in varli:oQS wsys. 
For example, his t'ardou.r and eloqu.ence" swayed many stu.dents of divi-
nity, some of whom attended his lectures as long as six years; and be-
fore long man_y pu:).pits throughou.t the land were filled with men who 
followed his doctrine of cultivating "a plain and practical style of 
1. Loo. cit. 
2. Carlo Denina, "The Learning of Scots in the Eighteenth Century," 
Scottish Hist~ieal Review, Giasgow, 1910 lA reprint of a pamphlet 
pu.blished-rn-il~,-prefaoed and entitled by Henry w. Meikle). It is 
incidentally interesting to note that Denina spurns the climatological 
int~r2retation of history common th his time. See :Bryson, op. cit., 
P• lOo,. It is also worth noting that Hu.tcheson was an Ulster Irishmen. 
preaching" which would try "to avoid both rhetoric and 'high speoula-
tiosn.•"1 And not only did Hutcheson's views on rhetoric take hold• 
($. 
but his doctrine of benevolence, almost identical with Shattesbury's, 
caused many pulpits to be filled with ''men who talked of virtue, libera-
lity, and benevolence, where their predecessors had talked of grace, cha-
rity, holiness ••• "2 This progress in "modifying and softening the harsh 
theology of the country"3 also stimulated the secular sister study of 
philosophy so that he is sometimes called the "father of Scottish philo-
sophy11 although this is not strictly accurate as far as his ideas go, 
referring rather to his :function as a stimulatorr4 
Even before O:x:tord and Cambridge had awakened :from stagnation, 
:from "port wine and pre judice" Scottish colleges had begun to 
show intellectual life in spite of their poverty. Antiquated 
systems died out. The Aristotelianism and the scholasticism 
of Ramus, which had turned logic and metaphysics into empty fu-
tilities and endless abstractions that meant little and taught 
nothing, disappeared, and Bacon, Locke, and even Putfendorf and 
Devries were welcome t ext-men :for the students in their stead.5 
Beyond these immediate results, Hutcheson's emphasis on elegance in 
speaking and writing had some influence indirectly on the rising interest 
in belles lettres, although a colleague of his, one Dr .• Leachman, Profes• 
sor of Divinity, may also be considered as important irn this respeota "the 
style and composition of Leachman, with equal purity, had more elegance 
than Hutcheson's, and contributed greatly to form the taste of his pupils 
in Theology and improve the eloquence of the pulpit in Scotland.11 6 
His contemporaries, however, gave Hutcheson the credit for dif-
:fusing "among a numerous race of pupils, a liber lity of sentiments, 
1. Mathieson, ~ ~·· P• 194• 
2. Loo. cit. 
3• Graham, Social Life, II, 188. 
4• See :McCosh, o~ cit., Art. VII. 
5• Graham, Social Life, II, 188. 
6. Tytler, .2l?.!_ cit., II, 225 
and a refinement of taste, unknmom before in t hi s part of the island. 11 1 
In the University of Edinburgh this influence was to be seen in the 
type of instruction and stimulation given by men enthusiastic toward 
the study of the humanities and fond of "refinement of. taste." One 
of these was Sir John Pringle, Professor of Moral Philosophy and la-
ter President of the Royal Society of London1 and another 1 Dr. 
Stevenson1 Professor of Logic~ Stevenson, especially1 is credited 
with infusing the love of literature into his students. To his "valu-
able prelections (particularly his illustrations of Aristotle's Poetics 
and Longinus on the Sublime) Dr. Robertson ~Blair's frie~~ has often 
been heard to say, that he considered himself more deeply indebted,. 
than to any other circumstance in his academical studies."2 He was, 
strangely enough1 "regarded:; as a dull man" but he evidently had gifts 
of a teacher to an uncommon degree: 
••• he had the merit of converting a class, which had 
for ages been esteemed a very dry one, into a school 
of criticism and belles lettres, whilst logic and 
metaphysics were by no means neglected. He was the 
better entitled to striko into a new course that in 
those days there was no professor of rhetoric in the 
University ••• & was amonl~ the first of his brethren 
that gave lectures in English which he found abso-
lutely necessary in pointing out the beauties of 
the English classics and comparing them with those 
of the ancients • • •• If Mr. Stevenson's lectures on 
critical subjects were less elegant and scientific 
than those of Dr. Blair, he was certainly one of the 
first professors in Scotland who called the attention 
of pupils to matters of taste, and connected the 
compositions of Greece and Rome with those of modern 
time.3 
Both Robertson and Blair were pupils of Stevenson's, finding in his 
1. 
2. 
3· 
Stewart, ~ cit., P• 3• 
Ibid., P• 4• 
Ramsay of Ochtertyre, ~~ cit., I, 23. 
I 
l 
classes the beginning of their interest in literature: "Stevenson was 
indeed a fosterer of letters in those days and seems to have awakened 
the love of what was beautiful in the minds of his more susceptible 
students. Blair, like Roberts on, owed his literary inspiration to the 
same master~ and at the age of' sixteen wrote an Essay on ~Beautiful, 
which Stevenson ordered to be read at the close of' the Session."l 
These professors mentioned above~ however, were not the only ones 
who advanced the state of learning and instruction in the universities,, 
alithough their work comes closest to our interests in this inquiry • 
• There were many other men of n'aarly ~qual fatne and some of more solid 
accomplisrm1ent even than Hutcheson, who labored in other fields of ~n-
quiry, the most distinguished among them being Colin ~~claurin, the 
mathematician and follower of Newton, whose popule.rization of the New-
tonian philosophy was one of the publications that served to disseminate, 
the idea of a harmonious, law-governed universe which permeates so much 
eighteenth cent~y thinking. His more formal work is highly regarded 
among the classics of rr:a.thematics. As the century went on (Maclaurin 
died in 1746), other noted men held chairs in the universities, among 
them Joseph Black, the chewist; David and James Gregory, professors of 
mathematics and medicine; ~Qlliam Cullen, professoe of medicine; Blair, 
Ferguson, Smith, Reid, e.nd ~thers whom we have mentioned. 11 ••• In course 
of time in every department, especially in philosophy, science, and 
medicine, the universities were abreast or in advance of their age."2 
However, with all this progress from moribund education to lively 
intellectual effort, there W8.fl still much to lJe desired in the 
1. Watson, ~· cit., P• 167. 
2. Graham, _££• cit., II, l?• 188. 
universities: "The new era in university teaching was certainly not to 
be attributed to the material equipment and organization of the colle ges. 
The buildings were for the most part exceedingly shabby and inadequate; 
teachers were overvrorked and s o poorly paid in salaries and fees that they 
resorted to taking students into their homes as boarders.111 The students 
themselves were very poor for the most part, and even wealthy students 
could live for very little, In those days was evidently founded the 
Scottish tradition that the poorest boy could have a university education, 
on a bursary if by no other means.. For another thing, there was a good 
deal of moral supervision, ev13n in the later part of the century.. In 
the early years life in a monastery could have been hardly more strait-laced, 
but the general moderating influences of the age loosened some of these 
bonds. Yet, 11far on in the century the scholars were required to attend 
the College Church in Glasgow, and their ways, t heir speech, and their 
morals were carefully watched., guarded, and chastened."2 Beyond these 
two dravrbacks 1 there was a t e,ndenc e toward nepotism: 
The total absence of C:ci!Il11issions and of interference 
from without during the g:rea ter part of the eighteenth, 
and the flirst quarter of the present, century made the 
Universities ••• intensely local. The professoriate were 
left undisturbed to develop idiosyncracies, ahd they took 
full advantage of thei r opportunity by giving nepotism 
full sway. Chairs were handed down from father to son, 
or from uncle to nephew, as if a professorship were as 
much a heredity ri ght as a seat in the House of Lords. 
The Universities, in fact, became family affairs.3 
1-. Bryson, E.e_• ~·• P• 8. 
2. araham, Social Life, II, 185• 
3• Bulloch, ~· cit.,p. 234• 
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The picture we get of the universities, then, is one of gradual 
emergence from desuetude and r eaction into f ull light of an intellectual 
renaissance--an emergence which was not completed, however 1 in all re-
spects during the eighteenth century. But still we see a loosening of 
the fetters, and realize that this progress must have filled those who 
participated in it with a mee.E:ure of pride for which they can surely 
be pardoned.! Campbell and Bl air were students at the be .gi.nning of this 
awakening--Campbell attending the Marischal in the 1740's and Blair the 
University of Edinburgh in the 1730's--so that they participated in the 
first burgeoni.ngs; and they knew as well the shabbyJI run-down buildings, 
the impossibly dull and hidebound lectures of some of the older professors, 
the smooping restrictions on their conduct. As t ime went on and they be-
came honored members of their universities, they came to play a most active 
share in the broadening intellectual activities in ·which the instut utions 
played a large part. As a consequence, we can safely say that the re-
naissance of the univ-ersities added its bpt to the thin..ldng of Blair 
and Campbell, contributing a. share to their feeling of living in an 
age and society of enlightennwnt and intellectual accomplishment. As 
well, it seems reasonably certain that the habits c1f didacticism, of 
organizing material according to topics 1 and of preserving moderation 
in opinion1 habits whidh we :3ee in their ·written works, quite possibly 
could be correlated with their lengthy services as professors. 
1. This pride is evidenced in, such contemporaries as Alexander 
Carlyle, Dugald Stewart, and Alexander Tytler in t he works cited. 
v. The Literacy Background 
As all good students are supposed to do, our critics built on the 
foundations laid by such teachers as Hutcheson and Stevenson to become 
very learned men in their ma~:;ure years. ·~Reading through their critical 
works alone we are frequent ly confounded by the wealth of references which 
indicate a really intimate acquaintance with a wide variety of authors 
from many times and countries. Yfe mi ght be even more amazed if we paused 
to remember that Blair and Campbell must have spent a large part of their 
livas stud~'ing theolo~ and. Kames in studying the law. Furthermore, none 
of them was averse to dipping into fields of knowledge which we would 
ordinarily consider quite f•lreign to their central interests: ·it will be 
remembered that Kames was a deep student of agricultuee, for example. 
Yet the range and depth of their literary background would do ample ere-
dit to a professional man of letters at any time. It would therefore be 
probably quite legitimate to spend some time here in discussing this back-
ground, if only to become better acquainted with the breadth of these men • 
. 
But quite naturally, they drew many of their ideas directly from their 
readingJ the genres in which they were at home helped to mold their tastes; 
omissions from their background are undoubtedly significant--in short, 
there are discernible patterns in this literary background which help 
us to understand these critics better. 
Kames' reading affords perhaps the most interesting problem of 
the three; as Miss Randa l l points out, where did he find the timet 
In Elements of Criticism alone he shmvs an intimate acquaintance 
with some 130 authors; Greek, Latin, French, Spanish, English,. This 
erudition is, however, not paraded or dragged in by the heels to im-
press us, but is handled easily and aptly as perfectly natural to the 
author. Even more important than the number of writers with whom he is 
acquainted is the fa.rniliari ty with "individual v;ri ters. For example, 
there are forty-eight referenees to Homer., fifty-three to Pope and the 
same number to Vir gil, tvrenty··fi ve to Racine., and tvw hundred thirty-nine 
to Shakespeare. Kames cites !he Spectator twenty-seven times, and 
Paradise Lost, f'orty-one, while Horace's Odes receive twenty-four ci ta-
tions. Beyond this, Kames 1 r eading covered such diverse subjects as are 
to be found in Demetrius Phalereus' On Style., Hakluyt's Voyages., and 
Montesquieu's De L'Esprit ~- Loix. Moreover, in the Elements there are 
passing references to such we ll-knovm people as La Grange-Chancel, Ben-
jamin Hoadly., and John Scott, with whom., I must confess, I am not fami-
liar. Still., with all this there are soma startling omissions: only one 
reference to Spenser and one to Chaucer., no reference to Fielding or to 
Greene, Nashe, and Peele, no~hing about John Donne or Herbert, Cr ashaw 
and Vaughan,although there a.:re seventy-two references to the Restoration 
drama and plentiful citations from Dryden and Waller. In all this, of 
course., Kames simply shows t he motes in ei ghteenth cent~y eyes; it 
would, in fact, be really more startling if he had reversed the places 
of Chauder, and Butler., for example., who still receives only mine fefer-
ences .1 To the critics of t .he eighteenth cent~n-y , Chaucer was a natu-
ral poet who simply did not know the rules of versification, t his misap-
prehension in turn being duet to their lack of knowledge about Chaucer's 
English. It was equally standaed practice to ignore the metaph~sical 
1. Bishop Hurd did in fact produce such a surprise when he defended 
the ro~zntic writings of chivalry., and particul arly., Spenser's portrayals 
of e. romantic world in the :Letters on Chivalry and Ro~znce. See the in-
-;roduction in the edition by Edith J. Morley, London., 1911. 
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poets of the seventeenth century~ whose conceits and harsh lines fell 
unpleasantly on ears accustomed to neo-classical wit and cadences. And 
we are all familiar >rlth the good office which Charles Lamb did us when 
he revived the predecessors and contemporaries of Shakespeare. It is 
consequently quite in order t ;hat Kames should have made some of the 
above omissions, and there appears to be nothing personally eccentric 
in his slighting any of the writers who we consider are the flowers of 
English literature. 
All in -all~ we might summarize Kames's sources for citation and il-
lustztat~ . i:nsomewhat the f ollowing way: (1) The classics: Homer~ Vergil~ 
Horace~ etc •. ~~th a good deal of the critics and Bhetoricians such as 
Quintilian, Cicero~ Dionysi.us of Halicanarssus, Demetrlims Phalereus, etc. 
(2) The great geniuses of English literature: Shakespeare and Milton~ (3) 
Representatives of the neo-classical tradition:Pope, Swift, Dryden~ and 
the French: CDrneille~ Racine~ Moliere, (~_) The dramatists of the Resto-
ration~ (5) Contemporary critics and historians--it is ineereating to 
note that the novelists, pC>ets., and dramatists of his own era get little 
or no mention: no Collins ,. Gray, Young: none of Steele or Lillo's dra.:mas. 
Beyond these five categorh~s there are of course some miscellaneous re~ 
ferences,. but on the whole Kames shows us a pattern of heavily classical 
and conservative reading lightened by his appreciation of. really great 
works. It should also be noted here that we are not saying that he al-
ways approves of the writers whom he cites--Congreve and Dryden, for in-
stance, are censured in several places--but the mere fact that he refers 
to some writers again and a gain while he apparently had never paid any 
attention to others is probably si gnificant. Later on we shall attempt 
to interpret this more specifically, but for now let us say that Kames' 
wide reading still shows a definite pattern although he re.nged over a 
very t~:ide field and devoured a great deal of literature. 
It might be to the poi nt here to note an interesting analysis of 
a library1 owned by a lord of session whose work was very lime Kames •. 
This le gal laird shows us s ome intriguing similarities in his tastes to 
those we have discussed above . For instande, among his books are the 
works of Pope and Parnell, but nothing by Gray, Cgwper~ or Collins. He 
has editions of the English classics:. Shakespeare and Milton, but no 
fiction. Unli~e Kames he has all the Scots--Ferguson, Robertson, Kames , 
even Hume, whereas Kames only refers to himself and Hume briefly. They 
both count Ossian among their reading, as all good Scots of the century 
were almost impelled to do: but there is nothing by such poets as Allan 
Ramsay or William Hamilton of Bangour or Robert Fergusson, who are 
gene~ally accounted to be t he most interesting predecessors of Burns in 
Scottish popular poet ry, bu"j:; who seem to have been looked on as rude rus-
tic bards by the literati of' the age. Kames was evidently unusual prin-
cipally in his thoroughness and his knowledge of comtemporary foreign 
literatures. 
Although ~'lair is ri ght ly considered a follower of Kames, he shows 
a more catholic taste in hi s references and illustrations in the Lectures 
en Rhetoric and Belles Le·ttr es. We do see citations from Young and 
Fielding and Smollett; the Bible is referred to mor e frequently; Allan 
1. Ja.mas Fergus s on, nThe Laird's Boi:!ks,n Cornhill Magazine, CLVI, 
July 1937, PP• 90-96• 
Ramsay receives mention. Of course, Collins~ Gray~ and Smart are nowhere 
mentioned; but we do see Shenstone~ Dyer, Young~ and Thomson from the ranks 
of the "pre-romantics • 11 Blair finds in wri tars of sermons such as Barrow 
and Tillotson good examplers of l fucid and perspicuous style~ but he natu-
rally ignores the metaphysical poets. We know from Hill that Blair read 
a great deal of history~ making abstracts and chronological tables, that 
II 
he was fond of accounts of voyages and travels~ and especially that few 
people were more conversant i n novels and remano.es than Dr. Blair."l 
Needless to say~ it was not the 11 love of amusement which they are fitted 
to bestow~ that attracted the attention of Dr. Blair" but : rather the 
moral instruction to be derivEld from them.2 Still, the greatest moral 
romancer in the language does not receive even the one reference found 
in Kames,3 and Chaucer as we l l is omitted entirely from the Lectures. 
One interesting divergence f r om Kames is tn the amount of space devoted 
to the French writers: where Kames censures them frequently for weakness, 
Blair disposes of Corneille and R~cine in two short paragraphs. He di~, 
however, criticize Voltaire' s Henriade at considerable length, 
Because of the broader sc ope of Blair's references, it is impos-
sible to categorize his readi ng on the basis of what he excluded as 
we did with Kames: it is rather a matter of degree. Although he men-
tions 141 authors in the course of his lectures, the bulk of his cita-
tions are drawn from two very different sources: the ancient and modern 
1. John Bill, _££• cit • ., P• 20. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3• This is surprising because the 11 pre-romanticn poets cited by Blair 
were very fond of Spenser (See, for example, Henry Beers, !_History of 
E11g_lish Romanticism i_g ~Eighteenth Century, New York, 1898); and as-
tonishin~ in view of Blair's possession of a six-volume edition of Spenser's 
works. (See Bryson, ~· clbt., P• ll2n.) 
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classicists, that is to say, t he true classics and the ei ghteenth century 
ne e-classics; and 11 romantic 11 ··r.ritings s uch as Ossian, the romances, and 
novels. This . is entirely a r la.tive matter j nevert hele ss ; and about the 
only safe conclusions which c n be drawn from this readin g are that Blair, 
like most of his contemporaries , was almost completely unaware of Eliza-
bethan literature except Shakespeare, that he l eaned heavily on classical 
and neo-classical v.rritirig, and that in several places we see a liberality 
of taste toward :rn.any works which we would label "pr e-romantic.•• 
With G·ampbell, we see r:nwh the sli'lh€J situation, allowing for indivi-
dual differences and objective. He refers most fre quently to the classi-
cal rhetoricians rather than t o Homer and Vergil--his most frequent au-
thority is Quintilian, with Ci cero follovnng close behind, b~t this is 
not surprising in that he is more concerned with such matters as style 
and perspicuity than he is ·with instances of the beautiful and sublime. 
This concern may also account for the large nt~er of quotations and 
illustrations f rom neo-clasEica l authors. The Specte:~~~· !£he_ Guardian, 
Swift, and Pope appear much · ~or3 frequently in Campbell's pages than 
they do in those of Blair or Kames; in f act Svnft and The Spectator are 
quoted more than any others throughout the first two books of The Philo-
sophy of Rhetoric. Even Bolingbroke is referred to a large number of 
times. In the third book, ampbell finds excellent usa in the Bible for 
illus trations, particular ly f or vivacity in writing. It is a trifle in-
teresting to note that Campbe ll, who was quite orthodox and a professor 
of divinity moreover, should have made so much more use of the Bible in 
his writing on rhetoric tha did the "moderate" preacher Blair. 
80. 
Beyond these works which bulk four or five times as large in the list of 
citations 1 there are the usua l references to :Milton, Shakespeare, the 
dramatists of the Restoration, Dryden, Shaftesbury, and numerous others; 
but the great writers are surprisingly less frequent than we might an-
ticipate. In their place we occasionally find people of the stature: 
of Hawkesworth, the travel writer., or 11 Hudibras"· Butler. The reason 
for thms apparent neglect of t he masters of literature is pr obably in the 
object of Campbell's book--h finds in lesser writers in relatively pure 
form the sort of errors and · rtues which he ·wishes to point out in par-
ticular pa s sages, whthout th ir beine; mixed With others: passages from 
Shakespeare Ythich could be eited for m~xed figures of speech might fre-
quen·bly prove to have such other virtues as to obscure the point comple-
tely; for Campbell riehness i s often not an advantage. 
Be that as it may, Campb1~ ll 1 s references are at the core very si-· 
milar to Ble.ir 's which are i turn very much like Kames '. Natura lly, 
each of these men ha s differ :nt emphases, due to differing tastes and 
objecti yes , and also each includes ·writers ·which the others ignore 
(although we ahould c aution urselvew that i gnoring does not necessari-
ly mean i gnorance ) • They shmv a due respect for the masters of Engl ish 
literature ., but are usually e glectful or censorious toward moderns of 
other literatures~ and the ar·s inclined favorably t oward the Au~stan 
literature of their mrm century. They are acquainted with all the cri-
tics, grammarians , phi losop ers, and rhetoricians who have vvritten on 
their subjects; the fundamEJ tal basis of their reading is the classics. 
81 . 
I n particular it behooves us t o look more clear ly at this las t and to 
inquire into the reasons for t he classical bias; it is one of the n;tost 
evident characteristics of the early eighteenth century, of course; and 
as we shall see later, it had a considerable impact on the criticism 
which was produced by t he Scot s . The classical bias or classi cal basis. 
however , should not be confus d with classical learning. The cultured 
gentleman of the eighteenth century was expected to know his Latin, but 
not to be a scholar of the classics. As J. A. K. Thompson says about 
Richard BentfJ.t·· : 11But if he brought the supremacy in classical scholarship 
to England he a lso divorced i t from literature, not because he himaelf 
was devoid of literary gifts - -for he v~ote very well--but because he set 
the standard too high for th ordinary man of letters. Henceforward we 
have the professional scholar on the one hand and the profess i onal au-
thor on the other."l Nevert;hE~ less, ~would probably consider that the 
man of letterw in the eighteenth century possessed a tremendous store 
of classical information and that it colored his outlook on literature 
in general. Thompson goes o : "A man who would be ashamed to say he 
had not read Horace or Tibul l us would not be shamed to say he had not 
read Chaucer or Spenser. That is a state of things that continued much 
longer than might be supposed, and it must be kept steadily in mind by 
anyone who wishes to understand why the ait erature of the ei ghteenth 
2 
century pursued the course it did.tt This is even true in reference to 
1. J.A.K. Thompson. The Classical Background of English Literature, 
New York: Macmillan, 19~p: 201. 
2-'. Ibid •• P• 209. 
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writers who are thought to shmv strong 11 pre-romantic 11 tendencies and il-
lustrates the persistence of l der modes of thought and expression at the 
same time that newer ones were being developed. For instance, in Gray~ 
English poetry ,.\lis clas sical nowled ge is everywhere evident; while the 
Elegy has an English sit·bing, "the sentiments and t heir expression re-
member the classics at every turn." Also in some of Gray's poems there 
appears to be more direct evidence of the classics; 11The HymJ:l, ~ Adver-
si ty 1 which has a special i nterest a:~ havi ng suggested Wordsworth's Ode 
to Duty, was itself pretty c l early suggested by some lines to Bemesis· by 
:Mesomedes, a Greek poet of t hH second century. 11 1 In the prose of the 
century, moreover, the influence of the classics is almost univer sall y 
discernible:. "That these writ ers /-Johnson, Gibbon, et. al.i of the. 
later eighteenth century lea ned a great deal from t he classics is car-
tain. Johnson's head was f ul l of Latin words and turns of phrase; Gibbon's 
'classical background' is t he great fact of his life; Burke was steeped 
i n Cicer onian oratory."2 
With the Scots this st eping process began early and continued · : 
throughout their lives. 
1. Loc. cit.,, Wbile I believe that these statements are sub-
stantially accurate, it should be noted that Gray was a scholar pra-
marily, and also that such analysis of direct author-to-author in-
fluence is always to be taken with a grain of salt. 
2. Ibid., P• 214. 
.A.fter children had been at a.n English or "vulgar" so-hool 
for two years, they wer e at the age of nine passed into· 
the gra.nnnar school, where they were plunged at once: into 
classics, and during t air four years' attendance gained 
an amount of classical knowledge to which ordinary uni-
versity students to-day certainly do not att ain; a pro-
ficiency was then re gar ded so sufficient that there were 
no professors of Humanity appointed or "considered ne-
cessary" in the universitjes a.t the beginning of the 
century. At the llge of twelve or thirteen (sometimes 
even at eleven years old), many passed into the colleges 
where the lectures were delivered in Latin.l 
We have seem above2 that the curriculum was mainly philosophy a.nd that 
the classics were subsumed as a foundation for learning rather than as 
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learning itself. In the 1750 's, shortly before Blair and Campbell be-
came professors, Latin was d opped from the curriculum for a. time un-
til popular demand brought i t back.3 Of course, the reason for this 
is the amount of study of the classics which went on in the classics 
before he entered the Univer sity at alle 114 For example, Thomas Rud-
dim.an tells us about the curriculum of the Edinburgh High School, the. 
five year schedule of the Ordo Scholae Gra.mmaticae Ediniensis: 
3rd Through the whole of the third year ;-after leaiming the language 
Class in the first tvt~~; the boys were to-repeat daily a portion of the 
etymolo57 and syntax; to be exercised in reading Cicero's Epistles 
De Senectute, de .Ami.oi.tia; Terence's Comedies and Ele gies; Ovid's Tristium 
rsic J Buchanan's Psalms; and to translate Cicero's Epistles. They W!lre 
~0 read the s:rmna clar l:l. voce. 
4th In the fourth year; the boys were to repeat daily, for the first 
Class month, what t hey ha.d already learned. To be taught Buchanan's 
1. Graham, Social Life, II, 177• 
2. P• 38~ --
3• Bulloch, op. cit., P• 
4• Schmitz, op. 'CT-f., PP • 8-9 from 
Ruddima.n, London;-1794; PP• 88-90• 
George Chalmers, The Life of Thomas 
Prosody, with Despauter's Select Rules 1 and Buchanan's Epi-
grams and Poetry. Duri ng the other months, the boys were to be 
exercised in poetry, and in the practice of the rules of grammar; 
to read Virgil, Ovid's Metamorphoses~ Horace, Buchanan's Psalms; 
and to translate Cicero, Caesar, and Terence. The beauties of 
these authors were to be explained to the scholars. 
5th In the fifth year; the boys were to study the whole Rhetoric of 
Class Tulaeus (Tully) and the greater part of the compendius Rhe-
toric of Cassandeus. They were to read Cicero's Orations, and the 
short speeches in Sallust 1 in Virgil, and in Luoai. They were to 
read distinctly and audibly; and were to declaim. 
It is certainly not surprisi ,g that, while the Scottish literary gentleman 
might not be a scholar in the technical sense 1 he was very well versed in 
literature of Rome, although. it should be noted that a great deal of his 
studies were pedantic and r hetorical. 
Another aspect of t hi s classical background which is quite impDrtant 
is its predominantly Latin l ant. " ••• the eighteenth century whole-hearted-
ly aoc~pted the classical tradit ion so far as it understood it ••• Of all the 
centuries of our literature it is the most Latin in temper and outlook ••• 
If we were to nama the aut hor who most strongly appealed to it, we could 
hardly avoid naming Horace . The 'correctness' of that poet, his humorous 
common sense, his interest in man r ather than in naturt:,- his distrust of 
fanaticism all have their r eflection in what is on the whole the most suc-
n2 
cessful and characteristic work of the century. For the Scots we nd ght 
have to substitute Cicero or Quintilian, perhaps, because of their impor-
tance as rhetorical fount ai nheads 1 but the essentiallpropositian is the 
same. "Classical" background means "Latinn almost exclusively . To be sure, 
the Scottish 1i terati were not unacquainted 1rl th Greek, but only the inind-
table Monboddo could properly be called Attic in his outlook. "LThe 
1. Schmitz, .2£• cit. , PP• 8-9• From C".e orge Chalmers, The Life of T~s 
Ruddiman, London, 17§4; PP• 88-90. 
2. Thomson, .2£.• .21!,• , I, 227. 
ei ghteenth cent~was rhetorical in its taste and never quite understood 
the reticence of the Attic st le ."1 Of all the poets, Collins alone comes 
close to understanding the genlus of the Greeks, but on the whole the "Latin 
.l 112 manner prevaJ. s • In prose, Addison shov1s us the most Attic style; and, 
as we havw noticed, he was very popular with the Soots. It is his influ-
ence, almost alone, which gives us what elements of Greek elegance and 
ease we find in the Scots or es poused by them as de sirable critical tenets; 
A taste for polite lite:rature,had, hovrever, begun gradually to di_. 
f fuse itself in Scotland, even from the time of the publication of." 
the Tatlers, Spectator:, and Guardians; and, as in England, the ef-
fect of those writings :and more particularly of the papers of Addison, 
was conspicuous in substituting an ease and elegance of composition 
as a more engaging vehi.cle for subjects of taste, in the room of 
the dry scholastic styl e in which they had hitherto been treated; 
so, in Scotland, the at t ention of our youth, fresh from their aca-
demical studies which yet retained a strong tincture of the ancient 
school dialectics, was insensibly atnra3ted to the more pleasing 
topics of criticism and belles lettres. 
Yet strangely enough, Addisonrs own Attic quality came rather ufrom Sir 
William Temple and Dryden" t han from the Greek masters, and both his English 
predecessors and he "gained V•3ry much from their French studies. For French 
literature, at least in its prose, has more of an Attic quality than that 
114 
of any other modern nation. As a result of this indirectness, the Scots 
. 
were quite naturally less inclined toward the Greek virtues than the 
Latin which had been drilled into them throughout their entire schooling. 
L. Ibid., P• 210. 
2. Loo; cit. 
3• Tytler, OE.:_ cit., I, vol.l., P• 227. 
4• Thomson, ~ ~·· P• 222. 
So much then, for the literary background of our critics. When we 
come to formulate their criticeLl principles, we shall be more specific 
85a.. 
in noting the influence of vari ous critics and rhetoricians, yet even new 
it is apparent that Blair, Kam s,end Gampbell found i n the classics of 
Rome and the writings of the Augustan age in England a great deal that 
appealed to them. Not that they were Unaware of other writings, by any 
means, for we have seen how thoroughly they were versed in such men as 
Shakespeare, Milton, and Ossian.; rather the picture we get is one of fair 
catholicity but with the emphas ls on the classical. It is the sort of li-
terary background which might well be expected in an era moving from pre-
occupation with the classics t o greater interest in the moderns. 
86. 
vi. Scot.tish Brahmins 
All of the foregoing--th life of the clubs and societies, the li-
terary friendships, the pursui.t of learning--took place within a very 
definite social milieu which can be held broadly accountable for some 
of the ideas and preoudices o:r our critics. We should probably be wary 
of"unmasking ideologies 1' to f:lnd in Kames, for instance, that his a.ris-
tocratic notion of taste derives from his social position, but I feel 
that it would be almost as unwise to ignore completely the fact that all 
three of our critics moved in ·the very highest social circles and were 
untainted by democratic ideas . And also it is important that two of our 
critics were melJi.bers of a cler gy so influential as almost to oonstitutle 
the ruling caste of Scotla.nd, while the third was a member of the equi-
valent to our Sup~eme Court i n its dealings with criminal cases. It is 
to a brief discussion of the characteristics of this social milieu that 
we now turn. 
The aristocracy to which lair, Kames, and Campbell belonged was not 
so considered inttheir day; f or such terms were reserved for the nobility of 
Scotland, with whom, however, :all of the men, and parti cularly Blair, were 
on fairly intimate terms. But the literati, as they are more usually 
called, coming though they did usually from middle class families, still 
formed a conscious class. Not till the end of the century was there to be 
a sharing of "the l~C?ve of lette rs and the talk of books"l with ordinary 
1. A. s. Collins, The Profession 2£ Letters, 1780-1832, New York; 
Dutton, 1928. 
people from the lower walks of life: and one of the more remariable as-
pacts of Burns' career was hi success in the social life of Edinburgh~ 
for it would have been more u. ual for him to be appr eciated as a plow-
man-poet but contemned as a crude rustic. Perhaps t he @Sneral poverty 
and dirt of Scotland is in par t responsible for the emphasis on elegance? 
and taste among this intelleotl~a 1 upper crust: ce!3tainly they were sur-
1 
rounded by squalor. At any r at e, the general tendency was to empha-
size the virtues of an upper ~Lddle class intelligentsi a rather than the 
self-assured canons of an in;nri ted aristocracy or t he 11 natural11 virtues 
of the lower classes. From thoir biographies we can see that our critics 
and their contemporaries stemm d from small landowner s or long lines of 
ministers and teachers: Kame s ' family, for a matter of fact, was quite 
poor, but of good stock. He c msidered this fortunat e in that it gave; 
him incentive :2 we might say t hat his position was st ill not such as 
to make his progress difficult .. Both Blair and Campbell came from minis-
terial families where respecta i lity and intelli gence predominated, but 
certainly not wealth. They al l had to work hard at t heir careers in or-
der to bring about the conspicuous success which they realized, but none 
of them was ever in want, nor did their. efforts go unrewarded and unrecog-
nized like those of some greater literary men: they knew neither the tri-
bulations of Rohnson, nor the disappoi ntments of Hume as his efforts 
1. Boswell tells of visiting the High Church (Blair's) which was 
"shamefully dirty11 and how Rohns on usaid nothing at the time, but when 
we came to the great door of t he Royal .l nfirmary, where upon a board 
was this inscripti on, 'Clean yot-U" _ Feet ~~ 't , he turned about slyly and 
said, •There is no occasion for putting this at the door s of your 
churches! '" (Boswell, Tour to ·t;he Hebrides, P• 25). 
2. Tytler, ~· cit.-;-I; 2. ·--
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"fell-dead-born from the pres <: . nl It is probably fortunate in one way 
that none of our critics tri::e c1 to make his way by letters alone; for they 
would qwt.te likely Iia.ve gene t he way of Johnson's poor friend Savage~, or 
Robert Heron~ Blair's onetime etssistant who turned to literary hacking 
and drink and poverty, or Will iam Smellie who wrote most of the first 
edition of the Encyclopedia Br:~ta~nica and seldom had two shirts to his 
2 
name. To be sure, after 176o or so there was a good market for serious 
works 1 vide Blair 1 s Sermons wht ch brought him some 1850 p.oun~ in cash 
and helped procure his pension of 250 pounds a year from t h? Cr own .3 But 
such success was both unusual e.nd unreliable: in Bnrke 1 s nove14 one ca:m 
see a vivid picture, historica l ly quite accurate, of the general condi-
tions of the literary hacks of Edinburgh. On the whole, the great in-
terest in literature around t h middle of the century was only to be 
laid to 11 hPPe of fame or the i n-spiration of genius~ for the "trade of' 
Authorship was unknown in Scotl1m d; and the rank which that country had 
ee.rly acquired among the learned nations of Europe~ had 1 for many years, 
been sustained by a small number of eminent men. 11 .5 " They were primarily 
'\ 
cler gyme n or politicians for the greater part of the time •· and learning 
and writing were to them recreat i on; because to them 'vita sine literis 
mors est' as Robertson prefixed to his note-books."6 
In the persons of our thre critics we are concerned with two 
1. David Hwne~ ~ Own Life, preface t~ An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding, LaSalle, Ill.: Optm Court "'Ublishing Co., P• vii. 
2. See Graham, Men of Letters, P• 10.5. 
3• Schmitz, _££• cit:; P• 84. 
4• See P• 17n• 
.5· Stewart, op. cit., P• ~ .• 
6. Collins,~· cit., P• 37• 
different classes of this soci ety:. the law and the clergy, with the; cha.rac-
teristics of the latter somew .at more important in general influence, 
"Although the Bar was the 'pre serve' or men of rank and fortuna, fashion 
and leisure, with whom cultur and taste might be expected to abound"l 
not as many men of law appear :in a list of the 1i terati of the age as men 
of the cloth. But at least t hree jud@es are distinguis hed as literary 
men: Lord Hailes, Lord Monboddo., and Lord Kames. Their profession was 
esteemed as being of a "liberal nature" and·,-was filled with men of good 
birth, the law being ttdeemed a "'Very useful piece of education, even for 
the son 
2 
of first families. n ·when Kames was a young Iran, he had visited 
Dalrymple, the President of the Session, and had found in that jurist's 
honors and affluence sufficient reason to choose the attorney-judge 
branch of the law. rather than t he work of Writer to the Signet, which 
provided competence b;ut not pos :i"l;ion.3 Somewhat like some of their 
clerical compatriots, the legal literati found their avocation taking 
precedence in their interests over their vocation, although Kames, un-
like Monboddo, did not refuse t > work as circuit judge because it inter·- · 
fered with his literary pursuits .LJ. Another aspect of their position in 
society is implied by Ramsay whe J:J. he says that most of the jurists were· 
trained in Holland, adopted cont inental fashions and manners, and always· 
1. Graham, Man of Letters, P• 37• 
2. Tytler, ~· cit., I, 11. 
3• Loc. cit. 
4• Knight, ~· ~·~ P• 54• 
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looked down a bit afterward on. the provincial ways and speech of their 
1 
countrymen. In short, the l egal gentlemen of ei ghteenth century Scot -
land were in fact, and felt t emselves to be, members of the elite. 
Some of them, like Kames, had made their way by di~t of their own efforts 
whereas others came from privileged families; but once the position of 
judge of the Court of Session vas reached a man could rightly re ga~d him-
self as one of the privile ged <>rders, _no matter what hl.s beginnings. 
And i t is only natural t hat moe:t of them were conservative in politics· 
and religion and cultl.llfe; yet :heir conservatism was not reaction, for 
2 Kames instituted his personal c hanges into the procedures of the courtroom, 
and most of the judiciary were Moderates in religion. 
This Moderatism is one of t;he more important phenomena of the age; 
for most of the clergy, includi:ng Blair 1 who were n oted for U .terary tastes, 
were members of the Moderate pa;rty; and even Campbell, who was undeniably 
orthodox in theology and could hardly be termed a Moderate in that way, 
was. tinctured by sentiments of liberality or he would not have produced 
~Philosophy !2!._ Rhetoric. It j_ s the distinguishing mark of the literary 
clergy, the reason why such men a s Blair and Roberts.on are known as writers 
rather than ministers, the reas on for their writings being in the i'ie.lds 
of rhetoric and history instead of homiletics and church history, their 
password to the society of the ttltured. It was the typical' eighteenth 
century reactDon against the narrow and sometimes fanatic beliefs · of 
an earlier age, the religious str ictness and "inquisitori al discipline" 
1. Ramsay of Ochtert;y-re, ~· -~·· I, 182. 
2. Ibid., I, 189, 191• 
of the :o~d··.Kirk. It did not go unopposed, for the party of the "High-
Flyersn took every opportunity to embarrass t he Moderates--a good exam.•· 
ple being the cause celebre of Kames' trial in company V'Ji th Hume; yet 
"it had for a time such unque s o.. ioned master y of a high-spirited Church 
that it could carry out its policy, even on the most costly terms, and 
in the end almost without e. pr otest."l The "High-flyers"· had to give 
ground slowly despite their be ing in the legitimate line of descent--
the spirit of perfervidum. inge~  of Scots religion. 
By the middle of the ceiO.tury the once despised and. repro-
bated nle gal" or moral :?reachers had increased so as to 
form the party of t he "FEoderates," which became the most 
prevailing, ablest, and dominant class of clergy i n 
Scotland. MOst of the literary and cultured clergy be-
longed to that class, t hose of most practical energy, 
shrewdest to· advance improvements in~ trade and agri-
culture and sagacious advisers of their flocks on week-
days, and lvise teachers of duties o~ Sunday~ Tories in 
politics, they were str ng in carrying out the law on 
patronage2, indifferent to the scruples of the popular 
clergy and to the wishe::: of the people; they cared for 
no 11 high-flying1! Their :i.deal virtue was a sanctified 
common sense, and they .ere sedatives to all enthusiasm. 
They taught solidly fronL the pulpit the duties of every-
day honesty, charity, go<>d neighborhood without stir-
ring a. pulse .3 
As Mathieson says, they "were humanists rather than di~ines 114 and they 
found their principal work in c ombating the "i lliberality of sentimentn 
of the older clergy who were so strait-laced as to thrmv up hands in 
~ 
1. Watson, ~· cit., P• 153 • 
2. This law placed the power of appointment in the hands of the 
clergy and nobility who frequently forced ministers on unwilling 
congregations in order to consolidate their ecclesia.sticd1 polity. 
The Moderatew. were very determined on this point; a~istocra.ts in tem-
perment, they were "indifferent t o t he wishes of the people. 11 
3• Graham, Social Life, II, 89. 
4• ~· cit., P• 19r;-
horror at the abomination of .John Home's solemn tragedy Douglas. 
The party was rooted in various places' the residuum of liberality 
which alwaY13 seems to exist e'lren in the midst of intoil.erance, the 1i beral 
theology of English and Irish Presbyterians (such as Hutcheson), and par-
ticularly in the uinfluence, Etmanating from England, which altered-at 
least for a time--the whole complexion of religion by causing it to be 
regarded from a novel, if not from an alien standpoint!! .. i.che benevoliist 
doctrine of Shaftesbury. It vdll be remembered also that Hutcheson, with 
his great influence, was the most distinguished adherent to Shaftesbury's 
general position, and a more ncute thinker. The result of these liberal 
sentiments was to broaden and humanize the church, at the same time that 
it lost some of its power to e:way the people. The irritation which these 
liberal ideas caused among the1 conservative clergy is well illustrated:. 
by John Witherspoon, later President of the College of New Jersey 
(Princeton) and signer of thEI Declaration of Independence. · As :Mathieson 
quotes him, he tells us of n ra plain and easy way of attaining to the 
character of a moderate man a e1 at present in repute in the Church of 
Scotland :. 11 
The aspirant to this distinction was desired "to take 
notice that it is an observation of Lord Shaftesbury 
that 'the best time f or thinking upon religious sub-
jects is when a man i s marry and in good humor'; and 
so far is this observed by many who have never heard 
of his lordship or his writings. n Thinking upon re-
ligion, when he thinks upon it at all, in this genial 
mood, 11the moderate di 'Irina will naturally befriend 
its reputed enemies, such as heretics--who are com-
monly able and learned--and men of loose life, 
1. Ibid., P• 190• 
particularly if their looseness takes the romance of good-
humored vices .•• Wickedne-s·s no more than [eresy can be 
combated till it is understood; and how is a minister : t o 
understand it "unless h e either practices it :himself (but 
much of that will not yet pas s in the world) or allows 
the wicked,·+ o be bold in his presence •" Sai l ors are known 
by their rolling gait, ·bailors by the shrug of their shoul-
ders; but a minister, mperior to such mean employments, 
should see that there i.s nothing to distingui sh him as 
such in his dress, his 1nanner, or his conversation--un-
less, indeed, he shoul d think it worth while t o argue uin 
an easy and genteel manner a gainst swearing.n l 
With a good deal more of' the s ame kind, the conservatives fought against 
what they conceived to be the wishy-washy and aristocratical tendenciea 
of the Moderates, but to littl e avail. Despite t hei r weakness es (and 
t he above certainly has more t han a mustard seed of' truth in it) the li-
beral clergy accomplished a good deal. Alexander Carly le enunciated their 
best defense before the Genera l Assembly when he thundered: 
Vfuo have v~ote the best histories, ancient and modern? 
It has been clergymen of thms Church. Who has v~ote 
the clearest delineati on of' the human understanding 
and all its powers?--a · (~ lergyman of' this Church? Who 
has v~i:tten the best S}t:stem of' rhetoric and exempli-
fied it by his own orat:L ons?--a clergyman of thi s 
Church. Who was the mo:>t profound mathematician of 
the age he lived in?--a. clergyman of this Church. 
Who wrote a tragedy thai; has been deemed perfect?--
e. clergyman of' t his Church. Viho vras the most profound 
mathematician of the age he lived in?--a clergyman 
of' this Church. 'Vnto is his successor in reputation 
a s in office? lfJho wrot the best treatise on agre-
culture? Let us not co .Ptain of poverty; for i t is 
a splendid poverty indeed . It is paupertas fecunda 
vivorum.2 
.'.Bes i des .... the.:acilomplisbmant of counting among its adherents such dis-
tinguished intellectuals, the ~bderate party achieved at least three 
1. Quoted in 1~thi e son1 ~· ~·~ PP• 205-206. 
2. Alexander CarlyJe, Auto iography, Edinburgh, 1860, P• 561. 
other results of importance t (' our inquiry. First, it became a powerful 
sociopolitical group. The c l ergy had always had a very strong hold on 
the life of the country, never having sunk in esteem as did the English 
clergy diring the eighteenth c:entury; and with so many eminent men in its 
ranks the leading party in t he churdh naturally swung a great deal of 
influence. Moreover, the poH tical situation conduced to increase this 
influence. After the Union with England in 1707, Scottish political in-
terest was at a very low ebb, the Scottish members in the English Parli-
m.ent having so little power t hat they might as well have stayed at home. 
Furthermore, London was a long; way from Edinburgh and it was difficult 
to drum up interest in the activitd..es of a legislative assembly which 
seemed to be practically in a foreign country. But Scotland did have a 
quasi-political body in the G~neral Assembly, the ecclesiastical legis-
ture,Which had sufficiently broad p~ere frequently to effect political 
results. Consequently, it bec}ame the forum for the di scussion of all 
sorts of issues;: and the Mode1~ates, having the lar gest number aritji the 
most brilliant members, natura lly dominated its meetings and its policies, 
with such men as Blair and Campbell taking a part, if not among the 
leaders at least in the middl1 benches. Second, the Moderates became the 
clergy of the nobility and gentry, vdth little contact with the people .. 
The comfortable doctrine of bl·eeding and p¢liteness paving the road to 
heaven was exactly suited to t he gay and fashionable set who attended 
Dr. Blair's High Church, and furthermore the eloquence and elegance 
with which this doctrine was s.dvanced s uited to the refined taste of the 
congre gation. The Moderates associated with the upper crust all week, 
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their interests in life were similar# to those of the gentry naturally 
they were disinclined to cond1lct borings into this pavement when Sunday 
came.l Third, perhaps because of the emphasis on good breeding and the 
social virtues# the Moderates and their secular friends show an impressive 
solidarity on which we have already commentea.2 It was a close-knit# 
self-assured society anyway, and Moderatism drew i t even closer to~ther. 
We would not say that the precepts of Moderate belief were the sole rea-
son for the "unbroken union" which prevailed among literary men; rather 
it was a strong bond of common sentiment which hel~d to cement these 
friendly relation&. 
Blair, Kames, and Campbe,ll, then, could well be termed Scottish Bra-
hmins without stretching Dr. Holmes' definition too far: while not waal-
thy# they were in comfortable circumstances during their mature years l' 
they were members of an assur ed intelli~ntsia; in politics and religion 
and social outlook they might be called "liberal conservatives 11 ..=-strongly 
~ooted in the status quo, they still would move with their a~; they wiel-
ded a good deal of influence, both cultural and practical, in the life 
of their times; they felt t hat their society and the~r era were among the 
most enlightened and cultured that had ever been. 
1. "Vie can understand how LBlair's Sermoni! r eached the people of 
that day# because thet deal with those moral plati tudes which constituted 
the sum of the Gospel to t he 'Classes' of the eighteenth century; be-
cause they make no demand upon the spiritual side of a man's nature, or 
raise awkward questions regarding the supernatural character of Christ; 
because they were written according :t;·o:·· the standard of the day in a cor-
rect, engaging style. They are common-sense, in a very respectable Eng-
lish, and what more did a s perior person of that age want?" (Watson, .2E.• 
cit., PP• 169-170• 
vii. Na ional Attitudes 
It always seems to me perilous to catalogue an;ything as complex as 
the attitudes of a country a l though such an exercise is apparently most 
popular among the writers anct editors of our i mport ant news magazines. 
Obviously, such generalizati ms as we can make must necessarily omit 
as much or more than they in: lude~ so that their accuracy is extremely 
questionable. Nevertheless, there are certain characteristics of 
eighteenth century Scotland i:;owa.rd which we may point a. hesitant finger. 
For example, we are told by those who should know that Scotland was an 
intensely patriotic country, proud of her long traditions and her inde-
o:"~f spirit. The Act of Unio in 1707 was not an abdioation of this pa.trio-
tism but apparent ly the onl:. means by which conti nual fricti on and oc-
casional warfare could be a elided. The Scots remained as ever, proud, 
contentious, and ambitious. Yet they were now li nked with a nation of 
much larger population and i n.fini tely greater wea l th , a nation that was 
not slow to pronounce the Sc ots who came to England as "convened like 
hounds over a carrion or fli e s in the shambles."l We have seen above 
in Carlyle's speech to the ~omeral Assembly an exhortation to be proud, 
in spite of poverty, in the accomplishments of the eminent intellectual 
leadership of Scotland, and we might notice as well in that speech the 
assurance ·with which it was stated that :!thi..s man or that was the greatest 
in his field. If we were to. generalize boldly from th:i:S and other evi-
dence which is available , W(3 might say that the Sc ot s protest too much 
and that there seems to be some compensation here for the facts of 
1. From an anonymous p per published in 1746, quoted in Mathieson, 
op. cit • ., P• ~. 
97 . 
poverty~ provincialism~ and. i nvidious comparison. 
Perhaps one of the bec·t indications of this feeling of inferiority 
which ca used the Scots to ovHremphasize the virtues of their culture was 
the attempt to s peak Englitlh on which we have commented in the section 
on Select ~ociety. Here th Scots willingly abdicated t hei r national 
prid·s, proba bly because thl, raalized that the di a lect which they spoke 
could not b6 :m .... ;.de to jib~ v ry we ll v<i th ei .shteent h century ideas of cul-
ture. nconscious of the pe culiari tes and disadvantages of their nat ive 
idio· , and anime.t~d by the h ope of appealing ·th the public of ·the vvhole 
island~ the Scottish philos (>phers _, historians_, and divines of t he f uture 
spent an infinity of paim i n imitating the best En glish ·write rs of their 
age . They sought to rival the elegance and grace which were fashionable 
in England and to adapt the:L· genius to modern methods of exposition and 
argument.'tl NJ6n of cultuJ•e addressed one another throughout the vmrld~ 
and none of the Scots wish d to be applauded only in his native heath. 
We may feel _, with Millar, t hat this turning away from the native dialect· 
was anything b!l t; an uncompounded benefit , for many of the Scot s were 
dazzled by the ttbaleful t r .cliti on of 'eloquence ' 12 --a false rhetoric 
which is apparent in some ..:r the things we have quoted . But on the other 
hand~ there were good pract i c a l reasons for this desire to "English" their 
writing; as Dugald Stewar·t tells u s., the provincial idion of the Scots 
seemed to shut up -every ElV(mue to fame, "excepting those departments of 
science, where the naturo f the subject is such as to dis pense with 
--------------------------------·--~------------------------------------~ 
1. j1Jf..;illa!! _, E.£.• cit. ~ p .. )17• 
2. Ibid.~ P• 320. 
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the graces of composi '~ion. 11 1 A further reason mi ght be found in the t act 
that the dialect was linked :"n the minds of the literati both with the 
common herd and with old du.y:s of 11 barbarismn and nsupersti tion." Natural-
ly such contamination was :painful to the cultural leaders of the Athens 
of the North. But still al l of this only goes to substantiate the idea 
that the Scots could not res t ; easy in the assurance of their culture: it 
was neces~ary to wo1·k at improvement in every direction. 
Another indication of' this general self-consc iousness is the avidity 
with which the Scots seiz€1d on the productions of native genius such as 
Douglas and the poems of Ossian. 11All Scotsmen were delighted at being 
able to boast that even the most barbarous parts of their despised coun-
try had been possessed of g~mius before England had risen out of savage-
dom. Hume and Home, Ferg;us.on and Blair, Lord Elibank, Lord Kames--in 
fact everyone--joined in t he chorus of acclaim and were fierce at anyone 
who dared to impugn their genuiness, or to slight their beauty.n2 And 
although this is said of 0:3sian, it is quite as true of the attitude to-
ward Douglas, other thing being equal. Ossian in particular became a 
national cause, and a gre t deal of the furore undoubtedly would have 
been leseened if some Scot :; had not been torn between their feelings and 
their good sense. Boswell tells of a dis'cussion Johnson had with one :Mr. 
Macqueen in which the great D)octor htated bluntly that :Mr. Macqueen knew 
perfectly well that Macpherson's work was faked, but that he refused to 
1. Stewart, ~cit~, P• 7• 
2 . Gr-aham, Men of ~etters, P• 229 . · 
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admit the facts. It is quite probable that :fr'ir. Macqueen's attitude was 
typical. 
Of course, on the othe r side of the ledger is the truth of Scotland's 
intellectual eminence in t ose days; a nation must take pride in something, 
and certainly there was lit t le enough else for t he Scots to point to. As 
far as their credulity and uncritical patriotism are concerned, Johnson 
had some things to say:-
For the satisfaction of those north of the Tweed, who may think 
Dr. Johnson's acco ~t of Caledonian credul ity and inaccuracy too 
strong, it is but :rair to add that he admitted the same kind of 
ready belief might be found in his own country. He would under-
take, he said, to write an epic poem on t he. story of Robin Hood, 
and half England, 1; whom the names and pl aces he should mention 
in it are familiar ,. would believe and dec l are they had heard it 
from their ear lies~; years .1 
Beyond this, some Scots themselves had tart things to say about their lar-
gar neighbor: Hume wrote to Strahan the printer in 1773, that England 
was 11so sunk in stupidity and barbarity that you may as well think of 
Lapland for an author."2 Nevertheless, all the contacts between the two 
countries were not marked wi th acerbity. Ramsay of Ochtertyre says, 
"There being from this time f orth £:1745J a constant intercourse between 
the two countries, people f r om the opposite quarters of the kingdom, who 
in former times had little chance of meeting, now began to discover in 
each other valuable qualit:i s which their prejudices forbade them to ex-
pect. Of course, intimaci(:! S were formed which proved salutary to both, 
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particularly to the Scots , who1 : being, the poorer, were reputed the more 
acute and accomm.odating." l We might here rei ter ata the remarks at the 
beginning of this section on the diff iculties of generalizing national. 
attitudes. 
Yet when all is said and done, there remains with the strudent of 
eighteenth eentury Scotland a notion that the predominant feeling of the 
writers and intellectuals was a kind of self-consci ousness--although that 
term is hardly satisfactory. They seem to be anxi ous to prove that no 
one is more cultured and enlightened than the Scot 1 that no one has quite 
such eminent men and lust rous accomplishments. Some of them, like our 
critics, are aisposed to t ake up arms for weak Scottish causes with very 
litt le provocation. And m st of them, not even excepting David Hume, p~ 
farred the respectable cours e of life where a man could be sure that he 
was right because he was approved by his society. I believe that this 
attitude is at least partl responsible for the s ocieties of mutual ad-
miration, the tendency tow rd emphasizing the "e l egant, 11 the puffing of 
works like Douglas and Oa;3 ian, and the generally conventional outlook 
of the majority of literary men. 
Having said this much about the national attitudes of our Scottish 
friends, we are now arri vetd at the point where we can look back over the 
ground we have traver sed and see how the land lies. Whill generaliza-
tions about any society are naturally tentative and the influence of the 
society in any individual case even less certain, there are several 
1. .Q£• cit., P• 309• 
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charact~istics about the world in which Blair, Kames, and Campbell moved 
which are fairly clear wnd which evidently helped to shape and give di-
rection to their thinking For one thing1 theirs was a truly brilliant 
society in which were inc uded some of the preeminent minds of their cen-
tury. Both in personal f r iendships and in groups organized specifically 
to stimulate thinking the Scots filed their minds sharp; and while our 
critics are not among tht~ keenest, they did share in the activities of 
this society. For anotht~r thing, their society was close-coupled: every-
one knew pretty well what everyone else was doing and thinking; there was 
a great deal of mutual eJcc hange of ideas. In some of their activities it 
is possible to 11 speak of them as composing a school --a school of hi gh; or-
der, too.nl We have seen in some cases how close this intellectual con-
nec·bion might be. From these characteristics of the society I think we 
may reasonabl~ draw two related conclusions: first, that whatever was 
produced by the Scottish group would be very respectable as far as logic, 
acuteness, and solidity of t hought are concerned. There would be little 
room for inane statement or careless generalizati on or obvious ~sequiturs. 
We should hardly expect to find opinions which could be deflated with a 
pin-prick of logical attack . 
The second conclusion is that original, indi vidual ideas would be 
equally as rare as stupid ideas. Only in a few intellects of the very 
highest order, and those, too, preserved for a time free from the influ~ 
ence of their society, would we expect to find re ally original con:bri-
butions to thought. David Hume wrote his philosophical dissertations 
1. Bryson, op. cit., P• ~. 
before he came into the Edinbur~h circle, Adam Smith his Wealth of 
Nations after he had retired from it. It might be that the entire con-
tribution of this society is unique--into that point we can hardly go --
here--but on the whole wl h most of the writwrs we would expect to find 
thinking which we might be tempted to call typical or conventional, but 
which we could certainly t erm "patterned." We might expect to see connn.on 
prejudices and assumption passing for ultimate truths, to see men who are 
otherwise keen-minded ignoring the obvious ques t ions which would pul]. away 
the foundations of elaborate structures of thought, to hear changes rung 
on a single theme when t he program announces an entirely new tune. With 
the pleasant advantage of hindsight we can see that our critics shar~ with 
each other and with many other men of their age a pattern of opinion which 
they embroider differently, but which is not fundamentally changed.. This 
is of course not strange in view of their society; in fact, the strange-
ness would rather lie in t heir expressing stt\ongly indi vidua1 opinions. 
They show us, in heightened form, the immense molding p~ler of society 
because their society was at once more compact and more efficient in its· 
exchange of ideas than most. Yet, I also think, that once we have said 
this we should repeat the first oonclusiona: because work is utypica:t" or 
"conventional" does not necessarily mean that it is weak or stupid; the 
society o£ the Scots would not abide criticism that was not respectable 
as far as logic, penetration, and solidity went.l 
1. For these reasons, t he strictures which such men as Oliver Elton 
amd George Saintsbury place on the Soots lose their validity. If we are 
looking for evidences of 11 pre-romantic 11 tendencies in criticism, the few 
we find in the Scots are di sappointing; and Bishop Hurd becomes an im-
por·cant figure. otherwise , from a historic 21 per spective the Soots take 
their due places as upholders of the traditional values who still can 
··appreciiat·e -new _;trends.. 
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We have also analyzed in the preceding pages two other characteristics 
of the critics'world which help to explain the kind of thinking they did 
and the critical posi tiona they held. We have seen that their education 
and their literary background was solidly rooted in the classics of Rome 
and the neo-classical writings of Augustan England, and be~nd this that 
they bel~ged to an influential and favored class. I believe that we can 
draw two inferences from t hese aspects of the s ocial back::gl'ound,;; first, 
that there would be a predominating tendency toward classical values and 
canons of taste in their cr i ticism, and, second ~ t hat their view of litera-
ture wopl.d be basically ari stocratic in the broad sense:: literature as 
the perquisite of the cultured and learned writer and reader. (It 'vil~ 
be noticed that we say upredominating" and nbasically,"· for we shaH see 
several exceptions to these tendencies.) 
In general, t hen, we have encountered the nnon-rational11 influences 
• 
which were brought to bear on the critical work of Blair, Kames, and . 
Campbell. We have tried t o fojl'll.ow Professor Love joy's advice to avoid 
~priori judgements and not to fall into the trap of unmasking the i-
deologies of men by shmving that theywere the si mple products of their 
environment. How well we ave succeeded remains to be seen when we 
come to the application of t hese o~ervations to ·the actual critical 
workd. Meanwhile we must procee d in our analysis to the rational bases 
for our critics' ideas: t he philosophical premises and the critical 
principles deduced from· t hem. 
C HA.Pl'ER II I 
Tho Rational Premise 
I 
Like all other inte l ectual activities, literary criticism is 
rooted in basic philosophi cal concepts. Before we can proceed to ana-
lyze the content of the eritical methods and pri nciples of our critics,, 
therefore, it bepoove s Ull t o turn briefly to so:me broa der ideas which 
g,-ave ei ghteenth century e i.ticism a good dea l of its characteristic di-
rection. Throughout t he critical work there are evidences of a s e t of 
preconceptions which affect t he kinds of ideas t he critics held. We c an 
re~ognize that although Blair, Kames, and Campbell lived during a transi-
tion period they share w:Lt h most men of the a g;e the preposs essions of 
the Age of Reason . Wbilt3 t here are numerous tendencies in thetr work 
which point al:}. 3ad to a n•3W Zeitgeist, these tendencies are on the peri-
phery of the c r itics 1 thL king, as it ·were, while the nucleus remains 
unshattered. Roma.nticis:n. was in the offing, but the Weltanschauung,._ the 
world view or climate. of opinion of the Scots, was more that of Pope and 
Dr. Johnson than it was that of Vl.ordsworth of! Shelley. In the next two 
• sections of this chapter, then, I propose to outline this world view and 
to note Q.riefly some representative concepti> which a re included or im-
plied in it. After we ha.ve examined this material, we can move on to 
a consideration of first t he psychology and met hod ol ogy of the critics 
and then t he crit ical concepts by which they proceed·~j. 
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i. The World View 
When Pope wrote the Essay ~ Man, he managed to crystallize most 
of the floating philosophi cal notions of the Enlightenment, and that 
poem with its derivative philosophy enshrined in sparkling epigrams 
still is a most representative docwnent f or the understanding of the 
basic ideas of thinking ne n toward the latter part of the century. 
The proper study of mankind still was man, who 1.v-as to know himself 
before he presumed to seen God, and who stood i :n the midst of a uni-
verse governe d by natura l lavv in which everythi:a.g had been contrived 
by the First Cause for t he best end. Every aspc3ct of this world was 
a part of none stupendous whole 11 in which the s·~ ars in their courses 
and the fall of an a pple obeyed the same laws m~ reason by which man 
exaruned his intellect. Wi thout exception all thins s were part of the 
divine Order . If sometime s we could not make out the efficient causes 
.for events, we could still rest assured of their rightness: 
••• vve cannot avoid taking notice of the strong i mpression 
which the powers of t aste and i magination are calculated 
to give us of the benignity of our Creator .. By endowing 
us with suc h powers, he hath widely enlargEJd the s phere 
and pleasufe of human life; and those , too~ of a kind the 
most pure and innocent. The necessary purposes of life 
wight have been abundantly answered, ·l:;hough our senses of 
seeing and hearing had only served to distinguish natural 
objects , without conveying to us any of those refined and 
delicate sensations of beauty and t_;randeur, with vvhich we 
are now so much deli ghted. This additional embellishment 
and glory, which for promoting our entertainment, the Author 
of our nature hath poured forth upon his works, is one 
striking testimony, amon g many others, of his benevolence 
and r:; oodne ss . 1 
l. Blair , Lectures, P• 31 . 
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The way in which the t hi nke r of the ei ghteenth century approaches 
the most subtle and elusive problems with utter confidence is in itself 
an indic ation of his reHance on t his orderliness of nature. He knew 
and could rely on 
The re gular and constant order of facts by wlrl.ch God rules the 
universe; the order whi c h his wisdom pre s ents to the sense and 
reason bf men, to serve them as an equal and c ammon rule of 
conduct' and to giJ. i de t hem, without di sxincti em of race or 
sect, towards perfection and happiness. 
In such a universe, harmoniously governed through and through by natural 
' law, there was no need to quail before the most awesome problems. The 
thinker mis ht f eel personal i nadequacy, but there was no doubt that 
eventually all the dark plac e s would b e reful e;ently i lluminated: 
Nature and Nat ure's laws lay hid in ni ght: 
God said Let N~1wton bel and all was Light.2 
According to Newt on's di scoveries f!IVery physic a l law which held 
good on the earth held good t hroughout the universe. 
This meant, on the one hand, that t he secrets of the whole 
world could be investi ge.t ed by man's experimen·;;s on this 
planet; and on the other t hat the world was ono huge, related, 
and uniform m.achine 1 the f undamental principle::; of whose 
action were known. One l aw could describ e the whirling 
planet and the falling gr ass blade; one law could explain 
the action of every bodJ· in the universe ••• The ·•vorld is a 
vast perpetual motion mz chi ne, and every event in it can be 
deduced mathematically fr om the fundamental principles of 
its mechanical action; the discovery of these nathe:rnatical 
rela tions is the goal of science. The universEt is one great 
harmonious order; not, a s for Thomas and the Middle Ages, 
an ascending hierarchy of purposes, but a uniform mathematical 
system. 
1. Comte de Volney, Oeuvre s, 2nd ed., I, 249 quctted in Carl Becker, 
The Heavenly City of the Ei ghte"Emth Centu~;y: Phi los of~~~ New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1932, P• l+5· 
2. Alexander Pope, Epitaph Intended for Sir Isaac Newton 
.....::..---=- - ----- -- --- ---- -----
The universal ordE r ••• takes on a clear and positive 
meaning. This or e r is accessible to tho mind it 
• is not preestablished mysteriously, it i:; the most 
evident of all f acts. From this it follows that the 
s ole reali ty that can be accessible t o our means of 
knmvledge, matter, nature, appears to us as a ti s sue 
of properties, preci~fiy ordered, and of which the 
connection can b e e xpressed in terms of mathematics. 
(Leon Bloch, La Phi losophie ~ ~ewton, P• 555). 
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It is to Newton, therefore, that we mve the most rervasive aspect 
of the world view of the ei ~hteenth century. As J. H. Randall says: 
11 Newton ~ science • and sc :· ence v•as the ei ghteenth century ideal. 112 
His works affected nearly every field of t hought and were popularized 
so that ever-.1 educ ated man eould feel that he had grasped the essential 
facts about the universe. I t is perhaps not so mueh Newton's actual 
discoveri e s which thus influenced the thinking of ·:;he century as these 
popularizations and what men concluded from the Newtonian worll:d-
ma chine. Ne1~on became a s acr ed symbol, and as ]~rjorie Nicolson 
points out it is significant that Newton was never satirized in t hi s 
golden a ge of satire. Where a l l the other philosophers took a shaft 
or two from the satirist • "the 1 godlike Newton 1 remained somehow 
apart, beyond evil, bey ond s atire. 113 And Becker implies the reason 
for this when he says: "The r eason • • • that common men take up 
philos ophy, if at a ll , is not a s an exerlltise in dialectic, but as 
something that holds for t hem the assurance of a better way of lif e. 
1. John Herman Randall, The M68ing of the Moder~ Mind, Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1926, PP• 259-2 • 
2. Loc. cit. 
3. lVJB.r jorie Hope Nicolson , Nevrto~ Demands the ~use, Prine eton: 
Princeton University Press, 1946, P• 92, in Book III of Gulliver's 
Travels Aristotle criticizes t he doctrine of 11attraction11 and pre-
dicts that it will me et the same fate as Descartes' "Vortices 11 • 
Thi s does not seem to consti t ute satire, however. 
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They are apt, therefore, t associate any philosophy that interests 
them with the name of some great man, whom they cEm love or hate f or 
having given the world a new idea; and they are snre to invest the 
new idea with some meaning t hat it did not origine.lly have. 111 We 
are famili ar with the transf ormation that Darwin's theories underwent 
into Darwinism {and we might add Freud's into Freudianism); the same 
thing happened to Newton: ''Common men associated the new philosophy 
with the mmna of Nevrton beca use it a ppeared that Newton, more than 
any ot£1er man, had banished mystery from the world by di scovering a 
'univ ersal law of nature', thus demonstrating, wh;~.t others had only 
asserted, that the universe as rational and intelligible through and 
through, and capable, therefor e of being subdued to the uses of men. 112 
Ordinary educated men were ot so much interested :·.n what Newton did 
in elucidating this universa l la:w, in his scientific discovery, as they 
were in the "bearing of thos e discoveries upon the most fund amental 
of human problems, that is t o ~;ay the relation of man to natu~~e and of 
both to God) In Edinburgh t he work of popularizing Newton and 
showing the bearing of his d i scoveries on the most fundamental of prob-
lems was undertaken by Colin Mac laurin who said, in his An Account of 
Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophi cal Discoveries: 
To describe the phen omena of nature, to explain their 
causes ••• and to inquire i nt o the whole constitution of the 
1. Becker, op. cit., PP• 59-60 
2. Loc, cit:-----
3· Ibid-;:-pp . 60-61. 
universe, is t he busine ss of natural philosophy. A strong 
curiosity has prompted men in all times t o study nature; 
every useful art has orne connexion with this science; 
and the inexhausted bea J.t y and variety of t hi ngs makes it 
ever agreeable, new, an surpr1s2ng. 
But natural philos ophy is subservient to purposes of a 
higher kind, and is cr~efly to be valued as it lays a sure 
foundation for natural eligion and moral philosophy; by 
leading us, in a satisfactory man...ner, to the knowledge of 
the Author and Governor of the Universe ••• 
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We are, from his works, to seek to knmv God, and not to 
pretend to mark out the s cheme of his conduct, in nature, 
from t he very deficient i deas we are able to form of that 
great mysterious Being • •• 
Our views of Natur e , however imperfect, serve to repre-
sent to us, in the most s ensible manner, that mighty paNer 
which prevails throughout , acting with a force and efficacy 
that appears to suffer no diminution from the greatest 
distances of space or i ntervals of time; and that wisdom 
which we see displayed in the exquisite structt~e and just 
motions of t he greatest and subtilest parts. These, with 
perfect goodness, by whi ch they are evidently directed, 
constitutes the supreme object of the s peculations of a 
philosopher; who, while he contemplates and admires so 
excellent a system, cannot but be himself excited and an&-
IP.ated to correspond wit h the gen~al harmony of natUre. 
As Becker observes, the men of' the ei ghteenth century, "having denatured 
God d .f. d .L n2 ••• e1 1e na vure. 
This Newtonian world pic t ure supports and encloses all t he more 
particularized thought of t h centt~y, usually with lit tle or no con-
sciousness on the part of the thinker as to the shaping force, muc h 
as such concepts as relativity and quantum mechanics affec·l:; the thinking 
of twentieth century men who have difficulty with albebra. Y'iherever we 
look in eighteenth eentury though"!; the ideas of the order of nature, the 
applicability of natural law t o every event, the harmony and benevolence 
1. Colin Maclaurin, Newton' s Philosophical Discoveries, 1775, PP• 3, 
4, 95, quoted in Becher, op. cit., PP• 62-63. 
2. Becker, E.£• cit., P. 6~ 
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of the universe, and the c or_cept of a Creator who operates as a divine 
mathematician are somewhere to be seen. To be sure, only a few thinkers, 
notably the deists, accepted all the implications of Jirewtonianism, 
most men finding here or the r e some variation on t e basic scheme. But 
when we encounter such diver "e ideas as Rousseau's dictUJ.-n that men are 
everywhere born free, Adam Smith's assumption that the public benefits 
of laissez-fairs are due to ·;;he guidance of an 11 invisible hand, 11 
Dr. Johns on's defense of the r anks of society, Shaf·tesbury's conclusion 
that benevolence is the key t o virtue, Butler's demonstrat i on of t he 
analo~y between revealed and natural religion--when we see that despite 
t heir diver gence these ideas share the same fundamental preconceptions, 
we recognize the all-pervadi g power of Newton's thought. The only 
approach to the basic problems of lif e vvhich can def initely be said 
to bypass the Newtonian world- view is that of the f ew mystics of the 
century--notably William Law--who founded their ideas only in timeless 
personal inspiration. 
Within this grand harmoni ous scheme, however, there was one 
puzzle that occupied a whole generation of thinkers, gave English 
philosophy its most brilliant period, and affected the course of philo-
sophical thought for a hundre d years. Unfortuaately for t he peace of 
mind of t hose who looked acutely at the problem.it was evident that 
t his rational and orderly, t his mathematical and i mmutable universe 
was dependent on a frail ves sel. v'lhatever the constitution of the 
world mi ght be, it was knmvn nly through the fal lib e mind of man; 
and it was easily shown by the philosophers that t he mind of man was ; 
possessed not of immutable and unchallengeable axioms, but r ather of a 
lU:. 
variety of' fleetin g experier.ces . This paradox of the relation of fallible 
man to the rational universe led eventua lly to Kant's conclusion that 
nwh3.tever certainty our science may have, it does not give us any light 
upon the basic structure of t he world; in other words, that the mind of 
man cannot know reality as i t exists, if indeed there be any such world 
at all apart f'rom man's mind • " 1 But in the eighteehth century t his crux 
in metaphysics first of all l ed men to inquire into the state of the mind, 
to endeavor to ,;malyze the c ontent of consciousness in order to see what 
we actually know or can know, with the result that English philosophy be-
came almost entirely absorbec. in epistemology which took a form whi c h we 
would call psychological. 
The first English investigatd>r to frame this problem was John Locke, 
whose Es~o~HumAn_Understanding (1690) stands ~~th Newton's Principia 
(1687) as one of the two most influential books of the age, and whom we 
may consider as one of the gr eat seminal minds of the past t wo and a half 
centuries.2 Without going int o the details of his analysis of the under-
standing here (although we sh_ll have to do so briefly later) we Jl1..ay note 
two as pects of his thought wh i ch affected the world vie1v of the ei ghteenth 
century. Locke's analysis showed quite conclusively (at least for his a ge) 
ths.t man has no innate ideas, his mind is a blank t ablet on which 
1. Ran~all, ££• cit., P• 270. 
2. As \~illiam Sorley says: " The period of English thought which fol-
lowed Locke's death was fruitf u l both in great writers and in important 
movements. Locke's own influence wa·S" felt everywhere. His new way of 
approaching the subject, his freedom from the traditional technicalities 
of the schools, and his a pplication of his method to a wide range of 
human interests, made philosophy count fnr more with reflective v~iters 
generally, and determined the line of thought taken by the greater minds." (!: History~ English Phi losophy, Cambrid ge, 1920, P• 132) 
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experience alone traces the chatacters. The corollary to this proposition 
of course was that experienc is the sole arbiter of man's actions; all 
ideas are to be tested in it crucible, and if they are found wanting they 
are to be di scarded. No lnnger could it be assumed that men could find 
immutable truths merely by l ooking into their own minds (like Descartes, 
for example)--truths on whic h they could build up vast structures of de-
ductive analysis descriptive of the world. Rather it became necessary to 
proceed from experience, framing general principles inductively, then 
checking them by reference to experience a~ain, much as the scientist pro-
ceeds except that experience rather than experiment characteri zes the 
method. The world of philosophical investi~~tion became piecemeal, a 
world in whi ch various porti ons could be examined without worrying about 
their place in the whole sc r.eme. 
The difference of method, here, may be characterized as foll~1s: 
In Locke or Hume, a comparatively modest conclusion is drawn from 
a broad survey of ma y facts, whereas in Leibniz a vast edifice of 
deduction is pyrami ed upon a pin-point of logical principles , 
In Leibniz, if the principle is completely true and the deductions 
are entirely valid, all is well; but the st ructure is unstable, 
and the sli ghtest fl~~ anyv•here brings it down in ruins. In 
Locke or Hume, on th contrary, the base of the pyramid is on 
the solid ground of obserued fact, and the pyramid tapers upward, 
not downward; consequently the equilibrium is stable, and a flaw 
here or there can be r ectified without tota l disaster.1 
1. Bertrand Rusell, A B-istory £!. Western Pb.iil.osophy, New York, Simon 
ana Schuster, 1945, PP• 643:&.44. It might be well to say here that this 
analysis of the sources of t e worii:d view does not take into account the 
rise of experimental science , a factor which undoubtedly played a lar·ge 
part in the empirical orientation; but here we are trying to keep the 
broadest as pects in mind. Experimental science, while a p~rerful shaping 
force, itself rests on metaphysical assumptions suuh as were analyzed by 
Locke and Hume. See Edwin 11. . Burtt, The W.tetaphysical Foundations of 
Iviodern Physical Science, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1925. 
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This empirical orientation i s important to the climate of opinion of the 
ei ghteenth century. 
A second corollary to Locke's basing his philosophy in experience 
is a confidence in the present and a spirit of unfettered inquiry. It 
was easy to draw the condlusi on that the world belongs to men now living~ 
that it is unnecessary to bui ld on tradition and authority, which are in 
fact obstacles in the way of the realization of man's potentialities: 
The empiricists who, f ollowing Locke, took Europe by storm, were 
essentially critics; s te.nding face to face with a traditional 
body of beliefs in whi ch they profoundly disbelieved, particu-
larly in reli gion, politics, and morals, they used their method -L 
to brush aside traditi ons and clear the ground for newer and 
better ideas. They were all active reformers;- they sought to 
remove the dead weight of the past by discovering the natural 
history of the ori gin and growth in the mind of the ideas ron-
nected with objections.ble and outworn beliefs and custolll'l. 
As we shall see later, in les s polemical fields than reli gion, politics: 
and morals this desire to brush aside the accretions of history and to 
proeeed on experientially tri ed principles also had s.n effect: for ex-
ample, none of our cnitics ci tes a classical authority as sufficient 
proof of a proposition; such authorities are used merely as corrobora-
tive of ideas established on empi rical grounds. 
These, then, are the two principal pervasive influences of the Lockian 
· or empiricist philosophy: the general use in. many fields of an inductive, 
empirical approach, and a confidence that problems were solvable by 
means of this approach without recourse to the past or tb·;authori ty. 
~1dle these ideas are not so all-inclusive in their molding of eighteenth 
century thought as is the Newtonian world-machine, I believe that they 
are important aspects of the world view; they certainly are assumed in 
many types of intellectual inquiry~l and t hey were tremendously influen-
tia.l in molding the political and social thought of the age. They are: · 
adumbrated in many of the concepts of the century such as~ for example~ 
the idea of primitivism~ which might not immediately seem connected with 
such ideas. 2 Consequently~ I feel ·that they are vi tal to a thorough 
understanding of the kinds of thought-patterns found in representative 
thinkers. 
Now that we have outlined the more general characteristics of the 
ei ghteenth century climate of opinion--the Newtonian world-machine and 
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the empirical study of man t ogether ~~th their most immediate . corollaries--
it becomes necessary to see soma of the particular ways in which these 
1. We mi ght note in passing that ·the empiricist philosophy not only 
had a general influence, but that it quite probably accounts for the spate 
of works specifically based in psychological investi~ations. Such inquiries 
as Ad~~ Smith's Theo)Y. of t he Moral Sentiments (1759J, Alexander Gerard's · 
Essay 2E:._ Taste (1759 -aildEsSay ~Genius (1774), Jame-s Beattie's Essays .9_n 
Poet:r:y ~Music ~t~Affect ~Min~ (1776), Joseph Addison's The 
Pleasures ~ ~ Imafinati on (i n The ~,pectator Nos. 411-412)., David Hartley's 
Observations O!!_ Man 1749), Edmund Burke's ! Philosophical Ing_uir:y ~ ~ 
Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (f757), Adam Ferguson's 
Principles of Moral and Political Science ( 1792)--all of them dealing with 
psychological matters--indicate the degree to which all kinds of inves-
tigations were oriented toward the analysis of man's mind in its various 
contacts with the environment. 
2. "Many aspects of the lif e of this century were destined to be affec-
ted by the exciting revelations concerning the mind in Locke's Essay. Oub 
o£ a new and sound interpretati on of the character of a child's mind evol-
ved principles 'of education that interested a father like Chesterfield and 
a mother like Pamela. Theories of government took psychological footings 
following Locke's analysis of men 1 s understanding. The Essays's explanation 
of the manner in which the human mind frames its idea of a God shifted the 
foundations of religions, whi le morality was altered by a restatement of 
human liberty and free dom. The objective quality of Eighteenth Century 
literature is certainly owing in part to the fact that Locke's demonstration 
that all ideas ori ginated in sensation induced writers to give almost undue 
attention to the external world.u (Kenneth MacLean, John Locke and the 
English Literature_ of the Ei r,hteanth Century_, New Ha:;:;n; Yale University_, 
1936, P• 13.) 
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grand @eneralizations appeared. My purpose in the following sections is 
not to try to analyze all the concepts which guided the thinking of the 
Scots or to show all the ways i n which the abstra.ctions of the hi ghest order 
a:we ared.Rather I wish to present some typice.l ideas of a fairly complex 
and abstract nature~ to see how they appear in the work of the critics_,_. 
and to estimate the way in which these philosophica l notions affected 
the type of thinking which our critics did. 
i i . Nature 
It is significant that i n the indexes to the editions of Blair and 
Kames which I am using there are no entries under nature, because all 
three of our critics are frequent in their reliance on this concept. 
Kames tells us that the law of the succession of ideas is "natura.lu 
in the second page of his treatise_, and goes on in the next few paragraphs 
to observe that we "naturally11 follow a certain order in feflecting upon 
what we have observed_, 11 and t hat nthe principle of order is conspicuous 
with respect to natural operations; for it always directs our ideas in 
the order of nature. Thinking upon a body in moti on_, we follow its natu-
ral course: the mind falls with a heavy body_, descends with a river_, and 
ascends with flame and smoke."l Blair assures us in his second lecture 
(which really is the be ginni:ng of his analysis) that the inequality in 
taste among men is 11 owing in part to nature 1 11 that the "constituti on of 
our nature 11 in this inequality "discovers admirable wisdom," that there 
1. Kames~ Elements, P• 20~21~22 (really the be ginning of Chapter I). 
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is a 11 great law of our nature" to the effect that 11exel'cise is the chief 
"1 source of improvement in all our faculties. Campbell observes that when 
we ascend from particulars to general la.ws n our acquaintance with nature 
and its le.ws 11 is geatly extended; he censures the visionary who does not 
ar gue from principles whi ch have a "foundation in nature; and he tells us 
that the "principles of our nature" sufficiently account for the existence 
of doers pri or to critics.2 
It appears quite evident that nature is an important term to the 
Scots, and yet the ways j_n which they use the term indicates that they are 
unconscious of the part it is playing in their specule.tions. Every 
statement -quoted above is immediately subject to qumstion, or at least 
to some sort of definition. All kinds of assumptions are made in stating 
that the succession of ideas is natural rather than learned, that there 
are nlaws 9f our nature ," and t hat the nvisionary's" arguments proceed 
from sonething other t han nature (by which Campbell here evidently m.eans 
the world of observed fact) • And it i s also important that there are 
several nuances of meaning f or the term even in the few statements a-
bove, different usa@SS of which the cr itics appear quite unaware. 1fust 
vital, probably, is the fact that, if we s hould push our critics to an 
ansvYer, we would find that they have no ready definitions for this key 
word, at least no definitions which wouibd tell us what they really mean. 
To the Scots,as to the rest of eighteenth century men, nature and 
natural law were part of the 11 little backstairs door that for any 
age serves as the secret ent ranceway to knowlad ge, u two of the 
"unobtrusive words with uncertain meanings that are permitted to slip 
1. Blair, Lectures, P• 17,18. 
2. Campbell, Philosophy of Rhetoric, P• 15. 
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off the tongue without fear and without research and which 11having from 
constant repetition lost the i r metaphorical meaning, are unconsciously 
mista.lcen for objective realities. ul 
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The uses to ·which 01.1r critics put this term indicate the two principal 
functions which it had in the century in general. In his third use of the 
word Kames is clos e to Campbell in the quotations I have used: nature is 
the world of fact with its l aws which are obeyed by inanimate ma.t·ber and 
on which ~arious principles L~Y be founded. As we have pointed out above, 
the idea of a harmonious law-governed universe implied that in all kinds 
of analysis it was most sound to work from premises of fact and from this 
to draw conclusions. Intimate ly connected with this and stemming from the 
empiricist point of view is the use of the term as it is applied to human 
nature. This use is most common among the Scots. Although they do not ap-
peal to nat ure in either sens e as frequently as do smwe other thinkers of 
the century2 they do find that a set of i deas about human nat~~e is indis-
pensable as a starting point for their discussions. As Tytler says about 
Krur.es' Essays £!!. Morality ~Natural Relig,'ion: 
The object of thi s work ••• is to prove, that the great laws of 
morality, which influence the conduct of man as a social being, 
have their foundation in the human constitution; and are as certain 
and immutable as thos e physical laws which regulate the whole 
system of nature. Hence he argues, that a just survey of the na-
tural world,and an examination of the moral constitution of man, 
furnish alike the mosi; Eregnant and convincing evidence of order, 
harmony, and beauty ••• • 5 
1. Becker., £12_• £2:!•, P• h7• .  
1· 2. See Backer, ~cit., and Basil Willey, ~ .h;i ghteenth Century 
Background for innumerable examples of the reliance on nature in the 
thought of the a ge. 
3• T~rtil:er .. ~· cit., I, 183• 
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We might say much the same thing about criticism, which was founded equal-· 
lyon the constitution of human nature. Kames' good friend Hume had at the 
a ge of eighteen arrived at t he conclusion that the 11complete system of the 
sciences" could be discovered in "the principles of human nature";l and 
although his idea goes beynnd the common acceptance of the century, the no-
tion that human nature--our ways of thinking and feeling--was basically 
equated with the structu:ee o:f' the world proved a powerful directing force. 
Gladys Bryson points out tha·t one of the two controlling ideas which bound 
the abstractions of the eighteenth century moral philosophers was that their 
science must be founded on the nature of man.2 
Now nhis human nature of which our critics speak and which is so es-
sential to their theories has two important characteristics: it is easily 
available to observation from which reliable inferences may be drawn, and 
it is always fundamentally the same, The first of these assumptions has 
a good deal of influence in directing the inquiries of the Scots. Campbell, 
f'or instance, after telling us that 11the springs by which they Lthe elegant 
(or fine) arts:f may be re ~~lated must be sought after in the nature of 
the human mind, 11 also assures us that the study of the principles of elo.;. 
quence "properly conducted, leads directly to an acquaintance with ourselves; 
it not only traces the operations of the intellect and imagination, b~ 
discloses the lurking springs of action in the heart ••• it is perhaps the 
surest and the shortest, as well as the pleasantest way of arriving at the 
1. Sorley, OJ2..!. ~·~ P• 171. 
2. Bryson, .££.• cit., P• 25. The ··other controlling idea was that ehhics 
was the 1rfinal arbiter' in consideration of social behavior. See balm;, P• 
$ . 
' 
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science of the human mind. 111 To be noted in this somewhat circule.r bit 
of reasoning ~s the notion that the observations of one of man 1 s intellectual 
activities can lead to an understanding of the human mind. The observations 
may requ±re keen analysis, but there is no suggestion that the complexities 
of human nature or the difficulties of assessing human conduct require a 
special sort of study and special techniques for "arriving at the science 
11 
of the human mind. Blair a l so shov1s this confidence in the power of the 
study of criticism to inform us about human nature: 
The exercise of taste and of sound criticism is, iA truth, one of the 
most improving employments of the understanding. ±o appl y the prin-
ciples of good sense to composition and discourse; to examing what 
is beartiful and why it is so; to employ ourselves in distinguishing 
accurately between the specious and the solid, between affected and 
natural ornament, must certainly improve us not a little in the 
most valuable part of all philosophy, the philosophy of human nature. 
For such disquisitions are very intimately connected vnth our know-
ledge of ourselves. They necessarily lead us to reflect on the opera-
tions of the imagination, and the movements of the heart; and inceease 
our acquaintance vn th some of the most refi ned feelings which l:lelong 
to our frame .2 
Vvnmle there is much in this st atement to which we wi ght not take exception, 
• it is evident that Blair, like Campbell, is working from an assumption 
which he does not attempt to defend: namely, that obsevation of and reflec-
tion on the "operations of the imagination and the movements of the heart" 
bring us relie.ble knowledge of human nature. This certainly might be a.rgiled 
if one wished to question the representative character of such an activity 
as criticism. The observations of human nature drawn from the f ine arts 
1. Campbell, Philosophy of Rhetoric, P• 19 
2. Blair, Lectures, P• 13. 
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could well be attacked as quite unusual manifestations of behavior. 
But this assumption[ res·ts in turn on a more general one: that there 
is a "something" which is called hume.n nature and which operates according 
to certain well-defined laws. As the astronomer can observe the behavior 
of a planet in very limited eircumstances and, bece.use he knows the laws 
of its being, predict its subsequent behavior, so can the analyst of the 
fine arts bring us a better tmderstanding of 11human nature 11 through obser-
vation e.nd the inferences drawn from it in the limited circmnstances he is 
using. Instead of nhuma.n nat ure 11 being an abstraction developed from in-
ntunerable observations, and a lways subject to revision if new observations 
do not fit the picture, to t he ei ghteenth eentury i t was an "objective 
reality," as Becker says, and relatively few observations would incontro-
verti bly showY how it operated. ·_. , 
This assumption that 11 human naturen could be equated in its operations 
concept 
vdth the physical universe bri ngs us to another as pect of t~closely con-
nected to the first. If human nature has laws which can be validly deduced 
from any one of its activities, then of course it must ~e always and every-
where essentially the same; or perhaps (it is impossible to tell) the _ 
ei ghteenth centpry reversed t he order of this proposition and made the laws 
of human nature dependent on t he assumption of universality. At any rate, 
it is quite evident that , as far as our critics are concerned, the bar-
barian, the child, and the man of taste shared t his universal human nature; 
the differences bet;vee.n them v;ere due to differences in individual sensibility 
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and training: 
Taste, in the sense i n which I have explained it LPri or to im-
provement~, is a faculty c ommon in some degree to all ~sn. No-
thing that belongs to human nature is more general than the relish 
of beauty of one kind or other; of what is orderly, proportioned, 
harmonious, new, or sprig~tly~ . In children, the rudiments of 
taste discover t hemselves very early in a thousand instances; in 
their fondness for re gul ar bodies, their admiration of pictures 
and statues, and imitations of all kinds; and their strong attach-
ment to whatever is new or marvellous. The most ignorant peasants 
are deli ghted with ballads and tales, and are struck vri th the beau-
tiful appearances of nature in the earth and heavens. Even in the 
deserts of America wh13re human nature shows itself in its most un-
cultivated state, the savages have their ornaments of dre·os, their 
war and their death songs, their harangues and their orator s. We 
must therefore conclude the principles of taste to be deeply 
founded in the human mind.l 
All three of our critics are prone to tell us that 11 i t is a truth ascer-
tained by universal experience"2 or 11it must be allowed there are certain 
principles in our nature"3 or nreflect first upon that .great law of' our 
nature"4 when they wish to establish some basic principles for ar{!,'Ulllen~r 
vvi thout really questi oning whether or not those principles and laws are 
shared with Hottentots or Eimdu sages. To be sure, as far as they could 
tell the principles were sound; but the point I wish to emphasize is that 
in their climate of opinion it did not occur to them to question whether 
or not they merely spoke for the merest fraction of human nature, simply 
because of' their basic assumption that all of mankind shared in the 
operati on of universal law. ~~hey could even go so far as to say, like 
Kames: 
1. Blair, Lectures, P• 17. This statement is also illuminating be-
cause it s hows (l) Blair's casual def'initi on of beauty as opposed to his 
f'ormal (See Lectures, 11Lect.V11 ) ; (2) his tendency toward interest in the 
primitive. 
2. Kames, &lements, P• 34• 
3• Campbell., Philosophy, P• 93· 
4• Blair, Lectures, P• 18. 
• 
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With respect to the connnon nature of man in particular, we have a. 
conviction that it is invariable not less than universal; that it 
will be the same hereafter as at pres ent, and it was in time past; 
the sa.JTI.e among all nations and in all corners of the earth.l 
Without going further i t should be apparent that these two complemen-
tary and overlapping concept s--the grand ~armonious scheme of phf.stca.l na-
ture, and the universal human nature--a.re examples of basic assumptions 
held by the Scots without realization of the implications· of such prepos-
session. It should be said that they do not call on either natu:re or 
human nature in every page of their treatises; it is a. :matter of the type 
of reference rather than the frequency which makes these concepts important. 
They lie 'beneath the inquiry, and our critics do not think it nece.ssa.ry to 
take soundings. Both nature and human nature are simp:J_y there, available 
to anyone who ·wishes to use them for evidence, uni versa.l and inviolable. 
iii. :!~he VVisdo:m of God 
The universality and the harmony which the Scots thought they saw in 
the operati ons of nature, whether physical or hUJ11..an, frequently led them to 
reflect with unction on the wisdom of the divine artificer who had con-
structed both the universal and the fleshly houses of man. This appears 
to me to be a si gnificant part of their fundamental structure of ideas, 
perhaps exaggerated a triflE! with Blair because of profession, and his 
eminence as a. preacher, but still typical and illuminating eighteenth 
century idea. "\lYe ·need go no farther than the writings of Benjamin 
Franklin or Ethan Allen to s ee paeans to the wisdom of the First Cause of 
1. Kames, Elements, P• h68. 
, 
or the Author of Our Nature: 
f How exact and regular is every Thing in the natural world . How 
wise ly in every part contriv'd! Vve cannot here find the least 
' . Defect. Those who have study 1 d the mere animal a nd vegetable 
Creation, demonstrat e that nothing can be more harmonious and 
! beautiful. All the heavenly Bod)es, the Stars and Planets, are 
r:egulated with the utmost Wisdom.l 
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·when we copiously pursue the study of nature, 1Ne are certain to be 
lost in the immensity of the works and wisdom of God; we may neverthe-
less, in a variety of things, discern their fitness, happifying . 
tendency, and sustaining quality to us-ward , from a ll which as ra-
tional and contemplative beings, we are prompted to infer that God 
is universally uniform and consistent in his infinitude of creation 
and providence ••• 2 
Prior to the Age of Reason this inference of the nature of God from the evi-
dence of his handiwork around us would have been unthinkable; the arguments 
went rather that the order of the univers e is a necessary consequence of 
the benevolence and vdsdom of God. But to the typical ei ghteenth century 
thinker, the nice ad justment of the wor ld-machine was an indication of the 
nature of the divine mechanic , and the thi:nker would comment in passing 
on this evidence of the wise and happy contrivance of God in making the 
world and men in it exactly as they were: 
It therefore shows great vnsdom, to form us in such a manner, 
as to be susceptible of the same improvement from fable that we re-
ceive from genuine history. By that contrivance, examples to im-
prove us in virtue may be multiplied without end; no other sort of 
discipline contributes more to make virtue habitual, and no other 
sort'-is so agr.-ee able in the application. m add another final 
cause with thorough satisfaction; becaus e it sh ows that the Author 
of our nature is not less kindly provident for the happiness of 
his creatures, .than for the regularity of their conduct. The 
power that fiction has over the mind affords an endless variety 
of re.fined amusements always at hand to employ a vacant hour:· 
such amusements are a fine resource in sol itude; and by cheering 
and sweetening the mind, contribute mightily to social happiness .3 
1. Benjamin Franklin, On Liberty and Necessity, 1725, in Norman Foerster, 
American Poetry and Prose, 3d ed., New York; Roughton~ 1~fflin, 1947, P • 134• 
2. Ethan Allen, Reason the Only Oracle, in Foerster, O.E.!, cit ., P • 211. 
3• Kames, Elements, P• 59· 
Perhaps mor e si f:,'nificant thGal such forr..a l e xpl a r..at:!.on, howeve r _, a re 
the little phr.:.s e s tha:c s e em to slip out a l most unconsciously_, t he rational 
genuf lecti ons to the 11Author of' o .cr nature . 11 Sc attered throughout the cri -
tic isml are pl ace s vrhe r e Bl a ir and Kames te ll us casually o.bout t he wisdom 
with which God has made thin ~ · s., particul ar l y us : 11 ~.:-iere it the n e.ture of an 
emotion to continue, like color and f i gure , in i ts pres ent state till varied 
by some operating caus e , the condi t i on of man would be de plorable: it is 
orderec!_ ·wi se l y_, t hat emotions s hould more re s emble another attribute of 
matter , name l y motion, which r equires the constant e xertion of an operating 
caus e a nd ceases when the caus e is withdrawn." Litalics mineJ2 we are as-
sured that 11 ••• to ascertain :in every case with the utmost exactnes s what is 
beautiful was not at all necess ary to the happiness of man ••• and therefore 
some diversity in feeling ~ here al lowed tot~ placeL and room v.ras . left 
f or discus s ion and debate, concerning the degree of approbation, to whi ch 
any work of genius is entitle d. 11 Citlaics rni:::.e7 3 In other places we are 
told that we need only open our eyes a bit to discern this wi s dom in the crea -
ti on : "Providence seems plainly to have pointed out this useful purpos e to 
which the pleasures of taste may be applied, by i nterposing them in a mid-
dle station betvveen the pleas ures of sense, a.nd those of pure intellect.n 
none of the most distinguishEld privile ges whic h Providence has conferred 
upon mankind , is the power of c ommunicating their thoughts to one another ."4 
t,;' 1. Campbell makes but lit tle use of thi s device, resting his arguments 
upon 11 f irst principles" of our experientially f ormed mi nds, but not drawing 
on the deity f or substantiation, or explanation of final c aus es. 
2. Kames, Elements, P• 63. This passage is also interest i n g for its 
aesthetic Nevvt onia.nism. Note the us e of the concepts and t erminology of 
physics in treating the operations of the mind. See Randall, .9.£• cit. for 
the general influence of l'lewi:;onian thought on Kames. 
3• Bleir, Lectures, P• 26. 
4• Ibid., P • 141 10. 
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Both as pious Scots and as men of the Enli ,?;;htenment, our critics 
were firm in their assurance t hat the world had been created by a divine 
artificer who had arranged for the reign of benevolence and harmony in 
every possible way; and it was quite natural f or them to comment on the 
evidences of this wisdom as t hey proceeded ~vith their investigations. 
To be sure, they do not make such comments on every page, or shuffle off 
explanations for all critical attitudes by calling on the wisdom of the , 
creator. But the way in which they make such casual use of the notion of 
Go.d 's sapience as a resting-place and support for their observations seems 
to me to indicate the basic, uncriticized nature of the concept. It was 
quite evident that there was a 11 happifying tendency to us-ward11 in the 
world that operated in the province of criticism as efficaciously as it did 
everywhere else, and it was only fitting and proper to take note of this 
tendency as it appeared in its relations V·ii th the arts. 
For our critics one of t he happiest examples of God's contrivance 
is the ethical nature of liter ature. As Kames says, 11Even in the simp-
lest matters, the finger of God· is conspicuous, ul and to him one of the 
most ,appealing evidences of the divine purpose is in the incitements to 
virtue which are to be found in all types of writing, In the quotation 
above, 2 it can be seen that through literat~e we are led toward virtue, 
even when literature portrays vice, as it must occasionally. This is 
explicable by the "sympathetic emotion of virtuen which Kames finds to 
be one of the basic emotions, t here being no other feeling quite like it. 
1. Kames, Elements, P• 127. 
2. P• 123 
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This emotion causes the spectator of 11 grand and heroic action" to feel 
in himself 11an unusual dignity of character which disposes him to great and 
noble actions.
11 
When we see wicked actions in literature, we are repel-
led, for "no man has a propensity to vice as such. 11 This is a wonderful 
thing, to see 11what incitements there are toward virtue in the human frame: 
justice is perceived to be our duty ; and it is guarded @.y natural punish-
ments, from whi ch the guilty never escape; to perform noble and generous 
actions , a warm sense of their dignity and superior excellence is a most 
efficacious incitement.n Moreover, in this ethical f·unction of literature, 
hhere is another 11 admirable contrivance 11 : because the ad1niration of virtue 
is a kind of virtue itself, in a mental form, it leads to the habit of 
virtue, "for a dispofition or propensity of the mind, like a limb of the 
body, becomes stronger with exercise .n And "thus, by proper disciplime, 
every person may acquire a set tled habit of virtue."1 
While we might well feel that Kames is a trifle sanguine in this a-
nalysis, and say with Blair t hat umore powerful correctives than taste 
can apply, are necessary for refor~ing the corrupt propensities which too 
frequently prevail among mankind, n2 it is interesting to see the reliance 
which at least one of our critic-s places on the ethical function of the 
arts. Although the basic concept of the wisdom of God in the creation 
may be only in part responsible f or this ethical bias--the social milieu 
of the Scots accounting for the rest--it is still significant that the 
generally benevolent character of the world is found to operate in the 
1. Kames, Elements, P• 40. 
2. Blair, Lectures, P• 15. 
• 
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sphere of criticism to ·bhe extent of calling for fairly frequent connnent. 
I think it a lso qui t e significant that there is the underlying assumption 
that God had so formed the world that the arts necess ari iby tend toward 
virtue. YYh:i.le it might be t r acing a tenuous line of influence, this no-· 
tion appears to approach ·l:;he Shaftesburian idea of the virtual identity of 
the ethical and aesthetic sense 3 and we might fine that the Scots were 
affected by the good earl's i deas except that the few references to his 
work are harsh toward his philosophy though appreciative of his style.l 
It is probably nearer the tru·l:;h of the situation to say that this is a-
nother facet of the climate of opinion and stems from the same source as 
the ideas of Shaftesbury: the fundamental idea of the wisdom and benevo-
lance of God in the creation. 
It should probably be poi nt ed out that our critics' ethi cal bias is 
somewhat different from that of the usual didactic school of criticism. 
Vvhile they approve of the poWEJr i'or moral suasion that some works of piety 
possess and denounce the license of the Restoration stage,2 they do not 
make literary excellence conti ngent upon moral messages. Their ethical 
tendency seems rather to be necessitarian, as the quotations above may 
indicate. As we have seen, Bl air warns that more than taste is needed to 
correct man's vices, but he also says, and more typically: 
There are indeed few good dispositions of any kind 1Ni th which the 
improvement of taste is not more or less connected. A cultivated 
taste increases sensibility to all the tender and human passions, 
1. Blair, Lectures, P• 209. 
2. See Kames, Elements, P• 36. 
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by giving them frequent exercise; while it tends to weaken the more 
violent and fierce emotions ••• The elevated sentiments and hi gh ex-
amples which poetry~ eloquence~ and history, are often bringing 
under our view~ naturally tend to nourish in our minds public spirit~ 
the love of glory~ contempt of external fortune, and the admiration 
of what is truly illustrious and great.l 
In fine, the divine arti ficer had wrought so well •that it was a mat-
ter of wonderment and w~rvel to observe the nice adjustment of His purpose 
in the world--the ways in which all our activities and those of the ma·-
terial world combined to "render ••• knowledge useful to us in discovering 
2 
the nature of things, and in re gulating our conduct" as well as to give 
us "great deli ght.u3 Perhaps Kames can sum the matter up for us: 
The mechanical power of nature, not conf ined to small bodies~ reaches 
equally those of greatest size; witness the bodies that compose the 
solar system, which, however large, are wei ghed, measured, and sub-
jected to certain lwwsJ with the utmost accuracy . Their places 
around' the sun, with their distances~ are determined by a precise 
rule corresponding th their quantity of matter. The superior dig-
nity of the central body, in respect of its bulk and lucid ap-
pearance~ is suited to the place it occupies. The globular figure 
of these bodies~ is not only in itself beautiful, but is above all 
Qthers fitted for regul ar motion. Each planet revolves about its 
own axis in a given time; and each moves around the sun, in an 
orbit nearly circular, and in a time proportioned to its distance. 
Their velocities 1 directed by an established law1 are perpetually 
changing by regular accelerations and retardations. In fine, the 
great variety of re gular appearances, joined with the beauty of the 
system itself, cannot fail to produce the hi ghes4t delight in every one who is sensible of desi~; , power~ or beauty. 
iv. Uniformitarianism 
The general concepts of nature and the wisdom of God in the creation 
1. Blair, Lecttrres 1 P• 16. 
2. Campbell 1 Philosophy, , p. 69. 
3• Kames 1 Elements 1 P• 163. 
4• Loc. cit..!. 
include another idea which is important to the bases on whic h the Scots 
built their criticism and which it a ppears fruitful to investigate here. 
A.O. Lovejoy has termed t hi s the idea of uniformitarianism, --that because 
the 11reason is identical in all men ••• the life of reason~ therefore, it 
is tacitly or explicitly inferred, must admit of no diversity. 11 l He points 
out that this idea is immensely important in the ei ghteenth century climate 
of opinion, and it is in fact the principal way in vvhich the ail-pervasive 
idea of nature was interpreted in many thinkers. Our Scots do not expli-
citly demand that there be no di versity in the life of reason, but their 
approach indicates that they tacitly assume that men do think alike and 
that there is only one ri ght vray to think. Kames, for example, builds 
his aesthetic on the mind of :~n, on the assumption that anyone can see 
that men think and react in certain ways which can be analyzed and cata-
logued so as to provide us wit h the 11 elero.ents 11 of critici-sm. He does not 
go so far as to maintain that there is only one possible criticism, but the 
important thing is that he should feel at all that he could build as com-
pletely intellectual struc.turet in the province of aesthetics, leaving no 
place for individual reaction because such a feeling rests on a belief in 
the uniformity of reason. Kames, with Blair and Campbell, relies on the 
common mind of man, the Oonnnunus sensus which is changed by no cir-
cumstances b3.:t idiocy and ins ani ty.2 
In her treatment of Kames already liberally cited, Helen w. Randall 
suggests that this reliance on the nnatural rea son" of rnan goes back as 
1. Lovejoy, Essays, P• 79• 
2. See for e xample, Campbell, Philoso~ PP• 61-62. 
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far as t he Institutes of Justinian and that it is responsible for such 
eighteenth century ideas as the moral sense a nd t he sense of tas·te .1 
Lovejoy points out that the principles of deism~ or better perhaps~ the 
"religion of nature~ uwera founded on the belief t hat the parochialism of 
Christianity made it 11 a sort of local custom of the European peoples, and 
therefore, on that ground a l one, it was suspect to those who were resolved 
to be rid of all merely loca l customs ."2 Kenneth Maclean feels that John 
Locke, whose influence we ha.ve already noted~ concerns himself with nthe 
connnon human mind, which he does not define~ but assumes to be the possession 
of the great part of ma.nkind . 11 3 Everywhere we turn in the century we find 
this notion which runs quite completely counter to the view which has been 
popular since the genesis oi .' the romantic movement--the individuality of 
each human mind, and the exi stence of many different manifestations of hu-
man behavior. It is not sm·prising, then~ that we encounter uniformi-
tarianism running through t he lucubrations of the Soots. One reason for 
this tendency is, of course :, the inheritance which the seventeenth century 
rational philosophers had boqueathed to the a ge of light. While it was 
explicitly mainta ined by mos t philosopher s, and philosophical writers of 
literary critic ism, that they wanted to get away from the barren rationalism 
of a barbarous century, it i s still true that much of their empiricism rests 
on essentially rationalistic bases: 
1. Randall, ~cit.~ P• 29· 
2 . Lovejoy, Essays, P• 81. 
3• Kenneth MacLean~ Joh:il Locke and the English 
Eighteenth Century~ New Haven, 193o, p.4Q: 
Literature of the 
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11 
••• the vvri ters of the century sought to weld together their 
observations with what they calle d general principles. The ef-
fort was to systematize, to order, t o present in methodical form 
the diverse phenomena , to sink the particular in the general. 
These general principles they c alled the laws of nature, anil 
they said the laws 1N·ere inferences drawn from experience. They 
were to be discovere d by observine; the nature of things; in the 
science of man they were to be discovered by observing the nature 
of rr~n and his achievements. Reflecting on several of the qualities 
frequently ascribed to the laws of nature--ete r nal, immutable,. 
readily discernible--we have some reas on f or judging that they were 
not always discovered by experience but by the 11Reasontt of the 
Cartesians which the later eighteenth century wanted to eschew. It 
must be admitted, moreover, that there would not have been so much 
concern wi th natural laws had it not been f or Descartes, who had 
retaken for the modern world the position that there is order and 
uniformity in the universe on whi ch men can count. For many that 
reliability was definitely linked 1vith the idea that the Ruler of the 
Univers e 1 in promulf,"ating these laws, had thus expressed his wi ll for ma.n. 
While our critics spurn "rationalism11 --the deductive method of knowle dge--
II 11 
they are not a gainst r eas on --the ability m~n has to understand: they 
have retained that much of earlier concepts. They shared with many men of 
their a ge the notion that the reason, unaided by emotion or revelation or 
any sort, could completely explain any of the aspects of the world.2 They 
looked with a certain de gree of suspicion on art which depended almost en-
tirely on emotj.onal quali t i es for its aesthetic appeal, sometimes making 
quite absurd statements (from our point of view) about each art.3 
1. Bryson, ~ cit.,p. 24• Note here that while t his quotation i s 
concerned with the approach of the moral philosophers to problems of socio-
logical nature~ the critics also sought to formulate their general principles 
by 11 observing the nature of man and his achievements • 11 
2. See Willard Durham, Critical Es says of the Eighteenth Century, New 
Haven, Yale University Press. 1915, P• xxix. 
3• K8.1J1..as, for instance, in commentin~ on t he beauty of useful objects 
(Elements ,p. 104) ~ says: 11Thus a subject void of intrinsic beauty appears 
beautiful, considered as proper to defend a g;ainst an enemy ••• 11 While there 
is probably something of the neo-cle.ssical pre;judice a&ainst the 11 C-othic 11 here• 
it is interesting to see how Kames finds a "reasonable answer to the problem. 
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The r e sults of t his c onf i dence i n t he unifor mity and power of the 
rea son a r e qui t e apparent bot h in t he ·works of crit icism a nd in the c ontem-
pora r y cormn.ent aries on them. It mi ght perhaps be i lhwinating to see what 
t he i r c ontemporaries thou ght of the use of re a son in t hese writings. For., 
example, John F.Qll, in c omment ing on Blair 1 s critica l dis s ertati on on Ossian, 
tells us t hat 
He traced the line of poetic descri pti on with an accuracy before 
unexampled, and made i t rest on the judicious selection of a few of 
the characteristic circuw~tances in the object described. The ec-
ce ntric play of Ossian's genius was brought to that @Snuine standard, 
to which every poet in every age must submit; and those v aried beau-
ties , which of old struck the untutored taste of the Norther n tribes, 
were referred to certain great pr inciples in human nature, whic h time 
cannot change .1 
Moreover, Blair, who had a n "unerring and delicate taste 11 was advantaged 
because uhe had only to l ro ok into his own mind., in order to catch the 
genera l law whi ch operate s upon that of others, and could thus delineate 
the power so as to suit the diversities in ·wh i ch mankind exhibit it. 11 2 
It is apparent that such diversities could not be very great. This con-
fidence in the uniformity of the reason here demonstrates the way in whieh 
the Sc ottish empiricism s ometimes shows its rationalistic background: men 
relied on experience, to be sure, instead of clear and distinct ideas, but 
because mankind is constructed all on the same genera l principles, the ex-
perience of any one man is quite completely re presentative. 
Another aspect of thj.s uni f ormitarianism is presented by Hill in a 
passage which is exceptionally fulsome even for him: 
1. Hill, £F..!.. cit., P • 50· 
2. Hill, ~· cit., PP• 50 - 51 • 
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By mea~s of the ingenui ty displayed in an Essay /Critical Diss~r­
tation /which combined the subtlety of Aristotle with the ele-
gance of Longinus 1 a new era was established in literatt~e. From 
an able development of the laws of one species of poetry, inferences 
were deduced, which applied, in a certain de gree, to every other. 
Polite literature was found entitled to take_ its place among the 
sciences. In the decisions of taste, whether gratified or other-
viise, one principle was f ound uniformly to operate. As certain-
ly as beauty exists, i t was proved that it has its own laws, and 
that the C{Dpriciousness falsely ascribed to tas·l:;e, arises from 
nothing but a hasty, and of course., an illegitimate induction
1 
by 
those who canvass its subjects.l 
This is a sort of. corollary, or complementary proposition, to the belief 
in the common mind of man: reason being iden~ical in all men, the critics 
were led to a confidence in the povwer of reason to elucidate the opera-
tions of men's minds. ¥7e mi ght also place t his idea as a specific ap-
plication of the Enlightenment's concept of the universal rule of law 
in the world; because the same principles obtained everyvvhere, they could 
be applied to all activities >rithout qualm. Tytler points this for us 
when he says: 
In this elaborate work ~Elements of Criticis~ the author proceeds 
on this ~ndamental propositi on, that the impressions made on the 
mind by the productions of the f ine arts 1 are a subject of rea-
soning as well as of:.'feeling; and that, although the agreeable e-
motion arising fr om what is beautiful, or excellent i n those pro-
ductions, may be a gift of nature,and like all other natural en-
dowments, very unequal l y distributed among mankind, it depends on 
certain primciples or laws of the human constitution which are 
common to the whole species: Whence it follows, that as a good 
taste consists in the consonance of our feelings ~~th those fixed 
laws , our judgments on all the works of @Snius are only to be 
esteemed just and perfect, when they are warranted by the conclu-
sions of a sound understanding after trying and comparing them 
by that standard.2 
1. Ibid., P• 42• 
2. Tytler, op~ cit., I, 401-402. 
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There is one thin€~ to be noted in this panegyric to the power of 
universal reason to unravel the mysteries of aesthetics: both Kames and 
Tytler admit that there are differences in the kind of feeling which 
people get from art, even t hough they wish to bring that feeling into con-
sona.nce with innn.uta.ble principles. For all their 11 scientific11 approach 
the Scots are not so enamored of uniformity that they reduce art to pure 
intellection according to rule. If there were ever any "neo-classicistsn 
who repudiated feeling quite completely, our critics are not of their num-
ber. As a matter of fact, all three of them give a large place to the 
emotional aspect of art, shmvi:mg that without feeling on the part of both 
·(;he artist and the appreciator to give life and meaning, no truly artis-
tic experience is possible. Bl air, in particular in his treatment of 
Ossian, praises the "sublirnit yn of t-hat author which produces in us "a 
sort of enthusiasm"! while t he poems themselves abound 11with that enthu-
siasm, that vehemence and fi r e, which are the soul of poetry. 11 2 Kames is 
one of the true lovers of Shakespeare, one who bases his appreciation on 
the mastery which Shakespeare displays "in delineating passion."3 
Campbell ane.lyzes eloquence (by which he means all kinds of speaking and 
writing) according to the effects which the orator wishes to consider, 
and that the most important is the appeal to men's feelings: " ••• there 
are two things ·which must be carefully studied by the orator. The first 
is, to excite some desire or passion in the hearers; the second is, to 
1. 
2. 
cit., 
--3· 
Blair, Lectt~es, P• 42• 
James Macpherson, The Poems of Ossian, I, 48 quoted in Bryson, ~· 
P• 52. - --
Kames, Elements, P• 239• 
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satisfy their judgment that there is a connexion be~veen the action to 
which he would persuade them~ and the gratification of the desire or pas-
sion which he excites.'11 
It might seem that this emphasis on the feelings which runs through 
the Scottish criticism is at odds with the basis of reason and uniformity 
on which the critics build t heir systems. Yet it is apparent that such 
a combination of tendencies is really not so surprising. The Scots' con-
cern with the mind of man t akes the form of a preoccupation with the 
feelings or as they say~ the passions~ which are the part of the human 
organism most involved in matters of criticism and aesthetics. As a 
consequence~ they give those feelings an importance and place on :them 
a trustworthiness which we may well feel does not jibe with "r-eason.11 In 
effect~ the Soots find in f eeling the key to the whole subject of criti-
cism; but they analyze and catalogue feeling rather than try to show 
others how to derive certain feelin@S from certain works of art~ as a 
later @eneration of critics was to do. They thus show us in solution~ 
as it were~ and not yet in sufficient strength to crystallize~ some of 
the foundations of romantic criticism at the same time that their basic 
ideas are firm in the Age of' Reason. 
To sum this matter up, the Scots show us a tendency toward uniformi-
tarianism which is to be descried principally from their attempt to order 
and "regularize" the subject of criticism and from the opinions which they 
and their contemporaries enunciated c~ncerning what they had accomplished. 
This assumption of the uniformity of man gave them the necessary confi-
dence to examine their own minds to find the uni versa! laws which guided 
1. Campbell~ Phil.osophy11 P• 100. 
criticism, and also provided them with t he assurance that t he proper ap-
plication of "sciencen (by which they substantially meant cla.;>sifying 
different states of consciousness) could develop a completely reliable 
critical set of standards. In these tendencies we can see the fine 
Italian hand of the r ationalistic philosophies of the seventeenth century; 
yet we cannot quite term t he Scots even quasi-rationalists because they 
chose a s their starting point experience r ather than self-evident axioms, 
and their procedux:,e is inducti ve for the most part. vTe can also see an-
ticipation as well as reversion, in the emphasis which they place on the 
feelings in art 1 rather than in the rules, or imitation, or follovnng 
nnature 11 as the Augustans and some contemporaries were wont to do. We 
ourselveH mi ght anticipate some of our conclusions here, and go so f ar 
as to say that t he Scots s hovr that they were men of a t r ans ition a ge,. 
who managed to combine notions incompatible in other times, vtithout qualm 
or cavil. As Lovejoy warns, we must be wary of over-simplifying the ways 
of thinking to be found i n any writer, for 11 only the narrowest or the dul-
lest minds ••• are, i f any are, completely in harmony with the:rnselves; and 
the most important and the most characteristic thing about many a great 
author is the diversity, the often latently discordant diversity, of the 
ideas to whi ch his :mind is responsive ••• nl Not that our crit ics are 
great authors, but they do present us ·with these discordant diversities 
that are probably more illuminating as to how men think than t he consistent 
1. Lovejoy, ~ssays, P• xvi. 
f 
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patterns of ideas which are most apparent. 
w·e can now turn from these grand philosophica l concepts that form 
the foundation of the "rational premisen to ideas which are more speci-
fically concerned ~~th criticism. This is another step in a descending 
order of' abstraction from the most general to the most s pecif'ic things 
we can say about the Scots. It should prove interesting to draw connections 
between the general world view, the concepts of nature, ·wi sdom, and uni-
formity, and the critical canons which Blair, Kames, and Campbell estab-
lish. There is however , an intermediate consideration in the ~sychology 
and the methods of criticism which our critics employ; to continue the 
analo gy which I have used occasionally: we have looked at the f oundation; 
now it is time to consider the framework;_ in a final section we shall 
take a stroll through the various rooms. 
II. 
i. The Interpretation of the Mind of Man 
To the Scots the word psychology- was an unusual word; the only e-
quivalent commonly used wa s pneumatology, which Ini ght etymolo g:ically be 
considered;.much the same. The study which bore this title was, however, 
pretty much of a hangover from the medieva l curri culum of the univer-
sities and was heavily loaded with fine-spun metaphysical s peculation. 
What we connnonly think of as psychology was in eighteenth century Britain 
the centra l issue of philosophy. It will be remembered that English 
phi losophy had veered away from metaphysics and had found its interest 
---- --
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in the question of examini n g nour own abilities, and ••• what objects our 
understandings were or were not fitted to deal with," 1 r ather than in 
the purs uit of a sys tGnmt ic explanation of the univer~e. For the next 
hundred years after Locke. philosophers and philosophically minded lit-
e r a ry gentlemen in general had something to say on the w2tter of our 
minds and how they oper ate. nF'ev;- philosophers of the period, when they 
sought to illustrate mental processes. failed to discuss the arts; and 
the relationship between c r itics and philosophers--es pecia lly in Scotland , 
from Vlhich the bulk of contempora ry critic ism emanated--vras very close •112 
This philosophy,• however , which concerns i t self primarily wi th men-
tal processes, incorporate s what we consider to be psychology in its dis-
cussions of the relation of man to his world. lifany, if not all.of its 
observations, have to do with the reactions of our winds to the environ-
ment, with sensation, perception, ideas , memory, and imagination. As 
philosophy turned to the arts for illustration of these faculties of 
the mind, so did the criticism of the arts in turn rest upon the s~ecu-
l at ions of the philosophe r-psychologists. Not that the critic denied 
himself the pleasure of speculating , f or was not the representative mind 
of IllB.n quite a s available to him as to anyone else?--but rather that car-
tain pri nc i p l es appear ed v1ell established and could be fairly we ll taken 
for grairl:;ed. By and lar ge, however, our critics make us e of this 
·----------------------------------------------------------------------
1. John Locke, Essay 0!!_ the Human Understandin[_,_ Bohn's Library Edition, 
I, 118, quoted in Arthur K. Rogers, ~Student 's His·tory of Phi losop~, :New 
York, I~:iacmi llan, 1917, P• 323. 
2. Bate, ~cit., P• 97 · 
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philosophi c o-ps~hology a s a basi c s ustem of ideas on whi ch to build, and 
f or that reason it is ne e df ul that we see j ust wh at it was as far as they 
,Nere conc e r ned and what va:riat ions they made in ideas t o s uit their pur-
P9Ses. 
In a ll thr ee of the c r it i c a l works under our conside r ation the start-
ing point for most discus s ions~ whether it be the construction of a ser-
mon, the source of t he sub lime, the bad taste shown in the gardens of 
Versailles, or the need fo r vivacity in wri ting, is in the construction 
of the human mind. The primary concern of our critics is to analyze the 
reactions of the receiver of an aesthetic experience and in turn to point 
out to the critic or the ·ivri ter the best ways of affecting those reac-
tions. This ana lysis is founded on certain as s umptions about the nat ure 
of man with which we must de a l here. Yie have already mentioned pe r haps 
the most basic of these e.ssumptions--that human nature is always and 
every-vrhere essentia lly t he same; this ne:;.-t step has to do ·with hmv it is 
the same, how our critic s thought it was put to gether. Of course, as 
we descend to these more particular observations it shoumd be clear that 
we a re going to find les s unanimity among our critics than we would in 
analyzinr their 11 climate of opinionn--the emphas i s of Blair in p sycho-
logy is not the same as tha t of Campbell--yet I believe that we can find 
~QB9 basic psyoholot,ic a l concepts which the critics substantially 
shared. 
The first of these , which undoubtedly owes its genesis to Locke and 
his followers~ can be c a lled the "association of ideasu concept, if we 
J.4o. 
remember t o construe "ideas 11 in a broad sinse. 
.. 
It appears i n two ways 
in our writers: in one interpretation as the basic reason f or the aes-
thetic experience, and t he other, as the specific cause for s ome of our 
particular pleasures. The first is the more pervasive, a lthough we have 
probably less rea son to term i t a matter of the ass ociation of ideas. 
According to this idea, ·' the important principle is the similarity of the 
reactions of the receiver of an aesthetic experienc e to the cause of 
that experience; a kind of affinity between art, or nature, and human 
nature is predicated: 
Motion, in its different circumsta nces, is productive of f e elings 
that resemb l e it: sluggish motion, for example, causes: a languid , 
unpleasant feeling, slovr uniform motion, a feeling cal m and plea-
sant; and brisk motion, a lively f eeling that rouses the s pirits 
and promotes activit y .. .. Vfuen f orce is exerted with any effort, the 
spectator fe e ls a simi lar effort, as of force exerted within his 
mind. A l a r ge object svrells in the heart.. An elevated object 
makes the spectator stand erect. 1 
According to Blair, the sign of beauty is that it arouses a feeling of 
"agreeable serenity, 11 that it disposes us t o calm and gentle and soothing 
~houghts. In such particular matters as setting down rule s f or construe-
ting sentences he tells us that when we write sentences omitting con-
necting particles we hurry the mind; 11when we enumerate, with the view 
to aggravate, the mind is suppose d to proc eed with a more slow and so-
lemn pace ••• " 2 Climactic sentences are effective because t he mind de-
li ghts in an ascending order. 3 It is this constant association of the 
reacti ons of the mind with t he objects of experience that typifies the 
1. Kames , Elements, P• 91J .• 
2. Blair, Lectures, P• 126 . 
3. I~. I p. 127. 
Scots and which sometimes caus e s them to bec.aJ.led .i:he npsychol ogical 
school 11 of criticism.1 In another place, for example, Blair tells us 
that: 11 0f all the means wh ·_ch hurnan ingenui t;y has contrived for recal-
ling the images of real objocts, and awakening, by representation, 
similar emotions to those which are raised by the ori ginal, none is so 
full and extensive as that -wvhich is executed by words and writing . 11 2 
[Italics mine.::::! In treatin g the 11 external signs of the emotions and 
passions 11 Kames shows us that a spectator is affected internally by what 
he descries . of emotion in anot her person.3 Consequently, it could be said 
that intellectual and moral objects raise emotions in the same way as do 
the objects of si ght. One of the most important phases of this is the 
nsympathetic emotion of virtue 11 whi ch is aroused in the spectator as he 
observes conspicuous examples of virtuous action.4 Campbell, because his 
purpose is somevvhat different, does not rely very much :On this relation 
betw·een the spectator and th13 object; but he does, for instance, make an 
affinity between the character of the orator and his effectiveness neaes-
sary, for we are more inclined to believe a man of weak understanding and 
unquestionable integrity than we are a clever man of doubtful character.5 
This most general use of ass ociation (perhaps we might conveniently 
call it 11 sympathy11 ) is complemented by more particular, and usual, ap-
plicatio:rs of the theory of tl:te association of ideas. It will be remembered 
that John Locke had first enunciated this theory, postulating that the 
1. See Bosker, .££.• cit., 
2. Blair , Lectures, P• 56. 
3 • Kames , Elements, Chapter XV. 
4• Ibid., P• 40. 
5 · Campbell, Philosophy, P• 119. 
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mind is devoid of content at birth (the "tabula rasa") and that it 
builds, from the experience of sensation, its ideas by means of connections 
and combinations. Although he did not specifically express them as fac-
tors in this process, conti guity and similarity are impmied as means by 
which it i s carried out. David Hume elaborated this portion of Locke's 
philosophy, showing that our minds make connections by resemblance, con-
ti ~~ity in time or place, and cause and effect, as wel l as by some sup-
plementary me ans, such as identity.1 David Hartley made the most exhaus-
tive use of this principle, findin g in association the key to the entire 
formation of our minds. (It seems. doubtful that he had any effect on 
our critics; for I have not found any reference to his work in any of 
the criticism yet his ideas are remarkably close to theirs). The theory 
was so solidly established, at least in the minds of literary gentlemen, 
that by the time our critics were vvriting it was possible to make casual 
reference to it vtithout going into elaborate argument. 
Kames begins the EleMents with an account of "perceptions and ideas 
in a train, 11 another way of describing the associative process, and one 
which in terminology harks back to Locke~2 He shows that there is a cer-
tain order and connection in our ideas: 11V{hen an object is introduced 
by a proper connedtion, we are conscious of a certain pleasure arising 
from that circu.mstance. 11 His conclusion from tljis prero.ise is the.t "Every 
1. 
York: 
2. 
Howard C • Warren, A History of the Association Psychology, Hew 
Scribners, 1921, pp:-43 f f. 
Randall, ~· cit., P• 30. 
work of art that is confornu:lb-1•3 to the natural course of our ideas is 
so far agreeable; and every work of art that reverses that course is 
so far disagreeable. Hence, i t is required in every such work, that, 
like an or gani c system, its parts be orderly arranged and mutually con-
nected, bearing each of them a relation to the whole, some more intimate, 
some less."l As can easij.y be seen, this constitutes a basic principle 
on which a number of critical ideas mi ght be founded: in a poem, for in-
stance, too great digression disturbs our order of perception;2 in the 
character of a hero even his vices are appropriated into virtues by our 
associative tendency) emotions may be painful and still "agreeable" if 
they conform to the order of nature;4 and so on--there are all sorts of 
possible applications of this principle which are worked out in Kames' 
thought. 
Campbell makes perhaps :Less use of the concept, but we can still 
see that it is a basic idea which is accepted and turned to use where 
it suits his purposes. In anal yzing rhetorical "tropes" he f inds the 
idea useful in a semantic way: in order to show why it is that nonsense 
in speaking and writing so frequently goes undetected he analyzes the 
relations, first, between objects-- shmnng that they are c onnected by 
various relations "by means of association" and "they p!'love ·,y means 
of association, the source of various conbinations of ideas Qnd abstrac-
tions, as they are conunonly denominated 11 ; and then, because words are 
employed to signify these relations among objects, and because it is 
"axionatic" that 11ideas assoc i ated by the same idea will associate one 
another ••• the sounds considered as si gns will be conceived t o have a 
1. Kames, Elements, P• 23. 
2o Ibid,. ,p~. -2.4 •. :· -. 
3· rb~a , P• LJ.l. 
4· ~ .. , P• 6o. 
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connexion analogous to the things signified.nl He implies the importance 
of this associative process also in discussing the tropes that "·conduce 
to vivacity't.; they are those which by association call up a concrete pic-
ture in our minds--such as figures where "things sensible'' are used for 
"things intelligible"; the opposite of this being destructive to vivacity.2 
In Campbell,however, associati on is not ao necessary to his system and 
is consequently more an assumption than a principle. 
Blair is more inclined to rest his analyses on the theory1 
We cannot look on any work whatever, without being led by a natural 
association of ideas, to think of its end and design, and of 
course to e:xa.mi~e the propriety of its parts in relation to this 
design and end. 
Or again:· 
Every object which makes any impression on the human mind, is 
constantly accompanied with certain circumstances and relations 
that strike us at the same time. It never presents itself to 
our view isola, as the · French express it:-that is, independent 
on, and separated fro.m, every other thing; but always occurs 
as somehoW related to other objects; going before them, or 
following them; their effect or their cause; resembling them or 
opposed to them; distinguished by certain qualities or surrounded 
with certain circumstances. By this means, every idea or object 
carries in its train some other ideas, which may be considered 
as its accessories. These accessories often strike the imagina-
tion more than the principal idea itself. They are, perhaps, 
more agreeable ideas; or they are more familiar to our concep-
tions; or they recall to our memory a greater variety of impor-
tant circumstances. The imagination is more disposed to rest 
upon s orne of themr ·and therefore, instead of using the proper 
nama of the principal idea which it means to express, it em-
ploys in its place the name of the acces~ory or correspondent 
h Campbell, Philosoph~, P• 281. 
2~ Ibid.~ pe32l 
3• Blair, Lectures, P• 54• 
idea; although ·;the principal have a proper, a well known name of 
its own. Hence a vast variety of tropical or f igurative words 
obtain currency in al l languages, through c hoi e , not necessity ; 
and men of lively i maginations are every day ad ing to their 
number.! 
Beauty, which is the result of conjoining w~ny pleasu ~ble sensations, 
from color, fi gure, motion, etc ., we think to be a si gle principle; 
because, "Although each of these produce a separate a greeable sensation, 
yet they are of such a similar nature, as readily to mi x and blend in 
one general perception of beauty, which we ascribe to t he whole object 
as its cause: for beauty is always conceived by us, a.:3 something residing 
in the object which realises the pleasant sensation; a sort of glory which 
dwells upon and invests it. 11 2 
It would, however, be over-simpli~ing the ideas of our critics to 
say that they are pure associationists, like Hartley; f or integra l to 
their psychology is a concept that would seem to be qui te incompatible 
with a strict associationist v~ew. As McKenzie lament in his analysis 
of Kames' associationist thought, he (and we should i nclude Blair and 
Campbell) was nbackward looking in the way most men of · ny time are ••• he 
made use of such elements in .b..i s culture as seemed to hi m useful, intel-
lectually sound, and morally correct, 11 and these elements were sometimes 
contradictory. This, however., bothered Kames less tha.n going a gainst 
common sense .3 ~je mi ght construe such contradictory vi.(3WS less sympa-
thetically, as does Sir Leslie Stephen, ~ut whether vve a pprove or not, 
1. Ibid., P• 151. 
2 • Ibid •, PP• 52-53 • 
3• Gordon McKenzie, nLord Kames and the Mechanist Tradition, 11 Univer-
~ of California Publications in English, Vol. XIV, 1943, P• 98. 
4• For example, that 11t he votary of common sense s onetimes refuses to 
ask the ultimate questions at all." Ste phers, ~cit .• , I, 71. 
• 
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our critics were a ll inclined to place a good deal of reliance on un-
questioned 11first principles , 11 11 ori ginal propensiti es,n or 11 internal 
senses. 11 We have already noted some of these tendenc i es in Section ii 
above; here 'Ne shall note some that are more specif i ca lly connected vli th 
the concepts of the constt.tution of man's nature than that of C-od. Sbma 
of this reli ance on ori g;ina l propensities and internal senses may be due 
to the f ar-reaching influence of Lord Shaftesbury di rE ctly shown in the 
thought of the Scots; but it seems more likely that ;fr ancis Hutcheson, 
with his elaboration of the .moral sense concept, was t he immediate in-
fluence .1 1'/hile both philosophers thiro.k in much the s ame way, Hutcheson., 
was a pious churc11man >'~he re Shaftesbury i'fa S knb1;m a s fl. deis t . He was con-
sequently in little f avor f or hi s philosophic a l pri nc i _les, a lthough his 
style was much appreciated. Hutcheson, on the other 1and, was re garded 
as the ):n'i ghtest sta r in the early part of the Scotti sh renaissance. 
Another important influence may have b ·een that of Tho::rJE.s Reid, whose 
reliance on 11 common sense 11 f requently !TlE'.de him bring unquest ioned first 
principles into his philosophical scheme: "whenever he comes to a prin-
cip le which cannot be proved, he says that it is i mpl anted in our hearts 
by the Almi ghty. 112 Whatever the source, however, it :l.s certain that the 
1. See Chapter II for s ome discussion of his i nfluence. His classi-
fication of t he sense s was int o: ( 1) the e xternal sens e ( 2) the internal 
senses--the 11 pleasa nt perceptions arising f rom re s;ulaJ:·, harmonious, uni-
fo r m objects, as also from g;r andeur or novelty ." \3 ) the public sense--
nour det e r minat i or to be pleas ed with the happiness of ot hers, and t o be 
unGa s y at t he i r mis er y (4) t he mor;al sense ( 5) t he· sen.s e of honor and shame • 
. 2. Stephen, ~ ~it ., I, 71. 1 his is s omewhat unfa i r to Reid, whose 
pramary purpos e was t o attack philosophi e s which had s eemed to show that 
th<u·e was "neither h uman nature or science in the wor l d 11 e.nd that a ll was 
a fleeting de lusion. His method v'ras to rlndicate perc epti on, to shmv that 
it is usually trustworthy and that we do ·_)ercei ve externa ls. Where he 
ran into trouble was with t he powers of belief, memory , abstraction, taste , 
mora l perception--powers whi ch he rr:aintained v· e re unque st ionable first 
princi ples. See Bryson.£P_~ oit. P• 133· 
doctrine of 11 internal sens es" a nd 11 ori gina l propensiti estt plays a para-
doxically importe.nt part in t he basic psychologice.l position of our critics. 
Thes e senses differ from innate ideas only in that they are less s pecific. 
Instead of t he deity 's implanting in our mind ·such c once pt as uA thing 
cannot be and not be at t he same time," we have be en provided with means 
for dealing with the phenome na of aesthetics or mora s wherever they ap-
pear. As with innate ideas, they are the common pos se s s ion of mankind, 
but they are subject to refinement t:l'mough training e.nd education, as it 
may be corr upted through bad influences: 
But although taste be u ltimately founded on se,nsibili ty, it must 
not be considered as ·: instincti ve sensibility a l one. Reason and 
good sense ••• have so extensive an influence on E 11 the operat ions 
and decisions of taste, that a thorough good t s te may well be 
considered a s a power compounded of natural sens ibility to beau-
ty, and of improved understanding . In order to be satisfied of 
this, let us observe , that the greater part of t he productions of 
genius.:; a re no otJ:!.er than imitations of nature ; representat ions , 
of the characters, act ions, or manners of men. The pleasure we 
receive from such irrJ.tations or re presentations is founded on 
mere taste; but to jud f~ whether they be properly executed, belongs 
to the understanding, which compares the copy v'· th the ori ginal. 
Even among nations ••• I admit that a ccidental c au es may occasionally 
warp t he proper operations of t aste; sometimes t · e taste of reli-
ion, sometimes the form of goverrunent may f or a. while pervert; a 
licentious court ma;y introduce a taste for fa ls e ornaments , and 
dissolute writings. 
While the moral sense is everywhere reco g11-ized as f irst among these inter-
nal senses, the sense of tas t e can be s een to hald a place not far behind. 
As both Bl air and Kames analyze this sense, it is natural, founded on 
usentiments and perceptions that belong to our nature; a nd which, in 
genera l, operate with the same uniformity as our other intellectus.l prin-
ciples ••• There is a certain string to which, when proper ly struck, the 
1. Blair, Lec t ures, P• 19, 25. 
human heart is made to ans1•;er. 11 1 
This conviction of a corronon nature or standard and of its per-
fection, accounts clearly for that remarkable conception we 
have of ~[' right and a wrong sense or taste in norals. It ac-
counts not less clearly for the concepti ons we have of a right 
and a wrong sense or taste in the fine arts • A man who, a-
voiding objects generally agreeable, delights i n objects ~~neral­
ly disagreeable, is condemned as a monster; w13 disapprove his 
taste as bad or ·wrong, because we have a clea: conception that he 
deviates from the common standard. If man were so framed as not 
to have any notiont' ·:)f a common standard, the proverb mentioned 
in the beginning ~there is no disputing about tast~ would hold 
universally, not only in the fine arts, but i n morals; upon that 
supposition, the taste of every man, with res peet to both, would 
to himself be an ultimate standard. But as the conviction of a 
common standard is universal and a branch of our nature, we intui-
tively conceive a taste to be right or good, if comforma~le to 
the common standard, and wrong or bad if disconformable. 
Our critics do not stop with these two senses, ho~ ever, but are wil-
ling to bring internal principles to bear at almost eve ry juncture where 
there is a difficult point to meet. Blair decides that beauty cannot be 
satisfactorily brought under any principle: nObjects denominated beau-
tiful, are so different as to please, not in virtue of any one quality 
common to them all, but by means of several different p inciples in 
human natlmee 11 3 In dealing with personification, he s a s, 11 Indeed, it 
is very rerr~rkable, that there is a wonderful pronenes s in human nature 
to animate all objects. Whether this arises from a so .. t of assimilating 
---
principle, ~~ propension to spread a resemblance o· ourselves over 
all other things, or from whatever other cause it arises , so it is, 
that almost every emotion, which in the least agitates t • e mind bestows 
1. Blair, Lectures, P• 26..-
2. Kames, Elexnents, P• L1.68. 
3• Blair, l~ctures, P• 50. 
upon its objects a momentary ide a of life."1 (Itali c•· mine ). Campbell 
also finds that in the 11 purely elegant arts 11 the a ce modation of their 
end is 11t o some internal t a ste. tr2 One of the most irn:~r~ortant c onsidera-
ti ons for t he orator is shown to be the succe ssful der.tling with the nprin-
ci ples in our nature 11 as men i n general: t he principle whi ch gui de the 
unde rstanding, the i ma ginati on , the memory, and the pao3 s i ons ..3 Kame s uses 
s uch mu l ti plied orig;i na l princi pl es perhaps more fr equently than Blair , a nd 
even mor e ba sically; for he fi nds ths.t t he 11 fina l caus e 1t of many of our de-
li ghts in the p l easures of t as te lie in princi ple-s- whit: h the Creator ha s 
wisely i mpl ant e d in us : 
It t he r efore\s hows great vvisdom_, t o form us in :::u h a manner , as to 
be suce ptible bf the s ame i mprovement from f a b l e t hat we receive 
f rom genuine history . 
In the next pl ace, a pass ion founded on a peculi a r propens ity, sub-
sists generally forever ; which is the case of pr:· de, envy, and 
malice: objects are never vranting to inflame t he propensi tJr into 
a passion . 
Opinion and belief are influenced by propensity ~s well a s by pas-
sion. An innate propensity is all we have to c onvince us, that the 
operations of nature are uniform ••• 
I should conclude with t he fina l cause of the r el ish we have for 
motion and force, were i t not so evident as to l~e quire no explana-
tion . We e,re placed here in such circumstances a s t·o make industr y 
es senti a l to our Yl e llbe i ne; ; for wi thout industiJ~ the plainest neces-
saries of life are not obtained. Vvhen our situati on, therefore , in 
t his lirorld requires activity and a c onsta nt · exer t i on of motion and 
force • Providence indul gently provides f or our vre lfa re by making 
these agreeabl e to us ••• 
1. Ibid._, PP • 172-3• 
2. Campbell , PhilosoJ?hy, P • 17 . 
3• Ibid., P • 93 ff . 
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'I'he perce pti on we have )of this rela:l:;ion, whic h seems peculiar to 
man LQOI'{;r·u'i'by and proprietilcannot proceed . ?r om any other c a use, 
than from all~ of congruity or propriety ; .. or supposing us des-
titute of that sense , the terms would be to u uninte lli gible.! 
As Tytler says, 
But although the author of these Essays C~ssa_L~ EE. 1.[orali ty ~ 
Natural Reli gi~he.s successfully shewn, that; the passion for 
simplification has led other philosophers to round their theories 
of morals on too narrow a basis, it has been ob jected, with some 
appearance of reason, that he himself has erre . on the other hand , 
in mul tiplying unnecessarily the motives of c on uct, and in as -
si g;ning to separate and distinct original princ · ples of our nature , 
many of those mora l phenomena which a stricter analysis, and more 
profound investi 6ation, h a s shevm to be reduci b e to one and the ~ 
same general law ••• 2 
In conclusion, I shall refer the reader to the part of the Appendix where 
is summarized Campbell's prof that we have intuitive evidence, dra'\m 
from the internal senses of our aesthetic feelings.3 
Beyond these concepts of the association of ideas and the importance 
of ori ;;i.nal propensities , the psychol ogy of the Sco·l:;s p laces great empha-
sis on the emotional nature of man . Despite the rati onalism which they 
disc erned in the order of nature (or perhaps precisely bec~use of it)h our 
critics saw man as possessed of' feelings by vvhich many 'Jf his activities 
were regulated. In the v10rils of Gladys Bryson: 11 SometLnes they are c a lled 
th.e Sentimentalists [''they11 includes such men as Smith Hume , and FergusoiJ 
because of their insisting that sensation and feeling together are far more 
"5 deterwinant of man 1 s action than is his rational nature . 
1. Ibid., P• 165. 
2. Tytler, ~cit., I, 189. 
3· P . xxvii. 
4• See section on the wisdom of C..'!od , above. 
5· Bryson, ~· cit., P• 12. 
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the quotati ons · we have us ed above indic ates that our rit i cs do not look 
on man as gui ded so much b;) r eason as by his ple as ure and dis:Just, his 
desire and aversi on . In fact , t he associative proc e~ s itself is l ar gely 
a matter of emoti on according to one TNay of looking at it, for the con-
necti ons of our i deas are i n lar ge part deterwined by our likes and dis-
likes: f or example, 11 the winp. gliding easily and swe,3t ly through related 
j 
objects, carries along the a greeable properties it meets with in its pas-
sage and bestov,rs them o~· the object. 11 1 
Our feelings are ar oused by many different means, all of which are 
i mportant to the subject of criticism; the emotioms and pass ions cannot 
be explains? by simple principles: 
Human nature is a complicated machine, and is una~oidably so, in 
order to answer its various purposes. The public indeed have 
been entertained with ma ny s ystems of human nature that flatter . 
the mi nd by t heir simplicity. According to s ome •vriters, man is 
entirely a selfish being : according to others , universal benevolence 
is his duty: one foundsmorality upon ~ympathy, a nd one upon u-
tility. But the variety of nature is not so e sily reached, and 
for confuting such utopian systems without the f at· gue of 
reasoning; it a ppears the best method to t ake H survey of human 
nature, and to set bef ore the eye, plainly and. andidly, facts as 
they really exist. 2 
The practical outcome of t hi s view is that the critic, t he writer, or 
simply the person of taste must concern humse lf with t ~1e ways in which 
the feelinf>~S are aDoused and controlled. Consequent ly, each of our cri-
tics takes particular pains t~ place the proper streE on the emotions 
and passions. Campbell l ays as his foundation for t he study of eloquence 
the consideration which the s peaker must have of his audience as 11men 
1. Kames, El ements, P• 41 . 
2. Ibid, P• 27. 
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in general" principally by analalyzing the various mea.ns of arousing 
their passions. In both Kames and Blair the beau.tifu l and the sublime 
are exp l ained in terms of the emotions which they rai s e; in fact~ the 
only way we have of knmvin g them is throu gh the chara cter of the emotion: 
In judging of any s t r ikin,g_ beauty in composi t i n, whether it is, 
or is not of t hi s class L the sublime ,..,e mus attend to the 
nature of the emotion which it raises; and onl y , if it be of that 
elevating, solemn, and awful kind, which dist · guishes this 
feeling, we can pronounce it sublime.l 
According to Blair fi gures of speech (and indeed lan.~ua ge itself, vrhich 
ge gan with exclamations of warning) ori ginated in the pass ions : 
But it was not necessity alone, that gave ris <"J to this fi gured 
style. other circu.~tances a lso, at the commencement of langua ge, 
contributed to it. In the infancy of all societies, men are much 
under the dominfu on of imagination and passion They live scat-
tered and disper s ed; they are unacquainted wi t h the course of 
t hings; they are every day, meeting with new an:i strange objects. 
Fear and surprise, wonder and astonishment are t heir most frequent 
passions. The i r language will necessarily partake of this charac-
ter of their minds ••• 2 
Even the word-order of a sentence is found to be effec Jive in the degree 
it satisfies the emotions: it is most vivid vrhen the primary interest 
comes first.3 Campbell devotes three-fourths of his analysis of the kinds 
of oratory to the discussion of those which are addres s ed to the emotions 
and the ~assions--particularly the latter--and makes he hi ghest form 
of eloquence the vehement which ttbears down every obs Jacle and procures 
the speaker an irresistible povrer over the thoughts and purposes of his 
audi ence . u4 In thinkin g of his audience, also,the spe aker must above all 
!.Bl air , Lectures, P• La. 
2. Ibid, P• 66. 
3• Ibi~ P• 69. 
LJ.. Campbell, Philosophy, PP• 26-27 • 
153· 
think of them as endowed vnth passions and use the proper means to work 
upon those pas si ons . Campbell further :makes a consi d rable excursion 
into the t y pe of analysis which occupies the other c.r i t ics so much when 
he considers at leng;th 11 the cause of that pleasure vvh · ch we receive from 
objects or Be presentations that excite pity and other painful fee!bings,n 
a subject obviously dependent on certain views of the emotions and passions. 
It might be of some importance to note that Campbell f eels that the cause 
of this pleasure is in a separate emotion (an ori gin 1 principle) rather 
than a combination of already recognized emotions.l 11w-e mi ght finally say 
that sufficient indication of the place of the f eeli :ngs in the psychologi-
cal views of the Scots can be gathered from the fact t hat Kames uses some 
seventy-six pa ges of fine print in an exhaustive ana l y sis of the emotions 
and passions before he proceeds with his critical analyses . These pa ges 
of direct discussion are, however, only part of the E>t ory, for they be-
come the basis for much else. The canons of Kames' c~ri ticism, such as 
congruity and propriety, dignity and grace, uniformit y and variety, novel-
ty and surprise, etc., are al l based on their appeal t different feelings 
and degrees of feeling . More specifically dependent e ven than this is the 
very i mportant discussion of the sentiments (the l ang;un ge) appropriate 
to the expression of the passions. 
The details of these analyses and discussions may be found in the 
Appendix, but mi ght be well here to swn..'tJlarize their views ab out these 
matters as we ll as their psychological outlook in gener al, at least as 
1. Campbell, Philosophy, Ch. XI. 
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far as we can. A useful hint toward doint; t hi s may be found in what 
Kames has to say ab . ut human nature: 1 our critics are essentially 
empirical a nd atomis ic in their interpretation of the constitution 
of the human mind. They do not explain man 's activities in terms of 
self-interest, or be evolenc e, nor do t he y base t heir interpretations 
on sex or the conditioned r eflex. Because man has at once certain 
original propensitie and certain experiences which are gathered to-
gather by associatio 1, he i s neither the passive receptacle of the 
pure associationist or t he manipulator and rational i nvestigator of 
his environment of t e neoc ~~ssicist. The emphas i s on the feelings 
does not admit of lo king at man as basically rati onal, anyv<ay; but 
then, on the other nd, he i s certainly not the pr1:1y of his feelings, 
nor is the presumpti n held t hs.t he should let intuition and personal 
to our critics the nd was like a house, with different r ooms desi gned 
for various specific functions, but v<ith the contents of the rooms in 
• different houses nev r being the same. Ever~y house would have a living-
room, but be tastefully furnished.t where in others 
it would bare uecessities, and so on for the other rooms. 
Y· e mi e;ht ex!:;end this a littlo by saying that, rather t han being like a 
house. alone, the was like a home wherein the arrangement and the 
c ondi ti on of the s were decide d by the feelings of the owner. 
155· 
To extend this analo gy further would, I think, be unwise, if 
the points have been made that the psycholog_y of the S ots is an 
inte gTal part of their criticism, formin g t he basis for much of their 
critical thought; that this psychology is unlike that of other thinkers 
of the ei ghteenth century; that it holds in solution same notions 
from associationism, sorne from rationalism, and some premonitory of 
romanticism; and that it consequently indicates the t ansitional 
character, the eclecticism, and the complexity of the Sco'ts' thought. 
ii. Theory and :Method 
The methods by which our critics attacked their pr oblems and 
the theory underlying those methods need not occupy u.· overlong, be-
cause much of this topic we have already i mplied in our discussion so 
far. The fact that each of the critics works lar gely f rom a psycholo-
gical basis has been indicated as well a s the fundamental idea that 
criticism, like all other act i vities, is subject to r ational, or 
11 scientific, n investi gation. 1 The interpretation of human nature 
with which we have been dealing is very i mportant to t he method which 
the critics follow--each of t hem be gins vvi th an examina tion of what 
constitutes the human mind, in its relation to the fine arts in parti-
cular. Each of them, after discussing the nature of our perceptions, 
taste, emotions, etc., proceeds to specific a pplicatio of the principles 
established--Blair and Kames principally to the exami:2ati on of various 
literary genres, a s they illustrate the principles, and to such aspects 
of literature as l:tyle, fi gures, rhyme, etc .--Campbell ·t o the formulation 
1. See pages 110 and lll above 
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of rules f or the guidance of the orator, including also s uc h n1atters 
as fi gures, or ganization, a nd vivacity . The discus si on of these 
matters is constantly r e f erred to t he human mind, a s we have s~en; 
and we may consequently call this the psychological a spect of their 
method. 
It remai n s to discuss the scientific aspect, whi eh has, inci-
dentally , occasioned a good deal of comment among students of this 
period.l Theory as well a s practice · is of concern he l' e , since our 
critics wer e working in a ccordance with some quite defi nite ideas 
about t h e ways in which criticism should be carried out : 
Its 5cience 'i/ successful investi gations had es -t;a.blished 
the belief that the whole universe was subject t o permanent 
a nd inflexib le laws whic h mi ght be discovered by t he continual 
a pplication of huma n reason to t he observation of' facts. The 
restless s pirit of inquiry , which characterized t his period, 
left its i mpress on all branches of human knowled c·.e, on ethics, 
reli gion, politics, and at last also pervaded t he domain of 
literary critic ism. . The met hods of physical scie nce were. 
transferred to them, an empiric process of resear c h came to be 
considered as the only ade qu2te means to acquire a t horough 
knovvledge of t he human mind . ~ 
The rationalistic critics of the Age of Johnson ·were firml y 
convinced t hat by a. careful investigation of t he permanent 
elements in art, exempt fr om the shifting conditions of h:uman 
lif e, i t would be possible to fix an immutable s hmda.rd. 'I'hey 
thought tha t criticism had at last reached s uch a hi rJl de gree 
of perfection t hat it might be called scientific. By a new 
a nalysis on scientif ic line s i t would be possible to arrive 
at the establishment of t he principles by which literar y art 
was gtiverned, and i n obedience to ·whi ch the arti st wa s to act . 
I n t hi s inductive proces s n o othe~ ~ide ~ were t ~ be ~ccepted 
tha t reason and human nat ure, both 1nvar1able gu.1des .~ 
---- - ---
1. See Br yson, Williams , Bosker, Bate, in the works cited. 
2. Bosker, op. cit. P• ~4 . 
3· Ibid ., p-:-64-_-
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The truth of these assertions may be g!lthered from what the c r itics 
thought they were doing (sometimes a trifle differen·t f rom what they ac-
tually accomplished). Campbell ~ for instance_, points out in his Intra-
duction th~t he is concerned t o establish general pri:nc iples by which 
eloquence may be guided. These principles, however_, are not to be es-
tablished a priori but are to be founded in induction: 11 ••• when we rise 
from the individual to the species_, from the s pecies to the genus, and 
thence to the most extensive orders and classes, we a;c·r ive ••• at , the 
knowledge of genere.l truths, which_, in a certain sens e are also scien-
tific_, and answer a similar purpose.'t Csimils:r to th(3 p:urpose of the 
general laws established by mathernaticE._)" In this wa;r vre avoid being 
empirics _, v.rho are g,v.ided entire ly by piecemeal practiee and never c orne 
to a knowledge of principles, or visionaries_, who argue from principles 
which have "no foundation in nature.111 It is even less desirable to be 
a visionary than an empiric_, f or he is influenced by ::,r opasitions whi ch 
are imag;inary rather than real; his theory is ttno better than a castle 
in the air."2 This aversion of Campbells to deduct ive speculation can 
also be seen in his attack on the nscholastic art of :>y llo gizing11 in 
Chapter VI. It would seem just to infer that he felt t hat reasoning 
from propositions not based in experience was no way to knowled ge un-
less the subject were such a one as matheiP.atics where a xioms really 
were axioms. Also interesting is his use of the word s cience which 
1. Campbell_, Philosophy, P• 15. 
2. Loc. cit. 
is applied primarily to the formulation of general tho cry and grand 
principles rather than to the experimental investi gat:i. on of phenomena. 
Newtonian influence is probably apparent here. 
Kames is even more clearly nscientific." As Hel·en Randall has 
shown, 1 he follows a :method of analysis and synthesis t.hat is Newtonian 
(and we might add Baconian, experimental, observational2 ). In Kames' 
words: 
-· 
His /_the author'sJ plan is, to ascend gradually to principles, 
from facts and experiments; instead of beginni :ne; with the for-
mer, handled abstractedly, and descending to t he latter. 
Dispatching next some coincident matters, I proceed to my clhd.et' 
aim; which is, to establish pra~tic al rule:s for the fine arts, 
derived from principles previously established. This is a gen-
eral view of the intended method; reservinr; howe ver a privile ge 
to vary it in particular instances, where a de·•rl ation may be 
more commodious.3 
Miss Randall explains: "To gether, these statements si gnify a combination 
of anal:y-tic and synthetic reasoning, the pattern 'for ·;vtich is to be found, 
of course, in the scientific method so warmly recommemc~ed by Newton." 
In this regard she quotes Colin Maclaurin, the populari zer of Newton 
in Edinburg;h : 
l. 
as the 
2. 
3· 
In order to proceed with perfect security, and t o put an end for 
ever to disputes, he L NewtonJ proposed that i n our enquiries 
into nature, t he methods of analysi~ and synthe s is should be 
both employed in a proper order; that we should be gin with the 
phaenomena, or e f fects, and from them investi gate the powers or 
causes that operate in nature; that, from particular causes, we 
should proceed to the rr..ore general ones, till t he ar gu:rnent end 
in the mest general: th i s is the method of analysis. Being 
once possessed of these causes, we should then descend in a 
--- - --- -----------
In the SQ~~Rry given below I have follm~ed ~~ s s Randall's work 
authoritative one on thi s subject. 
See B~Json, .££• cit., F• 52. 
Kames, Ele~~nts, P• 16, 102. 
contrary order; and from them, as established princi ples, ex-
a ll the phaenomena that are t heir consequences , and prove our 
explications; and this i s- the synthesis. It i s evident that, 
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as in mathematids, so in natural philosophy, t he investi gation 
of diffic ult things by t he method of analysis ought ever to 
precede the method of composition, or the synthesis. For in 
any other way, we can never be sure that we as:sume the princi-
ples which really obtain in nature; and that our s ystem, after 
we have composed it vvi. t h great labor, is not mr:3re dream and il-
lusion. 
She continues by pointing out l:ihat the first part of the Elements forms 
an analysis--though Kames does not entitle it such--and the second a 
synthesis. The first is apparsntly more pleasant to use: 11in followin g 
;the analyti c method, we have a sensible pleasure, likc:l mounting upward, 
which is not felt in the other: the analytic method i s more agreeable 
to the imagination; the other :nethod will be preferred by those who 
with rigidity adhere to order, and ~:ive no indulgence t o natural emo-
. II tJ.ons. Kames was, however_, c .1reful to follow the proper order and 
use both methods. He felt, wi t h many other thinkers of his time, that 
subjects like criticism, while inquiring about objects not perceivable 
to the senses, "Still dealt wit ::1 parts of nature available to observation 
and quite as much matters of i act. Consequently, he· is able to draw 
on experience (from the 11 uni ve::-sal mind of man") in t he usual empirical 
fashion to establish his basic propositions of fact. Lince he has done 
this he can proceed with confidence in the scientific method which he 
is followin g . 
We mi ght refer to Blair i n this connection, for although ·he pre-
tends less to sy stem than do t.1e other critics, he is quite as prone as 
Kames to base his critical c a nons on 11 cmmnon observati ons 11 or "truths 
'• 
• It 
universally admitted. Blair is even less inclined to prove his pro-
positions, frequently making a simple statement of them and letting it 
go at that. In his discussions of taste or wit or the progress toward 
refinement he seems to be assa i led by no doubt as to the firmness of 
his foundations. This is one r eason, of course, why the skeleton of 
his method is not so apparent, because he does not bother to question 
or .prove, but states lis opinion. Naturally, a good deal of · this 
attitude must stem from the confidence in the univers ~lity of human na-
ture which we have discussed above.1 Perhaps more of i t is due to a. 
habit of thinking quite different from the induction which the Scots 
ostensibly espoused. 
Such aspects of the critics' ideas a.s their reliance on univer-
sa.l and eternal laws of nature, "original propeneities 't a.nd internal 
senses, a.nd facta of human experience immediately observed and axio-
matic show, as we have said bef ore,2 that they were neither so empirical 
nor scientific as they thought. Tytler somewhat naively indicates this 
contradiction in our critics' t hought in his descripti on of Kames' 
methods 
••• his method is, to begin with laying down some general ob-
servation, or moral sent iment relative to the passions which is 
commonly !!!_ ~ simple 9.: nature ~ to be verifi4..2_ immediately 
by our ~ consciousnest_, ~is explained with so: :much precis-
Bisi on,~t the mind, llpon !:. ~ a~ reflection, yields its 
assent as to an a.xion. The truth of the theor«)t lcal observa-
tion thus establi"Shed and assumed £"? J, the author proceeds to 
1. Chapter II, iv., passim. 
~. See P• 146 above. 
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apply it to practice, by us ing it a s a canon of criticism to try 
certain pas sages of the poets, or s pecimens of t he work s of the 
fine arts; which accordi. n g1y, are held to be P':Jrfect or defective, 
as t hey coincide or di sagree ~~th the canon.l 
LI talic s mine J 
To me there is an obvious para dox in assuming and est::tblishing at the 
same time, and the essence of he experimental method i s quite the con-
trary of that outlined above, which smacks more of tho;~ scholastic art. 
Of cours e , Kames did not quite do what Tytler says, because the propo-
' sitions are not always axianatic but are sometimes dr~vn from in~uctions 
previously made; yet Kames does not quite do what he says either, for 
many of hi s nfacts and experirrents 11 are the result of i ntuition alone. 
In short, there is ample evidence that our critics were incli ned to 
mix the modes of their thinki:r:.g . Perhaps t he hist orhtn Buck l e might 
be called upon here to present a version of why there should be this 
reliance on essent i ally deductive processes. He tells us that , in the 
seve nteenth century 
••• the clergy, who wer E its zealous champions, had monopolized 
all the sources of educ ation, both public and private. In no 
other Protestant c.ountry, have they exercised such control over 
the universities; not c'nly the doctrines taught , but also the 
modes of teaching them, being, in Scotland, pla ced under the 
supervision of the Chm;·ch. This power, they, of course, used 
to propagate their own plan of obtaining truth; and, as long 
as their power remainec. undiminished, it was r.ardly possible that 
the opposite, or induct ive plan should gain a hearing. Over 
grammar-schools, the clergy possessed an authorit y fully equal 
to that which they had in the universities. ~'hey also a ppointed 
and removed, at their Clwn pleas ure, teachers of every grade, from 
village schoolmasters to tutors in private f a:rri lies. In tl1is 
way, each generati on a~ 1 it arose, was brought under their influ-
ence, and made subject to their notions; taking the mind of 
1. Tytler, £E_• cit., 11 402. 
Scotland when it was yo·.mg and flexible 3 they bent it to t heir 
own method. lienee~ tha::; method became supreme ; it reigned 
everywhere; not a voice was lifted up ag~inst it ; and no one 
had an idee. that ther~ was :more than one path by which truth 
could be reached, or ·that the human understanding was of any 
use except to deal dedu, ~tively Vlri.th premisses, which were not 
to be inductively e xa.mi:1ed • •• The inductive or analytic spirit 
geing thus unknown, and the deductive or synt hetic spirit be-
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ing alone favoured, i't ::l.appened that when ear l j.r in the eighteenth 
century • • • circumstances • •• gave rise to a ~eat i ntellectual move-
ment, that movement, t hough new in its result~; , was not new in 
the method by which the results were obtained • •• In that country, 
men have always been deductive; even the most original thinkers 
being unable to liberat• ~ themselves from the universal tendency, 
and being forced to accopt a method which time had consecrated, 
and which was interwoven with all the associations of the national 
mind.l 
I believe that t his is certainl y overstating the case ~ but it is an ar-
gument for the other interpretation of the thinking of the Scots, in 
opposition t ·o the interpretat i'm that they were induci~ive t hinkers. 
Happily, we do not ~ve to cho, :>se the correct analysi8, but can rest 
content in the knowledge that 1) ur critics show both and t hat both are 
influential in giving their ·bhiJught its particular s l ant. 
A further aspect of the mothods of the critics s hould be mentioned 
before we turn to other subjec·:;s . Apparent throughoui; the vwrk of all 
three is a habit of classifyin~ and catalo gtung which, I suppose, would 
be neither inductive nor deduc · ~ive;· for classification and analysis (in 
the sense of the separation of a whole into its component parts) are com-
mon both to the scientific modo of thought and the de ductive or ration-
alistic. Whether it be one or the other, however, a ppears to me to be 
of less interest than the fact that it shows our critics' intention to 
be scientific and orderly in t ::1eir thinking. :B'or example, the subject 
1. Henry Thoma-s Buckle, 'rhr :~ History of Civilizat i on in England, 2 
vols., 2d ed., New York, D. :ap:?leton, 1877• -
of eloquence is divided i nto "nature and foundationY ~ ttthe foundations 
and essent ial properties of e ocution, 11 and 11 the di s <n 'iminating proper -
ties of elocution.11 The firs 'c of these is then cat e orized into kinds 
of evidence necessary in persuasion, the considera i ons whi ch the speaker 
must take of his audience anc. of himself, and the i fferent kinds of pub-
lic speaking . Evidence is c:.e.s sified as intuitive and deductive; each 
of these is further subdi vid•:ld; and Campbell thus goe s on analyzing 
through the entire work. Ka:rnes c,a\_,l'ssifies the pl a sures which we re-
ceive from the objects of t a ste in'bo sublimity and grandeur, beauty, 
wit, novelty, motion and for ·ce , etc. He then analy z es motion according 
to quick and slow, regular ELnd irregular, upward and dovmward, str!;l,ight 
and curved, etc. Thus it i::1 throughout the c r i t i c j_sm: every subject 
is divided and subgivided, :} lassified and cate gor i zed. While not uni-
que, such is not the method of most literary cri ~i ei sm; i t certainly 
is not prominent among English critics of either t he ei ghteenth or nine-
teenth centuries . It is more allied to the method of philosophy, psy-
cholo gy, biology, or physieal science than to t hose of criticism as it 
is usually carried on. I f we were to separate nethod from content it 
mi ght be compared vnth the way in which some cl s sical rhetoricians at-
te.cked their subject or vrith the analysis of so_ne of the 11 new critic ism, 11 
but on the whole it seens to show the desire of our critics to make their 
study li~e a rational sciEmce. 
We thus have t wo pro•3esses of' 11 ana l ysisn go n g on simultaneously--
one the rising from part icul ars to general rul s ( induction), and the 
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other the cate p~orizing of r;e nf> r a l subjects i nto compo _ent parts • I feel , 
however , that we need not be ~ oncerned over this unduly, the most in-
teresting matter being that 1: oth types of analysis a e evidences of the 
11 scientific 11 intent of our Cl' itics. In summi n g up, • e might say that 
it is the re lati on between t::1is intent, or the theor of critica l method , 
and the actuali cy of that method that is most illmninating . We can s e e 
in this relation the endee.vc'r to methodize critic · s "Tl c uietly sabotaged 
by the nature of the study, by habits of deductive thought, and by un-
·wi llingness to question fundamental ideas. 
Tlus chapter has endeavored to eY..a.mine the r ationa l aspects of our 
critics' patterns of thought in order to s ee the k i nds of leading ideas 
wluch t hey held. Vfe have tried to avoid i n all this the capital error 
of deciding that Blair, Campbell, and Kame s were 11r eal l y 11 or ttbasica lly11 
neo- cla.ssi.c a l or r omantic .. empirical or intuitive , s.cientific or rationalis-
tic , by an effort to shovv that all these e lements appe al~ in '·their thinking . 
1Jle have, however, tried t o indicate the c limat e of opinion in ·which they 
lived, the principal influences on their thought, and some of the leading 
abstractions which mol de d their ideas. 
C ~-Ifl~PTER IV 
Critical Premise:.> 
Until tbis point in our lucubrati ons we have a ttempted to follow 
a procedt.u·e somewhat like J-ha t of Kames --establishi ng genera l principles 
and then descending: to more specific ideas. l~hile n e shall continue to 
do this i n reference to the v-hole inquiry, the approach in this cha pter 
vri ll be a trifle different. I vris h to present here some of the critica l 
ideas of the Scots withmi.; e onstantly trying to deouoe the more specific 
from the more genera l--to look on these idea s as i f thGy were more or 
le ss on a par with one another . This is primarily f or practica l rather 
than ·the oretical reasons, for there are still g;radations in the principles--
t he conc ept of the sublime, for instance, would "be: :in part attributable 
to notions about taste., and a criticism of Ossi an would be affected by 
ide a s of the sublime, But it appears that , as far as casting li ght on 
the ways in ·whi ch our critics thought, such a deductive procedure is 
no l on ger very profitable nor quite necessary. 
Moreover , an attempt to establish general critical principles in 
the be ginning would lead us over much of the ter· i tory we have seen al-
ready : the ideas of ur..iforroitarianism, of the wisdom of God, of the im-
portance of the pass i ons naturally functi on as critica l pri nci p l es as 
well as philosophical or psycholo gical. Consequently, this cha:[!iter will 
be more of a samplin g and tasting t han an att em:?t to fol lovr a ch in of 
reasonin g to its smalle.,·i:; link. Vie shall try t o relate the idea s we 
encounter to t he vrhole fabr ic_, but not necessari l y to each other. 
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Another obser vation is t lw.t in t his chapter we shall try to re l ate 
t he critical positions more s pecifically to t he s oci a l preLuse discus-
sed in the second chapter. Inasmuch as some ideas, which may be quite 
minor in the general scheme of' the critics r ideas--minutiae of cri t ioism--
may also be quite illuminat i ng in this re gard, it s eo:ms well to treat 
them on an equal level with more basic principles. 
1. Taste 
For a starter we migbfG r enew our bowing acquaintance with a general 
and fund~mental principle, t aste, which every school b oy knows is a per-
vasive and important critical concept in the eight eenth oEintury. We 
have noticed1 that this i dea of an aesthetic sensi bility subject both 
to nurture and distortion was a basic notion to Ble.i r , and to a lesser 
degree • to Kames. And we h.uve seen that it shows 1;;he usual mixture o£ 
a reliance on internal sens es and a belief in the . efining power of e:x:-
perienoe, It how remains to look at this notion a trifle more closely 
and to see how its use shows us some further thing;s about Blair and 
Kames.2 
The use of this concept had long been sanct i oned by eminent cri-
tics in certain contexts , as far back as the seventeenth oent~.3 By 
the early part of the e i ghteenth century some conun.ent on it was almost 
1. See P• above. 
2. Campbell has little to say about this topi c . 
3• Bate mantions Dryden, La Bruyere, Bonhours, Farquhar, Temple as 
supporters of an attitude of' ,j!_ ~ ~ quoi--the admission that there 
is something in art not completely explicable by reason and rules. See 
"Neo-Classical Developments." in From Classic ~ Romantic, passim. 
obligatory on the critic. For exrumple, the Abbe DuBos in his RefleZCion 
Critiques s~_l!_P~e et .!!..£1: la Peint~l shows us that taste is a 
principle distinct from the ru~es which guide the arti st. According to 
him, pleasure is the only criterion of the arts; "the1 greatest painter 
is he whose WJ)rks give us the greatest pleasure." P:Leas ure, however, 
comes from taste, and there are as many tastes in t he world as there are 
discerning men. Taste is conditioned by habit, age, nationality) and 
it is useless for the appreciator to discuss the re l ative importance of 
line, color, composition, etc. "Men would be right , ff everyone were 
content to judge for himself. Their wrong consists of wishing to judge 
for the world. 1~n believe naturally that their t aste is good taste; 
and consequently they think that those, who do not judge as they do, have 
imperfect senses or are led by their prejudices, not realizing the extent 
of their own prejudices. ••2 This is .. oerta~nly a ~ gusti bus admission 
for a neo-classical French critic, yet we can find the sense of taste 
as a quality of aesthetic judgment apart from rules in eminent English-
men of the same period. Addison, for instance, tells us in the papers 
on the .Eleasures 2f the Imagination that the reUsh of a description 
depended lar~ly on taste: 
This dififerent taste must proceed either fr a.m the perfection 
of imagination in one more than in another, or fro.m the different 
ideas that several readers affix to the same words. For, to 
have a true reli sh and form a right judgment of a description, 
a man should be born with a good imagination, and must have well 
weighed the force and energy that lie in t he several words of a 
language, so as to be able to distinguis which are most 
1. DUBos wrote this in l7l9; he is one of t he few Franch critics of 
whom the Scots have anything good to say. See Blair Lectures, P• 137• 
2. Dubos, ,2£• cit. quoted in Frank P. Chamber, The History o!._T~e, 
N~ York, Columbia University Press, 1932, P• 120. ' 
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significan and expressive of their proper ideas, and what ad-
di tion.al s ength and beauty they are capable of reoei ving from 
conjunctio with others. The fancy must be warm, to retain the 
print oft ose images it hath received from outward objects; 
and the ju gm.ent discerning, to know what expressions are most 
proper to clothe .· and adorn them to the best advantage. A man 
who is deficient in either of these respeo·ts, though he may 
receive t general notion of a description, can never see dis-
tinctly al its particular beauties.l 
r AddisOJIL bad written specifically on the subject of' 
g it to be "that faculty of the soul which tiiscerns 
the beauties of author with pleasure, and the imperfections With dis-
some people could never acquire, but that it could be improved ~ cul-
tivation.2 This aspect of taste is commonly observed, sometimes· 
in Addison's f'as sometimes with an emphasis on nature, at others 
with an emphasis n oulti vation. It seems probable that Shaftesbury's 
influence is to 
natural sense of 
seen in the first emphasis, and in some writers this 
is regarded; quite panegyrically. Such a oritio 
prises taste tra cends not only reason b~ also the imagination ••• The 
inevitable result of' the exercise of taste is an 'instantaneous glow 
of Pleasure which thrills thro' our whole Frame.•"3 On the other band 
Sir Joshua Reynol s in his Discourses emphasized the role of reason 
in forming taste- -the perception of the universal and ideal in the 
work of art.4 Al xander Gerard managed to bring both these points of 
1. Josep~ Add· son, The Spectator, ed. by A Caalmers, 8 vols., 
Boston:: Little Br and Co., 1856, no. 416. 
2. Ibid, No. • 
3• Bate, O.£!. it., P• 53• The material from Cooper is in Letters. 
C onoerning Taste, 1757 • 
4. Sir Joshua Reynolds Discourses, New York:: Everyman, 1907, no. 7• 
view together in··· · s elaborate Essay ~Taste. According to this fore-
most 
A Fine tas e is neither wholly the gift of nature, nor wholly 
the effect of~· It derives its origin from certain powers 
natural to the mind; but these powers cannot attain their full 
perfection unless they be assisted by proper culture. Taste 
consists o efly in t he improvement of those principles which 
are ommnon y called the powers 2f imaginationL and are considered 
by modern hilosophers as internal or reflex senses, supplying 
us with fi er and more delicate perceptions, than any which 
can be pro erly referred to our external organs. These are re-
ducible to the following principles; the senses of novel;y, of 
sublime, o beauty, of imitation, of harmony, of ridicule, and 
of virtue. 
As we might e peot, Blair and K&Ill$s hold views very similar to this a 
"Taste ••• is ulti tely f ounded on an internal sense of beauty, which 
is natural to me , and which, in its application to particular objects, 
is g guided and enlightened by reason."2 "A taste for 
Ctbe fin!_7 arts is a plant that grows naturally in many soils; but, 
without culture, scarcel y to perfection in any soil. It is susceptible 
is, by proper care, greatly improved. In this 
respect, a taste fine arts goes hand in hand with the moral sense, 
to which indeed ·t is nearly allied."' It is a "simple sense" and is 
improved in much the same way as the other simple senses, by "frequent 
1. Alexander Gerard, Essaz ~ ~e, Edinburgh, 1780, PP• 1-2. In 
a note on the illl ernal senses Gerard has this to saya: "l&o. Hutcheson 
was the first wh · consi dered the pawet's of imagination .as so many senses. 
In his In~uiry o noernin beauty !!!!Lvirtue, and his Esiays_2!! ~ 
passions, Sic e calls them internal senses. In his ater works he 
terms them subse uent and reflex senses; subsequent because they always 
suppose some pre ous perception oft he objects about which they are 
employed ••• refle , because, in order to their exertion, the mind re-
flects upon and akes notice of some circumstance or mode of the ob-
ject that was pe ceived ••• u (Note, PP• 1-2.). 
2. Blair, Le tures P• 23. 
3• Kames •• El menta P• 13. 
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exercise , and curious · attention to its proper objeota.111 We have a 
"clear proof" of this improvability 11in that part of taste, which is 
called an ear for music." It is quite evident that our appreciation 
improves tro~ the "simplest and plainest compositions" to the 11intrioa~ 
and compounded pleasures of harmony." So it is with painting, and so 
it is "with respect to the beauty of' composition and discourse"a 
When one is only beginning his acquaintance with works of genius, 
the sentiment which attends them is obscure and confused. He 
cannot point out the several excellencies or blemishes of a per-
formance which he peruses; he is at a loss on what to rest his 
judgment: all that can be expected is, that he should tell in 
general whether he be pleased or not. But allow him. more ex-
perience in works of this kind, and his taste becomes by degrees 
more exact and enlightened. He begins to perceive not only the 
character of the whole, but the beauties and defects of each 
part; and is able to describe the peculiar qualities which he 
praises or blames. The mist dissipates which seemed formerly 
to hand over the object; and he can at length pronounce firmly. 
and without hesitation, concerning it. Thus in ta:ste, considered 
as mare sensibility, exercise opens a great source of 1mprovement.2 
Taste, while founded on sensitivity, does not rely on that alone, how-
eveJ' :;even as improved by exercise; but "reason and good sense .... have so 
extensive an influence on all the operations and decisions of taste, 
that a thorough good taste may well be considered as a power c~ 
pounded of natural sensibility to beauty and improved understanding."? 
We should notice here that Blair makes a distinction· . .~between "tho-
rough good taste0 and'~re taste" that implies a confusion in his con-
cepts similar to that in Gerard's. It is logically difficult, if' not 
1. Blair, Lectures, P• 18. 
2. Ibid., PP• 18-19• 
3 • Loo • ill!. 
171. 
impossible, to show that a "simple sense 11 can be improved by acquaintance 
with the 11best models." .An ear for music is not just an "external sense" 
but also an intellectual and emotional capacity, which is refined quite 
differently fromthe sense of touch through usage. But then, this is 
only part of the paradox which Blair manages to ignore 1 not only is 
taste in its perfect state "the result both of nature and of art," but 
it may be anal~zed according to the predominance of one or the other in 
persons of less than perfect taste (this means everyone, of course). 
Taste in which nature provides "those finer organs or powers that enable 
us to discover beauties that lie hid from a vul~ eye," is known as 
delicate. This is quite different from strength of sensibility--one may 
be "deeply impressed by what he peroei vas; but he peroei ves only what 
is in some degree coarse, what is bold and palpable." This strength, 
without delicacy, of sensibility is characteristic of rude and unrefined 
nations. A person of delicate taste, on the other hand, feels both 
"strongly and accurately," and we may judge this delicacy as we would 
that of an external sense. Correctness is the result of art; it "res-
pects chiefly the impDovement which that faculty receives through ita 
oonnexion with the understanding." A man who has a correct taste is 
"never imposed upon by counterfeit beauties: LheJ always carries in 
his mind that standard of good sense which he employs in judging of 
everything." Each of these qualities implies the other& "no taste can 
be exquisitely delicate without being ' correot; nor can be thoroughly 
cor~eot without being delioate."l 
1. ~., 18-20., Eassi m. 
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Now thi s is as,suredly an instance of mixed modes of thought and 
paradox. One of the first questi ons which arises is how a "simple 
sense" can be "connected wit h understanding"--either it is not simple. 
a matter of sensati on. or it is not a matter of nature. but is intellec-
tual and subject to experience alone. A man cannot, by taking thought, 
improve his eyesight althoug;h he can improve his observation. But this 
means, of course, that delicacy of taste has no necessary connection 
with correctness; for trai ning (the use of the understanding) could i~ 
prove the ooarsest (or least delicate) taste. while delicacy is entirely 
dependent on "finer organs and perceptions." As far as theory is eon-
• 
earned. these two qualities are separate and we either ought to have 
internal senses ~experience as the determinant of t aste. A parson 
should either have fine tast e naturally. due to his greater percep-
tivity; or he should be abl e to learn how to have fine taste. regard-
less of innate sensibility. 
Hewing thus to a logic~l line. however];: is not characteristic of 
our critics. They would rather be illogical and common-sensical if it 
comes to a choice. The poi nt I wish to make is that the choice does 
not arise because the basic paradox is ignored. With Blair it was not 
I 
possible to espouse whole-heartedly either a complete internal sense 
theory or a complete empiricist theory. The first explanation would 
lead to relativism; the second to skepticism perhaps . Consequently, 
he makes a neat and typical compromise. There may a l so be another:· :f'ao-
tor at work here, in that Blair's analysis of taste, in its avoidance 
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of relativism and subjectivism~ leaves closed to the vulgar the enjoy-
ment of' the arts. While W13 should not rest too heavily on his use of 
words~ it seems quite clear that a fine taste ought to be the preroga-
tive of' the cultured~ not ·cha "vulgar." It is nowhere implied that a 
carter or a barmaid might have "finer' organs and perceptions" than a 
member ~t the more favored classes. While I would not want to press the 
point too far, a leaning toward an aristocratic interpretation of' the arts 
might account in part for Blair's unwillingness to plump for innate sen-
sibility. To this we might aad a possible interpretation that~ as a 
learned man, Blair would not wish to repudiate the use of' education in 
developing taste; such an idea would even be self-destructive in his 
lectures~ for there woul d be little point in them i f anyone could have 
fine taste naturally. 
In this regard we should both Blair's and Kames' discussion of the 
standard of' taste. According to both critics the one and only standard 
is the decision of' the common mind of man--of' "human nature." "We have 
a sense or conviction of a common nature ••• This common nature is con-
ceived to be a model or st andard for each individual ••• Henoe it is a 
wonder to find an .individual deviating from the common nature of the 
species., whether in its i nternal or external constitution."! We also 
believe this standard to be perfect or right, and we "intuitively con-
ceive a taste to be ri ght or good, if conformable to the common standard, 
and wrong or bad if disconformable ••• Hy dis gust is raised, not by dif-
fering from me, but ~differing from ~t !. judge toE!_~ common 
1. Kames, Elements, PP• 467-468. 
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standard. Citalics min~71 The falle.oy here should be quite apparent. 
if it be true that a man necessarily chooses what he conceives to be the 
good. Blair adds to this idea that there must be some other way of 
knowing ?Ihat the standard of human nature is than a majority ruling. 
Reasoning and understanding must support taste. nJust reasonings on 
the subject will correct t he caprice of unenlightened taste. and estab-
lish principles for judging of what deserves praise ."2 1ie cannot rely 
on reason alone.t of course ; and iames points out t hat the history of the 
fluctuations of taste shows that we must have another guide: "History 
informs us, that nothing :is more variable than taste in the fine arts: 
judging by numbers, the Gothic taste of architecture must be preferred 
before that of Greece, and the Chinese taste probably before either. 113 
The solution to this problem is that we must select carefully those who 
are to represent human nature. 
True it is indeed, that in gathering the common sense of man-
kind, more circumspection is requisite vnth respect to the fine 
arts than with respect to morals: upon the latter. any person 
may be consulted: but in the former, a wary choice is necessary, 
for to collect vot es indifferently would certainly ndslead us. 
Those who ~epend f or food on bodily labor are totally void of 
taste; of such taste at least as can be of use in the fine arts. 
This consideration bars the greater part of mankind; and of the 
remaining part, ITIB.ny by a corrupted taste are unqualified from 
voting. The cOl!lmc,n sense of mankind must theJl be confined to 
the few that fall not under these exceptions.4 
When we refer to the concurring sentiments of men as the ultimate 
test of what is to be accounted beautiful in the arts. this is 
to be always under stood of men placed in such situations as are 
favorable to the proper exertions of taste. Every one must :· 
1. Ibid •• 
2. Blair, 
3• Kames., 
4• Ibid., 
P• 4($. 
Lectures, 
Elements, 
P• 471• 
J?• 19. 
P• 470• 
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·perceive, that ~ong rude and unci,~lized nations and during 
a@Bs of ignorance and darkness, and lo&se notions that are 
entertained concerning such subjects, carry no authority. In 
those states of society, taste has no materials on which to o-
perate. It is either totally suppressed, or appears in its lo-
wer. and most imperfect form. We refer to the sentiments of man-
kind in polished and flourishing nations; when arts are cultiva-
ted and manners refined; when works of genius are subjected to 
free discussion, and taste is improved by science and philosophy.1 
Without too much exegesis, it should be apparent that our critics are 
denying their own premises, no matter how specious their arguments appear. 
The c o:rmnon sense of mankind should mean a bout what it says without all 
these limitations. It might be aaid that Blair and Kames are guilty of 
rationalizing here, and that, if their methods were less "scientific" 
and objective they would like to say that true taste is to be found a-
mong the literati of Scotland in the eighteenth century, along with a 
few other places and a~s. Naturall~ such an attitude would never be 
allowed to see the light of day, but li:n the course of "unmasking ideo-
fogies" I think we may r i sk saying that this subconscious social outlook 
colors our critics' thought quite definitely. 
Equally characteristi c of their desire to appear scientific and 
unbiassed is the final word which each of them has to say on this mat-
ter of the standard of taste--and yet it is apparent that they are 
.. quite sure that their attitude and explanations are sufficient and 
explanatory. As we might expect, the reason for the absence of a oate ... 
gorieal standard in aesthetics (in contrast to morals) is that the wis-
dom of God has not found it necessary for us to be so exactly guided: 
1. Blair, Lectures, P• 23. 
In the present case, there was plainly no occasion for any such 
strict and absolute provision to be made. In order to jud@B of 
what is morally good or evil, of what man ought, or ought not 
to do, it was fit that the means of clear and precise aetermina-
tion should be afforded us. But to ascertain in every case with 
the utmost exactness what is beautiful or elegant, was not at all 
necessary to the happiness of man.l 
Thus it is that we have a standard and a means of arrinng at it, but 
there is left plenty of room for difference of opi nion. Blair and Kames 
allow themselves to eat their cake and have it at the same time. This 
is also, I believe, part of. their compromising temper which operates 
under the .guise of reason but allows opinion to play its part as well. 
While the standard of taste must exist--there cannot be such a thing as 
pure relativism in aesthetic matters--this standard is not an absolute, 
for it is found only in one ultimate court of appeal, "human nature." 
Because we cannot take the. vote of everyone indi scimina.tely, we must 
choose our representatives of "human nature." Once we have done this, 
we must remind ourselves that because of its source the standard of 
taste is not applicable in hard and fast rules to all matters of aes-
thetic judgment. This is quite proper and logical because God has 
planned things that way. 
Now this is patently a compromise like that of limiting the "com-
mon mind of man." If' our critics were of harder temper (in the fashion 
of Hume, say), they would perhaps be willing to say either that we must 
rely on what the majority says, everyone, willy-nilly without restric-
tion; or that on the other hand the sensitive and the cultured must be 
allowed to decide what is good and bad in art; or that time alone can 
1. Ibid., P• 26. 
decide what really appeals to human nature and we must si:mply suspend 
judgment on works that have not lasted at least a hundred years. Of 
course, any of these posi tions would defeat the critics' purpose: the 
first is anti-cultural; t he se~ond controverts t he basic principle of 
11human nature" as an invariable guide; the third would prevent any cri-
ticism of present literat ure. It is, then, little wonder that they pre-
fer to blitlk the contradictions in their analyses of taste and to fol-
low e. path of common sense and compromise. 
I feel that t his is quite important as far as Blair and Kames are 
concerned, for their i dea of taste as e. compound of proper sensitivity 
and proper cultivation is basic in thei r thought. Without such a con-
cept, either explicit or implicit, they could not have taken the stand 
they di d on many matters. Their judgment of the i mportance of various 
aspects of literature and on various works depends on taste to a great 
degree--their awn as wel l as that of their readers and students, for they 
were representative, we must remember. It is t :he impact of'tbe sublime, 
the beautiful, the vivaci ous, or the humorous on t he sensitive and 
cultured appreciator that concerns them, not t hese qualities as inher-
ent in objects not these reactions as natural to everyone, subjective. 
The purpose of both the Lectures and the Elements is in part to guide 
the rational sensibilit y to recognize beauties and sti ~~tize blemishes, 
and this is a fUnction of taste. 
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ii. The Sublime 
Our discussion of taste has centered on one type of mixed mode of 
thought, the result of holding in solution basically incompatible philo-
sophical and psychologica l concepts. It might be illuminating now to 
look at a somewhat different kind of mixed mode which ia at onee the re-
sult of the critics' time and environment and an interesting illustration 
of their divergences within a common framework. Their liSe of ~sublime 
shows hovi they were affected as a group and severally by the transition 
from neo-classical ideas to romantic ideas going on in the 176o's and 
1770's. It also indicates that in some ways Campbell was more conser-
Vative than Kames, who i n turn shows less "romanticism" than Blair. 
Samuel Monkl has shown how the idea of the subli:iDe proceeded from 
the original Longinian idea of a grand or noble style, the purpose of 
which is to move the emotions, to the late eighteenth century notion that 
the sublime is a quality in art or nature quite beyond rational control, 
which "ravishes the soul." The study of this change as it appears in 
scores of writers . is most illumdnating about the course of eighteenth 
century thought, for it can be seen how certain implications of the 
Longinian tradition were seized upon and expanded until they completely 
replaced it, to become es sential tenets of a r omantic aesthetic. For us, 
it is also illuminating t o see how this idea c ould be interpreted by our 
critics and what place they gave it in-.,.their critical systems. It is, 
for instance, the principal point on which Blair and Kames are far apart 
1. Ibid,. P• 26. 
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and it shows how Blair oouldr· be quite "romantic" in one portion of his 
thought at the same time t hat he was quite neo-classical in others. 
First, however, let us turn to Campbell, who uses the sublime in 
two ways, one explicit, the other implied. The first use, which he neJilBB 
~ sublime, is one of bis categories of oratory, along with oratory de-
signed to enlighten the understanding, to move the passions, or to in-
fluenoe the will. The sublime is that oratory which has as its end to 
please the imagination. :rt consists of "those great and noble. images,, 
which, when in suitable coloring presented to the ndnd, do, as it were, 
distend the imagination with some vast conception and quite ravish the 
soul."l It achieves this effect by appealing to an internal taste. 
There is a "pleasurable Slmsation which instantly arises on the peroep-
tion of magnitude or of whatever is great and stupendous in its kind; 
for there is a greatness in the degrees of quality in spiritual sub-
jeots analogous to that which subsists in the degrees of quantity in 
material thin~."2 And because words which arouse the perception of 
greatness in material quantity are commonly also applied to great 
qualities, there is an immediate reaction so that we do not have to re-
fleet to see the connection; thus the sublime appeals to an l nternal 
taste rather than to the passions. 
The greater part of this concept of the sublime is to be found in 
many other writers; "the 11distending11 of the imagination, wh:ich showa 
1. Campbell, £,£• oj.t., P• 25. 
2. Loo. cit. 
--
180. 
the psychological approach of Burke 1 Gerard, and Blair; the idea that 
magnitude is the primary means by which the sublime is manifested; 1 and 
the Hutchesonian "internal taste." This last 1 especially in view of the 
emphasis which Campbell places upon it, is not, however, a common point 
which analysts of the sublime were wont to make. Perhaps the most sig-
nificant difference is his omission of the sublime as founded in nature, 
although he is of course concerned with tn. arts of langua~. Still, 
his directions for achieving the sublime in oratory are remarkably 
sketchy considering that i t is one of the primcipal kinds of oratoryJ 
and he appears to assume that all of his readers will be well aware of' 
the kinds of words to use to bring about the proper distention of the 
imagination, whether in picturing great scenes or great qualities. This 
may be in part due to the older tradition of the sublime as noble or 
lofty style without great E•mphasis on the kinds of feeling aroused, or 
the means by which to achieve that arousal. Campbell intended to spend 
a great deal of time with style so that he might not have thought it 
needful to talk specifically about the sublime style at this poi•t• 
Although he denies it, Campbell's category of the vehement is clear-
ly another instance of the sublime, or perhaps an extension, of it. Be 
manages to separate the two categoriew by ascertaining "with precision, 
the meanings of the words" and making them correspond as nearly "as the 
1. This is the principal source of the sublime in Addison(see S~­
tator 412), Hildebrand Jacob (see Monk, ~· cit., P• 6o f.), and BUrne 
(Treatise of' Human Nautee,. passim, quoted in~nk, _2P.!, ill_•, PP• ~f.). 
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~nius of the language which one writes will perrrdt ••• to the boundaries 
assigned by Nature to the things signified.t11 He admits that sublimity 
and vehemence "are often confounded, the latter being considered a spe-
cies · of the former, 11 and that Lon gin us used the terms in this way. But 
. he maintains that they are distinct. It appears evident, however, that 
Campbell's definition is hi s awn. If we are to rely on the oon,ensus 
of men in general as they use the word sublime (and what else is there 
to rely on?) we shall have to say that the type of oratory which ~eeps 
the audience out of itself is a type of the sublime, There is one dif-
terence in that the sublime as it is generally used need have nothing 
to do with persuasion as the vehement has everything to do with it. Yet 
the point seems clear that Campbell is merely insisting that we separate 
into two classes the single Longinian idea that the sublime is a lofty 
·~tyle which strongly affects the emotions. Instead of emphasizing one 
or the other of these aspects of the sublime, Campbell gives them dif-
ferent names. His final word is that, when the orator combines both 
the lofty and the vehement (which is what !.onginus was talking about), 
he uses "weapons which are at once sharp, massive, and reful~nt, which· 
like Heaven's artillery, dazzle while they strike, which overpower the 
sight and the heart in the same instant."2 
Kames is characteristically more elaborate in his- analysis of the 
1. Campbell, Philosophy, P• 29• This is a good example of the use-
fulness of Nature in substantiating every opinion. 
2. Campbell, Philosophy, P• 29• Compare Longinus a 11 ... Sublimity, 
flashing forth at the right moment scatters everything before it like 
a thunderbolt, and at once di splays the power of the orator in all its 
plenitude." In "On the Subli me .. " trans. by w. Hamilton Fyfe, London: 
William Heineman, 1927 .. P• 126. ~ (rull titles; Aristotle,_ The Poetics 
Longinus, On ~ Sublime, Demetrius,. .2!!_ Style.) 
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principle, and emphasizes the subjective aide more than does Campbell. 
He appears somewhat confused in his own mind between two complementary 
concepts, grandeur and sublimity, which he endeavors to treat separately 
but which insist on trespassing on each other's territory. The first 
of these he would like to apply to great objects, the second to elevated 
objects. Both of them are spatial and psychological interpretations of 
the sublime rather than stylistic, a point that indicates that Kames is 
farther from the older tradition than Campbella 
The emotions raised by great and elevated objects, ar~ clearly 
distinguishable, not only in internal feeling but even in the±r 
external expressions . A great object makes the spectatbr en-
deavor to enlarge his bulk; which is remarkable in plain people, 
who give way to natL~e without reserve; in describing a great 
object, they natural ly expand themselves by dr~wing in air with 
all their force. An elevated object produces a different expres-
sion; it makes the spectator stretch upward, and stand a-tiptoe.l 
As far as we are concerned, it makes little difference whether the ob-
server puffs himself up or does a toe-dance; the fact is still that both 
of these empathetic reactions are in response to spatial extension. The 
effect of certain objects Ol!l the mihd of man is what Kames wiahes to oall 
the sublime. It is to be noted that both parts of the equation are needed:. 
the sublime does not reside solely in objects or in the feelingp of the 
spectator. Without magnitude or elevation (or these spatial qualities 
appropriated to mental qualities), there is no sublime. 
Kames is n~turally not content to state what the sublime is with-
out reasoning about it as well. He considers that simple magnitude or 
elevation is not enough to bring about the sublime and that it needs in 
1. Kames, Lectures, P• 109. 
addH;ion the ttother qualities that contribute to beauty, such as re-
·gulari ty, proportion, order, or color ."1 Objects such as St • Peter's, 
the great ~amid, the Alps, or "above all, a clear, and serene sky, 
are grand because, beside their size, they are beautiful in an eminent 
degree."2 "An overgrown whale," on the other hand, is not sublime be-
cause it is not beautiful :Ln any way. "Thus greatnews or magnitude is 
the circum8tanoe that disti nguishes grandeur from beautya agreeable-
nee s is the genus, of which beauty and grandeur are species •113 other 
considerations for grandeur are that it does not need so. ~uch regularity 
and the other qualities mentioned as does beauty, that ascending in a 
series is a means toward sublimity, and that in the artistic sublime 
(as opposed to the natural) one should avoid any low or trivial circum-
stance that can bring down ·bhe mind. 
From what we have said, it is apparent that Kames foll~1s a middl~ 
path in his use of this concept. He gives considerable opportunity to 
subjective interpretation wi.th his psychological basis, especially in 
the empathy described above; but at the same time he limits the sublime 
by finding it in magnitude (a quality in objects rather than the spec-
tator) and by demanding that it have the qualities of beauty, although 
in a lesser degree. He hedg.as the sublime in art ~bout with several 
restrictions, most of them based on the idea that the sublime must avoid 
trivial or common circumstances. Also he presents a number of examples 
from the most eminent writers, of success and failure in achieving the · 
1. 
2. 
3· 
Kames, Elements, P• 110. 
Loc. cit. 
Loc. Cit. 
--
sublime. He further concerns himself at some length with the ".false 
sublime" or bombast--the result of straining to achieve the heights 
without succeeding. Yfe can find parallels to all of these in Longinusl 
and Kames also follows the Greek in his emphasis on content rather than 
form. and in what has been called the "beauty-blemish 11 method of cri-
ticism. 
Yet it is strange, and amusing too. that all of our critio·s bite the 
hand that has fed them and censure Longinus for failing to use the word 
sublime in its "proper sigoification,q especially since each of them has 
a different idea as to what that signification may be. Kames says in 
a ri.ote: 
Longinus gives a description of the Sublime that is not amiss., 
though far from being just in every circu:astanoe, 11That the mind 
is elevated by it, and so sensibly affected, as to -swell in trans-
port and inward pride, as if what is only heard or read, were its 
· own invention." But he adheres not to this description; in his 
6th chapter, he justly observes, that many passions have nothing 
of the grand, such as grief, fear, pity, which depress the mind 
instead of raising it; and yet, in chap. 8 he mentions Sappho's 
ode upon love as sublime: beautiful it is undoubtedly, but it 
cannot be sublime, because it really depresses the mind instead 
of raising it. His ·translator Boileaux f:'sicJ is not more suc-
cessful in his instances. In his loth reflection, he cites a 
passage from ~mosthenes and another from Herodotus as sublime. 
which have not the least tincture of that quality.2 
We can compare this with a passage of Campbell's already mentioned: 
Sublimity and vehemence are often confounded, the latter being 
1. See Longhnus, ~· cit., especially Sections II. III1 IV• and IX. 
2. Kames, Elements, P• 115. 
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considered as a species of the former. In this manner has this 
subject been treated by that great master1 Longinus 1 whose accep-
tation of the term sublime is extremely indefinite, importing 
an eminent degree of almost any excellence of speech, of what-
ever kind. Doubtless, if things themselves be understood, it 
does not seem material what names are assigned them. Yet it 
is both more aooura.te, and proves no inconsiderable aid to the 
right understanding of thin~, to discriminate by different signs 
suoh as are t~ly different.l 
To complete the indictment, let us consult Blair• 
I am sorry to be obliged to observe, that the sublime is too of-
ten used in this last and imprope~ sense ~s applied to any "re-
markable or distinguishing excellenc~ by the celebrated critic 
Longinus in his treatise on this subject. He sets out, indeed1 
with describing it i n its just and proper meaning, as something 
that elevates the mind above itself1 and fills it with high con-
ceptions, and a nobl e pride. But from this view of it he fre-
quently departs; and substitutes in place of it, whatever, in any 
strain of composition, pleases highly. Thus many passages which 
he produces as instances , of the sublime, are merely elegant ••• 
From this it appears, that a clear and precise ideas on this 
head are not to be expected from that writer. I wouldr.not, how-
ever1 be un~erwtood, as if I meant by this censure, to represent 
his treatise of small value. I know no critic1 ancient or modern, 
that discovers ra · more lively relish of the beauties of fine wri-
ting, than Longinus; and he has also the merit of being himself 
an excellent, and in several passages1 a truly sublime, writer. 
But as his work has been generally considered as a standard on 
this subject, it was incumbent on me to give my opinion concer-
ning the benefit to be derived from it. It deserves to be consul-
ted, not so much for distinct instruction concerning the sublime, 
as for excellent general ideas concerning beauty in writing.2 
It would seem a justifiable inference that our orities, while still 
retaining many aspects of the Longinian interpretation of the sublime, 
do not wish to rest in that interpretation but feel quite strongly that 
another meaning, having more to do with emotion than with style, must 
1. Campbell, Philesophy, P• 28. Perhaps this is the most blameworthy 
of these three quotations, for Campbell is at least partly aware that 
words must be handled carefully. 
2. Blair, Lectures, P• ~· 
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be the "right " one. The time-spirit has sea-changed the sublime although 
the transformation is not yet co.mplete. 
In Blair's analysi s t he transformation has been well-nigh c~pleted. 
He first of all divides h:i.s discussion into .two sections, the first deal-
ing with sublimity, or grandeur (he uses the terms interchangeably) , in 
natural objects, the second with sublimity in writi ng. This dichotony 
shows how the Longinian sublime is for Blair only part of a general sub-
ject. His further discussion1 shows how different is his attitude from 
that of Campbell or Kames--how much the concept can be broadened even 
among contemporaries. No longer is the sublime confined to lofty images 
· or great magnitude; but any object which fills the spectator with the 
proper concatenation of f eelings--solemnity, ~~a, wonder, astonishment, 
and perhaps terror--is sublime. Beay:by is no longer necessary; "the , 
hoary mountain, and the solitary lake; the aged forest, and the torrent 
falling over the rook11--thase are sublime. It can be as well produced 
by sound as sight, by a gr1aat bell or 11the striking of a great olock."2 
Obscurity and disorder are "very compatible to grandeur; nay, frequettb-
ly heighten it."3 
The cause of the sublime is also made more general, for it appears 
to reside neither in amplitude nor terror,4 but rather in 11mighty force 
" or power. Blair does not wish to insist on this ttas sufficient to 
1. See Appendix PP• ii-v for a summary of this discussion. 
2. Blair, Lectures, P•34 
3• Ibid., P• 36. Contrast thi s with Campbell (Phi losophy, PP• 304·305) 
and Kames Elements, p~ 117. 
4• It will be remembered that this was the theory of Burke, of whom 
Blair says: "But although t his tyhe terror theo.!i! i s very properly il-
lustrated by the author, (n~ny of whoae sentiments on that head I have 
adopted,) yet he seems to stretch his theory too far, when he r epresents 
the sublime as consisting wholly in modes of danger or of painJt" (Lectures, 
P• 31) • 
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found a general theory," however; "it is enough, to have given this view 
of the nature and different kinds of sublime objects."l Sublimity in 
writing is also made less limited and more a matter of su~jective emo-
tion; not only must the object be sublime, but the writer himself can-
not have "languid" feelings toward it or he will not achieve the sublime. 
Of' course, Blair has not enoaped entirely from his age and training& there 
are soma passages and observations which are rhetorical and show a kin-
ship with Kames and his sot~ces--that simplicity and conciseness make 
for the sublime and that "ntean" or 11 low" ci<rcumstances are destructive 
to it. Blair also has a comment, with examples, on<.the "false sublime n2 • 
His summarizing comment, however, shows that these rhetorical observations 
are not central to his conceptr 
Wherever a great and awful object is presented in nature, or 
a very magnanimous and exalted affection of the human mind is 
displayed; thence, if you can catch the impression strongly and 
exhibit it glowing, you may draw the sublime, In judging of 
any striking beauty in composition, whether it is or is not bo 
be referred to this class, we must attend to the nature of the 
emotion which it rai ses; and only, if' it be of' that elevating, 
solemn, and awful kind, which distinguished this feeling, we 
can pronounce it sub:~me.3 
At the beginning of this section we said that ideas of the sublime 
held by our critics indicated a 11mixed mode" of' thought and that this 
mi ght be an illuminating poi .nt as far as their thought in general is 
concerned. It should be apparent now that each of them shows a conflict 
between tendencies whioh we might desoribe (with a due amount of' semantic 
1. Loc. cit. 
2. Ibid.:-i). 48• 
3• Ibid., P• 47• 
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caution) as "conservative" or "neo-classical" and tendencies which we 
can call "romantic." In Camp be 11 the conservative influence seems strong-
est; in Kames there is a fairly equal balance; in Bibair the "romantic" 
predominates. In none of them, however, does one type of thinking exist 
without some admixture of the other: Campbell's "vehemenoen is conducive ·; 
to subjective emotion, and Blair's "sublime" is subject to certain re-
striations and laws found in the ancient rhetoricians who guide so much 
neo-classical criticism. 1 I believe that there is no need (or place, 
in fact) for value-judgments on this--the important thing is not that 
Blair was closer to the future than Campbell, but rather that in illoth 
men we can clearly see how two different kinds of criticism may be aP-
plied to a basic concept and how those kinds may be commingled. 
In the first place, i t is apparent that none of the critics wishes 
to jettison entirely the i dea of reason's playing a due part in the 
sublime. All three retain what seem to them to be the most valuable 
features of the Longiman concept at the same time that they expand 
and11improve 11 it. While the sublime should not be so loosely defined 
that it may be applied to any species of elegant writing, it also should 
not be confined only to the written page. It becomes instead a uDiver-
sal psychological principle ~th applications to many phases of life, 
both in the reactions of the spectator to art and to nature. Yet with 
1. From Aristotle through Demetrius to Horace there are visible the 
same general themes, part:i.cularly the unity. order, and decorum that is 
the genesis of the rules. It should be remembered, however, that the 
ancients were neither romantic or neo-classical. Without pretext of 
finality, the definition of "romantic" which I have in mind here in-
cludes the emphasis on such things as .the emotions, the specific, the 
uncontrolled, the diverse, and the individual. • 
-. 
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all this. in art the contr ol of those reactions is to be tained b~ ad-
herence to certain rules. Perhaps the rules have a subordinate place. 
but we still cannot get a l ong without them. I think the reasons for the 
retention of classical theory in this way are not too difficult to guess. 
though they might be hard to prove • We know for one thing that our cri-
tics had great respect for the ancients and had been nourished on the 
literature of Greece and Rome from early school-days. This familiarity . 
combined with admiration enabled them to use the c l ass i cs ~~thout uncri-
tical worship and to point out flaws wherever apparent. Beyond their 
general knowledge of the ancients, they were also very well versed in 
the rhetoric and criticism of Greece and Rome so that in dealing with 
rhetorical and critical matters they naturally draw on and refer to clas-
sical vieTIS. In short their use of the ancient critics is much the same 
as a modern scholar's use of his old professors; although he may disag-
ree with them and pick flaws, we can still see on the palimpsest of his 
mind the faint lines wratten there by Kittredge or Greenough or Perry. 
Also I think that there is another factor at work here in that our Scots 
were all solid citizens of relatively conservative temper, little in-
clined to throw over the t r aces and take off nn wild gallops of thought 
like a Smart or a Blake. Yet at the same time. within their society. 
they were quite advanced and said the latest things and enunciated the 
new critical doctrines. 
This last may help to account for the nromantic" leaven in all three. 
for the new thing in the le.te eighteenth century was to approve of wild 
nature. and feeling ridi ng with a loose rein if not quite unbridled. 
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It is . quite probable that among the many obscure currents that were 
sweeping along the romantic movement was this simple and quite human 
desire to be novel and have change. At any rate, our critics did not 
disapprove of writers lime Thomson, whom we like now to consider as 
"pre-romantic", and of course they greatly admired Ossian, even to the 
point of passionate partisanship with Blair. Despite the national pride 
that helped the cause of Macpl~rson's dit~ambs, there is also a good 
deal of the fervor of the literary discoverer in Blair particularly--a 
feeling that here was something new and wonderful in the world of letters, 
something of Professor Pottle'·s sentiment toward Boswell's papers. Be-
sides, while the critics acclai~d Ossian for his sublimity among other 
things, there was also an undoubted reciprocal influence--their notion 
of the sublime must have been affected to some degree by Ossian. To 
add to the · usual examples of Mi lton, Homer, and Shakespeare here was 
something even more transporting and untrammeled. It seems likely that 
theory was molded, at least in part, by these qualities as they appeared 
in what was considered a great folk epic. 
Of course, the reasons for the trend toward ·:·:eamanticism are muph 
mooted, and it hardly is the purpose of this essay to digress into a 
discussion of them. Suffice it to say that our critics show on many 
issues an anomalous attitude in part connected with this trend. One 
other interesting observation comes from this--tht. different degree to 
which each of the Scots was affected by the new tendencies. Blair ~ ls, 
of course, the most "romantic" of our trio in his treatm&nt of the :iub-
lime. We might hazard a few guesses as to why this should be. For one 
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thing, his whole approach is less systematized and rationalistic than 
that of Kames and CampbellJ for another, his office as professor and 
man of letters in Edinburgh might incline him to be more avant garde; 
and for a third he shows more approval of such radical fo~ of litera-
ture as the novel.l 
It may be said finally that these treatments of the sublime are il-
lustrative of the ways in which the average "transition mind" handles 
its concepts. In most cases we see a compromise or an integration be-
tween ideas normally incompatible~ or at least usually belonging to dif-
ferent systems of thought. Occasionally~ on the other hand, the old is 
simply retained without apparent concern over its consistency. Sometimes 
it is merely vestigial; at others it is the core of the thought with 
the new ideas barely making their appearance. Ataall times, of course, 
we see both the ideas of earlier timew and those of later existing side 
by side in the transition period; but it is a distortion of the facts 
to select either the indications pointing to the future or those pointing 
to the past as ~ important or characteristic ideas of the period. or 
this, more later. I would like to consider now some further evidences 
of the thinking of the critics, this time quite clearly dominated by 
the influence of the ancients. 
1. See Lectures, Chapter XXXVII. 
- ' . 
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iii. Rhetoric 
Throughout these pages we have called our authors "critics," be-
cause that seems the best title to cover the general scope of their 
activities. They have, however, been classified by other students! as 
"rhetoricians" and with some reason; for they do expend a good deal of 
effort on directions for and criticism of the means of effective commu-
nication. These two phases of their work are the two different sides of 
rhetoric: the first in its function as a science, the second in its 
function as a means of underotanding literature.2 It is nevertheless 
clear by now that their inter ests in how words may be put together, and 
in words as units of expressi on, are subordinate to the more general in-
terests of how literature (or, in Kames, the arts as a whole) affect the 
spectator, and how the spectator may be brought into a more thorough rap-
port with the arts. Rhetoric provides the means for the observer better 
to understand and the artist better to control the aesthetic situation. 
If the observer (the word receiver might be better) appreciates style, 
choice of words, precise diction, freedom from grammatical faults, per-
spicuity, accurate figures of speech, etc., he will be that nruch more 
perceptive of artistic values and that much more able to distinguish 
; 
beauties from blemishes. I t i s as well t he business of the artist to 
know these things and to encompass them to t he best of his ability. 
1s ee, for example, Oliver Elton, .2.£• cit. and Williams., .£12• cit., 
passim. 
2See Charles s. Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, New York: 
Macmillan, 1924, 3pp., Ch. V: 11 The Literary Criticism of Rhetoric." 
Our critics are therefore interested in rhetoric as providing a 
sound basis for the minutiae of the subject of criticism. A perusal 
of the sununaries in the Appendi·xl will indicate the extent to which 
they pursued this phase of t heir studies both in the analysis of the 
means of effective co~nunication and in the framing of directions, or 
rules, for comnnmication. It must be emphasized, however, that even 
the most rhetorical of them is concerned with much more than rules and 
directions for rhetoric. In all their work on this subject the con-
trolling idea is that rhetori c is one part, though an important one, of 
a means of arriving at an understanding of the human heart and mind. 
It is one phase of t he larger problem of the relat ion of man to aesthetic 
situations, and its study is consequently necessary to understanding 
this problem. And aesthetics or taste is probably the 100st "delightful" 
means we have abailable for knowing about mankind. Consequently, whether 
lve call our authors critics or rhetoricians is a matter of no great mo-
ment because they are basicall y dealing with connnunication in the frame-
work of a larger context. 
The most rhetorically ori ented of our authors is Campbell, liho 
spends the greater part of his book in analyzing el ocution, oratory, or 
"the art of persuasive discourse in connnunal affairs. 11 2 He concerns 
himself with such topics as the standard of good usage, lvith examples 
of departures from it; grammatical purity, barbarisms, solecisms, and 
t he like; perspicuity and its impairment. He takes up at length the 
2From Dionysius of Halicarnassus in Baldw·in, .!?.£• cit., p. lOSn. 
It should be realized t hat, even without the philosophical implications, 
t he eighteenth century conceived rhetoric more broadly than we are prone 
to do. The reason for t his becomes apparent below·. 
quality of vivacity as essential to composition; and under this general 
heading he analyzes figures of speech, words as sounds, and the arran@'-
ment of words--this last leading to a disdussion of connectives. All 
this material seems very much the same as that which we find in modern 
textbooks of co.mposition, with the exception of his elaborate analysis 
of figures of speech. In parti cular, the doctrine of correctness as 
determined by usage and the selll@:ntic explanation of the reasons why non-
sense so often goes undetectedl sound very similar to ideas stated in 
the most recent texts. 
However, all these specific points grow out of the first section 
of his treatise: "The nature and foundations of eloquence. 11 This is 
at once more basic and important than the implementation of eloquence 
in elocution, the subject of the second two books. Eloquence corresponds 
to the ancient subjects of rhetoric as skill in speaking in general, 
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whereas ~locutio, or that part of rhetoric concerned with style, was for the 
ancients only one of the five canons of the subject.2 Eloquence is defined 
by Campbell as "that art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end."3 
It includes not only the devices by which the ~peaker achieves his purpose, but 
also such general matters as the kinds of evidence which can be used and their 
relative value, the considerations which the speaker must have about the 
audience, and the character of the speaker himself. In addition, the vari-
ous kinds of speaking are discussed in regard to their different advantages. 
1. Campbell, Philosophy, PP• 278ff. 
2. The other canons are investigation, plan, memory, and delivery. 
See Baldwin, ~· cit., P• 64. 
3· Campbell, Philosophy, P• 23. 
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In short, the knowledge of rhetoric depends first of all upon intellectual 
and moral qualities. The effective orator is not merely a man \vho knows 
hmv to put \vords together; but he is as well a philosophical student of 
his subject, who has a keen understanding of mankind, and who is ethical. 
This emphasis in rhetoric indicates the degree t o ~~ich Campbell had 
absorbed t he doctrines of Greece and Rome. Not only in specific detail, 
but more importantly, in basic spirit he is indebted to such men as Cicero 
and Quintilian. The references to these authorities are quite frequent,l 
but more t han that, t he idea t hat rhetoric necessitates a training of the 
whole man and is a basic study influencing all our activities harks back 
to them. His approach is perhaps closest to Quintilian;2 for although 
' Cicero maintained the need for developing the whole personality of the 
orator, Quintilian framed his ideas pedagogically, designing his Insti-
tutes of Oratory as a handbook for teaching the subject. Campbell does 
not make this his objective, but t he organization of his work could well 
be turned to such purpose. There is no exact parallel with either Quin-
tilian or Cicero in Campbell ' s organization, but the informing spirit is 
the same. It might even be that he drew spirit from the same source as 
they did--Plato and Aristotle; but whatever the source for his basic 
plan, Campbell approaches rhetoric with the same broad, philosophical 
objective as did the ancients. 
It is worth noticing that there are many specific points on which 
Campbell and the ancient rhetoricians are in accord, such as: that the 
lin this discussion I am indebted to the analyses in Baldwin's work 
already cited, and J. lv. H. Atkins, Literary Criticism in .Antiquity, 2 vols., 
Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1934. 
2cicero, Orator, I, xiii, in Baldwin, ~· cit., p. 42; Campbell, 
Philosophy, pp. 98-118. 
orator's effectiveness depends on his knowledge of human emotions; that 
training in rhetoric needs philosophy and vice versa;l that language and 
thought are both necessary to good style;2 or that the aims of oratory 
are to inform, to influence the feelings, or to st-ray the will.~ Campbell 
makes no citation of sources for these ideas, quite naturally perhaps, be-
cause they could be arrived at independently. To me, however, it appears 
evident that in many phases of his subject, Campbell is stating ideas 
that were part of his thinking simply because he had so long been familiar 
with them, rather than because he had reasoned them out independently. 
There are too many unconscious parallels, not to mention cited indebted-
ness, for Campbell's rhetoric to be even as independent as he apparently 
thought. 
Blair is not quite so rhetorically inclined as Campbell in the gen-
eral organization of his Lectures; but the sections he devotes to style 
and eloquence illustrate as much leaning on classical authorities, tv.ith 
the difference that Blair is more apt to elaborate classical principles. 
In style, for example, he feels that the classification of Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus--11 austers, 11 "middle, 11 and 'florid" equally 1v.ith those of 
Cicero and Quintilian, are 11 so loose and general that they cannot ad-
vance us much in our ideas of style. 11 4 Consequently he subdivides 
these categories, which already overlap at some points, into three cate-
gories arranged according to the relation of style wi~h meaning, the 
lcicero, Orator, III, xvii-xxi.ii in Baldtv.in, .2E• cit., p. 54; Campbell, 
Philosophy, Introduction. 
2Ibid • .xriv, Baldwin 54; Campbell, 238. 
3Q~untilian, in Baldwin, p. 65; Campbell, 23, Campbell does add a fourth 
tvhich we have seen him call the sublime: to please t he imagination. 
4Blair, Lectures, p. 196. 
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amount of ornament, and the degree of naturalness or affectation, with 
each of these sub-categorized into from three t o five classes. Yet it 
should be clear that this is an advance only i n complexity and confusion: 
style is still approached in the fashion of some of t he ancient s-- as if 
it w·ere somehow· separable and susceptible of engrafting on nearly any 
meaning. According to t his approach Swift is classified as a master 
of the "pl ain" style, .Addison of the "elegant, 11 and Shaftesbury an ex-
emplar of the "affected." This, of course, misses the essential points 
of t he interrelations between t he personalities , the subjects, and the 
objectives of these men, which undoubtedly play d as great a part in 
their style as conscious design. The classical habit of classifying 
literary matters is still very nn1ch part ' of Blair' s thought, despite 
his criticism of the anci ent rhetoricians. 
A similar tendency is sho\in in Blair's consideration of harmony in 
sentences, reminiscent of Demetrius of Phalereus and Dionysius of Halicar-
nassus, the latter of whom Blair tells us writes on this subject "with 
great accuracy and refinement."! While Blair makes the necessary obser-
vations to bring his subject up to date as far as modern language and 
usage is concerned, the point still remains t hat this classical study of 
the ancients is influential enough on his thought for him to devote an 
entire chapter to it. For another instance of the se influences, the sub-
ject of perspicuity is introduced with a quotation from Quintilian, and 
the subsequent discussion has many similarities to that of the ancient. 
Also, when Blair embarks on his consideration of t he proper position of 
!Ibid., p. 136. 
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words in the sentence, he refers to t he works of Dionysius of Halicar-
nassus and Demetrius Phalere'us. lve might note as an example of parallel 
thinking what Demetrius and Blair have to say about the loose and 
periodic styles:-
1-fy Olvn personal view is that discourse should neither, like 
that of Gorgias, consist Wholly of a string of periods, nor 
be wholly disconnected like the ancient writings, but should 
rather combine the two methods. It lri.ll then be elaborate 
and simple at the same time, and draw charm from both sources, 
being neither too untutored nor too artificial.l 
The style periodique, gives an air of gravity and dignity to 
compositions. The style coupe is more lively and striking. 
According to the nature of the composition, therefore, and 
the general character it ought to bear, the one or the other 
may be predominant. But in almost every kind of composition, · 
the great rule is to intermix them. For the ear tires of 
either of them \vh.en too long continued: whereas, by a proper 
mixture of long and short periods, the ear is gratified, and 
a certain sprightl iness is joined 'vi th majesty in our style.2 
In discussing eloquence, Blair relies even more upon his classical 
forbears, and is particularly careful to point out (as Aristotle, Cicero, 
and Quintilian had done) that eloquence is not merely a method of dressing 
up w·eak l deas. He defines it, without reference to Quintilian (or to 
Campbell, for that matter) as 11 the art of speaking in such a manner as 
to attain the end for which we speak. 11 3 He adds that this applies to 
11 all the different kinds" of speaking, "whether calculated to instruct, 
to persuade, or to please. 11 4 Following this plan he discusses at length 
the history of eloquence and the different types, both handled in relation 
lDemetrius, ~ Style, trans. by \v. Rhys Roberts, (Loeb Library), 
London, 1927, p. 309. 
2Bla.i;' Lectures, p. 113. Blair finishes this passage with a 
quotation from Cicero to the same effect. 
3Ibid, :P • 261. 4see Cicero, 0uintilian, ~· al. for this tripartite division of 
oratory; and Baldlvin, op. cit., p. 57 for a derogatory connnent on its 
influence. 
to his own age; but it is perhaps significant that his examples are 
drawn, with the exception of a sermon of Bishop Atterbury, from Demos-
thenes and Cicero. Moreover, the two chapters on t he "conduct of a dis-
course in all its parts11 follow the classical divisions of introduction, 
division, narration, argumentation, and peroration.l Blair, in short, in 
t his part of his w·ork is only applying the doctrines of the ancients to 
the eloquence of his time. 
\Vhile Kames devotes less space to matters strictly rhetorical, the 
sections on "Beauty of Language" show that he shares in the ideas of his 
colleagues. The classifications and general observations \vl:lich he lays 
dmm are substantially classical, vri. th the Kamesian difference that they 
are all derived from 11 scientific11 reasons somewhere along the \vay. Per-
spicuity still holds first place as the requisite of a good style,2 with 
w·ord-order examined carefully for this quality in various authors; rhythm 
and cadence in sentences are discussed, together \-lith the usual observa-
tion on mixing the loose and periodic styles. Kames also devotes a good 
deal of effort to the analysis of the sounds of words as they aid the 
sense and increase the beauty of different expressions: for example, that 
a succession of syllables that alternately require a \vide aperture and a 
narrow, for instance, alternative, longevity, and pusillanimous, is most 
pleasant. This might faintly remind the classical rhetorician of the care 
with which Dionysius of Halicarnassus treated harmony in expression. 
lcompare Quintilian, Institutes, Book IV, as analyzed in Baldwin, 
.2.E • c~ t • , p. 65 • 
Kames, Elements, p. 270. The points follo\Ving are discussed in 
Chapter XVIII, passim. 
3Ibid. ' p. 250. 
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Now, all these similarities do not, I feel sure, imply that our 
critics are little better than plagiarists, or at the most charitable, 
eclectics. .Anyone who jousts \vith the subject of rhetoric is bound 
to reach the same conclusions as the ancients somel'lhere in the course 
of his thinking, unless he chooses to rebel entirely and start from a 
different basis. Indeed, it is possible that the ancients have said 
such acute things on the subject that we would do well to heed them 
more often. The point is a rather different one: our authors agree so 
fully, both in detail and in general outlook, that I feel w·e may say 
they have made classical rhetoric part of their own thinking; they have 
absorbed it into their bloodstreams. The result is that the rhetoric 
of the Scots is preponderantly classical in ~ even though it may di-
verge on specific points. Reading through the ancients and then through 
the Scots, one cannot help but notice this similarity. I feel that such 
a general tone or slant is perhaps even more convincing evidence of the 
classical foundations of Scots rhetoric than the specific instances of 
indebtedness and relationship that we have noted above. The most ~ 
portant part of this tone is, I believe, the basic assumption that 
rhetoric is an important business that affects a great deal of our lives.l 
This is hardly a necessary corollary to views which are based for the most 
part on psychological theories, and the doctrine of taste. In fact, it is 
apparent in Kames that he is employing a good deal of ingenuity to make 
rhetoric fit in lvith trains of ideas and other psychological concepts of 
lit might be noted that I. A. Richards in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 
(Ne\v York, Oxford Press) agrees with this position, and that perhaps a 
good deal of the "new criticism" might be applied lvith it. A new book 
by Kenneth Burke, ! Rhetoric 2£ Motives (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1950) 
also applies rhetorical principles, albeit very abstruse and subtle ones, 
to matters of life. 
2 Ol. 
his. And it might be pointed out that even the most cultivated taste 
hardly needs to descend to the minutiae of the order of words in sen-
tences in order to be appreciative of beauties. Yet, with all this the 
Scots mru{e rhetoric either a primary or an important concern. 
It would hardly seem too unwarranted an inference, then, to say that 
our authors sholv strong classical leanings in at least one part of their 
thought. 've might even go so far as to call them "neo-classical" in 
their rhetoric, insofar as neo-classicism was an atten~t to recall the 
standards of the Augustan age and not a separate movement in itself.l 
I believe that the reasons for this are not too far to seek. The educa-
tion and a large proportion of the general reading of our critics were in 
the classics. We have seen above2 that they were schooled in rhetorical 
practices and doctrine from their days in the grammar school, and we 
have deduced from their references that their reading in mature life was 
still heavily classical. While it is possible that education and reading 
may not strongly influence a man 1s thinking, it is somewhat unlikely. In 
vielv of the fact that our authors draw heavily on classical rhetoricians 
unconsciously as well as consciously, I think it safe to say that educa-
tion and reading had a definite influence. 
For another thing, we may remember that they were leading members of 
an essentially conservative society. While far from hidebound, in none 
of their work do they indicate desires to be the first to lay aside the 
old nor yet the last by lmom the new is tried. They preferred to work 
lr make this qualification to distinguish that kind of 11neo-classi-
cism11 which almost completely missed the spirit of the classics for the 
rules. 
2'' ~e above PP• 83-84. 
from accepted premises even when they were making new applications. In 
rhetoric, where it appears impossible to frame really new ideas unless 
one throws out the old premises, the conservative mind tends to preserve 
much of the material on which it has been nurtured, although it may im-
prove and $laborate it. 
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In connection with this we should mention the idea of "elegance" 
which rWJ.s through the work of our critics. Although they do not empha- · 
size that this quality is of primary importance, it is plain that they re-
gard an elegant style very hi ghly. For example, Blair has the highest 
praise for Addison, as do most other critics, and particularly because he 
represents the 11elegant11 which is neither affected nor too plain, too high 
or too low.l This sounds more than a little li~e the classical notion of~ 
decorum or perhaps the Golden Mean--a fine balance between virtues held in 
perfect tension. The difference, of course, is that it is difficult to 
hold this balance without substituting form for spirit. The principal cri-
ticism of the neo-classical literature and art, if I am not mistaken, comes 
from this balance without tension, this form without t he inner monition 
which we see in the ancients. It is no~ surprising, therefore, that our 
critics sometimes tend to miss the rhetorical point that elegance is an 
accompaniment, the inevitable concomitant to certain temperaments which 
have been highly cultivated, and that it cannot be copied or learned by 
itself. Yet we can see that, under the conditions in which they were wri-
ting, particularly with their society which so fervently desired to improve 
itself in English,! our authors would be bound to emphasize this quality. 
It is precisely the virtue in writing which would suit men lacking in ease 
and confidence in their writ ing. These tendencies tended to combine with 
and reinforce the classical influences we have mentioned to give the 
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rhetoric the characteristics we have examined. 
It thus appears t hat social influences, r ather than rational de-
duotions, produced most of t he ideas which our authors have on t he subject 
of rhetoric. It should be emphasized, however, that they did not accept 
the ideas of the ancients on a simple authoritarian basis. It seems that 
our critics decided that cer tain ideas of the ancients made good sense and 
were to be put to use. What they did not realize i s that they were putting 
more of these ideas to use t han they @aVe credit for . For another thing, 
these classical noti ons were , for the most part, found to f it in with t he 
rational systems which our critics were following elsewhere; but the fact 
remains that the classical notions come f rom the classics and not f rom the 
rational system, and that the syste~ are made . to jibe with the classicw 
rather than vice versa. On the whole, however, this rationalizing is less 
evident than simple acceptance: Blair, for instance, just states that these 
things are so, without bothering overmuch to prove them either by reason 
or authority. 
1. One of the principal purpos es of The Select Society in the later 
days of its career was to improve the ability of i ts members in handling 
English. The importation of Thomas Sheridan, father of the dramatist, 
to teach elocution (by a syst em of quantities and wit h an Irish brogue ) 
was a high point in these endeavors. See Chapter II. Note also the ar-
ticle by James Sutherland, "Some Aspects of Eighteenth Century Prose, n 
(i n Essays ~the Eighteenth Century Presented to David Nichol Smith in 
Honor o£ His Seventieth Birthday, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945). Among 
other things he shows that the influence of ths Scotts, who were definite-
ly not at ease with English, was influential in bringing about the shift 
from Addisonian "conversational prose" to the formal prose of the end of 
the century as seen in BOth such little men as Melmoth and in such giants 
as Johnson and Gibbon. 
To sum up: the rhetoric of our critics shows a strong classical 
leaning and is largely the end-product of t heir education and reading. 
It indicates that in one department of their critici sm the Scots were 
very conservative. The rhetoric, being a more specific topic, does 
not sholv very nmch in the way of "mixed modes" in itself, although 
• 
Kames11 substantiation of rhetorical principles by his usual psycholo-
gical explanations might be cited as an exception t o tllis statement.l 
On the whole, however, it affords us one example of the way in which 
our critics incline toward t he past in contrast to other notions in 
which t hey quite definitely look tmvard the future. We turn nolv to 
t heir view of the imagination, which shows this latter tendency. 
lsee Kames' explanation of why language ought to correspond to its 
subject: Among these dicta i s t he idea that herDic sentiments should 
be expressed in elevated language; tender, in soft and flo1ring language. 
He adds that where there is this resemblance 11 t he similar emotions mix 
·sweetly in the mind, and double the pleasuren whereas \.Jhere they do not 
the "~atural union" of the emotions is unpleasant. (Elements, p. 257 ) 
iv. The Imagination 
.An important critical concept with Blair, Kames, and Campbell is 
that of the imagination, an idea which they employ in at least four 
different emphases, some eA~licit, others implied.l Two of these had 
been standard critical noti ons since the day of Addi son, the other t\vO 
are premonitory of some of the most important ideas of t he romantic 
movement. In our authors' thought the imagination is both a necessary 
requisite for art and a touchstone' by which \Y'e as spectators may judge 
the artist, this latter being one of the ingredients of taste. The ima-
gination of the artist must be keen if he is to appeal to our imaginations 
which must be capable of bei ng aroused. If either part of this equation 
is missing, the aesthetic experience cannot be successfully brought about. 
Probably the more important part of this process is the artist's--the 
lr have tried to schematize these emphases as follo\vs: 
(l) 
As to the writE!r As to the reader 
Creative association: the form- (2) 
ing of new images from prior sen-
sations. Fancy indicates a par- ----
ticularly free form of this 
Means by which \ve follow 
ar tist's associations and 
visualize the images he 
provides for us. 
(3) Sympathy: the pO\ver to enter into (4) Means by which our sens-
and identify himself with charac- ibilities are aroused by 
ters or audience. Empathy (in ----- artist's presentation. 
Kames): correlation of feelings Empathy: the same as in 
with natural objects. wri ter. 
(Outside the aesthetic context, the emphasis is naturally either (l) 
or (3), but is usually thought of as (l) lmen the \vord imagination is 
employed: the imaging, or picture-making faculty. 
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imagination is treated by our writers primarily as a subject of criti-
cism or rhetoric (that is, t he control of expression), rather t han of 
taste or appreciation on t he part of the spectator. Most uses of the 
term in Blair, Kames, and Campbell are concerned lvith the success or 
failure of the writer in employing the imagination in one or the other 
uses we have outlined in t he note. Yet all the emphases in the use of 
t his concept are illuminating. We can see ho\.,r our authors apply a 
single concept to different critical matters, though with different 
terminology for the different applications; we can see t hat t hey as-
sumed a definite and commonly accepted meaning for a complex notion on 
which they were not agreed; we can see how t hey lrere working out impli-
cations of this idea in response to the current of t he times, so t hat 
the emphasis of t he past and t hat of the future coexist in our writers. 
All these points may be clarified if lve look f irst at the way the 
imagination had been thought of before our critics and then at the ways 
in which they used the idea . During the Augustan period, as \ve can see 
in Addison, the faculty was thought of as the ability of the mind to put 
together the materials of previous experience in new and delightful co~ 
binations. The writer, if he has this faculty in "full str ength and vig-
our," is to able to "receive lively ideas from outw·ard objects, to retain 
t hem long, and to range t hem together, upon occasion, in such figures 
and representations as ar e most likely to hit the fancy of the reader.nl 
lJoseph Addison, 2E• cit., No. 417, VIII, 156 • 
• 
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These figures and representations are "varied, inlarged, diminished, 
multiplied, or joined and mingled in Forms and Qualities different from 
what we had in our first Perception of them ••• 11 1 The process is far 
from mechanical, how·ever; the imagination is not restrained in 11 model-
ing nature, 11 and the artist may trdraw into his description all the 
beauties of the spring and autumn ••• His rose-trees, woodbines, and jas-
mines, may flo\ver together and his beds be covered at the same time with 
lilies, violets, and amaranths. 11 2 This is not quit e in accord with the 
strictest neo-classical view of the imagination, perhaps, since it gives 
so much rein to subjectivity.3 It does, however, indicate a general ac-
ceptance for the meaning of the word in the century: that imagination 
in the lvriter means a sort of creative association of ideas. The lvord 
fancy is used almost synonymously, with the difference that it emphasizes 
the untrammeled play of tlris association, and that it is usually not ap-
plied to the writer when he is combining and inventing, so much as 1J1en 
he is letting his imagination roam free. 
Comprehended in this earlier idea, however, w·ere certain implica-
tions l'lhich were to prove fruitful of change. The imagination was con-
strued as a faculty not subject to strict rational control, a faculty 
whicl1 achieved its result not through mechanic operations but by adding 
something not in the simple combination of the components. There is a 
ne"'lv entity the result of putting together 11 lilies, violets, and amaranths" 
lrsaac \vatts, Philosophical Essays, 4th Ed., 1733, p. 92, quoted in 
Donald F. Bond, Theories of the Imagination in Engli sh Literary Criticism 
of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, }~ dissertation, University 
of Chicago, 1934. 
2Addison, .2£• cit., No1 418, VIII, 164. 
3See Sir joshua Reynolds, Discourses, 1786, No. XIII in Wylie Sypher, 
Enlightened England, Neiv York :Norton, pp. 884 ff. 
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which is certainly not inherent in those flowers individually. The ~ 
agination lias by implication a creative faculty even in neo-classical 
times. Furthermore, it was a most desirable quality in art. Sir joshua 
would have huffed indeed if it had been misconstrued that his concept 
of imagination was a mere shuffling around or copying of eA~erience 
with no additive qualit:y- involved. This would have made it little more 
than "imitation" and no art at all.l The important thing for us to 
notice, however, is the possibility of emphasizing more and more the non-
rational and libertarian function of the imagination, the way in which 
it could change the face of nature and bring about sometlLing new and 
strange. 
Our critics r· view of this side of the imagination is not greatly 
different from the ideas of the early part of the century, to be sure; 
where they diverge is in their use of the idea (though they avoid apply-
ing the liord imagination to it) of sympathetic participation in the life 
of people or things. The source of this notion has been ascribed to the 
influence of Shaftesbury plus Hutcheson. 2 Hutcheson had made one of our 
principal senses the public sense-"our determination to be pleased 
with the happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their misery ••• It 
arises solely from an opinion of misery felt ~ another, and not ~ 
mediately from a visible form.n3 Like many other opinions of Hutcheson, 
this was liidely held throughout the s·cots school, such people as Adam 
Smith substituting this sense for the "moral sense" although it w·as more 
• lsee loc. cit. 
2Walter jackson Bate, "The Sympathetic Imagination in Eighteenth 
Century Literary Criticism, 11 ELH, XII, june, 1945, 146. 
3Francis Hutcheson, Essay ~ the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, 
London and Dub1inm 1728, pp. 4-10 quoted in Bryson, ..2E• cit., p. 120. 
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usual to consider sympathy as an extra sense instead of the 11 internal 
monitor.nl With Kames lie can see a similar attitude in his invention 
of the "sympathetic emotion of virtue" by which we feel ennobled by 
conspicuous instances of goodness.2 An important similarity in these · 
vie\Y'S is that Smith makes t he imagination a necessary element in the func-
tioning of the sympathetic sense, while with Kames it is implied that 
the 11 sympathetic emotion of virtue" means that we are temporarily iden-
tified with the virtuous person. 3 Now this 11 sympathetic imagination, 11 
while faintly adumbrated in the "creative associational11 imagination 
perhaps,4 is most certainly a different emphasis and has different criti-
cal results. Kames, for instance, asserts this opinion: 
To talk in the language of music, each passion has a certain tone, 
to which every sentiment proceeding from it ought to be tuned with 
the greatest accuracy: which is no easy work, especially where 
such harmony ought to be supported during the course of a long 
theatrical representation. In order to reach such delicacy of exe-
cution, it is necessary that a \Yriter assume the precise charac-
ter and passion of the personage represented: which requires an 
unconnnon genuis. But it is the only difficulty; for the \VI'iter 
who, annihilating himself, ~ thus become another person, need 
be in no pain abo~t the sentiments that belong to the assumed 
character: these will flolY' without the least study, or even pre-
conception; and will frequently be as delightfully nelr to himself 
as to his reader.s 
lsee Batei "Sympathetic Imagination, 11 p. 145. 
2Kames, E ements, p. 40. 
3In this regard, see the discussion of 11 ideal presence" below. 
4The creative ability to make images of things that never were on land 
or sea out of the elements of experience could also be turned to creating 
imaginatively the experience and feelings of other people out of the sub-
stance of one's own experience and feelings. It is possible that this 
idea reinforced and supplemented or in part was t he source for the 11 sym-
pathetic sense." Beyond this, the association of ideas psychology could 
be a source fer t his concept of the imagination. See Bate, From Clas~;c 
to Romantic, Chapter V. --
5Kames, Elements, p. 216. Italics mine. 
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This, it seems to me, is obviously a description of the workings of a 
different kind of imagination than creative association: the writer puts 
himself imaginatively into his characters, becomes his characters, and 
then all is subjective; he merely lets them take over. This is an em-
phasis on intuition as the function of the imagination and makes a sine 
qua~ of the lvriter's ability to put himself into his characters. If 
a writer lacks this intuition he will be labored, artificial, and coldly 
descriptive--a spectator rather than a sharer in the scenes he portrays. 
Both the creative associational and the sympathetic imagination as 
seen in the '\vriter have their complementary reactions in the 11 receiver. 11 
• 1vhen the artist creates new or pleasant combinations we follo\v him with 
delight--he appeals to our imagination in its picturing capacity and also 
to our pleasure in novelty. When he presents, 11 sympathetically," char-
acters or scenes of a moving nature, we share "imaginatively" in the lives 
of the people or events: we do not merely picture, w·e become one \vi th the 
sufferer, rejoice \vith the happy, and struggle with the tormented. We 
might also point out that \ve share in the motions and forces of inanimc1.te 
objects1 in this way as well, our minds ascending quietly \vith smoke on 
a calm day, or gliding along lvith a serpentine river.2 All these reac-
tions in the spectator form as essential part of the aesthetic picture, 
and the man of taste will naturally be sensitive to them. 
Another general observation is that the criterion for the effective-
ness of the imagination, which applies both to .. the ~writer and the reader, 
is that it must be strong and vivid, presenting lively images to the mind 
1\ve may call this, as I have done in the diagram, 11 empathy11 as 
disti~guished from 11 sympathy. 11 
Kames, Elements, p. 22, 128. 
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or arousing powerful feelings of identification. It should also be 
clear, without hazy impressions. As Blair says of descriptive poetry: 
Description is the great test of a poet's imagi nation; and always 
distinguishes an original from a second-rate genius. To a writer 
of t he inferior class, nature, when at any time he attempts to 
describe it, appears exhausted by those who have gone before him 
in the same track. He sees nothing new or peculiar, in the object 
he would paint; his conceptions of it are loose and vague; and his 
expressions of course are feeble and general. He gives us lvords 
rather than ideas; we meet with the language indeed of poetical 
description, but we apprehend the object described very indis-
tinctly. Whereas, the true poet makes us imagine that we see it 
before our eyes; he catches the distinguishli1g f eature; he gives 
it the colours of life and reality: he places it in such a light 
t hat a painter could copy after him. This happy talent is chiefly 
owing to a strong imagination, which first receives a lively im-
pression of t he object; and then, by employing a proper selection 
of circumstances in describing it, transmits that impression in 
its full force to t he imagination of others.l 
It is to be noted that both the imagination of the lvriter and of the 
reader are mentioned here, but that the reader's assumes a more passive 
role, absorbing the representations of the \Yriter. Yet the imagination 
of the reader must be sensitive enough to be strongly agitated by the 
writer; sensibility plays its part on both sides of t he equation. 
For the need of strength in the sympathetic imagination we may turn 
to Kames, who tells us that our feelings cannot be aroused by a writer 
who describes instead of being one with the passions of his characters: 
we lllL1St be "lulled into a dream of reality, and ev:erything must appear 
as passing in our sight. 11 2 lve might . also instance Campbell in his com-
ments on the ''sublime" (in his explicit use of the term) , when he says: 
!Blair, Lectures, p. 452. There are a nUJiiber of hfiooked atoms" here 
(apologies to Professor Lo\Yes and Epicurus): the foretaste of t he parti-
cularity of romantic description, a faint hint that here Blair \Vas getting 
back at Dr. johnson and I mlac for their view·s of the streaks of the tulip, 
t he Slving of the pendulumf.rom uniformitarianism to di versitarianism, hints 
of Kames' "ideal presence," etc. etc. 
2Kames, Elements, p. 217. 
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••• it is evident that this creative faculty, the fancy, frequently 
lends her aid in promoting still nobler ends. From. her entberant 
stores most of the tropes and figures are extracted which, when 
properly employed, have such' a marvellous efficacy in rousing the 
passions, and by some secret, sudden, and inexplicable association, 
awakening all the tenderest emotions of the heart. In this case~ 
the address of the orator is not ultimately intended to astonish 
by the loftiness of his images, or delight by the beauteous re-
semblance which his painting bears to nature; nay, it will not par-
mit the hearers even a moment's leisure .: ·fqr. _,. making the compari-
son, but, as it were, by some magical spell hurries them, ere they 
are aware, into love, pity, grief, terror, desire, aversion, fury, 
or ha.tred.1 
Beyond this, discussing the considerations which the s peaker must have for 
his audience as 11men endowed with imagination," he points out that unless 
the speaker gains ascendancy over his audience in .this way, he ~~11 not 
hold their attention.2 This emphasis on the stren&th and vi vidnews of 
the imagination is evident in all three ·of' our writers and is used by 
them as a critical criterion. 
We may see better ·how this is true, as well as observe the different 
uses of the idea of the imagination, if we instance further places in the 
criticism where it is applied. We should note first of all that in general 
our writers have a narrower meaning for the word ima:g:i..natipn than we might 
think. Although the imaging faculty is obviously at work in the sympathe-
tic function, the word itself is applied only to the creative associa-
tional function. With Kames, however, there is a:n interesting variant 
that may throw some light on this situation. We have noted that he had. 
a theory of 11ideal presence" which can probably be best described in his 
own words: "When I recall anything to my mind in a manner so distinc~ 
1. Campbell, Phil~~ P• 26. 
2. Ibid., P• 95· F·arther on in this discussion Campbell shows that 
the imagination to him is principally creative association. 
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as to form an idea or i mage of it as present 1 I have not words to describe 
that act 1 but that I perceive the thing as a spectator 1 and as existing 
in my presence; which means not that I am really a. spect ator, but onl~ 
that I conceive myself to be a spectator1 and have a per ception of the 
object similar to what a real spectator has."l This is a sort of ftwaking 
drewn." in that it vanishes like a dream the moment we reflect on our si tua-
tion; it differs from reflective remembrance in its intensity and imaging 
quality ; " ••• when I recall the event so distinctly as to form a complete 
image of it 1 I perceive it as passing in EW presence;, and this perception 
is an act of intuition1 into which reflection enters not 1 more than into 
an act of sight."2 Now it seems clear that Kames is abstracting from dif-
ferent degrees of memory and imagination the most vivid maxdfestations, and 
making them into a separate faculty or psychological phenomenon. As far 
as imagination is concerned thhs a eparat i on is helpful t o Kames, because 
it enables him t o make "ideal presence" a criteri on of excellence: "The 
power of langua ge to raise emoti ons 1 depends entirely on t he raising of 
s uch lively and distinct images as ar e here descri bed: t he reader's pas-
s i ons are never sensibly moved, till he is thrown i nto a kind of reverie; 
in which st ate 1 f orgetti ng t hat he i s readi ng, he conceives every i ncident 
as passing in his pr esence, precisely as if he were an eye- wit ness.n'3But 
it is har dlly new or s eparate s impl y bec::ause it is t he most intense form 
1. K~s, Elements 1 P• 52. 
2. Loc. cit. 
3• Ibid.:-p. 53· 
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of ima~~ng. He has split off one aspect of this phase of our psychological 
constitution vdthout relating it to the imagination~ yet from our point of 
view it appears quite clearly part of the process of imagining.1 
Besides this variant usage, which indicates how narrowly Kames construed 
the term, we have other instances of what he meant when he used the word 
imagination. For e:x:ainple in a critic ism of Pope he makes the imagination 
inferior to the true language of passion~ which gives us ideaL presence: 
" ••• the following passage {jrom the Elegy .i2_ the M3mory of !.!!. Unfortunate 
Ladi7 deserves no quarter; for it is not the langua ge of the heart; but 
of the imagination indulg;ing its fli ghts at ease; and by that means is e-
minently discordant with the subject."2 Of course~ there is nothing really 
wrong with the imagination's so indulging itself~ but its fli ghts belong 
not to the 11 serious and pathetic" b:ut to11fiction.n This is even clearer 
in the section at the end of the Elements where K~es tells us: 
•• .man · is endued with a sort of creative powerJ he can fabricate 
images of things that have no existence. The materials employed 
in this operation~ are ideas of sight~ which he can take to pieces 
and combine into new forms at pleasure; their complexity and vi-
vacity makes them fit materials ~t a man has no such power over 
any of his other ideas; whether of the external or internal senses: 
he cannot~ after the utmost effort, combine these into new forms •. 
being too obscure for that operation. An image thus fabricated 
cannot be called a secondary perception: the poverty of langua@e, 
however, as in the cave immediately above mentioned, has occasioned 
the same term idea to be applied to all. This singular power of 
fabricating im;;B without any foundation in reality, is distingui-
shed by the name of ima.gination.3 . 
1. It is a trifle amusing to realize that Kames~ who thought of him-
self as so original in this idea ("scarcely ever touched on by any other 
writer")~ had been anticipated as far back as Longinus. (See Henn, O£!. cit.) 
2. Kames~Edements~ P• 227. 
3· Ibid., P• 48oa "Terms Defined or Explained." 
This definition is obviously the creative assooiational one and would fit 
as easily into an essay of Addis·on as a criticism written in the latter 
part of the century. All this indicates that Kames 1 definition and con-
scious use of the word imagination definitely rests secure in traditional 
views~ but that he is at the saiDB time dealing with the concept of the 
imagination under different terminology. 
Campbell's use of the term is equally traditional: he construes the 
imagination as an image-making quality which must be appealed to in order 
to capture our attention in a pi ece of writing. Vivacity, beauty, subli-
mity, and novelty please this faculty. In using metaphor, for e~ple. 
the ~Titer must be specific--philosophy appeals to the understanding and 
uses abstract terms~ bpt "when the address is made by eloquence to the 
fancy, which requires a lively exhibition of the object presented to it, 
those terms must be cull; d that are as particular as possible, because it 
is solely by these that the object can be depicted.nl The difference be-
tween addressing the judgment and addressing the fancy2 is the same aa 
the difference between ratiocination and imagery. Further, imagination~ 
with the memory and the passions, is not the supplanter of' reason~ or 
even a rival in her sway, but one of her "handmaids" who assists the ora-
tor in his task of persuasion. This point of' view is at once rhetorical 
and indicative of' the psychological basis from which Campbell was working. 
The imagination in this use is principally a weaker sort of memory and 
an image-making faculty~ both i deas which we can see i n Addison. Yet, as 
we have noted before, the orator's appeal must arouse the audience; he 
1. Campbell~ Philosopgy, P• 309• 
2. This is a good example, with the preceding one, of the interchan-
geable way that "fancy" and the imagination were used. 
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must get into their minds and sweep them off their feet: "Sympathy is the 
one main engine by which the orator operates on the passions. 
With them who laugh our social joy appears; 
With them who mourn we sympathize in tears; 
If you would have me weep, begin the strain, 
Then I shall feel your sorrows, feel your pain."l 
(Horace, Art. ~., tr. by Francis) 
Consequently, I think we may say, as we have of Kames, that Campbell shows 
the same mingling of the traditional view of the imagination and of the 
sympathetic, but that he is rather more old-fashioned. 
Blair is the only one of our three authors who uses the word imagination 
to refer indiscriminately both to creative association and sympathy. Evi-
dently he made little disti~tion in his awn mind; for he tells us in 
one place that the effectiveness of figurative language depends on the 
fact that objects carry in their train associated objects that strike the 
imagination perhaps ·more forcibly than the primary,2 and in another place 
that the orator "must avail himself" of the power of the imagination, which 
is next to the i:cfluence of sense and memory, rtso as to strike tha imagina-
ti on of the hearers with ci rcumstances, which in lustre and steadiness re-
It 
semble those of sensation and remembrance. The foundation ••• of all suo-
cessful execution in the way of pathetic oratory is to paint the object 
1. Campbell, Philosophy, P• 118. Campbell also uses the principle of 
sympathy to explain why we are pleased with artistic presentations of grief. 
It is through the agency o.f sympathy that we "rejoice with them that re-
joice, and weep with them that weep.n (153) However., he separates this 
faculty from the imagination as construed by some critics to be the power 
by which, in seeing tragedy, we are brought under a "momentary deception" 
in which we believe that we are the persons involved. This subtle distinc-
tion does not invalidate the fact that either reaction involves an abro-
gation of self. 
~. Blair, Lectures, P• 151. 
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of that P8Ssion which we wislb. to raise, in the most natural and striking 
manner; to describe it in sut~h circumstances as are most likely to awaken 
it in the minds of others.• 1 Blair construes the imagiuation at one time 
as association, at another as sensibility or sympathy. Even when the 
emphasis is on association, however, sensibility--a "warm fancy"--is requi--
site to the proper exercise ·of the imagination. As we have instanced above2 
in considering the importanc•e of clarity and vividness in the imagination, 
the poet must have warmth and sensitivity if he is to describe to us so 
that we can get 1%J strong impression. But in these observations in the 
Lectures it ~ust be admitted that Blair is more reminiscent of Addisonian 
ideas and more dependent on Kames' standard of the "ideal presence," though 
he does not actually call it such, than he is in another piece of critical 
work. 
A Critical Dissertation .2!!_ ~Poems ..2!, Ossian, the !2!!, £!. Fingal? 
shows abundant evidence of a view of the imagination that c.ombines both 
an emphasis on creativity, particularly when undisciplined and untrammeled 
by too much reason, and on sensibility. In this interesting defense of 
a great example of the literary hoax, Blair makes out an excellent case 
for the son of Fingal, ·frequently pointing out that in some ways, among 
them his sensitive and vi vi d. imagination, he is the peer of any poet who 
ever lived. Blair makes some illuminating general observations throughout 
the dissertation as well. A typical stand is shown in such a statement 
as:: "As the world advances , the understanding gains ground upon the imagine.-
tion; the understanding is more exercised, the imagination less ••• The powers 
1. Ibid., P• 36o. 
2. P• 34. 
3• Second edition, London, 1765 as reprinted in The Poems of Ossian, 
translated by James Macphers on, Esq., New York: John w. Lovell,:l8~ 
• 
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of the imagination are most vi gorous and predominant in youth; those of the 
understanding ripen more slow"ly., and often attain not to their maturity un-
til the imagination begins to flag."l This is., of course., a fond theory 
of Blair's which he shared with some others: that his a@e was the most re-
fined and cultured that had existed since the days of the ancients., but 
that necessarily. something had been lost when refinement was gained. He 
goes on to say: "Hence poetry ., which is ~child of ~imagination., is 
frequently most glowing and a llimated in the first ages of society. As the 
ideas of our youth are rememb~~red with a peculiar pleasure., on account of 
their liveliness and vivacity, so the most ancient poets have afton pro-
"2 ved the greatest favorites of nations. In commenting on "Ossian" himself 
Blair says: 
Ossian himself appears to have been endowed by nature with an ex-
quisite sensibility of heart; prone to that tender melancholy 
which is so often attendant on great genius; and susceptible equally 
of strong and of soft emotion. He was not anly a professed bard, 
educated with care, as we ni.ay easily believe, to all the poetical'. 
art then known, and connected., as he shows us himself, in intimate 
friendship with the other contempor ar y bards; ~Jut a warrior a l s o; 
a nd the son of the most renowned hero and prince of his a@e• This 
formed a conjunction of circumstances uncommonly favorable tcw~ards 
exalting the imagination of a poet.3 
Throughout the critical diss ertation Blair i s apt to use such encomiums as: 
Ossian haB a 11glovJi ng and undisciplined imagination"; his imagination does 
no:t "sport itself" or dress out in tt gay 'crifles to please the fancytt but 
is always addressed to the heart; his descriptions transport us "as into 
"4 a new region Cwhere Y!iJ dwell among his objects S:s : if they were real. 
1. Ibid., P• 90. 
2. Blair, Critical Dissertation; P• 90• 
3• Ibid • ., P• 100. 
4• Ibid., P• 104, 107., 145·• 
In short, the imagination is a most essential quality in the poet, who to 
be great must combine both eL facility for creative association and sensi-
bility, who must have the ability to picture vividly and feel strongly so 
that his images and emotion are conveyed to us. 
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It remains to deduce the signific~noe of the concept of the imagination 
and the ways it is used in our authors. One thing is immediately evidenta 
that they do not agree comple·tely on how to construe t his faculty. Now 
this is somewhat signi ficant, because they are not at all careful to define 
the different ways it may be used, referring rather to it as a familiar 
concept about which there meed be no great to-do. To be sure, the imagi-
nation is not a crucial point in any of their systems; it is not a pri-
mary canon by which their judgment of aesthetic matters is determined. 
Yet the examples we have seen should indicate that it is a common point 
of reference frequently of cotLsiderable bearing on the opinions our critics 
asseverat.e on several matters, and also on the reasons they give for the 
pleasure we derive from litera.ture. Lacking such a concept., Blair might 
be a bit hard-pressed to analyze the delight in Ossian's gloonw and 
monotonous descriptions. Ka~s' important criterion of the ideal pre-
sence would either be denied him or would be subordinate. Campbell would, 
perhaps be less comprehensive in his classification of the kinds and effects 
of oratory. Wbile none of these would be very serious changes, they would 
affect the criticism to a degree. It therefore seems to me of interest 
that our critics are not greatly concerned over the idea. As we have 
pointed out in our consideration of Nature, there are many concepts which 
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our authors and other men of their time rely on as common knowledge when 
in reality there is a wide eli vergence of opinion on them. Remarking this, 
we can see why it is that they apparently are so inconsistent in ideas to 
which they give the s~ terminology .. 
This brings us to a second observation: that our authors were apparent-
ly unaware that the older concept of the imagination was being extended 
and changed even in their own hands. While they do not apply the word for 
the most part to the more creative and sympathetic faculties (using inatead 
such terms as "ideal presence" or "sympathy"), the same basic activity of 
the imagination which they describe els~here is involved here--only heigh-
tened. C~eativity is the result of the new whole brought about by the com-
bining and associating funot~ on of the imagination; sympathy exists only 
when we are able to picture ourselves or put ourselves ("imagine" ) in other 
people's position. If our ime.gining faculty is strong enough we can feel 
the sensations and emotions t hat they feel. When either the creative as-
socia.tion or the sympathetic process is heightened and made more a matter 
of emotion than intellect~ ot~ writers prefer other terms, but the same 
psychological processes are in~olved. Furthermore~ this extension of the 
importance of the imaginatio 1 particularly in its sympathetic aspect, 
looks ahead to the aesthetics of romanticism, no matter what words are ap-
plied.1 
1. See Walter Jackson Bate, From Glassic to Romantic and "The Sym-
pathetic Imagination." The iey role that the-rmagination in its creative 
function and ita identifying .function plays in the romantics is thought 
by Bate to be directly related to the concepts of the Soots. 
A third observation ma~· be made from what we know of the social an& 
rational background of our euthors' thought. In the first place, the iaea 
of the associational imagination is drawn from the psychology of the as-
sociation of ideas. We can i n this aspect see the line of d~ent and the 
..... 
theories which account for. ·the conscious view which t he critics have of 
the imaginatioh. It .is prob~bly quite accurate to say that their notion 
of this faculty ought to be t raced directly to Locke and Hobbes. They would, 
if asked, explain the imagination to us by the standard means: Objects 
associated in sensation can :~ all each other up in memory: one idea may be 
associated with other ideas; the original dominance of an idea may be 
chan~d by associations; and so forth. But in the s e cond place, the way 
in which they llRke use of idoas which we can only call imagination, shows 
other pressures on their thought which c o:m9 from the social situation. 
For instance, we have seen t he reliance on original propensities and in-
tarnal senses (this derived probably from their education and reading) run-
ning through their thought i r . counterpoint to induction and empiricism. 
This is probably one source t or the shift toward the idea of the impor-
tance of sympathy. Beyond t his, sympathy is complemented by sensibility--
in fact they :are but two sides of the same coin--and we know that the cult 
of feeling was reaching its hi gh point in the late decades of the eighteenth 
century, and especially in Edinburgh. While we would not want to call our 
critics "men of feeling, n they do show an emphasis on the place of emo-
tion and sensibility in art t hat equally prevents our classifying them 
as Augustans. We might also t' onjecture that this emphasis on fellow-feeling 
was reinforced both by the cohesion of their society and the strong moral 
bias our authors show. Kam .~ s i ndic ates this quite c learly: 
I n a rough road, a halt to view a fine c ountry is refreshing; 
and here a deli ghtfu:·. prospect opens upon us . It is indeed wonder-
ful to observe what " ncitements there are to virtue in the human 
frame justice is pe:rc·eived to be our duty; and it is guarded by 
natural punishments, from which the guilty never escape; to per-
form noble and generous actions, a warm sense of their dignity 
and superior exceller ce is a most efficacious incitement • . ~nd to 
leave virtue in no qt arter unsupported, here i s u~ed an ad-
mirable contrivance, by which good example commands the heart, and 
adds · to virtue the f crce of habit. We approve every virtuous ac-
tion, and bestow our affection on the author; but if virtuous ac-
tions produced no otr er effect upon us, good example would not have 
great influence: the sympathetic emotion under consideration ~'sym­
pathetic emotion of virtue 11Jbestows upon good example the utmost 
influence, by prompti ag us to imitate what we admire .1 
In fine, it may be said that our authors' concept of the imagination 
is molded both by rational a nd social means. The explicit meaning of the 
term comes from the r ational stream of thought; but there were strong pres-
sures directing critical tho·.1ght toward a greater application of feeling, 
and the peculiar ciroumstano • ~ s under which the Scots lived and worked un-
doubtedly affected the empha .. is on sympathy. We have in evidence here two 
types of mixed modes of thou,;ht: the Scots' use of t he imaginative facul-
ties points both to the past and the future for a mixed mode in time, 
while the rational and sooia: mix in the idea of sympathy and sensibility. 
1. Kames, Elements, P• 40 . 
v. Shakespeare 
~ It is always illuminati ng to observe the opinions which men of the 
eighteenth century expressed on the sub ject of Shakes peare. We can 
gather both the spirit of t hs ti~s and the particular way in which a cri-
tic responds to it--his cons arvatism or independence or common sense--from 
the things he has to say on ·bhis subject--ahvays assuming~ of course~ that 
our own twentieth century po:Lnt of view is the most i nformed. That Blair 
shows both a more conservati .e and traditional view here. in contrast to 
Kames; is probably more si gn:..Pioant than his liberal opinion on the ima.gin-
ation. say. an opinion which may well have been color ed by his illustra-
tions. But whether complete y trustworthy as indicat ions of character or 
not. the :ideas which both Bl:dr and K~s enunciate do tell us some in-
teresting things. 
One of these is that Srukespeare was more thoroughly read and appre-
ciated., as well as acted.l by many eighteenth century men., than is perhaps 
commonly supposed. The refe ences in both Blair and Kames are frequent 
and copious. They find in S!akespeare a wealth of illustrative material 
to point out innumerable beat~ies of literature. Kames especially is 
surely one of the great readers of Shakespeare in any century--a man who 
has absorbed most of what Sh.a.kespeare wrote. His familie.ri ty is not that 
of the reader or of the schol ar alone. however. for he is familiar with 
both substance and technique; he has a great appreciation of Shakespeare's 
1. See David Nichol Smith. Shakespeare in~ Eighteenth Century. 
Oxford: The Clarendon Press., 1928. Chapter Ie 
powers as a dramatist and of his mastery of language as well. All this is 
significant. because i t shcm s us that our authors wer e t ruly versed in a 
large body of the best that has been thought and said. Their ap~reciation 
also indicates that they had a good deal of the "taste" which they so high-
ly advocate. 
From our point of view • however • their exercise of taste was far from 
flawless. especially Blair's. His critical habit of poi nting out the beau-
ties and blemishes in works of liter ature was here reinforced by a tradition 
going back to Dryden, which phrased the matter thus a 
All the Images of Nature were still present to him. and he 
drew them not laborio:1sly1 but luckily: when he describes any thing1 
you more than s-ee it1 you feel i t too. Those who accuse him to 
have wanted learning. give him the greater collllllendation: he was na-
turally learn 1 d: he n::teded not the spectacles of Books to read 
Nature; he look'd inw!u•ds,. and found her there. I cannot say he 
is every where alike • • • He is many times flat. insipid; his Cornick 
~~t de@Bnerating into clenches, his serious swelling into bombast. 
But he is always grea t , when some g;Deat occasion is presented to 
him.l · 
Blair, if anything. is more :;evere on Shakespeare 1 s defects than was his 
eminent predecessor in the a .:-t of criticism: 
Instances, I admit, t l1ere are of some works t hat contain gross 
transgressions of the laws of criticism. acquiring nevertheless, 
a general and even a lasting admiration. Such are the plays of 
Shakespeare, which1 c nsidered as dramatic poems. are irregular in 
the hi ghest degree. ·:·•ut then we are to remark that they have 
gained the public adm'.ration1 not by their bei ng irregular 1 not by 
their transgression of the rules of art, but i n spite of such 
transgressions. They possess other beauties which are conformable 
to just rules; and tho force of these beauties has been so great 
as to overpm~r all c nsure, and to give the publ ic a degree of 
satisfacti on superi or to the disgust arising f rom their blemishes. 
Shakespeare pleases, :not by his bringing the transactions of many 
years into one play; not by his grotesque mixt-qres of tragedy and 
1. ~bid., P• 61, from Dryden's Essay of Dramatick Poes¥• 
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comedy in one piece, nor by the strained thoughts and affected witti-
cisms, which he somet imes employs. These we consider as blemishes 
and impute them to t he grossness of the age in which he lived. But 
he pleases by his an .mated and masterly representations of charac-
ters, by the liveliness of his descriptions, the force of his senti-
ments, and his posse~sing, beyond all writers, the natural langua~ 
of passion: beauties which true criticism no less teachjs us to 
place in the first r£.nk than nature teaches us to feel. 
This is the beauty-blemish t heory with a ven@Bance, as well as showing such 
11 
standard misconceptions as l:dief in the unity of time and the "kinds. 
Such a stand is based, of ccurse, on notions quite different £ram Blair's 
usual psychological criteria. He explicitly calls on "the rules" here as 
means for judging Shakespear1:.e But it is nevertheless a traditional and 
quite honorable position for his time. It betrays his unwillingness to aP-
ply critical notions in this connection which he coul d apply els$Where to 
support, for example, his e~ ;husiasm for Ossian. "Insofar as he ~Shakespear~ 
had observed these Cthe rul .tsJ and so far anly, was Shakespeare great. 
It was not his disregard of ~he rules which had brought him success, but 
his excellence in the expres ::tion of manners, in the distinction of charac-
ters, in the representation of passion. If in addition to these he had 
ohly known the dramatic art, he would have occupied an alto@ether higher 
place than the one he had act ually attained."2 
1. Blair, Lectures, PP• 28-29• 
2. T. R. Louisl)ury, S~.speare !!, a Dramatic Artist, New York: Scribners, 
1902, P• 359· Lousbury terms this the ,.classical" view and considers such 
men as Chesterfield, penni~ , Gildon, and BUrne as belonging to it. 
Blair repeats tradition in other ways too, one of the principal being 
in the idea that ShakespearEJ was an untutored genius deficient in "just · 
taste" and "altogether unas s isted by knowledge or art." This is the rea.-
son for his great faults; because the taste of his day was gross and unin-
formed 1 he was able to excel. only through his supreme ability to see into 
character and delineate pas s ion. Beyond this, it "remains to this day in 
doubt whether his beauties cr his faults be greatest ."1 Like other cri tics2 
Blair feels that Shakespeare is great in some passages, "beyond what are to 
.. 
be found in any other dramatic writer. Yet he is not consistent; " ••• there 
is hardly one of his plays v. ·bich can be called altogether a good one, or 
II 
which can be read w:i. th unint•6rrupted pleasure from beginning to end. He 
often fails in expression, b.;,ing inclined ·to "unnatural·; ·bhoughts, harsh 
expressions, a certain obscur e bombast, and a play upon words which he is 
ll:z 
fond of pursuing. ~ His ima~nation was more 11rich and bold" than ndel:l.- · 
cate." In Henry b for e:x:auple, he makes a 11 gross transgression" when 
he speaks of the soldiers' S:?irits rising like mist f rom a dunghil1.4 He 
indulges in such gross abuse s of figures of speech as the mixed metaphor 
in 11to take up arms against ~- sea of troubles."5 All in all, despite his 
1. Blair, Lectures, P• ~) . Notice that this is also suitable to Blair's 
theory of a progress from bol dness in the imagination toward refinement 
as civilization went on. An is it not strange that he could not see the 
paradox of Ossian's being"el(~ gant 11 so many years before Shakespeare? This 
is perhaps a strong implicat · on as to the power of critical tradition 
strengthening national predild:7.ice. 
2. See Smith, ££,• ill.•, n Pope 1 s marking the nbrillia.nt" passages in 
his edition, P• 67. 
3• Blair, Lectures, P• 5) 0. 
4• Ibid., P• 162. 
5• Ibid., P• 164• 
great ability to use the proper language o£ passion, Shakespeare is so £re-
quently at fault in taste aL to be subject to extreme censure at Blair's 
hand. 
All o£ this sounds more strange to us than it undoubtedly did to the 
eighteenth century. Despite Blair's severity he was not alone in his po-
sition; and there were other s , as we have mentioned, who were seriously 
disturbed at matters which w recognize as the characteristics o£ Elizabethan 
times or do not boggle at in the slightest. We are not inclined toward e-
legance; puns, "clenches," a 1d bawdy jokes £or the groundlings may not amuse 
us particularly, but they ar 1 not disturbing as they ·were to the Age o£ 
Reason. Yet ?t"ith all this <;l.·itioal myopia, Blair was not so hampered by 
rules and 11eleganceu that he could not see some of Shakespeare's greatness. 
Shakespeare redeems all his 'aults 11by two of the greatest excellencies 
w}iioh any tragic poet can por.ses; his lively and diversified painting o£ 
character; his strong and nat ural expression o£ passion ••• It is therefore 
no matter of wonder, that frcm the more polished and regular, but more 
cold and artificial performa ces o£ other poets, the public should return 
·with pleasure to such warm a d genuine representation o£ human nature. 111 
And Shakespeare also gives us great pleasure @y his f anciful world o£ 
"preternatural beings" wherei n his imagination, and ours, . disports itself. 
The way Blair puts this leads me to suspect that there i s probably some 
internal tension here--that ha is 'torn between the aesire to enjoy 
Shakespeare, as the public does, and the traditiona~ crit ical necessity 
o£ pointing out faults. · 
1. Blair, Lectures, P• 53 • 
It might be assumed fr om what we have said that BJa. ir spends a deal 
of time on Shakespearean cri ticism, whereas his remarks, though signifi-
cant, occupy only a small p :trt of the Lectures. Wi t h Kames the situation 
is different. We have note in Chapter II fhe extent of the references 
in the Elements of Criticis . ; they show that Ka.mas r elied on Shakespeare 
:Bor o illustration more often t:b..an on aey writer.l Moreover, though generally 
more conservative than Blai ~ in his criticism, Kames here belongs definite-
ly to a liberal school. He does not go so far as the romantics who could 
find no fault in Shakespeare . He admits that his favorite dramatist some-
times "deviates into intri~~e thought and obscure expression" when trying 
to raise ordinary matter above the style "of ordinary conver-a-ation."2 Oc-
casionally Shakespeare's "fe,rtility" betrays him int o error, as in the fi-
gures of speech where he uses simile in circumstances of "rooted grief, 
deep anguish, terror, remorr. e, despair, and all the severe dispiriting 
passions."3 He also finds f ault ·with Lady Macbeth's asking all the spirits 
to stop up the access to remorse to any "compunctious visi tings of nature.'' 
since this ttspeech is not nHtural. A treacherous murder was never perpetrated, 
even by the most hardened miscreant, without compunction." And, conceding 
that· she "must have been in horrible agitation,tt it is still a "never-ending 
artifice of self-deceit, to draw the thickest veil over the wicked action, 
and to extenuate it by all t he circumstances the imagination can suggest.114 
1. He quotes from some thirty plays, including fourteen references to 
Eamlet, ten to HenrY~ Pa~~~~ fifteen to Julius Caesar, and fifteen 
to othello, for example. He surprisingly omits the following from his 
references (in view of his . uoting such plays as K~ John and .2. ~ VI): 
Love's Labour's Lost, The C~medy 2!_ Errors, Titus ronicus, The Taming 
2£. ~Shrew, Timon 2£. Athen,~ Pericles,~ !_lti.dsummar-Night'Sl>i=eam. 
2. Kames, Elements, P• ~39• 
3• Ibid, P• 336. 
4• Ibid, P• 230• 
Still Kames finds that Shakt'iSpeare excels in his perfection of langua~"e as 
well as in the distinction .>f' his characters and representations of passion. 
Above all of course, he is ~: upreme in this last quality: 
Shakespeare is superi or 'to all other wri ters in delineating passion. 
It is difficult to sny in what part he most excels 1 whether in 
moulding every passi :m to peculiarity of character, in discovering 
the sentiments that ?roceed from various tones of passion, or in 
expressing properly !3very different sentiment; he disgusts not his 
reader with general declamation and unmeaning words, too common in 
other writers: his Slmtiments are adjusted t o· the peculiar charac-
ter and circumstancea of' the speaker~ That t his is no exaggeration, 
will be evident to e ·treryone of taste, u£on comparing Shakespeare 
with other writers i~ similar passages. 
Kames agrees with Blai:r that Shakespeare was supreme in drawing charac-
ter as well, but he feels that critics (and presumably this might include 
his friend) 0 seem not perfectly to comprehend the genius of' Shakespeare." 
His defects are in the mechanics of the drama, a matter of' experience rather 
than genius, and one which "is not otherwise brought to perfection but by 
dili gently observing the errors of former compositions. 11 Shakespeare's 
genius is •eeen in the fact that he excels all the ancients and moderns in 
knowledge of human nature, and in unfolding even the most obscure and re-
fined emotions. This is a rare faculty, and of' the greatest importance 
in a dramatic author; and · t is that faculty vnnch makes him surpass all 
other writers in the comic as well as tragic vein. 112 Kames' opinions 
on this score show that he cannot be fitted exactly into either of the 
two classes of' eighteenth <~entury critics described by Lounsbury: those 
who thought that 0 Shakespe >.re was irregularly great, but ••• would have beem 
far g,Teater had he only kn r:mn and practiced the poetic art" or those who 
l.Ibid., P• 239• 
2elbid., P• 240ne 
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said he was great precisely because he "did not know and practise it. be-
cause he was above it."l Eames sees that his Shakespeare ha.s faults# but 
feels that the reason is n t lack of knowledge. It is rather a combination 
of lack of experience and ·he absence of a pattern of dialogue suited to 
the theatre that accounts 'or Shakespeare's deficiencies. "But may it not. 
in some measure, excuse Sh~.kespeare, I shall not s ay his works, 
tha.t he had no pattern, in his own or in any living l anguage, of dialogue 
fitted to the theatre?" 1hen Kames makes this acute and prophetic obser-
vationz "At the same ti!ll!l, it ought not to escape observation that the 
stream clears in its progress, and that in his later plays he has attained 
the purity and perfection of dialogue; an observat ion that# with greater 
certainty than tradition# will direct us to arrange his plays in order 
lt2 
of time. Where Kames d pends; perforce, on the historical misinformation 
of his time he goes astray ; but where he works fram his own observation 
and independent judgment he avoids the errors both of his own time and 
the worshipping romantic • After the comment above on order he adds this: 
t'This ought to be consid rea by those who rigidly exaggerate every blemish 
of the finest genius for the drama ever the world enjoyed: they ought also 
for their own sake to co~ider that it is easier to discover his blemishes, 
which lie generally at t .ne surface, tha.n his beauties# which can be truly 
relished by those only who dive deep into human nature. 113 
1. 
2. 
3· 
On the subject of fhakespearats supposed irregularly Kames has a 
Lounsbury, ~ £!::•, P• 365. 
Kames, Elements, ?• 239• 
Loc. cit., 
---
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good deal to s ay by implicai:;ion in his chapter on the three unities, al-
though he does not apply hi s observations s pecifically . 'While his opinions 
are not completely originaJ, 1 they antedate those of Johnson on this sub-
ject and supply a reason f c. r Kames making no to-do over his favorite dra-
matist 1s irregularity. Thy shcwf his independence, liberality~ and sys-
ternatic consistency--for h re he works from a basis of psychology plus 
common sense. In substanc .3 his stand is that the only important unity is 
that of action,2 and that t he unity of place and of time are to be adhered 
to as a matter of choice, not necessity. For the Qreeks, whose drama was 
"a continued representati cn without interruption, 11 there was no opportunity 
to change time or place; l 'ut vdth the modern divi sion into acts such a re-
striation is :merely artif '.cial. To be sure~ there must '9e unity within 
the acts, but 
\Vhere the representation is suspended~ we can with the greatest 
facility suppose a:n.y length of time or any change of place; the 
spectator, it is t rue, may be conscious that the real time and 
place are not the s ame with what are employed in the representation: 
but this is a work: of reflection; and by the same reflection he may 
also be conscious that Garrick is not King Lear, that the playhouse 
is not Dover Clif s~ nor the noise he hears thunder and li ghtBing. 
In a word, after r n interruption of the representation, it is no 
more difficult fo a spectator to imagine a new place~ or a different 
time~ than at the commencement of the play to ima.ginine himself at 
Rome, or in a per·:.od two-thousand years back. And indeed it is 
abundantly ridicu.Lous, that a critic, who is willing to hold. 
candle-light for ;unshine~ and sa.me painted canvasses for a palace 
or a prison~ shou ld be so scrupulous about admitti ng any latitude 
of place or of ti~ in the fable, beyond what is necessary in 
the representati on.3 
This should not excuse~ he continues~ too great liberties, such as 
exhibiting at the close • •• a full grown person who appears as a child at 
1. See Thomas Rayso , "The 
~ Notes, XLII~ 1927~ 109. 
Downfall of the Three Unities~ 11 Modern ~ 
Farquhar~ in part icular, expressed ("1milar 
ideas. 
2. 
3· 
Note that this i s the only unity with which Aristotle is concerned, too. 
~· cit. In ··- ~. wr 
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the beginning, Ill for this i s beyond all probility. And for another thing, 
while unity of time and pl :tee conduce to unity of action, which is abso• 
lutely necessary, they are but refinements "which may justly give place to 
a thousand beauties more substantial.112 One of these beauties, an evident 
advantage of the modern dr ama, is the deeper impression which can be made 
by the alternation of dran.atic tension and pauses. It is a psychological 
fact that our attention i ·; strained by too lengthy a representation and 
"an uneasiness ensues, wh.i. ch never fails to banish the waking dream."3 
At the end of his clB.pter Kames back-pedals a bit and shows the habits 
of his time in his idea -t.hat thezre should be no irregularity within the 
acts. The sta@e must ahays be occupied; there must be only one action 
at a time on the stage; 1 ·each person introduced during an act /jnusy be 
linked to those in posse ;sion of the sta~, so as to join all in one ac-
tion."4 Many English pl·:tys are very irregular in these ways! Congreve 
being singled out for co.rnrn.enda.tion in his adherence to these dicta. But 
we :.may notice that Shakespeare is not mentioned at all, implying either 
that such irregularity is not censurable in him or that to censure would 
be pedantic. All in al , Kames' attitude toward the unities is such that 
it constitutes a defens . of Shakespeare (and other older dr~tists if he 
h.ad known them) against modern critics who "are guilty of an egregious 
blunder115 in trying to ::nake Greek practice into modern rules. 
The sources for t e differences o£ opinion between our two critics 
1. Loc. cit. In .ew of what he has just aaid this seems a bit illo-
gical. 
2. Ibid., P• 435· 
3· Ibid., P• 436. [ cannot help but wonder if Poe was familiar with 
this passage • 
4· ~- .. P• 439· 
5· Ibid., P• 433· 
are certainly not plain tc see, and we would undoubtedly wind ourselves 
in a tangled skein of con; ectures if we tried to unravel them. With their 
similar views on so many :ubjects they are so far apart here that we would 
have to depend on such sl nder evidence as the different professions they 
practiced, or Blair's gre .. tter . desire to please, or the purposes of their 
books, or simply that Kanu s apparently knew his Shakespeare better. But 
interesting as such .a tas~ might prove, I do not think it is sound, or ne-
cessary. The important ·matter here is rather the reversal of their usual 
positions as far as libe ality and conservatism are concerned. Blair, the 
defender of Ossian, the over of sentiment, the reader of fiction, here 
belongs to the school tlw.t Lounsbury calls the 11 hype!'cri tics" 1 while Kames, 
usually more conservati . , is very liberal. Of course, there are, as well, 
evidences of internal te sions in"both men: we have pointed out that Blair 
seems to enjoy Shakes pea .. e more than correct playwrights, and Kames gives 
way to regularity at the conclusion of his discussion. On the whole, haw-
ever, I believe that the illuminating thing about their opinions on Shakes'peare 
is the indication of an ther type of mixed mode of thought. Here Blair 
yields more to the cons rvatism ~ound throughout his criticism, while Kames 
asserts his independent views. Their approach to the greatest of dramatis~s 
adds one more bit o£ evidence to the pattern of waverings, tensions, and 
inconsistencies which we have seen characterize their thought. 
vi 1'-lilton 
The reputation of Milton in the eighteenth century never seems to 
have suffered from the lack of understanding sho~m toward much of the 
poetry of the preceding century; and following Addison's Suectator series 
on Paradise .!~~!!}his fame stead ... ly grew, at least as far as some poems were 
concerned. In the middle and la .er years of the century he was accorded the 
honor of assiduous imitation. The work of the "pre-romantic poets" echoes 
his diction; his blank verse prol )ably somewhat influenced Thomson, and he 
has been called Young's 11avo\..red naster. n2 Milton's popularity amone the 
poets was not ey2.ctly shared by the critics, however, who foUnd him cer-
tainly one of the greatest poets, but who also seemed to have a constitu-
tional aversion to much of the work he did. Every student is familiar with 
Johnson's severity in dealing witn the minor poems, with the exception of 
L1Allegro and Il Penseroso, altho~ the encomiums heaped on Paradise Lost 
should be balanced against the good doctor's remarks on Lycidas.3 The manner 
.ot 
and the matter both of Milton 'trer.:vsuch as 'trould naturally endear him to the 
Enlightenment, and it apparently equired considerable exercise of "taste" 
to e.ppre.ciate him, unlike the eas -~ with \'lhich the century could enjoy Dryden 
and \'Taller. And. when his poetry, as not obviously great, it 'tras likely to 
be but faintly praised or thoro~lly damned. Of course, L 1 Alleg~o and Il 
Penseroso were always enjoyed--wh .. le they ~tere not termed great, they quite 
definitely appealed in their past ral description and melodious octosyllabics 
to t he ta.ste of the eighteenth ce tury. The influence of Milton so very 
1. These appeared on Satude.ys and were numbered 267, 273, 279, 285, 
291, 297, 303, 309, 315, 321, 327, 333, 339, 345, 351, 357, 363, 369. See 
Cambridge History of English Litei a ture, IX, 66. 
2. See Elton; ~· cit.-;-f;".Chapter XII. 
3. See 11M:ilton" in Lives of the Poets. 
apparent in such writers as Tho son, Collins, Shenstone, and the l·Tartons 
is for the most part that of L1Allegro and Il Penseroso ·~ rather than that 
of Paradise Lost or Samson Agonistes. The great works were admired rather 
than imitated, or were roundly censured. 
Our critics share in thes J predilections and antipathies. When they 
mention Paradise~ they admit it to the very first rank; t hey are fond 
of the happy man and the reflect ' ve man; ~hey have nothing to say about other 
works. Blair, for example, devo ·es a trio of pages to Par~ise Lost where, 
despite some doubts as to whethel'' it may be properly called an epic poem, he 
calls it "one of the highest eff rts of poetical genius.ul L'Allegro and Il 
Penseroso he considers to be 11the richest and most remarkable 11 poems in the 
descriptive style to be found in .IDnglish.2 But like his contemporaries he 
mentions no other works. It is p9rhaps even more worthy of note that he 
devotes so little comment to Milt)n. Our authors, who devote voluninous 
pages to most subjects, and who mention Addison and Po9e so frequently, have 
comparatively little to say on ~.Ulton. To be sure, he is given lip service, 
but the citations from his works t~e as frequently used to point out blemishes 
in writing as to exemplify great irtues. We might say that our critics show 
for the most part a proper respec t for Milton but that it is generally un-
seasoned l·7i th enthusiasm. Their arm encomiums are reserved for Shakespeare, 
or more particularly Ossian. 
Kames, for instance, draws 3n Paradise Lost for examples of the im-
pressions made by 'til.evated objects 11 ; 3 he quotes at some length to illustre..te 
inverted style;4he instances how passion "redoubles" words from Book VIII ,5 
While he gives praise for "richest melody" and 11 sublimest sentiments,"6 .he 
1. Blair, Lectures, p. 503. 
2. Ibid., p. 454. 
3. Kames, Elements, p . 113. 
4. Ibid., p. 269. 
5. (Ll. 273-77): Ibid. I 
p. 239. 
6. Ibid., p. 317. 
also comments on the number of "careless lines.nl In many places he 
finds that Hilton1 s delinea, ion of sentiments is llnot altogether nat-
ural," while in many passag s we are confused by the juxtaposition of 
"dissimilar emotions. 112 He even considers that Jl{ilton descends to 
11 the lowest species of low it 11 completely unsuited to a heroic poem 
in such passages as: 
And br ought into the world a world of wo. 
-begirt thl, Almighty throne 
Beseec' ing or besieging---
Which t empted our attempt---
At one slight bound overleap 1d all bound. 
---With a shout 
Loud a from number without numbers.3 
In short, Kames' opinion of Hilton is at the best mildly appreciative, 
at the worst, censorious. 0 the whole, however, he uses Paradise 
~ most frequently as a s urce for examp1e of different beauties 
or blemishes, rarely making Ch critical comment on the intrinsic 
worth of the passages, or th ir place in the poem as a whole. It is 
also a matter of note that, like Blair and Campbell, he mentions nothing 
but Paradise Lost, and L1Allegro and Il Penseroso. , 
~lhile this attitude of Kames toward 1·1ilton is perhaps not too re-
markable, for it mi@1t be mer ly a matter of personal predilection, it 
is also true that Campbell tr ats one of the greatest of poets cavalierly. 
There are only six references to ~tllton in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 
and these are of the shortest . Inasmuch as Campbell was so strongly 
interested in religious writing, and in view of his frequeht references 
1. Loc. cit. 
2. Eames:-Elements~ p. 230, 71. 
3. Ibid., P• 246. 
f 
to the Bible,l we might pro.J?erly expect that he would turn to a great 
religious poet more frequen t ly, yet such is not the case. He tells 
us that we get a "tolerable imitation" of motion and sound in part of 
l! Penseroso;2 some passages are instanced from Paradise~ to show 
how verse form may imitate oovements;3 we learn that propriety sometimes 
necessitates circumlocution , as when Milton says that Satan fell from 
heaven "Nine times the spac that measures day and niftAt/ To mortal men ••• 11 
rather than nine days and nights.4 But this kind of citation and crit-
icism indicates the total a · tention which Campbell gives Milton--the 
great Puritan affords samples of diction. There is certainly no blame 
at t ached to this neglect on Campbell's part, for his purpose is not to 
criticize poets, great or small. The point is rather that a legitimate 
expectation on our part--that a religious writer would naturally give 
considerable heed to !viil ton-- is not fulfilled. 
Blair equally makes l i ttle of Milton's place as a religious poet 
although he does not use~~ Lost only for examples of perspicuity 
or vivacity. His section on Milton's epic follows Johnson's essay 
closely for many things: the characterization, the power of imagination, 
and the artistry of the design , for example. Blair differs from John-
son significantly on one point: he feels that l~lton 1 s versification as 
well as his poetic diction has 11 ••• high merit • .iiis style is full of 
majesty, and wonderfully adap t ed to his subject. His blank verse is har-
monious and diversified, and affords the most complete example of the 
1. It will be remember d that he was a distinguished translator of 
the Gospels. 
2. Campbell, Philosoph)~ , p. 345. The lines from the poem are 11. 
73-76. 
3. Ibid., p. 347. 
4. Ibid., p. 364. 
elevation which our language is capable of attaining by the force of 
numbers.nl We might, hO\'Ie er, ley this divergence more to Johnson's 
riding a pet theory too har than to Blair's greater insight. ~fuen 
all is said and done, Parad.i se Lost comes out of Johnson's criticism 
more favorably than Blair 1 s , if only because the stric~Ures are out-
weighed by the force of the praise. We might compare the conclusions 
of these two pieces of crit i cism: 
On the whole, Paradise Lost is a poem that abounds with 
beauties of every ki d., and that justly entitles its author to 
a degree of fame not inferior to any poet; though it must also 
be admitted to have many inequalities. It is the lot of almost 
every high and d.arin~ genius not to be uniform and correct. 
Milton is too frequent ly theological and metaphysical; some-
times harsh in his l anguage; often too teChnical in his words, 
and affectedly ostent tious of his learning. l.fany of his 
faults muet be attrib ted to the pedantry of the age in which 
he lived. He discove s a vigor, a grasp of genius, equal to 
every thing that is g eat; if, at some times, he falls below 
himself, at other tim s he rises above every poet of the ancient 
or modern world.a 
His play on words, in which he delights too often; his equivo-
cations, which Bantle endeavours to defend by the example of 
the ancients; his unn ,cessary and ungraceful use of terms of 
art, it is not necess ·~Y to mention, because they are easily 
remarked and generally censured, and at last bear to little 
proportion to the who l e that they scarcely deserve the attent~on 
of a critic. 
Such are the faults of that wonderful performance P@Xad.ise 
Lost; which he who can put in balance with its beauties must be 
considered, not as nice but as dull, as less to be censured for 
want of candour than pi tied for want of sensibility.l 
It is on the subject o ~ lUlton 1s sublimity that Blair allO\'IS him-
self the pleasure of undiluteu praise. As he says of the passage in 
Paradise Lost, Book I where w see Satan 11at the head of the infernal 
hosts~: ,, 
Here concur a variety c f sources of the sublime: the prin-
cipal object eminently great; a high superior nature, fallen 
indeed, but erecting itself against distress; tne grandeur of 
the principal object heightened, by associating it with so noble 
1. Blair, Lectures, p. 05. 
2. Ibid., p. 506. 
3. LiVes of the Poets i C. C. I•Ioore, English Prose of the Eighteeth 
Century, p. 565.--
an idea as that of tLe sun suffering an eclipse; this picture 
shaded with all those images of change and trouble, of darkness 
and terror, which coi cide so finely with the sublime emotion; 
and the whole expressed in a style and versification, easy, 
natunal, and simple, ut magnificent.l 
Blair considers that, althoueh the very nature of the sublime forbids 
its long continuance, in Hom r and lY!ilton "this effulgence of genius 
breaks forth more freQuently , and with greater lustre, than in most 
authors.n2 
All in all, it is apparent that our critics are not worshippers 
of Milton: though they speak well of his great genius and find that in 
some respects he is without , peer, they find little actual place for 
him in their citations, and t hat frequently only to cavil. T.he reasons 
for this are a trifle obscur , but I think we may risk conjectuxing that 
they are conpounded of genera l intellectual and social antipathies of 
the Enlightenment and the seventeenth century. For one thing, the world 
of l<!il ton was above all a ''lorld of turmoil where there was real need 
of justifying the ways of Go to man, but all that had been pretty well 
settled by the time our criti s "'ere living--not only the turmoil but 
also the ways of God. As a I' sult the drive and tension that char-
acterizes the poetry of Milto , and the problems with which he dealt, 
took on the appearance of ped. 1tic theology. The average critic of the 
Age of Reason could see that t here was nobility and magnificence in 
Milton's poetry, but the moti ation that made those qualities live "'as 
alien to him. It consequentl; took Milton 1 s highest efforts to satisfy 
the eighteenth century, or hiu most chiseled and perfect accomplishments 
1. Blair, Lectures, p. 44. The lines from the poem are 590-660. 
2. Ibid., p. 47. 
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in a minor sphere. 
The delight which t h . eighteenth century took in L'Allegro 
and Il Penseroso is probabl quite as significant as their neglect of 
Lycidas and Samson Agoniste • Literary theory and tradition, plus 
some Johnsonian influence, may account for the latter, but the former 
seems to be a natural outgr wth of taste. After all, the happy man 
and the reflective man are ut two phases of the gentleman of the 
Enlightenment. And the poe s are polished, urbane, and classical in 
the best sense of the word. They present the English countryside in 
terms of complete deli@1t t any Englishman (and the countryside in 
Lowland Scotland is not so very different}. The are melodious and 
exquisitely balanced; they are written in rhymed couplets. And lastly, 
they are relaxed and serene; they pose no issues and promulgate no v 
profundities. As far as t he · r popularity in the 11pre-roma.ntic 11 move-
ment is concerned, to these qualities above we may add that they both 
harmonize with the renewed i Lterest in the out-of-doors, and t hat Il 
Penseroso fits in well with t he cult of gentle melancholy found in 
the gentler work of the 11gra eyard School. 11 
But of course, they are not Milton at his greatest, and as 
far as his other work is concerned, the taste of the century seems to 
have been put to some strain. To answer the question implied above when 
we spoke of Campbell: Milton as a religious poet is too didactic, too 
i ntense, and too serious to EL!>:peal to the minister of the eighteenth 
century, particular to those f ~Moderate 11 tendency. Though ];i>us, our 
critics were first of all urb~e, and i~ does not seem that they were 
col!lfortable \!Then p:hty was dri en home with sleggehammer blo\'rs. 
240. 
Moreover, on a more specifically critical basis, their train-
ing had not prepared them e . inently well for enjoying one of Milton 1s 
most apparent qualities--thE~ 11 organ-tone 11 of his verse. :Blair, to be 
sure, praises it highly, but; it will be remembered that Jolmson main-
tained that rhyme was neces bary to make poetry poetic. It may be that 
some of the lack of enjoyment implied by Kames• and Campbell's brief 
treatment of Mil ton could be~ due to the unfamilia.ri ty of his language. 
Johnson says that this 11modo and cast of expression ••• bears little 
resemblance to that of any f ormer writer, -and ••• is so far removed from 
common use that an unlearne reader when he first opens his book finds 
himself surprised by a ne\'1 l anguage. ul Now our critics are obviously 
not unlearned, but we have s een ·~ that their literary tastes inclined to 
the classical and neo-class i cal. It is therefore quite possible that 
their taste was put to the tretch in reading much of Milton, and that 
they did not lean toward him as a favorite writer on that account. 
With all this, it mus t be remembered that our critics did admit 
Milton to the very highest r ank among the poets. They are all too acute 
and too unbiased to be preju iced against him. The point is rather 
that they allowed themselves to see his blemishes rather too clearly 
because he apparently did no t stir them to enthusiasm. I think that 
their attitude indicates one qgain how thoroughly they reflect the 
spirit of their age. Milton.1 s climate of opinion "ras alien to them, 
and his style and subjects w re not what they were used to. They could 
realize that l.Ulton was grea , but lacking the fervor that they felt 
for Shakespeare and Ossian, hey felt some coldness of temper toward him. 
CHAPTER V 
Conclusion 
It is time now to look back over the ground we have traversed and 
see to what haven our journe~;- has brought us. At some length we became 
thoroughly acquainted with t b ee Scottish men of letters, both with their 
lives and their ideas. We t raced their careers and watched them :in their 
social milieu; we bowed briefl y to their friends and acqua:intances; we 
oberved them at the club, at t. he university, and :in the quiet of their 
studies with a volume of Catul lus or Addison in their hands. THe charac-
terized their attitude toward their professions and their position in 
society. All this we did in order to place them in their surroundings, so 
that we could better understar_d the influences and pressures brought to bear 
on their work as literary crit ics. When we finisbec:l.< we felt that we couill.d 
say with some assurance that vre had to deal with men who were keen . thinkers 
and cultivated minds, but who were essentially conservative and represent-
ative. 
On further inquiry we found that they shared with most other men of 
their age the presuppositions of the Age of Reason--at least the fundamental 
and seminal presuppositions. 'Te considered that the unqestioned views they 
held regarding the universe and man 1 s place in it were much the same as 
those of the early eighteenth century. But we also observed that on t his 
basis they managed to build st.:euctures indicative of an archi tectural change. 
A molding here and a doorway t !1ere showed that their vi ews were far from 
mere duplicates of those of the Augustan age. We considered that this was 
a normal manifestation of an a ge of transition and therefore avoided the 
temptation to fit t hem neatly :into Procrustes' couch, showing that they 
could be comfortably stretched into early romantics or hewn into late 
Augustans. Our object, in j~ act, was to see them as representatives of the 
age of transition rather tha':l to point them out as unique manifestations 
of either arrested growth or of precocity . In this process we, too, 
naturally had to select and nethodize, as any history must, from the 
welter, but we tried to see ... ,he overall patterns rather than details. 
In doing this we first tried to show what >•ms the cl:imate of 
opinion cha r acteristic of the ir age; then we analyzed some important 
philosophical concepts which contributed to that climate . He endeavored 
to indica te how these concept s appear in our authors and how they mold and 
give general direction to much of their thought. Such concepts as Nature, 
uniformitarianism, and the w::.sdom of God were shovm to be themes of constant 
recurrence. Descending the ladder of abstraction , we analyzed the psychology 
on which the Scots relied for· most of their aesthetic interpretation and 
judgment, and noted how it indicated some degree of logical inconsistency 
in their thinking. Then we e~camined the methods by which they approached 
their subjects, si.rrilarly com 1enting on the evidences of incompatibility 
in the theory and practi ce of these methods. Vle termed these patterns of 
thinking the 11 rational prem.iso 11 to distinguish them from the patterns 
which were founded :in or influenced by non-rational factors such as pro-
fession or caste. VTe might p~: rhaps have termed the rational patterns the 
"basic concepts, 11 or the "int ellectual complex, 11 or the 11funda.JJ,e.:.·· al 
aesthetic 11 of our critics. 
Following this we concerned ourselves with still more specific material 
L11 order to see, first, some t ypical applications of the general ideas, and, 
second, some typical ways in w 1ich the social premise and the rational premise 
molded ideas, with now one inf l uence and now the other predominat:ing. We 
2W.J_. 
tried to show that usually both illfluences are at work, but that nearly 
always one or the other take: s the lead. In this connection we usually 
tried to assess roughzy whic: influence was most promillent ill respect 
to specific critical positio s. Beyond this, we noted the coexistillg 
tensions of illdividual writer s in these .rnatters. 
The question next aris ·~ s as to what all this has proved, what have 
been the contributions to knowledge which have been made. Withill a modest 
compass, I believe we may di:: cern several such contributions. First of 
all, I think we have seen the: t it is feasible and illwninatillg, as well 
as usually necessary, to take illto account the social pressures on lit-
erary critic ism. In my expei ience it has seemed that the usual procedure 
ill studyillg the genesis of l i ,~erary criticism is to i gnore even the phil-
osophical fotmdations. I trust that it is fairly clear that this results 
at least in narrowness if not in distortion, and that we must consider the 
entire illtellectual complex i n order to see how critics get even part of 
their thought-patterns. But .. tore than that I believe it is apparent the 
social background can be igno: ed only at the expense of distortion as well. 
As Sir Leslie Stephen puts it : 
Every great ·writer [and ight we not say every writer, to a degreeJ} 
may be regarded ill vari us aspects. He is, of course, an illdividual, 
and the critic may endec.vor to give a psychological analysis of him; 
and to describe his illte.llectual and moral constitution and detect 
thet. secrets of his perma 1ent influence without reference to the 
particular time and plac of his appearance. That is an interestillg 
problem when the material s are accessible. But every man is also 
an organ of the society in which he has been brought up. The material 
upon which he works is t he whole complex of conceptions, religious, 
imaginative, and ethical, which form~s his mental atmosphere. That 
suggests problems for the historian of philosophy. He is also de-
pendent upon what ill modt' rn phrase we call his 11 environrnent 11--the 
social structure oVJ whicb he forms a part, and which gives a spe!.ld.al 
direction to his passion~· 2nd aspirations. This suggests problems 
for the historian of po]j: ·~cal and social institutions .1 
l:'le do not have to be specialize:d historians of philosophy or society to see 
1. Stephen, 2£· cit., I, 30. 
that such matters as the conf lict between origli1al propens i ties and em-
p iricism, the ambivalence of their psychology, the d i vergence betvveen theory 
and practice in methodology, t he contradiction ilnplicit in t heir t heories 
of taste, all point to the nee d of considering both t he intellectual and 
social foundations of the cri t ics 1 thinking . Within the strict limitations 
of our sub ject I believe we bave indicated how men 1 s ideas on literature 
can be anal yzed with regard t the whole complex of their :intellectual 
and social environment. I t hin..'k: that this constitutes a contribution to 
t he theory of literar y histor · --and the history of literary criticism in 
particular. So far as I lmow, this essay is the first attempt to see how 
a group of literar y cr i tics c.::une to t h ink as they did--how t heir ideas 
are connected with philosophy , psychology, class pr e judice, economic status, 
national pride, professional pr edilections, the ideas of other crit.ics, 
reading habits, ect. VIhile I realize that such a complex synt hesis is 
bound to be inadequate, I als<:• feel that it points t he way for more complete 
treatments ana indicates at l east one reasonably feasible method for handling 
this problem. 
The second contr ibution ur investigation has made i s in illustrating 
the necessity for recognizing t he mixed modes of thought t hat characterize 
the ideas of t h inkers in tranc i t ion periods. While lip-service is usually 
paid nowadays to t his commingl ing of concepts, it is also usua l to decide 
finally t hat one set or anothe.: of t hem is really dominant. Lovej oy ha s 
some acute things to say on t hl s subject. He points out t hat in t he history 
of ideas one impor t ant "recurrent phenomenon " is t hat individua l writers 
show "inte r nal tensions" or wa· erings, some t i mes in a single writing and 
somet imes on a single page, wh:Lch come from confl i cting ideas tci. which t hey 
are susceptible. 
I suppese mest careful i nterpreters ef particular writings Gr authors 
have some realization of this phenomenons; but I have long felt that 
it is often insufficientl y realized, or at all events, insufficiently 
made evident to the read r. ~mny expositions of an author's views 
and his reasonings seem ·o me not merely over-simplified but over-
unified. It appears oft · n to be assumed that his t11iuking in gen-
eral, or at least on a pc. ticular subject or question, is all-of-
a-piece; or, if the expoli tor himself observes some inner discrep-
ancies, some crose~currents in his author's mental processes, he 
tends to minimize them or to ignore them altogether, selecting for 
exclusive representation, only what he considers (sometimes quite 
erroneously) t he most llimportant,u or the most llpermanently valuable,u 
or the "most characterist i c" idea, or consistent scheme of ideas, 
of the author. But it i s only the narrowest or the dullest minds 
that are--if any are--cot:t .. letely in harmony with themselves ••• 1 
All three of our authors show t h se waverings, tensions, and erose-currents, 
sometimes between various partia ls of their criticism, sometimes on specific 
topics. The usual procedure is o select those factors which present a 
consistent pattern and decide tho.t those are the "important," or llpermanently 
valuaole, 11 minimizing conflictint; notions. This is the wey most scholars 
manage to defend or scoff at the Scots,2 but I believe we have presented 
sufficient evidence to indicate · hat t hey are neither pure associationists 
nor Hutchesonians, Augustan rhet riciansiDr pre-romantics, rationalists nor 
empiri cist s, but a mixture of thEse and many more. B.Y allowing them to be 
thus inconsistent, we have managed to see (as nearly as possible, I believe) 
the true pattern of their thoughts . 
I think we may also discel'n a more general contribution in connection 
with t his matter of mixed modes. here seems to be a strong presumption that 
the :period betweenl750 and (roue ly) 1800 should be considered as neither 
" a decline of neo-class l cism 11 no an 11 a:pp:;oach to romant i cism" except insofar 
as those concepts are convenient ·ids to study of the two move1aents t hemselves. 
1. A. 0. Lovejoy, Essays !~~ ~ His tory of Ideas, :Baltimore:Jo~s Hop-
kins Press, 1948, pp. xv-xvi. 
2. Such diverse works as t ::1.ose of Elton, Saintsbury, Randa:D., Bond, Bate, 
Bosker, and Bryan, liberally cited above, as well as many others, show this 
approach. 
As Folkierski indicates,l the best way to look on t his period is as sep-
arate, without a title, unles .. it might be 11 transition. 11 While it is usual 
to look on t he period as being either a recession from or an approach to 
more clearly defined eras in 1>llought, t hese concepts mean that we must 
minimize one set of ideas prevalent in the period and emphasize another--
\.fhich i s which depending on t h t heory with wh1.ch we started. It is true 
that we cannot isolate a trans i tion era entirely and study i t in a vacuum: 
without knowing the cnaracteri ·· tics of the Age of Reason or the Romantic 
period, we would be seriously .uunpered, if not defeated, in our attempts 
to unders'lia.nd t he times which ·aw t he movement from t he fo r.ner to t he lat t er. 
But we still c~~ look on the t r ansition era as havi ng i nterest intri nsically, 
as being a period characterize by mixed modes of thinking. Of course, these 
mixed modes do not exist in a .ealm of abstractions, but only in individual 
men• s minds, and it is there w must study them if we are to comprehend the 
age of transition. I th ink, th~refore, t hat this essay indicates a way of 
understanding better how one ~.e slides into another, by the 'trey in which it 
has analyzed the ~t.ensions and i nconsistencies in the t hought of these t hree 
representative men. The import t problem of defining the Zeitgeist of the 
late eighteenth century has, I hope, been aided in some degree by our anal-
ysis oii. one phase of its though t . 
Still another point mey e made in this connection. The late eight-
eenth century is not i mportant cmly as a transition era in Western culture, 
but its thinkers made some sign: ficant contributions to that culture. Our 
1. Bernhard Folkierski, Entre le Classicisme et le Romantisme, 
Cracow, 1925, passim. 
autnors, while not really seminal minds, still are not to be disparaged 
in this respect. In some w~s they were quite influential. Their ideas 
on rhetoric were the staple food of several generations of American students, 
for example. The multiplicity of editions, paraphrase, and abridgments of 
their works indicates how widely their impact was felt: 
01 Kames 1 s book there were at least thirty-one American editions, 
the first, a reprint of the 7th London Edition, appearing in 
Boston in 1796, and the last in New York in 1883. Nine of these 
were published before 1853. The Andover Seminary, training school 
for orthodox clergymen, had five copies of it. James :Boyd, one 
of the American editors of the volume, said in the preface to the 
1855 edition: IIThere seems to be no other work even at this date, 
that is fitted to supply its place, nor, without great disadvantage 
to the cause of education, can it be laid aside.n 
:Blair's Lectures appeared in both complete and abridged editions 
totaling fifty-three, thirty-nine oi· which were published before 
1835. There were thiry complete editions, seventeen before 1835, 
and twenty-three abridged editions, twenty-two before 1835. The 
Andover Library had fourteen copies, inch.ding twelve of the abridged 
edition published in Brooklyn in 1807. It is interesting to note 
that many of the abridged editions were printed in small towns, 
pro~ably for the use of local schools. I have found copies with 
imprints of publishers in Albany, :Brookfield (Massachusetts), 
Wilmington, Exeter, Haverhi~l, Portland, Concord, ahd :Brattleboro. 
In addition, some of the editors published separate volumes of 
questions on the text for the use of schools.l 
It is also interesting (and somewhat terrible)to muse on the fact these 
questions "'ere constructed by one 11 careful 11 editor so 11 that the answers 
which they require, necessarily include every sentence of the work itself; 
thus effecting the double purpose of greatly facilitating the recitations 
of classes, and, at the same time, of compelling each student to learn 
every word of the author. 112 It is evident that there is room for a good 
deal of further study on this matter of American influence, but even if 
1. Charvat, 2.£• cit., p. 27. Campbell quite naturally was popular 
too. ~he :Boston Public Library, for instance, has eight copies of editions 
of The Philosophy of Rhetoric, from 180% to 1873 
2. :Blair, Lectures, Preface by Abraham lUlls to the 1829 American 
edition, for nuniversity, 6fillege, and School.lf 
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it be asswned t~~t students did not learn every sentence of our authors I 
imagine we are entitled to assume a strong molding power on American thought 
from this source. Professor Charvat is concerned in the work quoted, "rith 
critical thought, but it might also be conjectured that our authors influenced 
the whole. body of American prose in the nineteenth century, perhaps in some 
degree helping to mold the genteel tradition. And it is not beyond the realm 
of reason to detect some influence on such present-day ideas as that usage 
should dictate correctness, "'hich might be traced to our authors. 
Another influence, which is not so impalpable and which has been 
studied more, is that on the romantic poets and critics. In particular, 
Walter J. Bate1 has shown that the view of sympathy espoused by our authors 
and their contemporaries was in great part responsible for the attitude taken 
tO\iard this faculty in the early nineteenth century. The intuitive under-
standing of .And coalescence with the subject which is part of romantic 
aesthetic is implied in the Scots• theory and in the application of their 
criticism to Ossian and Shakespeare. As far as these two writers are con-
cerned, undoubtedly Blair had some effect in promoting Ossianism through his 
critical dissertation on the poems; and it is possible that Kames' devotion 
to Shakespeare helped along the tide of appreciation which reached its flood 
with the romantics. 
Not only were the Scots infl.uential in their own age and for many 
years after, but they are also frequently worth studying for what we in this 
latter time can learn from them. Standing as they did between a criticism 
based on 11 reason 11 and one based principally on feeling, they present us with 
the virtues of both views as well as the vices. But what they lack in the 
1. In 11The Sympathetic Imagination, 11 ou. cit. 
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strength that comes from consistency, they gain in catholicity. Their ideas 
of taste, of the sublime, of the need of psyChology for analyzing literature, 
and their emphasis on the function of rhetoric in communication--all these 
afford us food for thought. It is unfortunately true that it is easier 
either to disparage or praise the Scots than it is to read then (for I fear 
they are not "interesting11 ), but they still have in their weighty pages many 
ideas which can be regarded with profit even in such an improved age as our 
own, and by improved critics, too. Representative t hey were, no doubt, and 
sometimes "thornless. 11 But then thorns are not al\oreys part of the critic 1 s 
garb, or at least not necessarily. And they did have the inestimable advantage 
of approaching literature as a matter both for appreciation and study. They 
neither lose sight of the aesthetic rewards which mey be gained, in lookihg 
for formal structure, nor do they dissolve into a rosy mist of appreciation. 
Certainly such a middle-ground position is salutary. 
For these reasons--the influence and the intrinsic worth of the Scots--I 
think the preceding pages afford another modest contribution to the world of 
scholarship. As representative and as individual the Scots deserve to be 
understood and appreciated more thoroughly than they have been. They are 
hardly towering figures in the world even of criticism, and I would not wish 
the task of puffing then up beyond their stature. Yet their accomplishments 
are quite respectable and certainly cast a longer shadow than those of some 
more renowned critics and thinkers of their era. Therefore, despite the fact 
that such has not been a primary concern of ours, I feel the information and 
analysis devoted to the Scots in this essay is in itself worthwhile. 
Finally, may I sey that it is my sincere opinion that the study of how 
men thought and what influenced that thought is among the most valuable enter-
prises of humanistic scholarship. Our study has been severely limited, yet 
I trust that it may assist in some way, no matter how small, in ~ch larger 
endeavors as t he study of how aesthetic opinions are formed in general, how 
society and philosophy both bear on aesthetics, and how periodsof transition 
can be defined. These all form part of the still greater quest for understand-
ing the history of ideas in general--of tracing the patterns of man's thinking 
and the forces which operate on it. The opportLlllity of sharing in such a quest 
is to me the most worthwhile thing about the task in which we have been engaged. 
APPEliOIX 
Introductory~: 
T.he t hree principal .. critical works we have been considering are both 
lengthy and complex, as well as hard to re§d. To my knowledge they 
have never been thoroughly analyzed, except in part as they pertain to 
the investigations of this or that scholar. They are, however, worth 
analyzing, if only to clarify the ideas and organization of three such 
important critical pieces. Beyond this, moreover, I believe t hat the 
following analyses will serve to add some more information as to how our 
authors worked. And it is also a matter for consideration that, by 
placing them at the end of this essay, we are spared the necessity of 
including lengthy paraphrases in the body of the writing--paraphrases 
that I feel often clog the argument of studies such as this. Therefore 
I have seen fit to add this appendix, which analyzes, without co~~ent, 
the Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres of Blair, The Philosouhy of 
ID1etoric of Campbell, ru1d the Elements of Criticism of Kames • . 
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Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres: 
--- -- . 
After an Introduction in which he shows that the study of rhetoric 
and. belles lettres is important for those who \'rish to write and. for those 
who wish to enjo~ literature, as well as being of great value in our moral 
lives, Blair proceeds to take up Taste. This is a universal human faculty 
possessed. in d.ifferent d.egrees beacuse it is 11 one of the most improvable 
faculties in our nature, 11 and. mey be defined as 11The povrer of receiving 
pleasure from the beauties of nature and. of art. 11 It is ultimately 
founded on sensibility, but also needs reason and. good. sense. "The char§C-
ters of taste, "rhen brought to its most improved state, are all reducible 
to two, Delicacy and. Correctness," the first being depend.ent on natural 
sansibility, the second. on the understand.ing. The best critics have both, 
although one usually predominates. While it is a fluctuating and changing 
principle;. there is a standard. for it: in cases where (l) there is no 
diversity in the objects to which it is applied and (2) where the problem 
is not one of imitation of nature--reason being in complete authority in 
such cases, true taste is that 11which coincid.es \'tith the general sentiments 
of men." It is not necessary that this be an immutable stand.ard, and 
Providence has left room for some d.iversity of feeling. The im-
prtant thing is that taste is found.ed. on a universal internal principle, like 
our intellectual principles, and. that we can determine its ~oreectness 
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by referring it to the general sens s of mankind. ~In every composition, 
what interests the imagination, and touches the heart, pleases all ages 
and all nations." 
The third Lecture takes up four topics: criticism, genius, pleas uras 
of t aste, and sublimity in objects. "True criticism is the application 
of taste and of good sense to the several fine arts. The object which it 
proposes is, to distinguish what is beautiful and what is faulty in every 
performance; from particular instances to ascend to general principles; 
and so to form rules or conclusions concerning the several kinds of beau-
ty in works of gertius.lt It is founded on experience and observation of 
what has pleased men, and in the usual case critical rules have been found 
"consonant to reason and to the principles of human natnre."' Critics 
judge by feeling, pedants Py rule; no good author should mind being jud-
ged by a good critic and the invectives against criticism are really direc-
ted against poor critics. In the long view, true criticism and the true 
sense of the public~-the communus sensus/ will always agree. There 
are some works of genius which transgress the rules of criticism, byt 
they please, not because of their faults b)Ut in spite of them, because 
of their great virtues: Shakespeare is a good example of this. Genius 
is a hi g;her power than tas t e, implying "something inventive or creative/' 
which can produce new beauties, where taste can only appreciate them, al-
though taste is always needed as a guide to genius. One of these qualities 
cannot coexist in the highest de gree vnth the other, however; in the in-
fancy of the arts genius seems to flourish with most vi gor; in more 
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refined ages the perfection in details 11is for the most part accompaiJi:ed 
with a diminution of sublimity and force." The _E.~easures of taste consti-
tute a very extensive subject, which will be considered only in relation 
to li'Jri ting. We are very far from having "attained to any s ystem" re-
garding the·se pleasures, although Mr. Addisom has opened the matter up 
for us with his speculations, which, while not very profound, are very 
"beautiful and entertaining." The 11thinness and subtilty which are found 
to be properties of all the feelings of taste" place great difficul'bies 
in our way, f or when we inquire into the reasons for our enjoyment of , 
certain bea:uties, we find that "nature seems to have covered ,(-the reaso12.sJ 
with an impenetrable veil. 11 The only thing we can say is that our en-
joyment of taste attests the wisdom of the ereator. 
One of the most considerable pleasures of taste is that of sub-
limity or grandeur, which is more distinct and marked than the rest and 
which is more directly connedted with our main subject. First we shall 
consider sublimity in objects, then sublimity in writings, or the des-
cription of sublimity. Sublimity is not easy to describe. but we know 
that we get a nsort of internal elevation and expansion" from it; it 
raises the mind much above its ordinary state, arld fills it with a . 
degree of wonder and astonishment, which it cannot well express." 
11The emotion is certainly deli ghtful; but it is altogether of the ser-
ious kind; a degree of awfulness and solewnity, even approaching to 
severity, commonly attends it when at its height." The simplest form 
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of this grandeur is tn "the vast and boundless prospects presented to us 
by nature." The sea, the firmament, boundless plains produce this 
feeling of sublimity: but it does not arise, as some have thought, only 
from vastness or amplitude of extent. Great loudness also gives us this 
feeling, and particularly great power and strength: earthquakes, burning 
mounta.ins, conflagrations, thunder and lightning, the lion and the 
war-horse of the Scriptures. Also all ideas 11 of the solemn and awful 
kind~" darkness, solitu&, and silence, tend to assist the sublime; and 
obscurity is not unfavorable to it; for example, the indistinct and con-
fused descriptions of supernatural beings are sublime. An important type 
of the sublime is the "sentimental11 which arises 11 from certa.in exertions 
of the human mind; from certain affections and actions, of our fellow-
creatures ••• wherever, in some critical and high situation, we beP,old 
a man uncommonly intrepid, and resting upon himself; superior to passion 
and to fear; animated by some gr eat principle to the contempt of popular 
opinion, of selfish interest, of dangers, or of death; there we are struck 
y.,rJ.th a sense of the sublime.n Various explanations have been given of 
the source of this feeling of the sublime in so many different instances; 
one of the most promi nent being that of the author of "A Philosophical 
Inquiry into the origin of our ideas of the sublime and the beautifultt 
(Mr. Bnrke) to the effect that the s.ource is terror, but there are many 
places where this theory does not apply. It appears itather that "mighty 
force or power" has the bet ter claim as the source, there being no ex-
ample of the sublime ~ens it does not appear. 
We must distinguish the sublime in writing according to the true 
meaning of the term: it has been too often applied t o writing of any kind 
of distinguished excellency. Even Longinus has made t his error in his 
treatise, often departing from the true sense to speak of passages where 
mere elegance is the quality rather than the sublime, which consists 
in a 11description of objects, or exhibition of sentiments" so as to give 
us a strong impression of them, Longinus is an excellent critic, but 
more to be relied on for general ideas about good writing than for treatment 
of the sublime. ' Two quali ties are needed to give us the sublime in 
writing: the object described must be sublime, and t he writer must set 
it before us nin such li ght as is most proper to give us a clear and full 
impression of it. 11 The writer must have a lively impression himself; ttif 
his own feeling be languid, he can never inspire us with any strong emotion." 
We find sublimity among the ancients more than the moderns: the "rmde, 
uri.improved state of society11 is favorable to the "strong emotions of sub-
limity," whereas "in the progress of society, the genius and manners of 
men undergo a change more favorable to accuracy, than to strength or 
II 
sublimity. Tho Scriptures, Homer, and Ossian are particularly rich in 
the sublime. They show the simplicity and conciseness which are neces-
sary to arouse this feeling. Too much ornament is fatal to the subli~ 
because the mind, which has been raised to a pi tch of enthusiasm, is 
always tending to return to its ordinary state, and a single decoration 
that nsinks in the leas t below the· capital imago ••• relaxes tho tension 
of the mind. 11 While 11the beautiful may remain, the sublime is gone.11 
Caesar was sublime when he asked the pilot who was afraid during a 
storm1 
11 Q.uid times? Caesarem vehis, n but Lucan sinks this by trying to e-
laborate it. For this reason, rh~ is very unfavorable to the sublime 
in English verse; it smooths and spreads out the force of the pictures. 
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The boldness and freedom of our blank verse is much better: Milton affords 
the fullest proof of this; he is an author "whose genius led him eminently to 
the BUblime11 and in the first and second . books of Paradise Lost there are 
continued instances of it. 
Strength, which comes fram a proper selection of circumstances. is 
another necessity for sublimity. The writer cannot mingle any trivial or 
improper circumstances with his description. but must paint so that he fills 
the mind with "great and awful ideas." His imagination must be heated with 
grandeur of the object so that he transports us, because there is no mid-
dle state vvi th the sublime • 11 In judging of any striking beauty in com-
position, we must attend to the nature of the emotion which it raises ••• 
if it be of that elevating. solemn1 and awful kind, which distinguishes 
this feeling, we can pronounce it sublime," It cannot be long protracted, 
and no writer is always thus affecting. even the greatest. One final thing 
to notice is that many writers strive after it and only achieve pomp and 
parade of words, and also that frequently frigidity and bombast come from 
losing si ght of the proper object of the sublime . 
Le.cture V takes up Beauty and the other pleasures of taste--beauty 
affording, next to sublimity1 the highest pleasure to the imagination. 
It is more serene and capable of lon~r continuance than the subli~ and 
extends to a much ereater variety of objects, so great that it is pro-
bably a vain attempt to find the common quality in all of themwhich 
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makes us term them bea.J:lbiful. Rather it is that they appeal to several 
different :Principles in human nature, but the sens ation they all arouse 
is pleasurable and of nsomewhat the same nature; 11 t herefore the name of 
beauty has been gi van to them. We shall therefore examine different 
classes of object'S" in which beauty "most remarkal)ly appears ••• and point 
out, the separate principles of beanty in each of t hem." Colour is the 
simplest alt hough we can find no reason for its beart~r except that the 
nstructure of the eyett receives some rays of li ght with more pleasure 
than others. Perhaps association of ideas helps, too; and beyond this 
we can observe that delicate colors are s enerally considered more bean-
tiful than glaring ones. Fi gure is the next type of beauty, and is more 
complex, consisting of re~ularity and variety: the former principally 
appealing because of its indication of usefulness; the latter is a ·more 
powerful principle, :Mr. Hogarth bearing this out in his ide~ of the line 
of beauty which achieves its result by departing from regularity. Mo-
tion is another source of beauty, when it is mot too s'vift, for then it 
partakes of the sublime; and motion in undulations and curves, as well 
as motion upwards is most beautiful. 
These qualiti es are conjoined in many beautiful objects: the se-
parate principles blend in "one genera l perception of beauty which we 
ascribe to the whole object as its cause: for beauty is all ways conQ 
ceived by us, as something residing in the object which raises the 
pleasant sensation; a sort of glory ·which dwells upon and invests it. 11 
A rich natural landscape and the human countenance are tvro of the most 
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be'autiful of complex objects . There are also certain qualities of mind 
which raise in us na feel i ng similar to that of beautyn; akin to the moral 
qualities which raise the feeling of sublimity, but of a softer kind. A-
nother important kind of beauty is that of design, which influences many 
of our ideas and which comes through a natural association of ideas from 
our notion of fitness and propriety of means to ends: we demand in any work 
that its parts be proportionable and that they suit the main design--an 
important matter for writers to notice. Beauty in writing denotes a "man-
ner neither remarkabl~ sublime, nor vehemently passionate, nor uncommonly 
sparkling; but such as raises in the reader an emotion of the ~ntle, placid 
kind, similar to what is raised by the contemplation of beautiful objects 
in nature; which ne:i,ther lifts the mind very high, nor agitates it very 
much, but diffuses over the imagination an agreeable and pleasing serenity." 
Mr. Addison and Fane..lon are two good exemplars of this quality. 
Another pleasure of taste is novelty; in contrast to the familiar, 
which makes "too faint an impression to give an agreeable exercise to 
our fac 'ulties, 11 novelty ''rouses the mind from its dormant state by giving 
it a quick and pleasing impulseu--whence comes the pleasure we get from 
fiction and romance, Imitation also affords us pleasure, ••by recalling 
the original ideas of beauty or grandeur. 11 :Melody and harmony are 
pleasures of taste. All these are combined in writing to bring us plea-
sure because v~iting is the art possessing the greatest power of imitationaand 
description. We should, however make a distinction between imitation 
in discourse, and in the 
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other arts, and also between imitation and description in discourse. In 
any case it is evident that in writing both these qualities derive their 
power from the 11 si gnificancy of vYords 11 ; therefore we shall proceed to 
enter on the ori gin, progress, and construction of language. 
Lectures vr:...:IX concern themsebres with the Rise and Progress and 
the S.tructure of Language. Language as we now see it is a most refined 
means of conununication, bp.t consider how it first be gan, in what rude 
state it was formed. Undoubtedly the fil'st origin of language was in 
divine teaching, but so··marrow must have been the language of our f'j~ rst 
parents that we are justified in tracing its development. The first 
words used must have been exclamations of warning; then came words imi-
tative of objects and the sounds they made, fo~ lowed by the abstract words 
which were elaborated from the names of sensible objects. N~I, words 
are no longer r Bpresentations but ar e symbols, arbitrary or instituted 
signs rather than natural, because of the long interval of all kinds of 
influence. The poverty of the primitive vocabulary and its origin in 
interjections must have necessitated a good deal of gesticulation and 
force in speaking, which persisted into times when language had ubecome 
more copious and extensive. 11 We see this in the Bible and in the speech 
of the North American tribes, and inflections of the voice are very evi-
dent in the tones which the Chimese use. The CTeeks and the Romans also 
retained this mmsical and gesticulatory manner of speech, and we can 
see traces of it in peoples who are ~ss phlegmatic than the English. 
Another characteristic of the be ginni ng of language was that it abounded 
in fie;ur.ative expressi on-' "not correct indeed, but forcible and pic-
turesque.tt This is accounted for by the necessity of finding means of 
-painting abstract ideas with a vocabulary of snesible objects, and by 
the strong passions of early people. Yfe see this in ancient writing-' 
particularly the Scriptures.t and it accounts for the fact that poetry is 
older than prose. 
The word-order of ancient languages is different from modern-' placing 
the object which strikes the imagination most forcibly at the beginning; 
this makes for greater animation where the modern tongue is more clear 
and distinct. Another r eason for this is that we have "disused those 
differences of termination11 by which the ancients could transpose the 
order of words; this is due to the interest of the barbarians who over-
ran Rome only in clarity and copiousness. All this shows that language 
has had a progress like that of a ge in man; from imaginati~e.t vehement.t 
fanciful youth to precise, calm, unimaginative . age. nLanguage has be-
come, in modern times, more correct.t indeed.t and accurate; but.t however~ 
less striking and animated; in its ancient state more favourable to poet-
ry and oratory; in its present.t to reason and philosophy." The next topic 
is to trace the progress of writing, through pict~es, to hieroglyphs.t to 
. arbitrary characters, to symbols standing for sound instead of things.t 
examples being drawn from the various languages of the world 1 The alpha-
bet is one of the most remarkable i~ventions of man, but its inventor is 
unknown. The final observation on these matters is to compare the ad-
vanta ges and disadvantages of speaking and writing. 
. 
The eig4th and ninth lectures are concerned with the structure of 
language in general and the English language in particular. Some of the 
topics considered are: the parts of speech and their functions, the ways 
in which the relations c}f ... 'different words are indicated in different 
language, the history of the English language, and a description of its 
peculiar qualities, including its strengths and weakenesses. 11Dry and 
intricate as it may seem to some, /-this study-/ is, however, of great 
importance and very nearly connected with the philosophy of the human 
mind. For, if s peech be the vehicle, or interpreter of the conceptions 
of our minds, an: examination of its structure and progress cannot but 
unfold many things concerning the nature and progress of our conceptions • 11 
It is also necessary to study our English language because it is our own, 
and no one can excel in its use except through a study. 
The following sixteen lectures are concerned vdth style, its ele-
mants ~nd different types, and its appearance in such -#riterw as Addison 
and S1"1ift. Style is the manner "in which a man arranges his conceptions, 
by means of language." It is alway-s a picture of the ideas that arise 
in an author's mind, and is not a mere matter of words, nor is it ~· aa..sil'Y 
separable from the co.n.tent . 11All the qualities of good style may be 
ranged under two heads, perspicuity and ornament. For all that can pos-
sibly be required of l angua ge is, to convey our ideas clearly to the minds 
of others, and, at the same ·time, in such a dress, as by pleasing and 
interesting them, shall most effectually strengthen the impressions which 
we seek to make." The first is the most essential, vlithout it all else 
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is without value. When men read, they wish to understand withou~ pausing, 
reading over; when writers plead that their subjects are too difficult to 
be made clear, the fault is usually that their conceptions are indistinct. 
Perspicuity is also a positive beauty in writing. 11'[{a are pleased with 
an author, we consider him as a deserving praise,, who frees us fr~m all 
fatigue of searching for his meaning; who carrieasthrough his subject 
without any embarrassment or confusion; whose style flows always like a 
limpid stream, where we see totthe very '- bottom •11 Purity, t he avoidance 
of borrowe~ or strange word; propriety, the avoidance of words not in 
established usage; and precision, the retrenching of superfluities ••• so 
as to exhibit neither more nor less than an exact copy of his idea who 
uses it 11 are the essentials of perspicuity in words and phrases. The 
last is the most important: the good writer has nothing in his work that 
interferes with .. our., clear conceptibns,; a neaessity because our minds can-
not 11view clearly and disti nctly above one object at a time, 11 Lack of 
precision leads to what is called a "loose style. 11 Exceptions to this 
are possible when the O:- ject is familiar. Tilloi;son, Temple, and Addison 
are all very pers picuous, but they are somewhat i mprecise, using more . · 
words than are necessary . Shaftesbury is a much worse offender, an un-
par-donable fault in a phimosophical writer. The principal source of 
his imprecision, as with most writers is in the injudicious use of 
synon~. It is necessary to be very careful to mark the distinction 
in such words as: custon, habit; pride, vanity; entire, complete; etc. 
Precision, however, can be carried too far, resulting in a dry and barren 
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style, a fault to which Dean Swift, the most precise of writers, is prona. 
11To unite copiousness and precision, to be flowing and graceful, and at 
the same time correct and exact in the choice of every word, is ••• one of 
the highest and most difficult attainments in writing. II 
Lectures XI and XII take up the structure of sentences; the neces-
sity of clearness, unity, and strength together with the means of achie-
ving them, such as the avoidance of the ambiguous position of the adverb 
for the first, or the avoidance of overusing and _for the last. The twelfth 
lecture concludes with the observation that if men always thought clearly 
and were masters of language, there would be no need for rules. "Embar-
rassed, obscure, and feeble sentences are generally, if not always, the 
result of embarrassed, obscure, and feeble thought. io The thirteenth lec-
ture is concerned with the matter of harmony, less important than pet-
spicuity, but still to be attended to. The analogy of the harmony of 
Greek and Latin is unwise because of the differences between them and 
English; but still we may notice that the arrangement of the words should 
not be harsh and awkward, particule.rly in the close ·which is the part of 
the sentence 11most sensible to the ear." Milton, Shaftesbury, Addison, 
and Temple are generally very harmonious; Swift 11 despised musical ar-
rangement altogether." Two other aspects of harmony which are more im-
portant are the "current of sound. [the rise and fall, swif tness or 
slowne~7adapted to the tenour of a discourse," and the resemblance be-
tween sounds and objects. The Bible, Wd lton, Homer, and Virgil show these 
excellencies very strongly. 
Besides harmony, another great branch of the subject of ornament in 
style is figurative language ~ which is treated in Lectures XIV-XVII and 
part of XVIII . 11Figures, in genera l, may be described to be that language, 
which is prompted either by the imagination, or by the passionstt; it • 
should not be thought artificial, for it is dictated by nature--pri~itive 
and vulgar people use it freely . Rhetoricians have examined it because 
in it lies a great part of the beauty and force of 1:. nguage. 'While fi-
gurative language often comes vnthout knowled ge of rules, rules wAy al-
so improve it; yet it is· not to be thought, because a great deal of study 
has been lavished on this mat ter, that be~pangling one's writing >rith f i-
ures is a method of achieving :good writing~ nf or it is , in truth, the 
sentinent or passions, which lies under the fi gured expression, that gi.ves 
11 it any merit. Figures have arisen princi pally from the fact that our m 
minds associate ideas and that those i deas may have more strength or fami-
lie_rity than the ori ginal; they continue to be important because they en-
rich the langua ge, they "bestow dignity upon style,'' they enable us to en-
joy t wo objects presented to gether, without confusion, they give us 11fre-
quently a much clearer and more striking view of the principal object.n 
Follo>ring these genera l rew~rks is a discussion of the principal types 
of figures, with examples of eoocellencies and weaknesses in the use of 
them, and rules drawn from our natures as to how fi gures should be em-
played--for example, that metaphorasshould not be mixed or crovYded, nor 
should they be too far pursued, or tha.t similes ought not to be founded 
on likenesses too obvdous or too faint and remote. Other fi ~ures con-
sidered among those n such as occur most frequently" are hyperbole, per--
sanification, antitheses;, apostrophe, 11vision, n and amplification, all 
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of which must always arise, like metaphor and simile, from the subject a 
and by their own accord, must not be used too frequently, and should be 
attempted only by those wfuth the proper powers of imaginat ion which can-
not be acquired but 11must be derived from nature." 
Beyond fi gurative l anguage , there ar e some general characteristics 
of style to speak of--different styles which are exemplified 1zy different 
~t~rs. These have been distinguished by Dionysi us of Halicarnassus in-
to the austere·, the florid, and the middle, and by other rhetoricians 
similarly into three class es ; but we shall try to be more precise. The 
first distinction ;•rhich we make is that between the concise and t he dif-
fuse; Tacitus and 1A:ontesquieu exemplify the f irst, Cicero e.nd Addis on, 
the second. Which we prefer de pends on the subject and the type of ad-
dress: speaking and appeals to the understanding being more adapted to 
the diffuse, ~Titing and a ppeals to the passions, to the concise. An 
additional classification is that of the nervous and the feeble, either 
of wM.ch may or may not be concise or diffuse. Dr. Baerow shows us a 
combination of the diffuse and the nervous. The feeble is e.lways unde-
sirable, although great strength is not needed in all kinds of discourse. 
In. r es pect to the amount of ornaroEnt styles may be distinguished into the 
dry, compl etely without ornament (Aristotle), t he P.lain, with enough or-
nament not to be harsh (Swift, Locke), the neat, ornamented but without 
redundancy (found in good familiar letters, law papers, etc.), the elegant, 
possessing all the virtues, but none of the faults of ornament (Addison, 
Dryden, Pope, Temple), and the !lowery, too much ornamented, with "tinsel 
splendour 11 (Hervey). A final distinction may be made in the consideration 
of simplicity as opposed to affectation~ and in vehemence in style. Sim-
plicity consists in the appearance of naturalness, as if we see the writer 
"in his own natural character"·; it is not opposed to ornament. but to 
the appearance of it. Addison shows t l-,is in the ~ighest degree in con-
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trast to Shaftesbury, who is the most affected of writers desptte his 
other em:cellent qualities. Vehemence uhas a peculiar ardour; it is a 
glovling style; the · language of a man, whose imagination and passions 
are heated. 11 Demosthenes is the 11full and perfect example of this; 
Bolingbroke affording an example in English. To form a good style, six 
rules are presented: ( 1) have clear conceptions of the subject (2) prac-
tice frequent compostt~on (3) become acquainted with the styles of the 
best authors (4) do not imitate (5) adapt the style to t he subject (6) do 
not let attention to style detract from attention to the thought. 
The next four lectures consider the style of Spectator papers ~1. 
412. 413. and 414~ in minute detail, 11wrach may appear tedious to some 
readerw ••• but which, to those studying composition, I hope may prove of 
some benefit." A careful examination of sentences and groups of sentences 
points out the beauties and the fa:ults which are to be found in Mr. 
Addison's style according to the rules previously le.id down. This anal-
ysis is undertaken not 11wi th any view to gain the reputation of crl]:!tic; 
but intended for the assistance of such as are desirous of studying the 
most proper and ele gant construction of sentences in the English language." 
With a similar object a critic ~ l examination of a passage of Dean Swift's 
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s t yle is next w..ade, showing how he is sometimes most clear, elegant, and 
perspicuous, at others negli gent, 11 perplexed, and inaccurate." After 
this analysis, it is warned that, while Addison and Swift may on occasion 
be ne gli gent, many more proper writers have a style not possessed of half 
the merit; Swift and Addison are writers who "carry always those general 
characters of good style, which in the midst of t hetr occasional negli-
gences, every person of good t~ste must discern a nd approve .n 11We see. 
their faults overbalanced by higher beauties." 
The subject of eloquence occupies the following eleven lectures, 
considering 11 the different kinds and subjects of public speaking; the man-
ner suited to each; the proper distributiion and Iilanagement of all the 
parts of a discourse; and the proper pronunciati on or deli very of it •. " 
First, as to the genera l nature of eloquence, i t is, contrary to the 
misunders t anding of many, "the art of speakine; in such a manner as to 
attain the end for which vre speak" rather then being a trick, or "art 
of varnishing weak argumei'l~s plausibly." Because it is used principal-
ly ;~to influence action, although it may be used in all types of discourse, 
it is best considered as the art of persuasion. Consequently, 11 th,e most 
essential requisites are, solid argument., clear method, a 'character of 
probity appearing in the speaker, joined with such graces of style and 
utterance as shall draw our attention to what he says .•t Because it is 
the art of persuasion, eloquence demands that the speaker consider 11man 
as a creature moved by many diff erent springs. and must act upon them 
all," addres sing himself to the passions as well a s to the understanding. 
There are three kinds of eloquence: that which aims only at pleasing,. 
for example, the panegyric; that which also intends to inform, instruch, 
and convince, the eloquence of the bar; . that which interests and agitates 
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the audience, carrying them along and resolving them to act, the elo-
quence of the popular assembly. This l ast is always 11the offspring of 
passion,n which rouses and kindles the mind and makes it "infinitely 
more enlightened, more penetrating, more vi gorous and mast erly, than it 
i s in its calm moments. 11 This me ans that the orator must be a man of 
strong feeling. 
We may be gin our i nquiry by trac i ng t he history of eloquence, which, 
flourishing most in free states, finds its firs t and brightest ara in an-
cient Greece. Among the most celebrated of Grecian orators are Demos-
thanes and Pericle-s, both of whom are renowned f or t he strength and sim-
plicity of their discourse. The former in par t i cular saved the eloquence 
of Oreese at a time when an' affected and flori d rhetoric was the custom, 
his discourse being vehement, f nn'"Ill, manly, gravtJ, and noble--"the admirable 
and masterly force of masculine eloquence," Roman eloquence derives, like 
its poetry and learni~, f r om the Greeks, and consequently we find in 
• Greek production "more native genius; in the Roman more regularity and 
art • 11 Cicero shows us the greatest qualities of eloquence, being always· 
s onerous, regular; "rolling words along with the greatest beauty and 
pomp11 ; he is very exact and careful, full and flowing. Sometimes he is 
too pr one to at t end to magDifi cance at the ex~ens e of strength--this is 
his primar y fault. In comp~~ng Demosthenes and Cicero we can only con-
elude thll.t human genius cannot achieve perfect i on and that each is su-
prem.e in his way--Demosthenes in strength and vigour, Cicero in smoothness 
and ornament--finally perhaps giving the palm to Demosthenes because he 
would still be able to wway any audience. After Cicero, Roman eloquence 
decayed into fantastic ornament displayed in part in t he writings of 
Seneca; then t he rise of Chris t ianity brought about the eloquence bfl 
the . church Fathers, which is best exemplified by St. Chrysostom. Elo-
quence in modern times has not been cultivated as it was by the ancients, 
which see~ strange in France and Great Britain, count ries where the 
liberal art s have flourished and where there is utaste and erudition in 
a high de gree. 11 Part of the reason undoubtedly is in the increased study 
of correctnews in modern times, which has resulted in a lessening of the 
emphasis on the passions seen in the ancients. Further, both philoso-
phy, which has advanced "a certain strictness of' good sense, 11 particule.r-
ly in England, and our "natural phlegm and coldness 11 of t emper conduce to 
put us on our guard against oratoryl In the public assembly, at the bar, 
and in the pulpit the effects of this stress on reas oning are evident. 
Still, eloquence is a field wherein "much honour ;-is _/ yet to be reaped 
d h h b 1 d f th • t II ) • an w ere muc may e earne rom e anc~en s, ma c2ng s ome necessary 
adjustments to modern manners. 
. 
Modern eloquence may be considered as falling i nto that of the as-
sembly, the bar, and the pulpit--to all of which apply the rules cancer-
ning the conduct of a discourse in all its parts. We shall first, how-
ever, consider the distinct character of each of these manners of dis-
course, for such dis t inction is "the f oundation of what is called a 
just taste in that kind of speaking ." As for the oratory of the public 
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assembly: its object ought always to be persuasion~ which demands the sup-
port of sound reasoning; for "even the connnon people are better judges of 
argument and good sense~ than we sometimes think them, " and while flowery 
speaking may succeed a:Ile it will fail ten times • 11The foundation of all 
that be called eloquence is good sense and solid thought." Beyona this, 
other needed qualities are self-persuasion of the truth of the discourse, 
and order in its or~nization; although the discourse should not appear 
too formal or obviously prepared, it should be premedit ated. As for style~ 
' 
while eloquence in the popular assembly can be most vehement~ we should 
(1) suit the warmth to the occasion {2) never counterfeit warmth (3) not 
allow impeiuousi. ty to carry us too far (4) preserve re gard to "what the 
public ear will bear (5) attend to the decorums of time, place, and chara-
cter. The style whould also be "full~ free, and natural ," as well as firm 
and determined in speaking to "mdxed assemblies." In or der to illustrate 
these qualities at their best, there are appended s ome exteacts fram 
Demosthenes. 
For eloquence at the bar, soma differences must be noted, the first 
being t hat the great object here is not to persuade, but to convince; 
not to sway the feelings of the judges "to what is good or useful," but 
to show them what is just and true. Moreover, the ran~ of this species 
of eloquence is confined to the law and the statutes, and the auditors 
are the judges~ "persons generally ,,of age, gravity, and authority of 
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character. MOst important for a lawyer is knowledge of his profession 
and his case, but eloquence still is a necessity--the subject being dry 
11 
and "subtle"--"the eff ect of good speaking is always very great. It 
should be a source of satisfaction to the young advocate to realize that 
his advance in his profession is based ultimately on those qualities, for 
while preference might help some to get started, only merit will enable 
a lawyer to gain the top of his profession. The eloquence of the bar 
should~e, first, oalm and temperate; it should avoid verbosity, the result 
of composing in haste, a habit that should not be culti vated, though some-
times it cannot be avoided. Further, it should be dist inct, and the 
narration of facts as concise as their nature permits: some diffuseness 
may be allowable in explaining very obscure points of the law. The plea-
der should be wary of doing injustice to the arguments of the opposition, 
for that makes his hearers feel that he does not respect their intelli- · 
gence. "A proper degree of warmth in pleading a cause, is always of use, 11 
although the lawyer should not enter into every cause with equal warmth, 
lest his probity should be questioned. In order to illustrate the type 
of eloquence proper to the bar, there is given an analysis of Cicero's 
judicial oration in defense of Cluentiu~, this, h~;ever, with the warning 
that the modern advocate cannot expect to follow the method of Cicero in 
all respects, both the law and the customs being now much different. 
The next subject is the eloquence of the pulpit, first as to the 
advantages and disadvantages of this kind of speaking. The advantages 
are the dignity and importance of its subjects, such as aught to interest 
everyone and come home to everyone's heart; at the same time admitting 
of the highest embellishment and the greatest warmth, requiring no re-
plies, given without interruption, and prepared freely and at leisure. 
As for disadvantages, the preacher has subjects which are over-familiar 
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to all rnen1 subjects which have engrossed tongue and pen thousands of times 
before~ and which are for the most part abstract 1 lacking the personal ap-
proach of the public assembly. The requisites of good preaching demand 
f~rst that .the preacher be persuasive~ since the proper end of preaching 
is to lead men to be better, not merely to expound metaphysical truths. 
This in turn means that the preacher must be a good man1 since no one can 
persuade effectively who is not himself persuaded of 11 both the truth and 
the importance of those principles which he inculcates i n1. others; and not 
only ••• believe them speculatively# but have a lively and serious feeling 
:flor them." Distinguishing the eloquence of the pulpit from the other two 
types we have considered are its gravity and warmth--qua lities which it 
is hard to unite, the first tending to degenerate into dull solemnity, 
the second into lightness. Combined, however, these qualities are most 
powerful in affecting the human heart. Beyond them1 the preacher needs 
to choose subjects which are practical for his auditors; he needs to be 
careful for the unity of the sermon, building it around a single idea; he 
is well advised to light upon a specific phase of his topic; and he should 
not try to cover the whole general subject in one sermon. 
Lectures XXXI and XXXII are an extended consli.deration of the whole 
conduct of a discourse: first as the introduction1 the divi sion, narration, 
and explication. Each of these sections is considered as to its reasons 
and h~f it should be carried out: for example~ that the i ntroduction is 
11founded on nature and suggested !?y common sense," that it has the three 
ends mentioned by Cicero and Quintilian: "Reddere auditores benevoles, at-
tentos, dociles," and that there are five rules to be fol l owed in composing 
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it: (1) it should be planned after the substance of t he discourse has been 
meditated (2) it should be correct and simple in expression (3) it must 
be modest and not promise more than will be accomplished (4) it "should 
be carried on in a oil.lm manner" {5) it should "not ••• anti cipate a:ny material 
part of the subject." Or for another example: in the pat hetic part of the 
discourse, while the clas sical rhetorici ans have spent much eff ort in ela-
borating rules for it, it i s doubtful that "any philos ophical knowledge 
of the passions can confer this talent Lto sway the passio~ We must 
be indebted for it to nature, to a certain strong and happy sensibility 
of mind." 
Lecture XXXIII is concerned with the pronunciation and delivery of 
a 'discourse: the need for speaking with 11a due degree of loudness, distinc-
tness, slowness, and propriety of pronunciation," together with directions 
on each of these points; and the means of attaining n grace and force" 
through emphasis, pauses, tones, and gestures. The fina l advice in this 
matter is to let the manner of deli very "be your own; nei ther imitated 
from another, nor assumed upon some imaginary model, which i s unnatural 
to you." The f'ollmdng lecture provides various directions for improving 
in eloquence; for though it is founded in nature, it still must be cul-
tivated for its fullest powers to be realized. The need f or virtue--not 
of the cold or skepti cal kind, but warm for the good and i ndi gnant a-
gainst evil--is the most importamt to the true orator; and then come: a 
fund of' knowledge, that is, a liberal education; a habit of application 
and industry; attention to the best models; and frequent exercise both in 
composing and speaking. Beyond these, a study of the critics and rheto-
ricians such as Aristotle, Demetrius P.halersus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 
Cicero. and especially Quintilian. is exceedingly helpful. 
The last twelve lectures in the book constitute a unit which points 
out the principles of criticism relating to "the most distinguished kinds 
of composition. whether in prose or verse'\ the discussion relying on "good 
sense and reason" rather than on authority. First 1 however. come some general! 
observations on the comparative merits of the ancients and moderns to see 
non what foundation that deference rests which has so generally been paid 
to the ancients •" The concil:usion in general is that where high concepts. 
simplicity1 and fancy are concerned the ancients are ::superior; where art 1 
correctness. and the advance of knowledge are concerned, the moderns have 
the advantage. We must not push this too far 1 however 1 for Milton and 
Shakespeare are inferior to no poets in any age 11 in point of poetical · 
fire and original genius." Yet we are less energetic in our writing than 
the ancients 1 and we must look to them for mos·l:; of our e:xrunples of the 
highest excellences in wri ting--11wi thout a considerable acquaintance with 
/Jhei/ no man can be reckoned a polite scholar." Next c omes a consideration 
of historical writing--the need for objectivity and unit y. an acquaintance 
~~th human nature and with government, vividness, characterization, etc. 
After this all the other major kinds of writing--pastoral 1 ly.ric 1 and 
dramatic poetry; tr~~dy and comedy; and 11fictitious history" or the ro-
mances and the novel--are the subject of the discussion. The principles 
by which they are guided are examined and the ways in whi ch distinguished 
compositions illustrate the presence or neglect of these principles are 
instanced. /Jo avoid "undue prolixity" as Blair says 1 it seems well to 
summarize here one of these discussions as an example of the procedure and 
the general stand which Blair takes in cri tici~: The fourth type of 
poetry considered ~following a discussion of pastoral, lyricJ and didac-
ticJ is the descriptive, "where the gi ghest exerc i se of genius may be 
displayed." No poetry is descriptive alone, but descri ption enters into 
all kinds of poetry and 11possesses ••• a very considerabl e place." It is 
the greatest test of a poet's imagination and alv~ys disti nguishes an 
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original from a second-rate geni'\lS• ... The 11tr~ P.oet makes us imagine that 
we see ~the scen~ before our eyes ••• Thia happy talent is chiefly owing 
to a strong imagination, which first receives lively impressions of the 
object; and then, by employing a proper selection of cir cumstances in 
describing it, transmits that impression in its full force to the ima-
" gination of others. Good description demands that the poet select oir-
oumstances which are net vulgar and common, but new and ori ginalJ which 
11 partict1larize the object described, and mark it strongly . No description, 
that rests in generals, can be good. For we can conceive of nothing in 
the abstract; all distinct ideas are formed upon particul ars ." Good des-
cription also should employ uniform circumstances which a ll tend to a ggran-
dize or beautify the object, none of them detracting from it; and further, 
the best description is concise and simple. 
Mr. Thorns on's Seasons is perhaps the "largest and fullest" of pro-
fessedly descriptive compositions. Although the style may sometimes be 
harsh, on the whole Thomson is "a strong and beautiful describer; for he 
had a fee'Iing heart and a warm imagination." He knew nature and felt the 
impressions she made with strong sensibility, "and no person of taste can 
pursue any one of his Seasons, vdthout having the ideas and feelings, which 
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belong to that season, recalled and rendered present to his mind." Parnell's 
Hermit is also conspicuous throughout for beautiful descriptive narration. 
"But, of all the English poems in the descriptive style, the richest and 
most remarkable are, lialton' s Allegro and Penseroso. They have been "the 
storehouse whence many succeeding poets have enriched their description 
of similar subjectsu; and they illustrate all the qualities necessary for 
good description--they are particular, picturesque, nothing forced or ex-
aggerated, a simple style, and a collection of strong expressive images 
which are all of one class. Beyond this, they are concise, not resting 
"Long on one circumstance, 11 or using many words to describe it. This is 
an important desideratum in describing great and solemn objects, in the 
sublime and the pathetic, though "ga.y and smiling scenes" a.nw be more am-
plified. 
It also deserves attention ~hQt in describing the i nanimate the poet 
should include living beings to enliven his descriptionl: ~'!hioh otherwise 
would pall on the attention. This is well known to every painter 11who 
It 
is a master of his art and hardly any beautiful landscape has been 
drawn without human figures in it. A second important consideration is 
that mEverything in description should be as marked and as particular 
as possible, in order to imprint on the mind a distinct s.nd complete image." 
Most ancient ~Titers are well aware of this, excellent examples being 
at hand in the Bible,Homer, and Virgil. Among the moderns Milton and 
Ossian are notable for this quality, and Shakespeare "cannot be c>Olfti tted 
on this occasion, as singularly eminent for painting ~~th the pencil of 
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nature.11 
"Much of the beauty of descriptive poetry depends upon a right choice 
of epithets" which should not 11be brought in merely t o complete the verse 
or make the rhyme answeJJ11 but should 11ei ther add a new idea to the word 
which it qualifies or at least serve· to raise and hei ghten its known sig-
nification." "Sometimes it is in the power of a poet of genius by one well-
chosen epithet to paint a whole scene to the fancy ••• We have reason always 
to distrust an author's descriptive talents when we fi nd him laborious and 
turgid, amassing commonplace epithets and general expressi ons~ to work up 
a high conception of some object of which after all, we can form but an 
indistinct idea. The best describers are simple and concise. They set 
before us such features of an object as, on the first vi~, strike and 
warm the fancy; they give us ideas which a statuary or a painter could lay 
hold of, and work after them; which is one of the strongest and most deci-
sive trials of real merit of description." 
LThere is no sum:·ntry ~r formal conclusion to the Lectures~ the one 
on English Comedy ending wit h observations on the evidence of progress 
in comedy which avoids the licentiousness which had characterized much 
of the comedy of the ancients and had stained the English stage. We 
may then conclude as inconclusively as Blair, and turn the next boo~ 
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The Philosophy of Rhetoric 
Campbell describes his purpose in the Preface, where he writes: "It 
is his L:the author'sJ purpose in this work, on the one hand, to exhibit, 
he does not say a correct map, but a tolerable sketch of the human mind; 
and, aided by the lights which the poet and the orator s o ~ply furnish, 
to disclose its secret movements, tracing its principa l channels of per-
ception and action, as near as possible, to their source; amd, on the 
other hand, f rom the science of human nature, to ascBr tai n, with greater 
precision, the radical principles of that art, whose object it is, by use 
of the language, to operate in the soul of the bearer, in the way of 
informing, convincing, pleasing, moving, or pel'su§,ding. 11 Two extremes 
which are to be shunned are "too much abstraction in investi gating causes 11 
and "too much lllinuteness in specifying effects"; the author trusts that 
he has generally avoided both. 
The work proper is divided into three books: the f irst, ttthe nature 
and foundations of eloquencett; the second, "the foundat ions and essential 
properties of eloquence"; the third, "the discril!linating properties of' 
eloquence." Book I is the most general and philosophical, the other two 
books decending to particulars--the second taking up such matters as good 
usage, grannn.atical purity, and perspicuity; the third, such matters 
as the types of rhetorical tropes, the offences against brevity in tauto-
logy and pleonasm, and the different kinds of sentences . The work is, 
then, an establishment of philosophical principles relating to rhetoric, 
followed by an application of those princ-iples to various specific rheto-
rical matters. This basic logical structure is overlaid, however, with 
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some verdigris resulting probably from the lengthy period during which 
the author worked over the material: some ten years between 1750-1760. 
He includes some essays which could be called fugitive but which are 
thought to be rather 11 illustrations or confirmations or some parts of 
the work, than as essential to it," notable Chapters III, VI, and X of 
Bk. I. Nevertheless, the general architecture is quite apparent. 
The Introduction to the whole scheme begins with a consideration 
of the relation betiveen art (which is . defined as the practice of know-
ledge) and science (the theory of knowledge) in which it is shown that 
science alivays leads to 11 some practical skill and is completed in it" 
and that "there is, by consequence, a natural relation between the 
sciences and the arts, like that which subsists between the parent and 
the offspring." The practitioner of an art may, of course, be unacquainted 
with the principles, but we cannot expect improvements in the art from 
him. Moreover, the rules by which nearly all ·such practitioners are 
guided depend basically on the principles, through a knoivledge of which 
the rules may in turn be deduced. There are, of course, different de-
grees of dependence in different arts, but in any art we are able to ap-
ply our knowledge most profitably and to determine 11 beforehand, with 
sufficient certainty, the success of every new application," when we 
have the -principles mastered. By ascending from particulars to general 
principles we avoid being either empirics who go entirely by practice, 
or visionaries, who argue from principles which have "no foundation in 
nature. 11 
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The arts are connnonly divided into the useful, and the polite, 
fine, or elegant, although some arts, like eloquence and architecture, 
are considered as mixed. The elegant, like the usef ul, are founded in 
experience, but probably arose later in history, necessity first giving 
rise to the useful. But though the elegant arts arose later, they 
reached perfection more quickly--where the English are greatly ad-
vanced over the ancients in navigation and shipbuilding, in the fine 
arts there seems to be no presumption that the moderns will ever excel, 
or even equal the ancients. The "purely elegant arts" such as poetry, 
"as their end is attained by acconnnodation to some internal taste, so 
the springs by which alone they can be regulated must be sought for in 
the nature of the human mind." This is also true of some useful arts, 
like logic; but of all arts none has 11 so close a connexion with all the 
faculties and powers of the mind as eloquence," which "in all its exer-
tions ••• requires the aid of the imagination" and which is manifestly a 
useful art as well. Though proficiency may be attained in it by one 
who unites a clear apprehension, sensibility, readiness of imagination, 
and a certain readiness of words, a thorough study of its basic prin-
ciples as it affects the auditors will aid the speaker; first, by showing 
him faults to avoid, and secend by suggesting "the proper mediUrn.s where-
by the necessary aids of topics, arguments, illustrations, and motives 
may be precured." 
There are four steps in improving and directing the rhetorical art: 
the speaker can, first of all, better understand what operates on the 
minds of others "from the consciousness of what operates .on his own mind, 
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aided by the sympathetic feelings," and his practical experience of 
mankind; next, he can observe and discriminate (or analyze and cata-
logue ) the different ways in which orators have attempted to affect men; 
then he can compare the success, or want of it, of t hose attempts ac-
cording to the circumstances in which they have been used; last he can 
"canvass those principles in our nature to which the various attempts 
are adapted" and by which their success is accounted for. The first 
step provides the critic with the materials; the second classifies 
them; the third provides the rules of composition; and the fourth 
gives us a knowledge of human nature that ''adds both weight and evi-
dence" to all the preceding. Considerable progress has already been 
made in the first three; in fact, it appears that t he observations and 
rules of such men as Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian have in no wa.y 
been advanced by modern critics, but have merely been "put into a modish 
dress and new arrangement." The fourth, holrever, brings us "into a new 
country, of which, though there have been some successful incursions oc-
9asionally made upon its frontiers, we are not yet in f ull possession." 
The farthest advance seems to have been in the Elements of Criticism; 
but the subject of 11 the learned and ingenious author " of that treatise 
is so multifarious, treating all the arts in their aspect as objects of 
taste, that he could not scrutinize each of them nar rowly enough to at-
tain a perfect knowledge. The Elements, while more various, have a less 
extensive subject than the one here proposed, for el oquence is there treated 
only as a fine art, an object of taste, where here i t is also taken into 
consideration as a useful art in its connections wit h the understanding 
and the will. 
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Finally, in this introduction it may be observed that the objec-
tions that criticism can afford no direction to art are specious, inas-
much as it is apparent that the rules of criticism are derived from the 
practice of art and consequently are applicable to the art: "From ob-
serving similar, but different attempts and experiments, and from co~ 
paring their effects, general remarks are made, which serve as so many 
rules for directing future practice; and from comparing such general re-
marks together, others still more general are produced." "It is evident, 
t herefore, that the artist and the critic are reciprocally subservient 
Li.e. performing a servic~ and the particular province of each is 
greatly improved by the assistance of the other." 
Chapter I of Book I defines eloquence "in its l argest acceptation" 
as "that art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end, 11 
(Quintilian) and then exhibits the general forms of eloquence with their 
different objects, ends, and characters. The ends of all eloquences are 
four: to enlighten the understanding, to please the imagination, to move 
the passions, or to influence the will. Although t hese may be mixed, 
one of them is always primary, the others serving t o assist the primary 
end; and we estimate their propriety or impropriety according to the ef-
fectiveness lrith which they serve that end. For instance, a discourse 
addressed to the understanding can use aid from the imagination, but not 
the boldest and most exciting figures of speech, whereas an harangue 
framed to influence an assembly "needs greatly the assistance both of 
intellect and imagination." A discourse addressed t o the understanding 
may have either information or conviction as its immediate object, the 
former demanding perspictdty as its predominant quality, the latter, 
argument. "The imagination is addressed by exhibiting to it a lively 
and beautiful representation of a suitable object"; therefore the merit 
284. 
of eloquence designed to appeal to the imagination consists in the dig-
nity of subject and manner, and the exactness of its resemblance. It 
attains its highest perfection in the sublime, which "distends the 
imagination with some vast conception and quite ravish [eiJ the soul." 
In the third type of eloquence the fancy has a still greater role in 
hurrying the hearers on 11 ere they are aware, into love, pity, grief, 
terror, desire, aversion, fury, or hatred, 11 resulting in what is called 
the pathetic. The last kind is an 11 artful mixture of that which pro-
poses to convince the judgment and that which interests the passions,'' 
thus combining the argumentative and the pathetic into the vehement, 
11 lroich bears down every obstacle and procures the speaker an irresist-
ible power over the thoughts and purposes of his audience. 11 
This first chapter concludes with the observation that we should 
distinguish carefully between the sublime and the vehement which are 
frequently confused; 11 in matters of criticism, as in the abstract 
sciences, it is of the utmost consequence to ascertain with precision, 
the meanings of words, and as nearly as the genius of the language in 
which one \'~rites will permit, to make them correspond to the boundaries 
assigned by Nature to the things signified." To be sure, the sublime 
(that is the representation of such objects as distend the imagination) 
and the vehement are often combined, and "It is only then that the orator 
can be said to fight with weapons which are at once sharp, massive, and 
refulgent ••• 11 
Chapter II considers in three sections 11 another genus of oratoryn 
which is in many ways similar to eloquence in general but is suited to 
light and trivial subjects--the oratory of wit, humor, and ridicule. 
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Lft is here that Campbell goes off on a lengthy tangent which seriously 
obscures his central purpose.J Wit has as its design to "excite in the 
mind an agreeable surprise, and that arising, not from anything marvel-
lous in the subject, but solely from the imagery she employs, or the 
strange assemblage of related ideas present to the mind. 11 It achieves 
this purpose in three ways: by debasing things seemingly grave, by 
aggrandizing things frivolous, and by setting ordinary objects in an 
nnconnnon view·: wit is an ''enchantress jjhiJ exults in reconciling con-
tradictions." Wit requires novelty above all, for nothing is more 
I 
tasteless than a stale joke. It differs also from the graver sort of 
oratory in its different effect on the hearer: where wit diverts, beauty 
charms, and sublimity elevates. To these general observations are 
appended examples of the various kinds of '\ri.t drawn from such writers as 
Butler, Pope, Phillips, and Yeung. 
HumBr and ridicule are then taken up, humor being shmm. as an analo-
gue to the pathetic in more serious oratory: 11when the emotion is either 
not violent or not durable, and the motive not anything real, but imagi-
nary ••• or when the passion displays itself preposter ously, so as rather 
to obstruct than to promote its aim" amusement and contempt are the .re-
sult, contempt being the passi on which humor addresses. Ridicule con-
sists of arousing laughter for t he purpose of persuading opinion, and 
is similar to the vehement in serious eloquence: 11Those things which 
principally come under its lash are awkwardness, foppery, pedantry, 
and affectation of every kind." The distinction bet ween the light 
vices which ridicule attacks and the serious vices of vehement 
eloquence has given rise to the difference between t he mock-epic and 
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the epic, tragedy or comedy, and the tlvo types of satire such as can be 
seen in Juvenal and Horace. Another difference betw·een ridicule and 
the vehement is in the use of argument, for where the l atter may proclaim 
its aims and methods, t he former conducts its reasoning in disguise if 
at all. 
The next chapter defends the observations concerning laughter made 
previously in contrast to the theory of laughter advanced by Hobbes and 
commonly held by many people. It is Shown that Hobbes' theory is defi-
cient particularly in its disregard for many facts about laughter. 
Chapter IV takes up the relation which eloquence bears to logic and 
grammar preparatory to a lengthy discussion of the f unction of logic 
in eloquence. It is stated that the sense and the expr ession are the 
soul and the body of discourse, and that rhetoric "holds of the sense 
by logic, of the expression by gramnar." The sole and ultimate end 
of logic is the eviction of truth, "which is equally one important end 
of eloquence. 11 There is one important difference: in eloquence not 
only the subject is in regard, but also the speaker and the hearers. 
But beyond this: 11If it is the business of logic to evince the truth, 
to convince an auditory, which is the province of el oquence, is but a 
particular application of the logician's art. 11 We must therefore ac-
quaint ourselves with t he various aspects of logic in order to master 
eloquence. Grammar, on the other hand, is a more particular matter, 
standing in somewhat the rel ation to oratory as does t he art of the 
mason to that of the architect. 
The consideration of logic takes the form of an analysis of the 
different kinds of evidence and an attack on the scholastic art of 
syllogizing, which Campbell describes as a method of losing ourselves 
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11 in clouds of words of our own raising. 11 The various sorts of evidence 
are discussed in two major sections: one concerned with "intuitive evi-
dence," which includes mathematical axioms, consciousness, and common 
sense. The second holds a rather important place because of the con-
clusions drawn from it. The reasoning is to this effect: Every man is 
perfectly sure of his own existence and that he feel s, thinks, sees, 
hears, and the like. Hence he is absolutely certali1 in regard to the 
reality of his sensations and passions, and of everything ·whose essence 
. consists in being perceived. This assurance extends beyond the truth 
of original feelings to the jud~ents formed by the mind on comparing 
these with one another. Thus the judgments we daily and hourly form 
concerning resemblances or disparities in visible objects, or size in 
things tangible; where the odds is considerable, dar ker or lighter tints 
in colours, stronger or weaker tastes or smells, are all self-evident 
and discoverable at once. It is from this principle that, in regard to 
ourselves, we judge infallibly concerning the feelings, whether pleasant 
or painful, which we derive from what are called the internal senses, 
and pronounce concerning beauty or deformity, harmony or discord, the 
elegant and ridiculous. All of these principles of evidence are "natu-
ral, original, and unaccountable." 
Of deductive evidence, there are two principal divisions, the second 
in turn being analyzed into subdivisions. The first general division is 
that of scientific evidence, comprehended in purely intellectual handling 
of general ideas, such as geometrical demonstration. The second is that 
of moral evidence, which deals lvith more specific things, is admissible 
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of degrees of truth, can find room for contrariety of proofs giving rise 
to probabilities, and is usually complicated instead of simple; and 
which, moreover, is of the widest importance in hunk~ affairs. Under 
this general principles of moral evidence is included experience (in-
duction from particulars and classification), analo&.,ry, testimony, and 
the calculation of chance. 
Chapter VII once again takes up matters more pertinent to eloquence 
proper, discussing nthe consideration which the speaker ought to have of 
the hearers, as men in general.'' There are certain principles in our 
nature, which "when properly addressed and managed, give no inconsider-
able aid to reason in promoting belief." .Among these principles are 
the understanding, imagination, memory, and the passions. The first 
. of these is assumed to be universal, any lack in the understanding 
being due to men in particular; the second is, however, a principle 
which may be approached in different ways and for different purposes. 
In particular, addressing the imagination results in increasing the at-
-
tention of the hearers and pleases them by pointing out resemblances, 
and in this way it reinforces the argument. It is naturally necessary 
to address the memory; for while not a separate principle it subserves 
the rest. Most essential of all is the consideration of men as endowed 
•vith pa,ssions, for without an appeal to the feelings of men the orator 
has not accomplished any practical end; " ••• passion is the mover to 
action, reason is the guide. Good is the object of the will, truth is 
the object of the understanding." The circumstances operative upon the 
passions are probability, plausibility, prorimi.ty of time, conne.xion of 
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place, relation of the actors or sufferers to the hearers or speakers, 
interest of the hearers or speakers in the consequences. As an example 
of how these circumstances are employed, we might consider the fourth: 
whatever is close to the hearers in time, whether i n the past or the 
future will be more affecting to them and therefore orators tru{e care 
to make it clear that their tale is not old or that the action pre-
dicted. will be soon forthcoming. Important to this whole matter is the 
need for calming an unfavorable passion, which may be done either by 
annihilating it through showing that the narration on which it rests is 
false or the prediction for the future is incredible, or by diminishing 
the "object which raised it," or by exciting "some other passion which 
may counterwork it. 11 
The next chapter analyzes the 11 consideration which the speaker 
ought to have of the hearers, as such men in particular": the differ-
ences between audiences both in intellectual and moral attainments is 
very great--a speech "may be clearly intelligible to a House of ColiDllons, 
which would appear as if spoken in an unknown tongue to a conventicle 
of enthusiasts." The following chapter concerns "the consideration 
which the speru{er ought to have of himself": the principle of sympathy 
being most important to the establiShment of belief and whatever tends 
to werucen that principle being most necessary to avoid, the hearers must 
have a good opinion of the speaker 1 s intellectual and moral character, 
especially the latter, for we are more inclined to trust the words of a 
man of "weak understanding but of distinguished probity, than •••• a man 
of the best understanding who is of a profligate life. 11 But of all the 
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prejudices with which the speru{er has to contend, party spirit is the 
worst, and he must strive to mollify the hearers and insinuate himself 
in t heir f avor in order to get any hearing from them. 
Chapter X considers at length the differences between the oratory 
of the pulpit, the bar, and the senate, as it affect s t he speaker (the 
degree of probity expected of each, for example), t he audience (the 
difficulties of addressing an audience very mixed as to age and station, 
such as confronts the preacher, for example), the subject, the occasion, 
and the end in view. This last is shown to by very important, since the 
objective of the preacher is to infuse Christianity, "to subdue the spirit 
of faction, and that monster of spiritual pride with which it is invariably 
accompanied; to inspire equity, moderation, and charity into men's senti-
ments and conduct with regard to others. 11 
Chapter XI considers 11 the causes of that pleasure which we receive 
from objects or representations that exci te pity and other painful feel-
ings, 11 this being one of the important aspects of t he pathetic which 
is in tt~n one of the most effective instruments of the orator. The 
various theories advanced by other thinkers are discussed: t he first 
is that of the Abbe DuBos--the mind is averse to any absence of the 
passions and seeks avidly any excitement offered, the stronger the better, 
whether disagreeable in itself or not-the w·eakness in this being that 
real-life tragedies do not arouse pleasant feelings . Similarly, the 
theories of Fontenelle--pleasure and pain are close together and there 
is such a thing as a 11 soft and agreeable sorro~'; of Hume--that art 
gives a new direction to pain, seizes the painful f eelings and g ives 
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them a new tincture, "the soul being at the same time roused by passion· 
and charmed by eloquence, feels on the whole a strong movement which is 
altogether delightful"; of Hobbes and his latter-day followers-that 
we enjoy the fiction of distress because we care only for ourselves and 
are pleased to know that we can escape from this distress at any moment--
each of these theories is analyzed and its weaknesses shown. Then the 
author advances his hypothesis to the general point t hat pity is a gen-
uine emotion, call it smypathy or benevolence perhaps, and that it gives 
us pleasure by affording occupation "to the thoughts which agreeably 
arouses them." 
Book II is entitled 11The Foundations and Essential Properties of 
Elocution. 11 It begins with the nature and the characters of the use 
which gives law to language. Language is a ser ies of conventional sym-
bols and granmar is a methodizing of those conventi ons; 11 exceptions11 to 
rules, if they are in constant usage, have same standing as the rules. 
The only fixed principle is that use, or the custom of speaking, is the 
sole standard of style and that t he "latter comprehends the former" with 
something added; the final appeal is not to the grammarian but to usage. 
Then arises the question as to what is "reputable use": the conclusion 
is that it is the language used by the great number, if not the majority, 
of celebrated authors (not necessarily great authors, but celebrated). 
It must be national as opposed to provincial or foreign: for t his latter 
too many foreign words appear to be an affectation of the learned. It 
must be suited to the present day: 11 I should not think it prudent often 
to introduce words or phrases of which no examples could be produced 
since the days of Spenser and of Shakespeare." 
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The Canons of good use are: (1) When use is divided and one term 
is susceptible of more than one meaning, the univocal ·expression should 
be preferred (2) In doubtful cases regard ought to be had in our deci-
sions to the analogy of the language (3) When the t erms or expressions 
are in other respects equal, that ought to be prefer red which is most 
agreeable to the ear (4) \Vhen 'none of the foregoing apply, simplicity 
should determine (5) When none of these apply, "conformity to ancient 
usage" is the criterion (6) All words and phrases which are remarkably 
harsh and unharmonious and not absolutely necessary &1ould be eliminated 
(7) 'Vhen etymology plainly points to a signification different from that 
which the word commonly bears, the \'lord should not be used ( 8) Obsolete 
words or those used only as part of another expression (2r dint £!, for 
example) are better given up (9) "Idiomatic" expressions containing 
grammatical solecisms (viz. a river's emptying itself) are to be de-
leted. 
After the discussion, with examples, of these canons, the next 
subject is that of grammati cal purity and the three principal offenses 
against it: the 11 barbarismn or word entirely obsolete, entirely new, or 
or new formations and compositions from simple and primitive words; the 
solecism, which is damaging in proportion as it stands in the way of the 
author's purpose rather than for its offenses against grammatical laws; 
the impropriety, or inaccuracy in the precise meanin,g of a lrord or 
phrase (arrant ;..errant, property-propriety). Each of these is discussed 
with a wealth of examples taken from the ttbest writ ers" to show that such 
faults are not to be found only among the uninformed. In the following 
chapter we are warned, however, against too great a scrupulosity in 
applying these principles, for there are some anomalies in English 
which do not admit of explanation or logical correction. 
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Beyond purity in style, there are other qualities which are equally 
necessary to excellence: perspicuity, vivacity, elegance, animation, and 
nmsic. The first is always important; although the speaker may not al-
ways wish to use vivacity, he must always speak so as to be understood. 
Obscurity, the first way in which perspicuity may be violated, may come 
from: (1) Defect-too much ellipsis, or omissions, and missing antece-
dents, for example (2) Bad arrangement--misplaced modifiers (3) Using 
the same word in different senses (4) Faulty refer ence (5) Artificial 
sentence structure (6) Technical terms (7) Long sentences. The second 
violation comes from the double meaning, which is a result of (1) Equivo-
cation, through error rather than intent--for example, this use of ~: 
"The reformation of Luther" (2) Ambiguity--from faulty construction. 
The third violation is the "unintelligible," from (1) Confusion of 
thought (2) Affectation of excellence--using remote and heterogeneous 
figures, bombast (3) ivant of meaning: where all seems simple until we 
stop to think about it: found in four styles--the "puerile," the 
"learned," the 11 profound," and the 11marvelous. 11 
Chapter VII of Book II discusses the reasons why this last viola-
tion, or nonsense, so frequently goes undetected by writer and reader; 
and is in effect a semantic analysis. Berkeley, Hume, Burke have all 
advanced the idea the words do not always evoke t he ideas for which 
they stand, but have not endeavored to explain the matt er further. To 
do so, it is necessary to analyze the connections among things, between 
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words and things, among words and other words. The first is seen to 
be natural and in the order of nature, giving rise to various combina-
tions of ideas and abstractions; the second connecti on is an artificial 
one, but has much the same effect as the first through the associative 
process; the third is the connection in the minds of those who speak a 
language, and is consequent on the fact that the words are employed as 
signs of connected or related things. Now, as ideas which are associa-
ted call each other up, so do the signs, psychologi cally,- 11 hence the 
sounds considered as signs will be conceived to have a connexion anal-
ogous to th at which subsisteth among the things signified. 11 This habit 
or tendency is "strengthened by the frequent use of language and the 
structure of it." 
The application of this principle shows us three kinds of writing 
wherein we are apt to be deceived: (1) Where there is an exuberance of 
metaphor, that is, where the author talks in metaphor, or t he signs 
of t he signs of his thought (2) Wherein the most frequent terms denote 
things of a complex nature and to which the mind is not familiarized--
i.e. government , church,-words in which t he writer may slip, unaware, 
from one meaning to another (3) tYherein the words are "abstract and of 
very extensive signification, 11 as those of some r eligious believers, or 
the logic of schoolmen. 
The next chapter is a discussion of the "extensive usefulness of 
perspicuity," first; as to when obscurity is apposite, if ever. Al-
though it may be t hought that persuading to evil might call for ob-
scurity or sophistry, perspicuity is necessary even there; for the ora-
tor who is on t he wrong side, is wrong in matter of degree in accord 
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with the character of moral evidence, rather than completely wrong, 
and he therefore will usually have real evidence to insist on and 
present clearly. Sophistry and obscurity are convenient for the ora-
tor who is trying to refute clear and· convincing arguments and who cares 
only for victory rather than truth. The third kind of violation against 
perspicuity is most useful to this kind of orator, ho\rever--where what 
is said appears meaningful but is really unintelligi ble. This can be 
seen most forcibly in such a subject as 11mystical theology11 like that 
of jacob Behmen. 
Sometimes a dash of obscurity may sometimes be found needful, as 
in matters requiring delicacy of address, in praise or censure wilich 
wishes to avoid flattery or abuse. It may also be necessary in alle-
gories, parables, apologues, and enigmas, where two meanings are pre-
sented; but obscurity in style is hardly good here: the parables of 
the Gospel are models of clarity and simplicity. Another place where 
obscurity is permissible, or perhaps necessary, is in "prophetical 
\'ll'iting. 11 It may be objected that too much perspicuity is boresome, 
but this is not true if the writer really has something to say and if 
the readers are intelligent enough to distinguish between the speaker 
who seems clear because he is saying nothing and the perspicuity that 
comes from design. 
Book m takes up "the discriminating properties of elocution," 
first as to vivacity as depending on the choice of words, vivacity 
being one of the important appeals to the imagination. The first ob-
servation is that proper {concrete) terms greatly assist vivacity. For 
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examples we can see how the Bible, Homer, Milton, all use the 
precise and special epithet to convey a lively picture. Whatever 
11 tends to subject the things spoken of to the notice of our senses, es-
pecially of our eyes, greatly enlivens the expression." The second lvay 
of achieving this quality is through the use of "rhetorical tropes." 
In using these, it is in general advisable to avoid new figures with 
the exception of metaphors: we are accustomed to read ~ for ships, 
but not poops, and we are a\'lare of the difference between brute and 
beast as applied to people. ' It is also dangerous t o use new metaphors 
too freely; while they have the greatest vivacity when new, there is 
also the greatest risk of offending. It is to be noted that many of the 
terms we use w·ere originally metaphors but have lost this function: 
when language was in its formative s~ages, there was reason for making 
new metaphors; but in these later tunes, there is l i ttle need, and 
people look on new metaphors not \vith indifference: if they are not 
beauties, they are blemishes. 
Another topic which is considered is that of t he different tropes 
which conduce to vivacity. The first is the less f or the more general, 
or autonomasia, such as a Solomon for a wise man or a Croesus for a 
rich one. The second is when the most interesting circumstance is 
distinguished as in synechdoche and metonomy: 11 all hands employed" 
although to say "one of the hands fell overboard11 is an example of 
"the contemptible cant of particular professions." Other types of 
this figure are making the concrete abstract: 11my Impudence,n and 
substituting the passion for the object: 11my love ~" A third trope 
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is using things sensible for things intelligible; a~l terms for spiri-
tual and intellectual things are of this sort: 11 burning with zeal, 11 
11 crmm11 for royalty, 11 sword11 for military, etc. The fourth trope dis-
cussed substitutes the animate for the inanimate: 11 brainchild .for liter-
ary work, a "learned age, 11 the ''thirsty ground." 
Next are considered the tropes which are destructive to vivacity: 
the synechdoche and metonomy wherein the genus is used for the species, 
matter for instrument or the intelligible for the sensible. We use 
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these because lre desire a variety of expression; because we wish to in-
sinuate contempt; or because we have a desire for brevity. Another trope 
of this sort which is used to veil the disagreeable or the indecent, is 
~he euphemism; properly not a trope but rather an application of others, 
this can be carried so far that there is no connection because the word 
used as a euphemism in turn becomes inelegant and another is adopted, 
and so on. Still another trope which is harmful to vivacity is the 
catachresis, wherein words are used which are close to the usual, but 
not the expected: a big genius, or wherein there are far-fetched meta-
phors: 11 a face melodious to the eye.n The final observation on this 
head is that in general tropes are from original principles of the human 
mind and consequently are "the same, upon the ~' in all nations, bar-
barous and civilized; that the simplest and most ancient tongues most 
abound with them, the natural effect of improvement in science and lan-
guage, which commonly go together, being to regulate the fancy and re-
strain the passions; that the sole business of art in this subject is to 
range the several tropes and _figures into classes, to distinguish them 
by names, and to trace the principles in the mind which gave them 
birth." 
The next section discusses words considered as sound, first as 
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to what are articulate sounds capable of imitating and in what degree. 
They come closest in things audible; in the descript ion of the tempest 
and the sea or anything sonorous, although even here the imitation is 
very faint, the sounds of words not being the same as natural sounds. 
Time and motion can be imitated to some degree through the use o f 
long and short syllables, this appearing particularly in verse. Other 
imitations that can be handled with greater or less success are those 
for vibration, intermission, inequality; difficulty and ease; the 
agreeable and disagreeable. It is also possible to get such effects 
by the use of certain letters, the liquids, the nasals, and the gutter-
als. 
The. question which this brings up is 11 In what esteem ought we to 
hold this kind of beautyf11 The answer is that a good deal of it is in 
the reader's fancy rather than in the work; for inst ance, if it is not 
in the work, we never miss it, and when it is present 1ve frequently do 
not notice it. It is like a jewel to be used as an adornment, but not 
as part of the dress and 11It ought ••• to give place t o the other vir-
tues and ornaments of elocution and not they to i t . " 
Next is discussed vivacity as depending on the number of words. 
The solution is that the fewer the better. Pope is supreme at this: 
"Of all our English poets, none hath more successful ly studied concise-
ness or rendered it more conducive to vivacity. 11 This quality may be 
achieved, however, at the expense of other values; yet sometimes 
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propriety may be felicitously violate. If we were to reduce the work 
of Shakespeare to grammatical correctness, we would destroy much of 
his vivacity. But at the same time, perspicuity cannot be success-
fully violated: 11W'ithout perspicuity, w·ords are not signs-they are 
empty sounds ••• " Good examples of this combination of perspicuity 
\dth vivacity--the a~1oristic style--are Swift and Montesquieu. 
The principal offences against brevity are tautology, pleonasm, 
and verbosity. The first is a very conunon fault, t o be found in the 
best writers. Examples are given from Swift and Addison. It can be 
objected with justice that there are circumstances where this is ad-
missible: where an obscure term precedes a clearer term and is explained 
by the latter and where the language of passion is used. Pleonasm does 
not repeat the sense as does tautology, but it adds nothing to it: "They 
returned back again to the ~ city from whence they came." It some-
times is seen in certain single words such as selfsame and foursguare, 
but in poetry such usage is occasionally permissible. The third of-
fence against a vivid conciseness is verbosity: circlmlocutions, epi-
thets, asseverations. The one place in which this style is proper is 
in the paraphrase where the design of the writer is to be as verbose as 
possible: this is a bad kind of writing anyway. 
The final treatment of vivacity is on its dependence on the ar-
rangement of words. Although the classical languages have great advan-
tages in this, English has some resources which may be taken into account. 
In simple sentences, for inst&lce, inversion can add much to vivacity. 
,.,e are led to believe that the word order \ve follow is "natural, 11 but it 
would be better to call it customary because in the simplest languages, 
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such as Hebrew, the order is connnonly verb, subject, predicate-saying 
first what is most important. \ve might say of this "Nearest the heart, 
nearest the mouth," and in support we might notice that in all languages 
whenever vivacity is desired this order is found. Various examples of 
this are drawn from t he Bible in particular, showing the ways in which 
transpositions aid vivacity. It becomes evident that the transposed 
order is the natural one to vivid expression and that "to render the 
artificial or conventional arrangement, as it were, sacred and inviolable ••• 
as a trespass against the laws of composition in the language, is one 
of the most effectual ways of stinting the powers of elocution, and 
even of damping the vigour both of imagination and of passion. 11 
Complex sentences are not so conducive to vivacity as are the 
simpl e, The relatives and conjunctions used are harmful to force, be-
cause as i n nature cause and effect is conceived rather than perceived 
by the senses, so should the construction of sentences suggest relations 
rather than pointing them out: the first mW{eS for vivacity, the second 
for declamation. The use of t he periodic sentence, suited to the writer, 
the historian, the philosopher, is helpful to vivacity ; the loose sen-
. 
tence is more suited to the speaker, am the essayist, but is apt to 
languish. One way of making the periodic sentence more vivid is to 
made use of antithesis. In some cases the objection of artificiality 
may well be brought against this arrangement; in others such elaborate 
diction is more called for. The antithesis should not, ho1-rever, call 
attention to itself. It is well suited to persuasi on and is found in . 
the enthymeme and the dilennna of the orator, but it seems particularly 
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adapted to the drawing of characters where the delineation of the boun-
daries of a character is too delicate a matter for 11 the most copious 
and expressive language." The only style where antithesis is excluded 
is the pathetic, but it can be abused, like any other figure: 11 The 
only original qualities of style which are excluded from no part of 
a performance, nay which ought, on the contrary, to pervade the whole, 
are purity and perspicuity. The others are suited merely to particu-
lar subjects and occasions ••• In the art of cookery the spiceries lrl1ich 
give the highest relish must be used the most sparingly." 
The next chapter discusses the connectives employed in combining 
the parts of a sentence, this discussion framed to assist us in fur-
ther forming judgments of works under our review and to aid in regu-
lating our practice in composing. First, as to conjunctions: they 
should be as inconspicuous as the pegs and tacks in a cabinet, "which 
seems more cohesively complete the less we see them." As taste im-
proves, the tendency is toward using monosyllabic conjunctions; be-
cause, with most of our verbs and nouns being monosyllables, cumbersome 
conjunctions appear the more so in comparison. This is not sufficient 
reason to do as some critics would have us do, and eliminate entirely 
some old forms like therebYJ therewith, and whereunto in favor of double 
conjunctions like ~ which. This idea is the 
exaggerated regard for everything French, even when it is a deformity: 
the " ••• penury of the French language hath, in t he way of which I am 
speaking, been hurtful to English. 11 
302 . 
Similarly, other connectives--the relatives, auxiliaries, and 
pronouns--are discussed in the light of the improvements which taste 
.. 
has produced in shortening old forms to make for greater perspicuity 
and force. The proper use of the preposition with the relative and 
the correctness of separating it is analyzed according to the canon 
of good use, the conclusion being that, in places wh~re it is awkward 
to connect the preposition closely, custom has no decree that the 
union should not be broken. Further, in some uses an unexceptionable 
usage according to grammar may be much less animated than the usage 
which custom has brought about. "But to what purpose, I pray, those 
criticisms which serve only to narrow our range, where there would be 
no danger of a trespass though we were indulged with more liberty? 
Is it that the genius of our language doth not sufficiently cramp us 
without .these additional restraints? But it is the unhappiness of the 
generality of critics, that when two modes of expressing the same thing 
come under their consideration, of which one appears to them preferable, 
the other is condemned as gross, as what ought to be reprobated in every 
instance. 11 
Elements of Criticism: 
The work begins with a brief analysis of t he ps.ychology of the 
aesthetic experience and the values attached to the aesthetic sense. 
The primary observation is that nothing external is perceived till 
it makes an impression on the organs of sense. There is, however, a 
great deal of difference in our knowledge of this impression: we are 
a\;are of it in touch, taste, and smell, but not in hearing and seeing. 
The pleasures of the l atter t\Yo occupy a "middle rank" between the 
organic and intellectual pleasures and in some ways are superior: 
they are more long-lasting than the organic and les s fatiguing than 
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the intellectual. We rise from organic pleasures t o t hose of the eye 
and ear, thus moving toward the pleasures solely of t he mind, so that 
taste in the pleasures of the eye and ear is a quality which lve should 
strive to improve. The moral sense and taste in t he arts are very 
closely allied--both discover \Yhat is right and wrong; t hey are aff ected 
by fashion, temper, and education; they are univer sal, rooted in human 
nature, and governed by principles conmon to all men. 11The design of 
the present undertaking, which aspires not to morality, is, to examine 
the sensitive branch of human nature, to trace t he objects that are 
naturally agreeable, as well as those that are naturally disagreeable, 
and by these means to discover, if we can, lihat are the genuine prin-
ciples of the fine arts." The critic must go still farther and dis-
criminate the lofty, the low, the proper, the improper, etc. 11 Hence 
a foundation for reasoning upon the taste of any individual, and for 
passing sentence upon i t. Where it is conformable t o principles, we 
can pronounce with certainty that it is correct; ot herwise, that it 
is incorrect, and perhaps whimsical. Thus the fine arts, like morals, 
become a rational science; and like morals, may be cultivated to a 
high degree of refinement. 11 
The advantages of criticism thus studied are: that we redouble 
our pleasure in them; that, through the practice in reasoning we get, 
we are better prepared to deal with abstract subjects; that the heart 
is improved no less t han the understanding; that t he social affections 
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are strengthened; and, most important, that morality is greatly supported. 
"A just relish of what is beautiful, proper, elegant, and ornamented, 
in writing or painting, in architecture or gardening, is a fi.Ile pre-
paration for the just relish of these qualities in character and be-
havior." 
This sort of criticism is opposed to the rule of authority, 
designed as it is to unfold the rational principles which guide the 
fine arts. It is not the intention here to "compose a regular treatise 
upon each of these arts, but only, in general, to exhibit their fun-
damental principles, dr awn from human nature, the true source of criti-
cism." The plan is tlto ascend gradually to principles, from facts and 
experiments; instead of beginning with the former, handled abstractly, 
and descending to the l atter." In the critical part of the work, the 
object is "to censure works, not men." 
The beginning of the inquiry proper discusses t he train of per-
ceptions and ideas which continually flows through the mind. tve have 
some power to control this train by rejecting some i deas and accepting 
others, but we cannot dissolve the order completely. Minds that lack 
fine discernment (like the Hostess in Henry _!!, Pt. 2) have a great 
flow of ideas; whereas in minds of accurate judgment, slight rela-
tions have no power to introduce ideas and consequently there cannot 
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be such a great flow. We can see this illustrated in the fact that wit 
(the power of seeing relations) is seldom combined lvith judgment (the 
power to distinguish difference). 
There is an order in the train, such as the t endency to perceive 
the principal rather than subordinate or accessory subjects, or the 
tendency for the mind to descend with a river and ascend with flame 
and smoke. In history we go from cause to effect, in the sciences 
from effect to cause. All this is important in the pleasure we re-
ceive from the arts, f or "Every work of art that is conformable to 
the natural course of our ideas is so far agreeable; and every work 
of art that reverses t hat course, is so far disagreeable. Hence it 
is required ••• that its parts be orderly arranged and mutually connected, 
bearing each of them a relation to the whole." Regularity is a restraint 
on a bold imagination; and even in the greatest artists we see defects 
in regularity, for example, in Virgil's Georgics and his description 
of Fame in the Aeneid. We accept such irregularity in a description 
of nature where mere contiguity is often the only order, but not in 
metaphors based on nature. 
The discussion next comes to the emotions and passions, and their 
connection with the fine arts, 11with the view chiefly to ascertain what 
powers the fine arts" have to raise emotions and passions. This is one 
of the best uses of criticism, for it opens up to us the "sensitive 
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part" of man's nature. First, the causes of the emotions and passions 
are unfolded; we love what is agreeable and hate what is disagreeable. 
This is evident in the way in which a gently-flowing river and a tower-
ing hill are pleasant, where a barren heath or a dirty marsh are dis-
agreeable. Similarly, we are pleased with some int ernal properties--
sympathy, benevolence, courage--and displeased with their opposites. 
These emotions may also be recalled to us by memory. A further ob-
servation is that some of these emotions are not f ollowed by any de-
sire, while others are--these last are distinguished by the name of 
passions. The cause of a passion is quite simply 11 that person or 
thing which, by raising desire, converts an emotion into a passion." 
This person or thing is called the object of the passion in respect 
to its power to arouse action. Some passions are social and others 
selfish; still others are instinctive and can be termed neither sel-
fish nor social; while many are a mixture or depend on the surrounding 
circumstances. Because all desires, however, are most intense when 
directed to a rational being as the object, only those so directed can 
be properly denominated passions. 
Because most of the foregoing is based on t he connection of the 
passions lrith sight, there is added a short section on the influence 
of sounds on the passions: the great influence of speech and music in 
particular. 
When a passion is gratified, the pleasure we get is termed an 
emotion and is highest in the 11 removal of any violent distress of mind 
or body." Why this should be is somewhat puzzling, but is answered by 
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the constitution of our nature--contrast heightens the gratification 
of our desire. A very singular feeling, but nevertheless very impor-
tant, is to be noted in these connections. It may be called the ~ 
pathetic emotion of virtue, "for it is raised in t he spectator, or in 
a reader, by virtuous actions of every kind, and by no others." This 
emotion readily finds objects, and through its exercise, contributes 
to virtue. 
The relations by \roich things are connected have a great influence 
on the emotions and passions, for "the mind, gliding sweetly and easily 
through related objects, carries along the agreeable properties it meets 
'\nth in i ts passage and bestows them on the object •• • 'J lve can see this 
in many instances, were the character of a hero i s extended even to 
his defects, or the bad qualities of an enemy are "spread upon all 
his connections." We may call these secondary emotions. In s:>me cases, 
impelled by desire, they may swell to the point where they rival the 
pr~nary passions; for example, if we lil~e a person we may extend that 
feeling to his son or wife, finding them as worthy as the original 
object. The natural order of descent and ascent reinforces these and 
the primary passions as well: usually a man's feeling for his children 
is stronger than for his parents, it being easier to descend t o the 
children than to ascend to the parent. Finally it is to be observed 
that "a passion paves the way to others similar in their tone whether 
. 
directed to the same or to a different object." 
We next come to the emotions and passions aroused by fiction, and 
their causes. It may first be noted that there are differences between 
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the memory of a past event as an image in all its vivid detail, and 
ordinary vague recollections. It explains the intensity of our 
feelings in such circumstances, for we conceive "every instance as 
passing in [Oui} presence, 11 precisely as if w·e were eye-witnesses. 
It is only by this means that our passions are excited by fictional 
representations, and it is found most intensely in the representations 
of the theatre. But it is also necessary in writing where we would 
not expect it to be--for example, in history which pretends "to en-
gage our belief.u 
This theory has many interesting consequences in criticism, one 
of which, for example, is that in an epic poem whi ch pretends to "copy 
human manners and actions" there nmst be no incident 11 contrary to the 
order and course of nature." For a further instance, epic "machinery" 
is inadmissible because the interference of gods and goddesses is not 
conformable to nature. The final cause of this phenomenon, which may 
be called ideal presence, that is, the existence of an idea as if it 
w·ere immediately present in reality, is to be found in the wisdom of 
the Creator who formed us so that we may derive improvement from fable 
no less than from genuine history. 
Next there is a discussion of the agreeableness and the disagree-
ableness of emotions, based on their conformity to the order of nature. 
The agreeable and disagreeable differ from the pleasant and painful ac-
cording to this last principle, for a painful emotion aroused by an 
action conformable to nature (such as a brutal act performed by a 
brutal person) should not be disagreeable; "and t he painful emotions 
of grief and pity are agreeable, and applauded by all .the world." 
Another way of determining the agreeable and disagreeable is that: 
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"If the desire be to perform a right action in order to produce a 
good effect, the passion is agreeable," and visa versa. Now there 
are many degrees and modifications of the pleasant and painful, 
agreeable and disagreeable; and an ability to distinguish among them 
is known as delicacy of m· 
To avoid undue prolixity we may say that ti1e remaining sections 
of this chapter further analyze the emotions and passions. The third 
section discusses the growth and decay of the passions--for example, 
that a passion is produced in perfection 'ivhen nature requires it to 
be sudden, that passions sudden in their growth are equally quick in 
their decay, that a passion founded on an original propensity (e.g. 
pride) lasts forever, and that "every passion ceases upon attaining 
its ultimate end." The fourth section is concerned with "coexistent 
emotions and passions11 --how similar emotions readily combine into one 
complex emotion, while different emotions cannot combine, and how there 
are various degrees of this combining. There is, further, a "pleasure 
of concord" when emotions are joined. With dissimilar emotions we see 
a rapid alternation from one to another, as in Othello's soliloquy be-
fore killing Desdemona. The fifth section discusses the influence of 
passion with respect to our perceptions, opinions, and belief: how it 
is true that love is blind, ho\V" ideas suited to our tone of mind are 
readily suggested by slight connections, whereas contrary ideas are 
hard to find--a process of rationalization. F'art VI shows that many 
emotions have a resemblance to their causes--a sluggish motion causes 
a languid feeling, a large object swells the heart , a leaning pillar 
produces a tottering feeling, etc. Part VII di s<~usses the "final 
causes of the more frequent emotions and passiom111-to the effect that 
they are "by nature modelled and tempered with pe!rfect wisdom, for 
the good of society as well as for private good. For example, some 
objects attract us and are agreeable-a"large tree, a well-dressed 
fellow, a rich field of grain"-while others-"a rotten carcase," 
or a dirty marsh-are repulsive. This is all for our benefit. With 
regard to people we see the same thing. When we see someone in dis-
tress, our natural emotions of pain combine with natural behavior to 
produce sympathy, so that we may aid the unfortunate. 
The third chapter is an analysis of beauty as part of "a more 
narrow inspection of Lthe emotion!J as serve to unfold the principles 
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of the fine arts." This is part of the inquiry into "such attributes, 
relations, and circumstances, as in the fine arts are cheifly to raise 
agreeable emotions," beginning with the attributes of single objects, 
then proceeding to relations among objects, finally arriving at "prac-
tical rules for the fine arts, derived from principles previously estab-
lished.11 
In its proper signif ication beauty is a property of objects of 
sight. All beautiful objects "maintain one common character, that of 
sweetness and gaiety." There are two kinds of beaut y-intrinsic and 
relative (founded on the relations of objects~ The first is an object 
of sense merely, the second of understanding and reflection. Intrinsic 
beauty is, however, complex, consisting, for example, in color, figure, 
and motion, each of which can be further analyzed. Figure gives us 
the matters of regularity, simplicity, uniformity, proportion, and 
order. Simplicity is needful for beauty of figure because the mind 
does not absorb a multiplicity of objects all cro·wding in on it. 
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There follows a discussion of the beauty of figurt;l according to these 
principles--for example, that a circle is more beautiful than a square 
because of the circle' s greater simplicity. 
Chapter VII discusses grandeur and sublimity--" great and elevated 
objects considered with the relation to the emotic•ns produced by them, 
are termed grand and sublime" respectively. Grandeur is the result of 
a combination of magnitude with beauty. Regularity and proportion con-
tribute to grandeur, but in passing for the small to the great, we are 
satisfied wi. th proportionately less of these qualities--lie do not mind 
irregularities in a Gothic church or an epic poem 'which would seriously 
detract from a lesser building or poem. Sublimity combines elevation 
with beauty. By an extension of these ideas, taken f rom the world of 
nature, into the fine arts, lve see that works that raise or expand the 
mind are termed sublime. Some of the requisites fclr this quality are: 
that it is most effective when we can comprehend i t all at one view, 
when the principal circumstance is put in the strongest light; that 
nothing low or trivial may be admitted; and that it: should not be 
overstrained. It should avoid both the minute and the abstract, and 
it is most effective when conveyed by reiterated i.m~ressions. A "hum-
bling image" is very damaging to it, for our minds fall the more heavily 
from an elevated state. A series of examples of t he "false sublime" or 
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bombast is next given from Johnson {jonsoiJ , Dryden, and Beaumont and 
Fletcher. 
Following this discussion comes an analysis of mot ion and force 
in relation to taste. Motion is shown to be agreeable, and rest in-
different; motion is most agreeable "when it corr ·esponds with the 
course of our perceptions"--quick motion is agree.abl e until it ac-
celerates the course of our perceptions; and slmv motion is painful 
because it retards the course of perceptions. Re~ ar motion is more 
agreeable than irregular, and uniform acceleration t han is retardation; 
upward motion and t hat in curved lines are very agreeable. Motion and 
force combine to furnish us with very pleasant feelings. 
Novelty is another means of arousing pleasant emotions; the emotion 
so raised is termed wonder, which is different fro1 admiration in that 
the first is directed to an object, the second to an agent or the person 
who "performs anything wonderful. 11 Surprise differs fr om wonder in 
that unexpectedness rather than newness is the cause . I t is difficult 
to say whether these emotions are generally pleasant or painful, be-
cause frequently novelty may produce terror rather than pleasure. The 
effect of surprise is simply 11 to swell the emotion raised by ["a:iJ ob-
ject." The usual course of the train of perceptions is broken and the 
mind is consequently disturbed. There are various <degrees of novelty 
from t he lowest--when objects are surveyed a second t i me after a long 
interval; through the middle rank, where we have hear d of the objects 
at second hand; to the highest, where the objects ~~e like nothing we 
know even by analogy. The final cause of both thestl emotions is in 
11 designing wisdom." 
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In similar fashion to the above discussions, the various elements which 
enter into taste are analyzed in their several aspects, according to causes,. 
the pleasures which they arouse, the effective means of handling them, and 
defects in this handling which may be seen in different writers. Chapter 
VIII takes up resemblance and dissimilitude--how comparisons and contrasts 
affect us, how they can inflame the passions, and how they must have neither 
too close or too remote a resemblane. It is also shown that in the fine 
arts a succession of contrasts, as in the alternation of the comic and the 
serious in Shakespeare, is frequently advisable. Chapter IX concerns uni-
formity and variety, discussed according to their rela.tions with the train 
of perceptional for e~ple, in different temperaments or in different ~ 
circumstances, the train of perceptions may be either uniform or varied: 
in some cases the percipient may vary his train a great deal, in others 
he has little or no power over the ideas. Other instances of these obser-
vations on uniformity and variety are that either in excess is painful, 
and that a train of idea is most pleasant when it has a certain degree 
of velocity and variety--a good example of this is in the train of ideas 
in a revery. The conclusion, in respect to the fine arts, is that we re-
lish uniformity and variety which is in accordance with the natural train 
of our perceptions. There is also an appendix to this chapter in which 
is discus.sed the works of nature in respect to uniformi ty and variety--
the evidence of the vnsdom of God in the creation. 
Chapter X analyzes congruity and propriety; Chapter XI, dignity 
and grace; and Chapter XII, ridicule. Each of these is defined, analyzed, 
and related to representative works of literature, with critical comments 
as to the degree of success which is shown. Other discussions in this 
portion of the work are on wit (analyzed in consider able detail) and on 
custom and habit. The two following chapters take up the emotions and 
passions a gain, this time as to their external signs and the sentiments 
by which they are expressed. The external signs ar e shown to be both 
involuntary and voluntary, and lasting or temporary i n accordance with 
their formation and habitude; they form a "universal l anguage" under-
stood by all men in all times, and are "upon the whole, the best inter-
preters of the heart~; they produce various effects upon the spectator; 
for instance, some passions are "attractive" (we are drawn to them), 
while others are 11repulei ve ." The conclusion of this chapter is that 
the external signs are evidences of the divine wisdom in the way they 
conduce to social i ntercourse, sympathy, and morality . 
The treatment of the sentiments is more directly concerned ~~th 
the fine arts, for a sentiment is a "thought prompted by passion.u A 
sentiment is, then, the manifestation of passion as i t is affected by 
personality--it is therefore necessary that the artist (poet or dramatist) 
be able to adjust a passion "to the character, the sentiments to the 
passion, and the language to the sentiments." This requires genius to 
assume the character of many different people without detect and without 
falling into cold and florid declamation as so many writers do. Examples 
of the proper and of the improper expression of sentiments are culled 
from several writers, showing such errors as "sentirn.ents too artificial 
for a serious p1 ssion11 or description rather than true sentiments, or 
"sentiments introduced too early or too late." 
In connection with this subject Chapter XVII discusses the language 
of passion: for example, that immoderate passions, whether rage or grief, 
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are mute whereas moderate passions are loquacious. It is essential that 
the words by which the passions are expressed by in hannony with the 
ideas. This does not exclude figurative expressiou, but it does mean 
that the figures must be adjusted to the kind of f eeling--in depression 
or an guish the passions speak plain. In 11active and hurrying IR ssions" 
the words should be short; with melancholy, on the other hand, the words 
should be of many syllables. Shakespeare is the supr eme master of de-
lineating the passions. We may see in other writers such errors as ex-
pressing the passion in an even flow of words without i nterruption, 
elevating the langua ge above the tone of the sentiment , or using language 
11too li ght and airy f or a severe passion, 11 but not in Shakespeare. 
The very extensive eighteenth chapter is an elabor ate analysis of 
beauty of language, according to the following order : first, "those 
beauties of language that arise from sound," then those according to 
signification, then the "singular beauties of language that are derived 
from a resemblance between sound and signification." The beauties of 
verse are handled in a last section, since verse has many "peculiar 
beauties" not found in prose. We might follow through s ome of the high-
lights of this last section in order to see the procedur e followed in 
this chapter: First, the distinction between verse and prose is laid 
down, it being concluded that the difference lies i n the greater degree 
of melody (tone, rhythm) found in most verse, plus the fact that verse 
is "subjected to certain inflexible laws." Next, in order to prevent 
too complex an extension of the analysis of the kinds of verse, the laws 
that apply to classical hexameters and to French and English heroic verse 
are examined• It is premised that there are five i mpor t ant elements to 
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all kinds of verse: the number of sylla. bles composing a line; the 
different lengths of the syllables; the arrangement of syllables com-
bined in words; pauses; and tone . Then the speci.fic rules under these 
five headings that govern hexameter and heroic v~rse are examined: 
for example, that a hexameter line has a length 11 equi valent to the time 
taken in pronouncing ~velve long syllables or twent y-four short; or 
that the heroic line has a "capital pause" after t he fourth., f ifth., sixth., 
or seventh syllable. These pauses make for difft3rent kinds of lines., 
according to the way the mind is affected; and c ombined 1rvith the pauses 
at the end of the lines, they produce such eff ect s a s boldness and 
liveliness for the first type, solemnity and gravity for the third, 
and tenderness and me lane holy for the second. WEt can see examples 
how this works out in various poets., Pope being probably the best, 
the ace uracy of' his ear in adjusting the melody to the sense. For 
of 
for 
all 
the eimplicity of English heroic verse, it is capabl e of highly mel-
odious effects and shows an admirab le mixture of uni f orm.i ty and variety 
rivaling the "most perfect species known in Greece or Rome." Blank 
verse is superior to rhyme in t his, because it a llows a better wedding 
of the sound and the sense, curtailed as it is only by the need of 
putting the final pause at the end of a line. It also has greater op-
portunity for inversion, which is one of the best means of giving "force 
and elevation" to language. Anyone wh o is acquainted with Paradise Lost 
is assured of these f acts, for 11at every turn the richest melody as well 
as the sublimest sentiments are conspicuous." Bl ank verse has the most 
extensive melody of any of these forms and is the ef or e ruperior even to 
the classical hexameters. 
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Rhyme is next considered in order to determine its 11 peculiar beauties" 
which have made it universa l ly popular, an indi c ation that it must appeal 
to universal human nature. Its principal function is to raise the mind, 
to produce 11 an emotion moderately gay without di gnity or elevation." 
It is not suited to grand or lofty subjects, and no poet has succeeded 
in writing a poem in rhyme that "sustains a tine el evated much ab ove 
the melody." It ct~,n, however, raise a low subject to i ts own elevati on 
and prevent prosiness; yet it should be noted tr~t . a poem like the 
Essa;y ~ l'lan vrould have be en better in prose. I t s province is 'sportive 
love., mirth, gayety., humor, and ridicule." Although barbarous a ge s 
have extended its limits to all other kinds of writing, it is to be 
hoped that the i mprovement of taste will eventus.lly confine it to its 
proper limits." This account concludes with a 11list of the different 
poetic feet with their names: thirty-four being named and defined. 
Chapter XIX considers comparisons. They s~Jrve two purposes: to 
instruct when they are addressed to the understanding, and to please 
when addressed to the heart. Objects of differE'tnt s ense cannot be 
compared, and the chief :means of comparison in -vrri t i ng i s in objects of 
signt: 11the ideas of sight are more distinct and l :lvely than those of 
any other sense." As bas been pointed out above (Ch . VIII) comparisons 
are inef£ective when they are too close or too remot e. Examples are 
given of both these faults, and of comparisons whi ch are happy in their 
delicacy and accuracy--several being taken from Os s i an. Comparisons may 
bring pleasure in different ways: first, by an unusua l resemblance such 
as "Sweet are the uses of Adversity Which like the toad, u gly and venomous 
Wears yet a precious jewel in her head. 11 Second, by placing an object 
in a strong point of view: 11 Let concealment like a worm i' the bud, etc." 
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or 11Life 's but a walking shadow," etc. Third, by associating the subject 
with others that are agreeable; Milton has a pecu .. i ar talent for this. 
Fourth, by aggrandizing or el~vating the subject-- a characteristic of the 
sublime. Fifth, be lessening the disagreeable. : omparisons are shown 
to appropriate when there is an animating passion that disposes us to 
see resemblances, but not when everyday aff airs a:·a being treated, when 
the resemblance is too faint, or when an ela~ted subject is compared 
with a lmv one, etc. 
Chapted XX is concerned with figures of speellh, analyzed into 
seven classes, the first being personification. s with all figures 
the primary ·requisite is that there be animating J assion to carry this 
figure through successfully. We accept; such a ph: ·ase a s "the thirsty 
ground" only when the 11mind, e.gi tatad by certain tJ8.Ssi ons, is prone to 
bestow sensibility" upon inanimate objects. Ther· ' are two kinds of 
personification, however, the passionate, where f''r e. moment we are con-
vinced of the actual l i fe and intelligence of the object personified, 
and the descriptive, where such conviction is noi: attained. This latter 
is particularly common where abstract terms are p3rsonified. A further 
distinction in personification is made by separe.bing such a phrase as 
11thirsty ground11 or 11angry ocean" under another olass, called figures of 
speech, which does not carry confiction of realii:y- . Several rules for 
determining the propriety or impropriety of persc:nification are given: 
for example, that it should be confined to its p l ' ::>per province without 
giving rise to any other sentimenti and that low subjects ought not to 
be personified. Each of the other fi gures: apo11 trophe, hyperbole, 
fi gures in which the means is conceived to be th t: agent, fi gures in 
which tta:mong related objects" the properties of one ar e extended to the 
other, metaphor and alle gory, and "figures of speec :1," are analyzed in 
similar fashion to personification. There is also .l.ppended an analysis 
of the class called "figures of Speech" into two ta 'le s of thirteen and 
five subdivis i ons. Ten rules far using figures are s et forth, all based 
on the principle of relation and proportion. 
Qhapter LXI has as its subject narration and d. ,s cript ion. The 
first observation is that 11in history reflections c lght to be chaste 
and solid" because we are riot disposed to the imag:i. 1ation in factual 
accounts. An epic poem should have a modest beg;i..nr. Lng s ince it taken 
time to warm the reader. Where the subject is for mtertainment, things 
should be described as they appear, not as they re~J.L ly are. Objects 
ought to be painted so as to form distinct images j, J. the mind of the 
reader. All useless circumstances are to be suppr€,3sed and everything 
should conduce to complete the picture; it is some -t: i.n:es preferably to 
select the most important circumstances in order 11 i;J make a. sudden and 
strong impression." Drawing character is the mastEir-stroke of descrip-
tion. Tacitus excela in this, but Shakespeare out ·.Jes Tacitus in live-
liness, "some characteristical circtun.Stance being ~~ !!lnera.lly invented or 
laid hold or, which paints more to the life than w.1y words. n Extrava-
gance, contradiction, gratuitous explanation are a l l to be avoided in 
description; but, being addressed to the ima.ginatic1a, it 11is susceptible 
of th~ hi ghest ornaments that sounding words and f'i ?;Urative expressions 
can bestow upon it." Most important to descri ptior1 a r e considerations 
mentioned before: that the style should · suit the ~: Jbject ; ·that it should 
be uniform, neither leaping upll·•ard nor falling; a nd. that setting forth 
an image conveys description most effectively. 
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Chapter XXII covers epic and dramatic composi"l: Lon, both of which have 
the same end in view--instruction and amusement, a J:d employ the same means--
the imitation of human actions. The drama makes a deeper impression on us 
because it passes under our own observation. Both epic and drama may be 
patheito' desi gned to move the passio•s and to exrr.bit pictures of virtue 
and vice; in a.ddi tion they may be moral--designed t o illustrate some moral 
truth. '!'here are di f ference between them, however ,, and consequently each 
is fitted to perform some tasks better than the otl·er. Because dialogue 
is better qualified for expressing sentiments. the tender passions belong 
more to tragedy. Narrative being better for displHying facts, grand and 
heroic actions belong more to the epic. The rulin,; passion of tragedy is 
pity when the work is prima.rliy pathetic, and pity is most effectively 
aroused when a man of integrity falls into misfort·1: ne through an innocent 
act which he mistakenly believes is evil. A moral tragedy adds to this 
the passion of fear, for "when a. misfortune is the natural consequence o f 
some wrong bias in the temper" the spectator who f •!els the s ame bias in 
himself is filled with terror for himself. This, J:hen is the proper 
meaning of Aristotle in his analysis of these pass:: ons in tragedy. We may 
conclude our reasoning upon this subject by noting t hat Aristotle's four 
propositions about the subjects proper for tragedy are supported ~ 
reasoning . These, however, refer only to moral tr1: gedy; the pathetic is 
not "so narrowly oonfined. 11 
In both epic and drama the writer should try ·:o create the illusion 
of reality. This can b e done well by using histor;i ·, but should not 
contradict it and should not use history which is ·: oo rec ent. A final 
r ule for this part of the discussion is "that a.cti •: n, being the f'undamental 
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part of every composition whether e pic or dramatic~ t he sentiments and 
tone of the language ou ght to be subservient t o the a ction so as to 
a ppear natural, and proper for the occasion. The a : >plic at ion of this 
rule to our modern plays would reduce the bulk of t: tam t o a skeleton." 
For some further :particulars in this matter, it may be s a id that "epic 
machinery" is inadvisable because it damages the il us ion of reality 
and because virtuous emotions cannot be raised succ ts s ful ly "but by 
the actions of those who are endued with passions tnd af f ectations like 
our own." This is a defect even in great writers w1ose creed admitted 
the interposition of supernatural b eings in human ~~~fairs. It is much 
worse in writers like Boileau and Tasso. For epis <: i es, another character-
istic of the epic, they should not be introduced ~ : xcept in order 11to 
unbend the :rr.ind after the fati gue of a long narrat:. on~ 11 and should be 
lively and interesting~ short, and well connected 1' i t h the principal 
action. Similar observations are made upon the pe1: u l a.rities of the 
drama: the sub-plot should be interesting and wel : c onnected, and should 
occupy such moments as are the pauses in the princi pal; violent action 
ought never to be represented on the stage; the dir l ogue should be con-
ducted ao as "to be a true representation of naturn . " 
The next chapter is a discussion of the three uniti es, first as to 
the unity of action. This is seen to be needful : .n order for us to 
enjoy the spectacle of a be gi nning, mi ddle, and en·l: we see a person 
involved in some di f ficulty or with some problem, · l 6 watch the prosecu-
tion of a plan to compass a desired end, and we se 3 t he end in which the 
event is brought about and the plan accomplished. Ideally~ each scene 
in a drama should form a link in the connected actL on , and scenes which 
322. 
do not are therefore usually blemishes. Occasiona:J ly, they may b e ad-
missible for the beauty they add to the piece, but they should be used 
sparingl y because of their deviation from nature. Unity of place and 
time, on the other hand, are in modern practice duo simply to an "egre-
gious blunder" on the part of modern critics who hr:ve failed to take 
into account the differences bet-..veen the construct:i on of the Greek drama 
and the modern. Where there was a chorus continua:l l y present and no 
interruption in the representation, unity of place and time became a 
matter of necessity if the illusion were to be proc: uced; but in the 
modern drama with its division into acts it is qui-:e as easy to ima gine 
a change in place or time as it is to believe in t J: e f ab le in the first 
place. Some things are to be avoided: for example! , showing a character 
as a child in the beginning and as a grown person :later in the drama--
the principle here is that license in changing plac:e and time is always 
bad. The only realyproblem is whether or not the j: orm of the modern 
drama is better or worse than the anoient. It is concluded that only 
the continued presence of the choruses, preparing t he audience for what 
is to come and keeping their minds stimulated, is t he only principal 
advantage of the Greek drama, and that in general i:he observation of the 
unities of time and place amounted to a crippling J~ astriction on the 
Greek dramatist. A final observation is that in t J.: 9 individual act in 
the modern drama the unities should be observed in order to preserve the 
illusion and the force of the presentation. 
Chapter XXIV applies the rules of taste which have been hitherto 
established to gardening and architecture. It is r:; hown t hat gardening 
can be criticized as a fi ne art according to the wety-s in which it carries 
out the qualities of regularity , proportion, variei: y-, novelty, harmony, etc. 
Furthermore, such more particular observations are ~de as that, inasmuch 
as continual contrast sti mulates the mind, it is w~tll to have a ruin~d 
tower to be seen from a scene of gaiety. Or that, because t he mind is 
most stirred when it can take in the entire scene f l t one view, trees 
should be so distributed as to allow this and prevEtnt t he need of the 
eye's wandering over the scene. The gardens at VeJ'sailles are criticized 
severely for the execrable taste employed, which r \:ns counter to all the 
rules which have b een es·tablished by reason: for tlxample , in the foun-
tains where figures of r eal animals and fishes are shown "vomiting11 water. 
On the other hand, Chinese gardening is pointed oui: a s s howing the most 
exquisite taste completely in conformity to the pri nciples that govern 
all the f ine arts. Similarly, architecture is ana:lyzed and specific rules 
governing the various portions of its practice are applied. 
The final chapter in the book is an attempt t .: e stablish a definitive 
standard of taste. The first step in doing ~ is t o dispose of the notion 
that there can be no disputing about taste. While t his idea is true in 
some indifferent matters, such as in taste for fooc: s, in the fine arts it 
has long been recognized that there is good and bac: , ri ght and wrong taste. · 
With a universal propensity of this sort, there mw1t be a foundation in 
human nature to ace ount for it. We do know that t J: ere is a common human 
nature which is not only universal but also perfec·.l and right, so that all 
men ought to be made conformable to it. When ther ': e.re deviations from 
this standard of perfection, we feel pain. In mor:: ls there is such a 
standard (the moral sense), and it is not less trut! f or the fine arts. 
Yfuen we see a man apparently preferring that whi~h is univ ersally accounted 
wrong, we feel that he is deviating frcm the standr: r d . 1 e should, however, 
make a careful distinction betseen our individual t: ssessments of what we 
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prefer and dislike, and the universal. We are conv ne ed that there is 
this standard which operates in all matters of mome·lt , and in fact it is 
to tl1e standard we attribute our pleasure which we ;ake in those who share 
in our principles and op inions. Our disgust is arc 1sed, not by men differ- ~. 
ing with us, but by t h eir diff ering with what we j u. tge to be the common 
standard. The final conclusion is that it is the C: lmmon sense of mankind 
which affords us the test as to what ie; the true s t mdard of nature, but 
that those only who are favored \>rith an §CUte tast (t , reinforced by ed-
ucadon and experience, are qualified to be the arl:tl ters of the common 
sense oi' mankind. 
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The latter part of the eighteenth century is fertile ground for the 
study of the history of ideas, for it presents the student with the prob-
lems of an age of transition which is not so complicated by political, 
economic, or religious factors as to make general analyses virtually im-
possible. Scotland affords a particularly good area for this study of 
the transition from the charact eristic thinking of the neo-classical age 
to that of the romantic, for there we can find a large body of systematic 
thought produced by a homogeneous society. The members of this society 
who worked primarily in philosophy, economics, or history are well known, 
but there were also many men of lesser note but still of considerable ability, 
whose ideas can tell us much about the kind of thinking t hat went on at 
that time. ~lis dissertation investigates and analyzes the thought of 
three of these representative men: Hugh Blair (1718-1801 ) , Henry Home 
Lord Kames (1696-1782), and George C~bel1 (1719-1796). The specific 
focus is on literary criticism, for whiCh these men are pr incipally noted, 
and the analyses are concerned primarily with the one major work each man 
wrote in this field: · Blair's Lectures~ Rhetoric~ Belles Lettres, Kames' 
Elements ~ Criticism, and Campbell's Phi1osopSr ~Rhetoric. 
In order to carry out this :~ask of analyzing characteristic patterns 
of thought, and in order to indicate the impact of different factors on 
literary criticism, the writer of this dissertation has divided the study 
into three major sections: the social premise, the r a tional premise, and 
the critical premise. The firs t analyzes various aspects of the social 
milieu and assesses its general influence on the modes and quality of the 
critics 1thought. The second analyzes, first the general cl imate of opfni~ 
of the eighteenth century as it appears in the critics, and second, the 
psychology and methodology they used. This section is intended to show the 
1 . 
2 . 
purely intellectual and philosophical roots of their thought. The third 
section L~vestigates various critical concepts, both general and specific, 
and correlates these critical ideas with the findings of the first two 
sections. Throughout this process of analysis the emphasis is on discov-
ering significant patterns and modes of thought rather than on exhaustive 
treatment of any one aspect, such as psychology, or on l ist ing and cata-
loguing as many ideas as possible. The conclustion of the study is therefore 
a synthesis or deduction rather than a summation of findinga. 
T'.a.e "social premise" takes up first the lives of the critics. The 
careers of Blair and Campbell in the church and university, and Kames in 
the law are shown to be distinguished and active. All three belonged to 
~rhat ma¥ be called the literati, and led lives influential not only in their 
own circles, but abroad as well. We also see that their t raining and careers 
were essentially conservative so that they might be best described as "solid" 
thinkers rather than original or provocative. Another section is devoted 
to the friends and acquaintances they had; and it is seen that they all three 
moved in the most brilliant intellectual company, including such people as 
David Hume, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, and such others as Lady Hontagu, James 
Boswell, and Robeet Burns. Follo\ilng this we see them · in their clubs and 
societies, such as the Rankenian Club and the Select Society--groups formed 
to improve the cultural and intel lectual life of Scotland by mutual inter-
change of ideas. It is noted t hat this mutuality and cohesiveness accounts 
in part for the representative nature of the critics' thought. Next there 
is an investigation of their educational. and literary backgrounds, it being 
concluded that both their education and their reading was strongly classical, 
and, in the case of the reading, also neo-classical. Their train,·~ ; in the 
high school and the university was largely in Latin, philosophy, and t heology. 
Kames, who was trained as a l awyer through apprenticeship rather than in 
the university, is found to share the literary tastes and prejudices of his 
fellows to a large degree, with some natural divergences in taste. The final 
three sections of this Chapter consider the professional, social, and national 
attitudes of our critics. It is found that, for the !irst two, they were 
all members of an intellectual aristocracy that was at once conservative in 
temper and receptive to llberal notions--but certainly not to radical ones. 
This aristocracy demanded of its members a considerable degree of ability, 
but also complete assurance of great esteem for any sort of accomplishment. 
T here was a tendency towa1·d mutual admiration which the writer feels was 
due in great part to national self-consciousness that caused the Scots to 
exaggerate the productions of native genius at the same time they tried to 
emulate the culture of England and France. 
The third chapter, the "rational premise," takes up first the general 
climate of opinion of the eighteenth century. An analysi s of the philosoph-
ical assumptions in the critics• work indicates that they shared with most 
men of their century a belief that the universe is a great, harmonious 
machine so constructed by a benevolent creator that all parts of it conduce 
to the ultimate good of man. In particular, our critics show clearly that 
their opinions on such fundamental concepts as Nature, Uniformitarianism, 
and the W isdom of God in t he Creation are similar to the general position of 
their age. The first of this trinity of preconceptions is very influential 
in their thought: the ass~ions that Nature and man are so adjusted that 
3 . 
he must appreciate art, and that 11h1Jman nature" is subject to scientific 
investigation are complementary axioms on which most of their critical ideas 
are based. T he other two concepts are allied to this more general one, but 
they also have a specific function. T he assumption of Uniformitarianism--that 
human beings are al\ilcy'S and eTerywhere basically the same--gives the critics 
ground for basing aesthetic observations on their own i ntrospection. The 
belief that God has so made the world that every phase of it works for good 
is used to explain why we enjoy aesthetic experiences more than others of 
less virtue and reward. 
After considering these grand generalizations, the writer proceeds to 
a consideration of the psychology and the critical methods of our authors. 
Their psychology is in general empirical, but it is also seen that they 
make frequent assumptions not logically consonant with that psychology. In 
particular, all three of them depend on "original propensities" and "inter-
nal senses" to account for various phases of the aesthetic experience. This 
position is considered by the writer to be an evidence of the mixed modes 
of thought che~acteristic of a transition era. A similar situation is 
4. 
found to exist in regard to the methods which the critics use. Kames and 
Campbell are found to be:· very much convinced that they are following a 
scientific and inductive method, but it is shown that they frequently refuse 
to establish necessary evidence, and proceed deductively and rationalistically 
from assumed premises. This habit is also construed as an indication of a 
mixed mode--the coexistence of old and new methods which have not been in-
tegrated but are in a state of internal tension in the critics• thought. 
The next chapter, the "critical premise, 11 further investigates these 
mixed modes of thought. It elaborates the analysis by showing the presence 
of both social and intellectual pressures on critical notions. Because, 
however, such sampling of critical concepts and opinions could be extended 
indefinitely, certain significant ideas are selected and interpreted. One 
of the most important of these is Taste. It is shown that this idea is 
a compound of a belief in internal senses and the notion that education 
can improve appreciation and discrimination. The standard of taste for 
our critics is found to be affected by their social postion and is 
essentially aristocratic. The next example, the idea of the Sublime, shows 
I 
I 
how they were differently affected by new ideas. This is construed as an 
instance of mixed modes among them as a group: in his concept of the Sub-
lime the u.SuaJ.ly conservative Blair is much more 11 romantic 11 than Campbell 
who is in turn much more liberal on many other matters. Other topics 
similarly analyzed are the Imagination-shown to be very s t rongly influenced 
by unconscious pressures and to be an example of a complex mixed modef 
Rhetoric--a subject that indicates classical indebtedness; Shakespeare--quite 
differently appreciated by the critics: Kames here being the most liberal 
and Blair the most conservative ; and I4ilton-who suffers from neglect ex-
cept on the basis of his sublimity. 
The conclusion points out some contributions to the study of the 
history of ideas which ~ be deduced from the preceding i nvestigation. One 
of the most significant of these contributions is fel t to result from the 
method, which illustrates the need of considering both environmental and 
philosophical influences on literary criticism. Another important con-
tribution is the conclusion that mixed modes of thought must be considered 
as the normal manifestation of intellectual endeavor in a transition era. 
The investigation indicates that concentrating on modes of thought that 
are premonitory of the future or that look to the past can only result in 
a false perspective. The thinking of a transition period must be accepted 
as shO\'ling inconsistencies. 
It is pointed out that the dissertation also contr ibutes to our general 
knowledge about an important per iod and some influential men. Furthermore, 
by illustrating the typical t hinking of some representative minds, it helps 
us to understand how literary cr iticism is made, and ther eby adds some bit 
to our understanding how men think. 
A final section is devoted to a lengthy appendix which outlines and 
summarizes the Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, the Elements ~ 
Criticism, and the Philosophy~ Rhetoric. 
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church '"ork at the First Universalist Church in Melrose. Follo"ring grad-
uation in 1938 I received a. graduate assistantah!9at Boston University, 
where I was awarded the M. A. in 1939. ~~ thesis was a criDical consider-
ation of the modern short story. 1939 to 1940 w~s a period of unemploy-
ment, with some part-time work here and t here, principally as interviewer 
for the Gallup Poll. In February of 1941 I was empl oyed as an instructor 
in English at the Madison lviili tary Academy in Old Lyme, Conn. I worked 
there until February 1942, when I felt that I could do something more 
contributory to the war effort and left to work i n the General Electric 
Company, as a machinist. After seven months at this work I was inducted 
into the army. I had t hree and a half years of service as a personnel 
technician, all in the United States, and was discharg~.d . with the grade 
of Technical Sergeant in February 1946. I was married to Ethel Agnew of 
Brookline in June, 1945. After my discharge from the Army, I enrolled 
in Boston University Graduate School as a candidate for the doctorate, 
with the vie"r to college teaching. For the period from Febr..ta.ry, 1946 
to September, 1947 I completed my co1rrse requirements and worked as a 
part-time instructor at the College of Business Administration and in 
the Swnmer Session. In September, 1947 I was emp_oyed as a full-time 
instructor at the College of Liberal Arts, where I have been teaching 
Freshman Composition, and English and .American Li teratu.re. \'le have 
one child, Peter, who \'tas born in October, 1948, and live in f•1elrose • 
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